

Bodleian Libraries

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

This book is part of the collection held by the Bodleian Libraries and scanned by Google, Inc. for the Google Books Library Project.

For more information see:

http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/dbooks

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 UK: England & Wales (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0) licence.

CABINET EDITION

OF THE

ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

Publishing in Weekly Parts and Monthly Volumes.

The SECOND EDITION of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA will be handsomely printed in a series of CABINET VOLUMES in CROWN OCTAVO, on Long Primer type, in the style exhibited by the present volume.

The whole work will be THOROUGHLY REVISED, many NEW TREATISES will be added, and the articles will all be provided with comprehensive INDEXES, or with analytical TABLES OF CONTENTS.

It will be abundantly Illustrated by Maps, Wood-cuts, and Engravings.

It will be published in WEEKLY PARTS, PRICE ONE SHILLING, and in MONTHLY VOLUMES, varying in price according to the number of Parts contained in each.

The PLAN of the Work, the NAMES of the CONTRIBUTORS, and a detailed account of the CONTENTS, are given in a Prospectus, which may be had of all Booksellers.

The vast amount of original writing, of the highest class, in every department of literature and science, which is comprehended in the First Edition of this Encyclopædia, and the proved excellence of its methodical plan, will so greatly facilitate the preparation of the CABINET EDITION, that the Conductors trust to be enabled to issue the WEEKLY PARTS in uninterrupted succession,—correcting in the work, as they go on, what requires correction; retrenching what is superfluous; and supplying what is deficient; so as to bring the whole more strictly into accordance with Mr. COLERIDGE's great idea of the essentials of an Encyclopædia, and producing, if possible, a "SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE," more philosophical in its plan, more ably executed in its details, more convenient in size, and more economical in price, than any work of the kind that has ever hitherto been produced.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA,

Second Edition, Revised.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES ARE NEARLY READY:

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Comprehending UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR, or the Pure Science of Language, and GLOSSOLOGY, or the Historical Relations of Languages. By Sir JOHN STODDART, LL.D. Thoroughly Revised by the Author, and edited by WM. HAZLITT, ESQ.

LOGIC. By RICHARD WHATELY, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. With an Original Synopsis and an Index.

RHETORIC. By RICHARD WHATELY, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. With an Original Synopsis and an Index.

MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY. By the Rev. PROFESSOR MAURICE, Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn. Thoroughly Revised.

POLITICAL ECONOMY. By NASSAU WILLIAM SENIOR, ESQ.

SACRED HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY, from the Antediluvian Period to the Time of the Prophet Malachi. By the Rev. F. A. COX, D.D., LL.D., and other Contributors.

HISTORY OF THE JEWS, from the Time of Alexander the Great, to the Destruction of Jerusalem under Titus. By the Venerable ARCHDEACON HALE.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. In Three Divisions.

FIRST DIVISION.

THE RISE AND EARLY PROGRESS OF CHRISTIANITY. By SAMUEL HINDS, D.D., Bishop of Norwich. A new edition, revised. To which is added, A DISSERTATION ON MIRACLES. By the Rev. J. H. NEWMAN, B.D., Oriel College, Oxford.

SECOND DIVISION.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE MIDDLE AGES, comprehending a period of a Thousand Years; A. D. 100 to A. D. 1100. By the Rev. PROFESSOR JEREMIE, the Rev. R. GARNETT, and the Rev. Dr. CARWITHEN.

THIRD DIVISION.

THE REFORMATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES; A. D. 1100 to A. D. 1850. By the Rev. J. C. CROSSTHWAITE; the Rev. J. G. DOWLING; Dr. HAMPDEN, Bishop of Hereford; the Rev. A. LYALL; the Rev. J. E. RIDDLE; and the Rev. H. J. ROSE.

GREEK AND ROMAN LITERATURE. By Mr. Justice TALFOURD; Dr. BLOMFIELD, Bishop of London; the late Dr. ARNOLD of Rugby; the Rev. J. B. OTTLEY, M.A., late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford; and the Rev. HENRY THOMPSON, M.A., Senior Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.

GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY AND ART. By the Rev. J. W. BLAKESLEY; Dr. BLOMFIELD, Bishop of London; Professor BARLOW; Rev. Professor JEREMIE; W. LOWNDES, ESQ., M.A., Q.C.; Rev. J. H. NEWMAN, B.D.; Sir JOHN STODDART, LL.D.; Mr. Justice TALFOURD; and the Rev. Dr. WHEWELL, Master of Trinity College, Cambridge.

ARTICLES IN ACTIVE PREPARATION:—

GEOLOGY.	CHEMISTRY.	ARCHITECTURE.
BOTANY.	OPTICS.	STEAM ENGINE.

399 .c. 265
4

CABINET EDITION OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

ADVERTISEMENT.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

Second Edition, Revised.

ORDER OF PUBLICATION.

I. WEEKLY PARTS.

PART		
1.	METHOD. By S. T. Coleridge	Nov. 1
2.	UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. By Sir John Stoddart. Part I.	Nov. 3
3.	LOGIC. By Archbishop Whately. Part I.	Nov. 17
4.	LOGIC. By Archbishop Whately. Part II. (*conclusion*)	Nov. 24
5.	RHETORIC. By Archbishop Whately. Part I.	Dec. 1
6.	RHETORIC. By Archbishop Whately. Part II. (*conclusion*)	Dec. 8
7.	HISTORY OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY. By Bishop Hinds. Part I.	Dec. 15
8.	HISTORY OF THE JEWS. By Archdeacon Hale. Part I.	Dec. 22
9.	UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. By Sir John Stoddart. Part II.	Dec. 29
10.	HISTORY OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY. By Bishop Hinds. Part II.	Jan. 5
11.	HISTORY OF THE JEWS. By Archdeadon Hale. Part II.	Jan. 12
12.	MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY. By the Rev. Professor Maurice. Part I.	

II. MONTHLY VOLUMES.

VOL.		
1.	METHOD. By S. T. Coleridge	Nov. 1
2.	UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. By Sir John Stoddart	
3.	LOGIC. By Archbishop Whately	Dec. 1
4.	RHETORIC. By Archbishop Whately	
5.	HISTORY OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY. By Bishop Hinds	Jan. 1
6.	POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Nassau W. Senior, Esq.	Feb. 1
7.	MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY. By the Rev. Professor Maurice.	Mar. 1

Other Articles are in active Preparation.

53, BAKER STREET, PORTMAN SQUARE,

AND RICHARD GRIFFIN AND COMPANY, GLASGOW.

1849.



CABINET EDITION OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

PROSPECTUS.

JUST PUBLISHED, HANDSOMELY PRINTED IN CROWN OCTAVO,

COLERIDGE ON THE SCIENCE OF METHOD,

BEING PART I., PRICE ONE SHILLING,

(*To be continued in Weekly Parts and Monthly Volumes,*)

OF

A SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND CORRECTED

OF THE

ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA,

OR,

System of Universal Knowledge;

ON A METHODICAL PLAN,

PROJECTED BY SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

Φαίνεται οὔτε πέρας, οὔτε τελεύτην ἔχων· ὅτι πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη ἀεὶ φάινεται ἀρχὴ· μέτά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή· τὰ μὲν ἐλλείπειν, τὰ δὲ πλεοναζειν, θρύπτεσθαι δὲ, οἶμαι, κερματιζόμενον τὸ πᾶν ἀνάγκη· Οὐκοῦν δὴ φανῆναι καὶ ἁπτόμενα καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένα πάσας κινήσεις, καὶ ἑστῶτα πανταχῆ, καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ μηδετερα, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλά ἐστιν; ΠΛΑΤΩΝ· Παρμενιδης.

"The strength of all sciences, which consisteth in their harmony, each supporting the other, is, as the strength of the old man's faggot, in the band. FOR WERE IT NOT BETTER FOR A MAN IN A FAIR ROOM TO SET UP ONE GREAT LIGHT, OR BRANCHING CANDLESTICK OF LIGHTS, THAN TO GO ABOUT WITH A SMALL WATCH CANDLE INTO EVERY CORNER?"
BACON. *Advancement of Learning*, Book I.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY JOHN JOSEPH GRIFFIN AND COMPANY,
53, BAKER STREET, PORTMAN SQUARE,
AND RICHARD GRIFFIN AND COMPANY, GLASGOW.
1849.

PROSPECTUS.

1. An Encyclopædia is indispensable to every library, as a *concentration* of human knowledge; while to the voyager, the naval and military officer, the colonist, and that numerous class of enterprising Britons whose want of a settled residence may isolate them from the world of letters, it is the only possible *substitute* for all other books. Works of this description are therefore among those few literary projects which have uniformly secured the patronage of the public. The reason is obvious: an Encyclopædia is to the rising education of the country at once a reservoir and a fountain—it receives perpetual accessions of knowledge from the genius of the age, which it yields again in willing abundance to posterity.

2. With the ancients, the term Encyclopædia, explained itself. It was really *Instruction in a cycle, i. e.* the cycle of the seven liberal Arts and Sciences, that constituted the course of education for the higher class of citizens. Unfortunately, the inapplicability of a strictly *scientific* method to a modern Encyclopædia, such as shall include the whole of its contents, has led to the abandonment of all principle of *rational* arrangement; and it may be safely asserted of all our universal dictionaries hitherto, that the chief difference between them, in respect of their *plan*, consists in the more or less complete disorganization of the Sciences and Systematic Arts; now retaining certain integral portions of the system as integers, forming each an entire treatise, but resigning these treatises to the places severally assigned to them by the accident of their initial letters; and now splintering all alike into their fractional parts, with an arrangement merely alphabetical. Nor has the imperfection rested here. This very alphabetical position was but too frequently determined by the caprice or convenience of the compiler; inasmuch as the division of parts into minor parts had no settled limit. Thus, one technical or scientific term included as its subordinates, and to be explained in the same article, sometimes more, sometimes fewer, other terms: and the arrangement became neither properly scientific, nor properly alphabetical. It had the inconveniences of both, without the advantages of either.

3. The results are such as might have been expected, in part from the necessity of such plans, and in part from the interference of individual whim, carelessness, and procrastination, to which it afforded the amplest opportunities, and even frequent temptation. Numerous articles of important information are found where the reader could have least expected to find them; while articles of equal interest are in many cases not to be found at all.

4. A second result is, that an Universal Dictionary so constructed, equally with an Encyclopædia the most methodically arranged, requires alphabetical references; but with a twofold inconvenience, from which the latter would be free. First, the references, instead of being collected in one appropriate index, or at least in some known portion of the work, are scattered throughout the whole; and this is no slight annoyance, when a scientific term happens to have many synonyms, as, for instance, Azote, Nitrogen, Phlogisticated Air, &c. Secondly, the references must eventually lead the reader through as many volumes, as those other words happen to be placed in, which are necessary to be *previously* understood in order to a tolerable comprehension of the term first sought.

5. A third evil, resulting from the same causes, is the utter want of all proportion in the space occupied by each article, relatively either to the importance of the particular subject, or to the promised limits of the whole work. Hence, too, it arises that the proprietors are frequently reduced to a choice of evils. The work must be extended far beyond the first expectation of the purchasers, or the articles assigned to the latter volumes must be crowded in scanty and superficial abridg-

ments. They contract to give the public an Universal Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences, but the execution outgrows the plan. Either openly then, or in the form of supplementary volumes (bearing perhaps a large proportion to the whole work), this pledge must be redeemed. In both cases the disorder and dislocation, and in many instances the deficiencies, remain unremedied.

6. The fourth ill consequence of this arbitrary arrangement calls for a somewhat fuller consideration. It requires but a moment's reflection to be convinced, that the most voluminous Encyclopædia which has yet appeared, is incomparably too narrow to contain an Universal History of Knowledge in its present state; and that the authors and compilers will have satisfied all rational expectations if only nothing shall be found excluded from any other cause than the higher importance of that which has been admitted; in order that on *all* subjects the ends of *general* information at *least* may be accomplished. Where, therefore, selection is so imperiously required, there must be an equal necessity that certain fixed and intelligible principles should be pre-established. An Encyclopædia neither is, nor can reasonably be considered as, the book which a man of profound science is likely to consult for those things in which he is himself eminent. He will seek for accessions to his knowledge in the works of contemporaries employed like himself in extending the pomœria of science, and will often be most interested in *speculations*, the worth and stability of which are yet undetermined. But an Encyclopædia is a *History* of human knowledge, in which therefore these intellectual embryos, which at best are (as it were) but truths in the *future* tense, have no rightful or beseeming place. This, indeed, we hold to be a principle of such paramount importance, that we take the earliest opportunity of avowing our determination of a strict and systematic adherence to it; and we here give our public pledge that the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA shall be so far *historical* in all respects, that only what has been *established*, or is at least already *publici juris*, and to be found in the records of Science and Literature, shall form the main body of every article; and that any opinions or speculations of the writer himself shall be declared to be such, and be given distinctly as a mere appendix of the article to which they belong.

7. We shall now particularize the evil to which we have been referring. From the licence which the planless plan of former works allows to the separate writers—in one place, instead of a systematic history of the received truths and established discoveries in the department of knowledge, which was to have been exhibited, the larger portion of the space is filled up with the individual writer's own crude conceptions and prolix argumentation—while in another, on some subject of the highest interest, lo! in tarnished fragments over the numerous volumes, an old work torn asunder by all the letters of the alphabet! and reminding the classical reader of the decrepit Pelias, whose credulous daughters were induced by the artifices of Medea to cut his aged limbs in pieces, as the sole and certain means of restoring him, like another Æson, to the blooming honours of youth.

8. The SCHEME which we propose to substitute, or the principal outlines of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA, we now lay before the reader, as follows:—The work will consist of four main divisions. The first, which for the sake of distinction we have called the Philosophical part, comprises the Pure Sciences; and the second, or Scientific part, the Mixed and Applied Sciences. The third, or Biographical part, is devoted to Biography chronologically arranged, History, Chronology, and Geography; and the concluding or Miscellaneous part, besides being referential and supplementary to the preceding volumes, will have the unique advantage of presenting to the public, for the first time, a Philosophical and Etymological Lexicon of the English language; the citations selected and arranged chronologically, yet including all the purposes of a common Dictionary. The volume of Index will complete this division. It will be instantly seen that the first two divisions of a work, thus arranged, will grow naturally out of each other; the needful references will therefore be generally *retrospective*, and rarely made to future volumes. In our Biographical department we shall teach the same truths by example, that have been evolved in the former divisions, and stimulate to the exertions that have developed them;—while in our Miscellaneous

portion or in the Index, every word will be found in its usual alphabetical place, as in any other Dictionary, with a plain reference to the volume and page containing its full explanation in the present work; together with a variety of interesting articles, either illustrative of the former divisions, or in their own nature miscellaneous. Each division of the work will be separately paged.

9. Such is the general outline of the proposed Scheme. The Table at page 13 places the principal subdivisions, likewise, before the reader's eye, with as much detail as is compatible with the limits, or requisite for the purposes, of a Prospectus. It will be seen, too, that a more particularized and systematic justification of the principles, on which the Scheme has been constructed, will be afforded in the Preliminary Treatise, or General Introduction to the Encyclopædia.

10. When the work is completed, it will appear as an orderly Digest of all the great points of human knowledge, and, notwithstanding its comparatively moderate extent and price, must form the most perfect system of intellectual instruction and entertainment, that has been hitherto submitted to the friends and patrons of Art, Science, History, and general Literature in Great Britain.

11. We would place our claims to the favourable attention and patronage of the public, on two grounds: 1. That the great outline of our plan is free from the numerous defects and inconveniences *involved* in the plan of all preceding works of the kind, or occasioned or permitted by it. 2. That the plan now substituted possesses great *positive* advantages, peculiar to itself.

12. From what has been already seen of our plan, in the necessary discussion of its relative merits, we presume that we appropriate to the work the title of an Encyclopædia by an especial right, and that of a Philosophical System on a plea of superior propriety. But we cannot neglect the argument for such a work as the present, which is derivable from the peculiar circumstances of our times. The political changes of the world have not been more wonderful than the scientific and moral revolutions that have occurred within the last few years. The new views, new discoveries, and fresh facts, especially in all the different branches of Experimental Philosophy, which every year has brought with it, are unparalleled in the history of human knowledge; and the accessions have not seldom been of such a nature as no mere supplementary postscript can embrace. For in many instances they affect the whole theory and consequent arrangement of the Art or Science to which they belong. Our project is in this respect therefore singularly fortunate in point of time. It will have to collect and combine the rich but scattered elements of future Science; while a still more important argument for our plan and for the period of its execution, will be found in the manifest tendency of all the Arts and Sciences at present, from the most purely intellectual even to the labours of the common mechanic, to lose their former insulated character, and organize themselves into one harmonious body of knowledge. The civilized world is now doing that which the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA is preparing to do; and for which it is providing a correspondent repository.

13. The Proprietors have not disguised from themselves that their undertaking is of the most *arduous* kind. The mass of ability requisite, will be great in proportion to the originality of our plan; and the perseverance, harmony, and punctuality, that are indispensable conditions of its success, must be commensurate with the difficulty of uniting variety with system, and of reconciling selectness and calculated proportion with universality as a whole, and fulness in each component part. If, in addition to this, the amount of capital demanded and already dedicated to the one purpose of securing this coalition, and of overcoming these difficulties, be considered; with the number and high character of the artists, the men of science, and men of letters, on whose zealous co-operation, now pledged to us, we rest our pretension to the first acts of the public favour, and our confident hopes of continued support—not forgetting the relief and moral influence of a regular employment afforded during all seasons of the year to so many industrious mechanics as must necessarily be engaged on this work—the Proprietors of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA dare promise themselves, that by no reflecting reader will the present prospectus be deemed too serious.

14. Having explained the *Principles* on which the Encyclopædia Metropolitana was founded, we proceed to state a few facts, in reference to the manner in which the FIRST EDITION of the work was executed, and the *Modifications* now intended to be made in the SECOND EDITION.

15. The Encyclopædia Metropolitana was projected by the late eminent poet and philosopher, S. T. COLERIDGE. It differs in its plan from other Dictionaries of Universal Knowledge in being strictly methodical. The contributions of the scientific and learned men by whom it was composed, are arranged, not according to the letters of the alphabet which happen to form the initials of the English *names* of the Treatises, but in agreement with a PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM, based on the *nature* of the Subjects,—a method which causes the entire work to become a rational exposition of the state of human knowledge, and the mutual dependence and relative importance of its different branches. In virtue of this classification, the work forms both a course of study for the scholar, and a book of reference for the man of business: the former has the principles of the sciences laid before him in the philosophical order of their natural sequence; the latter is enabled to find readily the specific information he requires on any subject that interests him.

16. The system, projected by Mr. Coleridge, was ably executed by the Editors * and Authors to whom the execution of the scheme was confided. To confirm the truth of this assertion, it is sufficient to refer to the names of the Authors, and to state the fact, that many of the Treatises have been admitted by the Learned throughout Europe to be of the highest order of merit, and to have enlarged the boundaries of the scientific world, and placed their authors in the first rank of men of science in the present age.

17. The following ABSTRACT OF THE CONTENTS OF THE QUARTO EDITION, taken from the GENERAL PREFACE, will show in what manner the early professions of the projector of the work were realized.

We shall speak of the four great divisions of the Encyclopædia separately.

PURE SCIENCES.

18. The order in which these sciences are exhibited, and the plan on which the MATHEMATICAL portion of the *Encyclopædia* is conceived, resemble considerably the series of Elementary Treatises projected many years ago for the University of Cambridge by Dr. Wood, the late Dean of Ely, and Professor Vince; but with this difference, that the present volumes are far more comprehensive in the subjects they embrace, and far more elaborate and scientific in their execution. But this very similarity shows that the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* has attained one of its professed objects,—systematic instruction and scientific information, conveyed—not in a confused mass, but in the natural sequence of the sciences.

Indeed this portion of the work has met with a degree of approbation in many quarters, but especially in the University of Cambridge, which no other Encyclopædia has ever yet received. The student who has really mastered these sciences in the systematic form in which they are arranged here, will never in the course of the longest life find occasion to *un*learn any portion of what he has here acquired, and will find no difficulty whatever in adding to his stores any new results which the mental energy and labour of mankind may hereafter develop from principles now known. It may, indeed, be safely affirmed, that any person of good mathematical abilities, who shall follow the course of Mathematical treatises in this Encyclopædia, which are so arranged that a student may pursue them even without the assistance of a tutor, may become by that means a mathematician of very high character, and be enabled to master the most difficult and delicate speculations of continental mathematicians.

19. The names of the authors of the Treatises on *Pure Mathematics* are suffi-

---

The EDITORS of the original edition of the Encyclopædia Metropolitana were—The Rev. EDWARD SMEDLEY, M.A., late Fellow of Sidney College, Cambridge; the Rev. HUGH JAMES ROSE, B.D., late Principal of King's College, London; and the Rev. HENRY JOHN ROSE, B.D., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.

cient to prove that the *Encyclopædia* is worthy of the present state of science, and that its most important articles are contributed by those who have themselves been foremost in the onward march of science. The elaborate Treatise on ARITHMETIC, by the present Dean of Ely (Dr. Peacock), Lowndian Professor of Mathematics in the University of Cambridge, is interesting alike to the scholar, the mathematician, and the speculator in metaphysics. The brief but comprehensive Treatise on TRIGONOMETRY, by Professor Airy, now Astronomer Royal, is of considerable value from the general elegance of its demonstrations. The publications of the Rev. H. P. Hamilton on ANALYTICAL GEOMETRY and CONIC SECTIONS, and that of Professor Barlow on the THEORY OF NUMBERS, are so highly esteemed, that any eulogium on their papers on these subjects would be superfluous. The Treatises of Professor Levy on the DIFFERENTIAL and INTEGRAL CALCULUS are calculated to carry the student to a very high point of proficiency. The GEOMETRY, ALGEBRA, and GEOMETRICAL ANALYSIS complete the Volume in a manner worthy of the treatises with which they are associated.

20. These sciences are, however, in some degree elementary; and although by them the student would be so far advanced as to enter upon the works of some of the ablest analysts, it would be unworthy of such a publication as the Encyclopædia Metropolitana to leave untouched or imperfectly treated, the more refined applications of the higher Calculus. It will be found, accordingly, that the highest branches of mathematical analysis have been treated by writers conversant with all its intricacies, and the mathematical student is furnished in them with results of far greater variety and of a more subtle nature than can at present be used in the application of analysis to Mixed Mathematics.

21. The CALCULUS of VARIATIONS, and the CALCULUS of FINITE DIFFERENCES by Professor Hall, are distinguished by the clearness peculiar to his treatment of these refined and subtle portions of analysis. The CALCULUS of FUNCTIONS and the THEORY of PROBABILITY are the work of Professor De Morgan. The latter (on a subject which has exercised the talents of the greatest mathematicians, even down to the times of Laplace) is, as might be expected, one of the most complete in any language. The Treatise on DEFINITE INTEGRALS completes the series of these elaborate surveys on the higher branches of Mathematical Analysis. The name of Professor Moseley is a sufficient warrant that his Essay is also of the highest character.

22. Without wishing, therefore, to offer any undue eulogium on the Treatises enumerated above, we confidently ask that portion of the public which is qualified to judge of their merits, to compare the whole system of *Pure Mathematics* here presented to them with that in any similar work, whether of this country or of the Continent, on the grounds of *arrangement, clearness, ability*, and *completeness*.

23. We must now allude to such of the Pure Sciences as are not included in the Mathematical department. Sir John Stoddart has given a lucid and able summary of the General Principles of GRAMMAR, or the Philosophy of Language. The LOGIC and RHETORIC of Archbishop Whately require no commendation here, as they have long since been published in a separate form, and have taken their place among the standard works of our language. The Treatise on LAW is the work of Richard Jebb, Esq., Professor Graves, and Archer Polson, Esq. It embraces one of the most difficult portions of Philosophy—the general foundations of Law and Morals; and the Editor is happy to state that testimony from the very highest quarters has been given both to the profoundness of the views entertained, and the ability with which they are developed.

24. In the present state of metaphysical knowledge, it would be presumptuous to put forth any *system* of Metaphysics; but a general HISTORY OF MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY affords the most convenient opportunity for displaying the principles on which the greatest philosophers have hitherto endeavoured to form their systems, for pointing out their difficulties, and for marking how far each has contributed to the progress of the science. Such a sketch, however, required the hand of a master; and the Editor confidently believes that the Treatise on Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy which is here given is calculated fully to sustain the

deservedly high reputation of the Rev. F. D. Maurice. Of the Outlines of THEOLOGY, it does not become the Editor to say more than to acknowledge with gratitude the very able assistance of Professor Corrie, to whom two chapters are due. He has endeavoured to render this Treatise as practically useful as possible, not only to avoid passing controversies, but to bring forward the sound and genuine doctrines of the Church of England; and perhaps he may be allowed to add that, in pursuance of this object, he has spared no pains or labour.

MIXED AND APPLIED SCIENCES.

25. From *Pure Mathematics* we proceed in natural order to their application to physical phenomena. Of these sciences, some belong to the elementary branches of physical knowledge, and others to a higher and more advanced stage. Now, the treatises on MECHANICS, HYDRODYNAMICS, PNEUMATICS, OPTICS, and PLANE ASTRONOMY, have been written by Professor Barlow with an express view to this distinction. They are elementary enough to enable any student, with a competent knowledge of Pure Mathematics, to overcome their difficulties; and yet they are so based on scientific principles, that they will also prepare him to enter readily on the higher branches of Mixed Mathematics. In *Mechanics*, more especially, a foundation is laid for the succeeding investigations of Physical Astronomy, which is, in fact, only one of the higher branches of Analytical Physics.

26. Some of the treatises in the volumes devoted to the Mixed Sciences demand a separate notice, as enlarging the boundaries of our scientific knowledge. Of this class are the Treatises on LIGHT and SOUND, by Sir J. F. W. Herschel. The Treatise on LIGHT, by Sir J. F. W. Herschel, from the position it has already obtained in the scientific world, both in England and on the Continent, cannot require any recommendation here. The simple mention of Sir J. F. W. Herschel's name is a sufficient recommendation to the Treatise on PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY, and proves at once that it must be an Essay of the highest order of merit, and worthy of the present state of the Science; and the conductors of this *Encyclopædia* may justly be proud that that distinguished writer has contributed so largely to its pages. But although Plane and Physical Astronomy had been thus ably treated, it was considered that something more was required; and the late Captain Kater kindly furnished the very useful and able Treatise on NAUTICAL ASTRONOMY, a subject with which his acquaintance was at once profound and practical.

27. MAGNETISM and ELECTRO-MAGNETISM are treated by Professor Barlow with the same ability and research which he has displayed in the other Essays contributed by him; and GALVANISM, by Dr. Roget, whose scientific character is too firmly established to leave any doubt as to the merit of his contributions. The author of the Treatises on ELECTRICITY, HEAT, and CHEMISTRY, the late Rev. F. Lunn, was one whose merits as an experimental philosopher and chemist were not so extensively known as they deserved to be; but at Cambridge his acquirements were acknowledged to be of the highest order. The treatises themselves, it is believed, will amply justify their favourable anticipations.

28. The Third Volume of *Mixed Sciences* is chiefly devoted to the FINE ARTS; but there are two or three Essays in the early part of the Volume which belong to the more exact sciences, viz., the Essay on the FIGURE OF THE EARTH, by Professor Airy, the present Astronomer Royal, and his Treatise on the TIDES. With regard to the former much novelty was hardly to be expected; but it is presumed that this Treatise contains the most complete combination and discussion of observations relating to the subject hitherto produced in England. The treatise into which this great mathematician has thrown all his power is the Theory of the Tides. The terms in which some of the most distinguished mathematicians of Cambridge have spoken of this treatise prove that they consider it to have greatly advanced the knowledge of this difficult subject. Every previous treatise on the theory of the tides is entirely superseded by this production, and it will supply, for many years to come, the only sound foundation of our knowledge upon this subject.

29. The Treatise on POLITICAL ECONOMY was written by N. W. Senior, Esq.

30. The Treatises on BOTANY and HORTICULTURE are supplied by G. Don, Esq.,

whose profound acquaintance with every department of knowledge which belongs to the vegetable kingdom is known to all botanists and florists. The ZOOLOGY combines GENERAL PHYSIOLOGY with COMPARATIVE ANATOMY, and is the work of J. F. South, Esq., Surgeon of St. Thomas's Hospital (assisted in one portion of Physiology by Mr. Clark and Mr. Solly). The descriptions in this Treatise possess the very unusual and peculiar merit of being given by Mr. South, in every practicable instance, *from the specimens themselves*. Of the ANATOMY, by Mr. South and Mr. Le Gros Clark, and the MATERIA MEDICA, by Dr. G. Johnson, it may be said that their names are a sufficient pledge that these Treatises are of first-rate character. The Treatise on MEDICINE, by Dr. Robert Williams, of St. Thomas's Hospital, is an attempt to give a more philosophical view of the classification of disease than has hitherto been taken in any work of modern date. To W. Bowman, Esq., the Encyclopædia is indebted for an able outline of SURGICAL PRACTICE. The medical volume is closed by a comprehensive Treatise on VETERINARY ART, by W. C. Spooner, Esq.

31. The METEOROLOGY of the late Mr. Harvey, and the CRYSTALLOGRAPHY of Mr. Brooke, have been referred to respectively with especial commendation by Professor Forbes and Dr. Whewell. The names of Mr. Phillips and Dr. Daubeny will sufficiently recommend the Treatise on GEOLOGY, as exhibiting an adequate representation of that science at the time of its publication. The Treatise on MINERALOGY by Mr. Brooke; the Essays on CARPENTRY, by P. Nicholson, Esq.; on FORTIFICATION, by Major Mitchell and Captain Procter; and on NAVAL ARCHITECTURE, by the late Mr. Harvey, must not be passed over. The names of these writers guarantee the value of their contributions.

32. In this class of *Mixed Sciences* a novel feature is exhibited in the Sixth Volume of the series, viz., *A Systematic Account of the* ARTS *and* MANUFACTURES *of Great Britain*. There is probably no writer who would be able to do such ample justice to so extensive a range of matter, requiring both theoretical and practical knowledge, as its author, Mr. Barlow; but that nothing might be wanting to the completeness of this portion of the work, Professor Babbage supplied a Preliminary Discourse on the *Principles of Manufactures;* and it may confidently be asked, to what other source could the conductors of the work have appealed with equal confidence on so difficult and multifarious a subject?

HISTORICAL DIVISION.

33. It is not possible, in this rapid sketch, to specify all the papers in this portion of the work; but as nearly every contribution is assigned to its proper author at the beginning of each volume, such a course is unnecessary either for the information of the public, or as a tribute of respect to the distinguished authors themselves. Ample care has been taken to enlist among the contributors to this department writers not only of splendid endowments, but also of the highest attainments in different classes of historical knowledge. There will be found among the numerous writers in this division contributions from Bishop Blomfield, Dr. Whewell, Mr. Justice Talfourd, Dr. Arnold, Dean Hinds, Rev. J. A. Jeremie, Rev. G. C. Renouard, Rev. J. H. Newman, Bishop Russell, Archdeacon Hale, Dean Lyall, Rev. J. B. S. Carwithen, Bishop Hampden, Rev. R. Garnet, Major Mountain, Rev. J. H. B. Mountain, Captain Procter, Rev. J. E. Riddle, Archdeacon Ormerod, T. Roscoe, Esq., W. Macpherson, Esq., Rev. R. L. Browne, Rev. H. Thomson, Rev. J. G. Dowling, Rev. J. W. Blakesley, Rev. J. B. Ottley, W. Lowndes, Esq., Q.C.

34. A good work on General History has long been a great desideratum in our literature. The summaries of Tytler and Russell are too brief, and the Universal History, independently of the heavy manner in which it is written, is too long. It is presumed that the Historical Volumes of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* will be found to meet this want in an efficient manner. They are written by men of undoubted ability; they exhibit the history of the world at first in a series of biographical sketches, and then in a continuous history of each remarkable country, combined with an Ecclesiastical History remarkably full and rich in the most interesting epochs of the Christian Church. Dissertations of great importance in a

philosopnical point of view, such as those on Ancient Philosophy and Literature, on the Crusades, the Feudal System, and the Scholastic System, are introduced into the text at the most convenient periods, for the illustration of the respective subjects.

MISCELLANEOUS PORTION.

35. Although the *Miscellaneous Division* of this *Encyclopædia* occupies a larger number of volumes than any other, it requires a less extended notice. It appears, however, desirable to explain in some degree the *principle* on which this portion of the work was executed, and to indicate the authors of some of the most remarkable series of papers.

The leading features in this division of the *Encyclopædia* are—

1. The ENGLISH LEXICON.
2. The GEOGRAPHY.
3. The NATURAL HISTORY.
4. The MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES.

The universal approbation with which the LEXICON, compiled by Dr. Richardson, has been received, precludes the necessity of enlarging either on the plan itself or on the gigantic labour involved in its execution. The plan of giving the quotations of each word *chronologically* has the advantage of embodying in a philosophical Lexicon a *History of our own Language.*

36. For the whole of the Articles on GEOGRAPHY, the proprietors feel that they may fairly advance the claim of having obtained the co-operation of persons more than competent to bring forward whatever is most valuable for a work like this from all usually accessible sources of information. In this respect, the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* claims to take a high station among similar works; and the names of the contributors of the Articles on *European* and *American Geography* are a sufficient pledge of the ability and care with which they are executed, viz.:—T. Myers, Esq., Captain Bonnycastle, R.E., C. Vignoles, Esq., C.E., H. Lloyd, Esq., G. H. Smith, Esq., A. Jacob, Esq., W. D. Coolie, Esq., and Cyrus Redding, Esq.

One class of Geographical Articles demands especial mention, and may be said to be wholly without a rival in any similar work in our language, viz.: those on *Ancient, Oriental,* and *African Geography,* which were entirely supplied by the Rev. G. C. Renouard (of Cambridge, formerly Chaplain at Smyrna), and evince the most extensive familiarity with every variety of language, ancient and modern. The Editor believes that if these essays were collected together, and published as a system of Oriental Geography, they would surpass in accuracy and value anything at present existing in our own or any other European language.

37. The section of NATURAL HISTORY is divided chiefly into *Botany* and *Zoology.* In these two sciences the *Genera* will be found described in their alphabetical order, while their scientific arrangement and the principles of the sciences form part of the treatises in the volumes devoted to the *Mixed Sciences.* For these two departments, the services of several eminent naturalists were engaged. In *Botany,* T. Edwards, Esq., and G. Don, Esq., &c. In *Zoology,* T. Bell, Esq , F.L.S., &c., J. E. Gray, Esq., F.L.S., &c., of the British Museum ; J. F. Stephens, Esq., and J. F. South, Esq.

38. The highly-gifted individual to whom this Encyclopædia owes so many of its attractions—the late Rev. Edward Smedley,—enriched the Miscellaneous Division with a series of articles which embody a vast store of curious and recondite information, communicated in a manner at once instructive and agreeable. Besides these articles, the *Geographical Gazetteer* and the *Dictionary* of *Law* and *Political Philosophy,* a large number of very important and valuable articles will be found scattered through the volumes of the *Miscellaneous Division.* Attention may be called, amongst a variety of others, to the *Biblical Articles,* by the Rev. T. H. Horne; to the *Philological* and *Oriental,* by the Rev. G. C. Renouard; the *Scientific Articles,* (as *e. g., Dialling, Surveying, Weights and Measures, &c.*) by Mr. Barlow; *Meteoric Stones,* by Professor Miller; *Stove and Ventilation,* by C. Hood, Esq., F.R.S.; *Stucco,* by T. L. Donaldson, Professor of Architecture in University College, London; the *Theological Articles,* by Archdeacon Hale; Essays on *Engineering,* by C. Vignoles, Esq., C. E.; and *Writing,* by the Rev. R. Garnet.

THE PLATES are for the most part the work of those two eminent engravers,

Messrs. Lowry. They require only a simple inspection to prove their beauty and excellence.

The GENERAL INDEX was, at an early period in the publication of the *Encyclopædia*, intrusted to the Rev. J. Hindle, and occupied the attention of this very competent person for several years. It will be found to contain ample reference to all that is most important and interesting.

From this review of the FIRST EDITION of the Encyclopædia Metropolitana, we proceed to describe the peculiarities of the projected SECOND EDITION.

39. THE SECOND EDITION of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA will be handsomely printed in a series of CABINET VOLUMES, in CROWN OCTAVO, in the style shown by the SPECIMENS on pages 14 and 15.

40. The whole work will be THOROUGHLY REVISED; many NEW TREATISES will be added; and the Articles will all be provided with comprehensive INDEXES, or with analytical TABLES of CONTENTS.

41. It will be abundantly illustrated by Maps, Woodcuts, and Engravings.

42. It will be published in WEEKLY PARTS, PRICE ONE SHILLING, and in MONTHLY VOLUMES, varying in price according to the number of Parts contained in each.

43. METHODICAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SECOND EDITION.—In preparing the SECOND EDITION of this Encyclopædia for publication, very little change will be made in its SYSTEM. The peculiar characteristic impressed upon it by Mr. Coleridge—ITS METHODICAL ARRANGEMENT—will be followed strictly. Indeed, the chief difference that will appear between the arrangement of the Second Edition and the First, will proceed from a more rigid adherence in the Second Edition to the *principles of Method* established by Mr. Coleridge, than it was possible to attain in the First Edition. The work being wholly original and composed by more than a hundred Contributors, it happened, during the first publication, that many of the articles, either because they were not produced in proper time to be incorporated in their systematic places, or for other unexplained reasons, were cast into the great "*Alphabetical, Miscellaneous, or Supplementary Division*," where they are connected together by no stronger scientific bond than their alphabetical initials. But now that we have the whole work before us, complete (as respects the First Edition), and capable of re-arrangement, we propose to rectify these accidental departures from the true method of the Encyclopædia, and to transfer, from the Alphabetical Miscellany, every article that is capable of transference, to its appropriate position in the Philosophical Classification. Thus, the Article GEOGRAPHY, properly organized, will form a new division, complementary to that on History, as was originally intended, see § 8; the details of NATURAL HISTORY will be grouped with the General Treatise on that science; the art of Diplomacy will be subjoined to the science of the Law of Nations; and so on. What remains in the Alphabetical Division, after this effective re-arrangement has been made, will form a SERIES of DICTIONARIES, Lexicographical, Classical, Theological, Technological, &c.

44. REVISION AND ENLARGEMENT.—Though the changes contemplated in the *General System* of the Encyclopædia are not important, the improvements to be made in the *details* will be considerable. In all possible cases, before the articles are reprinted for the Second Edition, they will be thoroughly revised, either by their authors or other competent persons, and Indexes and Tables of Contents will be added; the Historical series will be completed and re-arranged; the Treatises on the Natural and Experimental Sciences will either receive important amendments,

or be replaced by others entirely new; while the Mechanical and Chemical Arts, and the applications of the sciences to affairs of public utility, will be treated of in the Second Edition, much more practically than they were in the First Edition.

45. PROPOSED EXTENT OF THE WORK.—The series of scientific and historical TREATISES on the important SUBJECTS comprehended in the philosophical scheme of this work (page 13), which form indispensable links of the great chain of human knowledge—the Series necessary to complete the *circumference* of an Encyclopædia—cannot be compressed into *fewer* than EIGHTY CABINET VOLUMES. That is the *minimum* extent. But since the methodical plan of the work, as developed in this Prospectus, will permit at all times of the incorporation of such additional Treatises, as may be requisite to keep its scientific principles and historical facts in accordance with the progress of the age,—a permission of which the conductors will freely avail themselves,—it is impossible to state what may be the *maximum* number of its volumes. An Encyclopædia intended to reflect always the existing state of human knowledge, "to act," (in the language of Mr. COLERIDGE,) "at once as a reservoir and a fountain,—to receive perpetual accessions of knowledge from the genius of the age, and to yield the knowledge again in willing abundance," —such a work can never be effectually "*completed.*" That word applies with as little propriety to such an Encyclopædia, as it does to the Times Newspaper or the Philosophical Transactions; for, like those celebrated journals, this Encyclopædia will be at all times ready to incorporate an account of every important Event and new Principle that Time and Discovery may furnish, and for which its philosophical system provides an adequate Repository.

46. IMPROVED PLAN OF PUBLICATION.—A great alteration, and, it is hoped, an important improvement, will be made in the METHOD OF PUBLISHING the Second Edition, as contrasted with the method adopted for the first edition of this Encyclopædia. The PARTS of the CABINET EDITION will not, like the Parts of the Quarto Edition, contain letter-press and engravings belonging to different subjects or different Divisions of the Encyclopædia, forming a heterogeneous and unreadable mixture of fragments of many Treatises; but *each* PART will relate only to *one subject;* and whenever it is possible, *each* VOLUME of the CABINET EDITION will embrace ALL that relates to one subject. That, however, will necessarily depend upon the nature of the Subjects and the consequent extent of the Treatises. Very frequently several will be comprised in one Volume, and occasionally an important subject,—the principles of a leading Science, or the History of a great nation,—will occupy two volumes. But care will be taken to ensure a due proportion in size among the several Treatises, to avoid unnecessary prolixity, to combine comprehensiveness in matter with convenience in form, and to avoid the incongruous binding together of Treatises on irrelative Subjects—such, for example, as occurred in Vol. 5 of the First Edition, where the Treatises on the FINE ARTS were combined with two profound MATHEMATICAL TREATISES belonging to the Department of ASTRONOMY.

47. ADVANTAGES TO THE SUBSCRIBERS.—Those who subscribed to the original edition, and who remember how it was contrived to convert the most *Methodical* of Encyclopædias into the most *Immethodical* of Publications, will readily recognise the importance of an alteration, which INSURES TO THE SUBSCRIBER TO THE SECOND EDITION the possession of a complete readable portion of the work in recompense for every Subscription he is required to make.

48. ORDER OF PUBLICATION.—It seems not unnecessary to call the attention of intending Subscribers to the difference that exists between the *order* in which the SUBJECTS *occur* in the general system of this Encyclopædia and the *order* in which it may be *advisable to publish* the TREATISES on those subjects. In consequence of the different amount of corrections that will be required by the various Treatises that compose the Encyclopædia, and the circumstance that many Treatises on subjects that demand extensive investigation must be written entirely anew,—it would be impossible, without submitting to great delay and irregularity, to publish the revised Articles and new Treatises in Weekly Parts, in the exact order in which the subjects occur in Mr. Coleridge's methodical plan. Neither is it desirable

to adhere to that order pertinaciously, because it would not be agreeable to the great body of the SUBSCRIBERS to so comprehensive a work as this ENCYCLOPÆDIA, to receive, for months together, a series of WEEKLY PARTS relating solely to Mathematics, or to Geography, or to History, or indeed to *any* Department, in its order—*all other subjects being, for the time, systematically excluded.* A proceeding of that sort could hardly fail to excite dislike or indifference to the work in the FAMILIES of many of the SUBSCRIBERS. The Proprietors consider, therefore, that they will consult the general convenience, both of the Authors and the Subscribers, by publishing the Treatises in an indeterminate order,—giving History, Science, and Art alternately, but carefully indicating on the title-page of each Volume its exact place in the entire System, in accordance with the Plan given in page 13. In order, however, to prevent mistakes, every PART and VOLUME of the work, *as published*, will be marked with a running Number, simply to indicate the order of Publication, and irrespective of the ultimate Philosophical Arrangement of the articles. The Parts that constitute a Volume will be published as near together as circumstances permit, and, from time to time, General Title Pages and Tables of Contents will be supplied, to complete the Volumes of the several Divisions.

49. REGULARITY OF PUBLICATION.—The vast amount of original writing of the highest class, in every department of literature and science, which is comprehended in the First Edition of this Encyclopædia, and the proved excellence of its methodical plan, will so greatly facilitate the preparation of the CABINET EDITION, that the Conductors trust to be enabled to issue the WEEKLY PARTS in uninterrupted succession,—correcting in the work, as they go on, what requires correction; retrenching what is superfluous; and supplying what is deficient; so as to bring the whole more strictly into accordance with Mr. COLERIDGE's great idea of the essentials of an Encyclopædia, and producing, if possible, a "SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE," more philosophical in its plan, more ably executed in its details, more convenient in size, and more economical in price, than any work of the kind that has ever hitherto been produced.

50. We conclude this Prospectus with a short extract from the Preface to the First Edition of the Encyclopædia:—

"The foregoing enumeration of the principal parts of the Encyclopædia embodies all the observations which the Editor considers it necessary to make in recommending the work to the patronage of the public. The exertions made by the Proprietors to procure the just fulfilment of the high expectations formed of the work, and of the promises they had made, as well as the perseverance with which they have conducted this important publication to its completion, amidst the many obstacles which must necessarily arise in so extensive an undertaking, entitle them to high consideration from that portion of the Public which is interested in works of a sterling and substantial character. From the present position of Literature, and *the system now in fashion of publishing small and superficial works which may be cheaply produced, and are really of no intrinsic value*, it is probable that a long period must elapse before any similar undertaking will be entered upon, from the enormous outlay of capital it requires, and the uncertainty of remuneration which it offers. It is hoped, therefore, that this GREAT NATIONAL WORK, for such it really is, may meet with that patronage which the Proprietors feel confident it fairly and fully deserves. They feel assured that, whether it be viewed as a whole or in its separate divisions, *it embodies a mass of information at once extensive, accurate, and scientifically arranged, which must place it in a pre-eminent and triumphant position.* Whatever its measure of success may be in a pecuniary point of view, they may justly feel a high gratification in having been instrumental, under Providence, in bringing to a successful termination *a work which, whether its* LITERARY MERIT OR THE SOUNDNESS OF ITS MORAL AND RELIGIOUS VIEWS *be regarded, must ever be considered as an* INESTIMABLE BENEFIT TO THEIR COUNTRY AND A PERMANENT ORNAMENT TO ITS LITERATURE."

London, October, 1849.

PLAN OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

The INTRODUCTION.—On the Laws and regulative Principles of EDUCATION; or in the Language of the Schools, the Elements of METHODOLOGY.

FIRST DIVISION.

PURE SCIENCES.

SECTION I.
FORMAL SCIENCES.

Philosophy of Language.
Logic.
Rhetoric.
Mathematics:—
- Geometry.
- Arithmetic.
- Algebra.
- Geometrical Analysis.
- Theory of Numbers.
- Trigonometry.
- Analytical Geometry.
- Conic Sections.
- Differential and Integral Calculus.
- Calculus of Variations.
- Calculus of Finite Differences.
- Calculus of Functions.
- Theory of Probabilities.
- Definite Integrals.

SECTION II.—REAL SCIENCES.

Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy.
Law:—
- General Principles of Law.
- Roman Law.
- English Law—
  - Laws of England.
  - Laws of Ireland.
  - Laws of Scotland.
  - Colonial Law.
- Canon Law.

Politics:—
- Law of Nations—
  - Diplomacy.
- Political Philosophy—
  - Statistics.
- Political Economy—
  - Commerce.

Theology:—
- Natural Theology.
- Evidences of Revelation.
- Scripture Doctrine.
  - Biblical Literature.
  - Biblical Antiquities.
  - Religions and Religious Customs.

SECOND DIVISION.

MIXED AND APPLIED SCIENCES.

SECTION I.
MECHANICAL PHILOSOPHY.
(*Mixed Mathematics*).

Mechanics.
Hydrostatics.
Pneumatics.
Optics.
Astronomy:—
- Plane Astronomy.
- Nautical Astronomy.
- Physical Astronomy.

Figure of the Earth.
Tides and Waves.

SECTION II.
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Magnetism.
Electro-Magnetism.
Electricity.
Galvanism.
Heat.
Light.
Chemistry.
Sound.
Meteorology.

SECTION III.—THE FINE ARTS.

Architecture.
Sculpture.
Painting.
Heraldry.
Numismatics.
Poetry.
Music.
Engraving.

SECTION IV.
THE USEFUL ARTS.

Agriculture.
Horticulture.
Floriculture.
Arboriculture.
Carpentry and Joinery.
Fortification.
Engineering.
Naval Architecture.
Manufactures.
Mechanical Arts.
Chemical Arts.

SECTION V.
NATURAL HISTORY.

Inanimate:—
- Crystallography.
- Mineralogy.
- Geology.

Insentient:—
- Botany.

Animate:—
- Zoology.
- Physiology.
- Comparative Anatomy.
- Vertebrals:
  - Mammalia. | Reptiles.
  - Birds. | Fishes.
- Invertebrals:
  - Molluscs. | Spined Skins.
  - Insects. | Sea Nettles.
  - Crustaceans. | Infusories.
  - Arachnidans. | Polyps.
  - Myriapods.

SECTION VI.—APPLICATIONS OF NATURAL HISTORY.

Anatomy.
Materia Medica.
Pharmacy.
Medicine.
Surgery.
Veterinary Art.

THIRD DIVISION.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

INTRODUCTION:—
- On the Uses of History.
- Chronology.
- Chronological Tables.

ARCHÆOLOGY.

ETHNOLOGY.

ANCIENT HISTORY:—
- Sacred History.
- The Jews.
- Greece.
- Greek Literature.
- Greek Philosophy and Art.
- Ancient Oriental Nations.
- Rome.
- Roman Literature.
- Roman Philosophy.
- Classical Antiquities.
- Heathen Mythology.

MIDDLE AGES.

MODERN HISTORY:—
- The Christian Church.
- Greek Empire.
- Ottoman Empire.
- The Crusades.
- Italy.
- Germany.
- France.
- Spain.
- Portugal.
- Netherlands.
- Switzerland.
- Britain.
- America.
- India.

FOURTH DIVISION.

GEOGRAPHY.

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY.

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY:—
- European.
- American.
- Oriental.
- African.
- Classical.

BRITISH TOPOGRAPHY.

FIFTH DIVISION.

LEXICOGRAPHICAL.

English Lexicon, &c. &c. &c.
See Prospectus, § 43.

GENERAL INDEX.

derived from them the greatest encouragement to carry on the war against Darius, not doubting but that he was the person described in the prophetic books.

Alexander's favour to the Jews.

At his departure these circumstances so effectually recommended the Jews to the favour of Alexander, that when they petitioned him to allow them to live under their own laws, and in the free exercise of their religion, and further to be exempted from tribute every seventh year, because their law forbade them to cultivate the soil in the year of the sabbath, he immediately complied with their request. The Jews further implored his protection for their brethren whom he would find settled in Babylon; and many of them, won by his kindness, enlisted as soldiers in his service, and accompanied him on his expedition.

His behaviour to the Samaritans.

The Samaritans envying the Jews the favour they had so unexpectedly gained, and jealous of the distinction conferred upon them, thought by a similar line of conduct to gain as much influence with the king. They met him as he returned from Jerusalem in a solemn religious procession, and professing their kindred with the Hebrews, sought from him a grant of the same privileges which he had given to their brethren. Alexander excused himself from paying attention to their request till after his return from Egypt; but, during his absence, a rebellion taking place in the city, in which Andromachus, the governor, perished, at his return he caused all those who were concerned in the disturbance to be put to death, and driving out the Samaritans, planted their city with Macedonians: those who survived retired to Shechem, under Mount Gerizim, which from that time became the metropolis of the Samaritan sect, and continues so to this day. The eight thousand Samaritans who had joined Alexander at Tyre, and had been with him ever since, he settled in Thebais, the remotest province of Egypt, lest their presence in Samaria should revive the mutinous spirit of their countrymen. This treatment contrasts strikingly with that which the Jews subsequently received, for when Alexandria was built, he settled therein many of that nation, giving them great privileges, and allowing them not only the use of their own laws and religion, but also the enjoyment of equal franchises and liberties with his own people, the Macedonians.

Influence of the preceding events upon Alexander's conduct.

It does not fall within our province to pursue the narration of Alexander's conquests, or to trace him in his rapid progress to the highest pinnacle of martial glory; one part, however, of his character is so closely connected with the occurrences related to have taken place on his arrival at Jerusalem, that we cannot forbear stopping to direct the reader's attention to it. It has often created surprise that a man of Alexander's strength of mind, should have been guilty of such folly and weakness as to feign himself to be the son of Jupiter Ammon, and to undertake a most laborious expedition to his Temple, which was situated in the midst of the deserts of Lybia, and twelve days journey from Memphis, for no other purpose than that of procuring himself the title of son uf Jupiter.

The water to be distilled is poured into the Still at the opening marked *t*. The water of the Condenser is continuously renewed by the supply-pipe T T′, and when heated by the steam, it is suffered to run off by the escape-pipe *o*.

200



It is frequently necessary, in the laboratory, to distil volatile liquors, in which case the condensing power must be very effective, that loss be not occasioned by the escape of uncondensed vapour. For such operations, the apparatus represented by fig. 201 is employed. The

201



liquor to be distilled is placed in a glass Retort, the neck of which is connected, by means of an adapter, to a straight Condenser, consisting

ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

THE QUARTO LIBRARY EDITION,

In Complete Sets, bound in Thirty Volumes, at the following prices:—

Embossed Cloth, lettered Contents . . . . 20 Guineas.
Bound in Half Russia, lettered Contents . . 25 Guineas.
Half Morocco, gilt, lettered Contents . . . 28 Guineas.

The PLAN and the LITERARY MERITS of the Encyclopædia Metropolitana have been sufficiently dwelt upon in the PROSPECTUS. After twenty-eight years of arduous labour, the work was completed in 1845. The expenditure upon it amounted to £26,000 for authorship, £7000 for designing and engraving the Plates, and £11,000 for stereotyping the letter-press, a total of £44,000, exclusive of the cost of paper, printing, binding, and publishing. These facts are cited to show how earnestly the Proprietors endeavoured to do justice to their undertaking. The work contains 23,000 quarto pages of letter-press, and above 600 quarto engravings by Lowry, of great beauty and accuracy; the whole forming Thirty large Volumes. The original form of publication was in 59 Parts, at 21*s.* each.

Re-Issue of the Encyclopædia Metropolitana,

ON A METHODICAL PLAN, ACCORDING TO MR. COLERIDGE'S ARRANGEMENT

FIRST AND SECOND DIVISIONS OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

PURE, MIXED, AND APPLIED SCIENCES.

These two Divisions are Re-Issued in two forms.

I. RE-ISSUE IN PARTS. The Arts and Sciences may be had in SIXTY-FOUR PARTS, *each containing one complete Treatise*. The last Part contains the Title-pages and Tables of Contents of the First Ten Volumes of the Encyclopædia. The Parts vary in Price according to the number of Sheets and Plates in each. A separate list of this Re-Issue may be had gratis.

II. RE-ISSUE IN VOLUMES. These two Divisions may also be had in TEN VOLUMES, in which the TREATISES are arranged according to the nature of the SUBJECTS; forming a SERIES OF ENCYCLOPÆDIAS devoted to Ten Special Departments of Science and Art.

Names and Prices of the Ten Volumes forming this Re-Issue.	Number of Plates.	Embossed Cloth Lettered.	Half-Russia Binding.	Half-Morocco Binding.
1. Mental Philosophy	..	21*s.*	26*s.*	28*s.*
2. Pure Mathematics	17	31*s.* 6*d.*	37*s.*	40*s.*
3. Mechanical Philosophy	78	42*s.*	48*s.*	50*s.*
4. Astronomy	28	21*s.*	26*s.*	28*s.*
5. Experimental Philosophy	40	31*s.* 6*d.*	37*s.*	40*s.*
6. Natural History	131	52*s.* 6*d.*	58*s.*	60*s.*
7. Medical Sciences	18	21*s.*	26*s.*	28*s.*
8. Fine Arts	55	31*s.* 6*d.*	37*s.*	40*s.*
9. Useful Arts	19	21*s.*	26*s.*	28*s.*
10. Manufactures and Machines	87	42*s.*	48*s.*	50*s.*

THIRD DIVISION OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

UNIVERSAL HISTORY, from the EARLIEST ACCOUNTS of MANKIND to the PEACE OF 1815. The Contents of this Division are described at pages 9 and 15 of this Prospectus. The Re-Issue has a SYNOPTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS, which was not published in the First Edition. In Five large Quarto Volumes, averaging 1000 pages each, with Maps.

Embossed Cloth, lettered Contents . . . . . £5. 5*s.*
Half-bound Russia, lettered Contents . . . . £6. 10*s.*
Half-bound Morocco gilt, lettered Contents . . . £7.

FOURTH DIVISION OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

THE LEXICON, OR ALPHABETICAL MISCELLANY. The Contents of this Division are described at page 10 of this Prospectus. In Fourteen large Quarto Volumes, averaging 870 pages each, with an Atlas, and a Series of Engravings comprehending 72 Quarto Plates, 29 Folio Plates, and 3 whole Sheet Plates.

Embossed Cloth, lettered Contents . . . . . £10. 10*s.*
Half-bound Russia, lettered Contents . . . . £14.
Half-bound Morocco, gilt, lettered Contents . . £15. 10*s.*

GENERAL INDEX to the ENCYCLOPÆDIA, One Volume, 4to. Price in Cloth, 21*s.*; Half-Russia, 26*s.*; half-Morocco, 28*s.*

The ORIGINAL SUBSCRIBERS to this work, who have not yet completed their Sets, have still the opportunity of doing so—but the sale of the Original Parts will very shortly be discontinued.

LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA:

OR,

System of Universal Knowledge:

ON A METHODICAL PLAN

PROJECTED BY SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

SECOND EDITION, REVISED.

First Division. Pure Sciences.

RHETORIC.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY JOHN JOSEPH GRIFFIN & CO.
53 BAKER-STREET, PORTMAN SQUARE;
AND RICHARD GRIFFIN & CO. GLASGOW.
1850.

264. f. 3.

GLASGOW:
PRINTED BY BELL AND BAIN.

RHETORIC.

By RICHARD WHATELY, D.D.
ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN.

REPRINTED FROM THE ORIGINAL EDITION.

SYNOPSIS.*

INTRODUCTORY SECTION.

PAGE

The various definitions of Rhetoric have been occasioned, not so much by disagreeing conceptions of the same thing, as by the application of the same terms to different things, ... 1

No general term has a real object properly corresponding to it, independent of our conceptions; there is no one definition of a term solely accurate or applicable to every acceptation of the term, . . 1

The word Rhetoric, in its primary signification, had reference to Speaking only; but it has gradually, furthered by Printing, assumed such extension, that it now comprehends all prose composition, . . 1, 2

On the ground that argument may be employed on all subjects, and that no one can argue well on a subject he does not understand, some ancient writers insist upon universal Knowledge as essential to the orator; whereas Rhetoric is an *instrumental* art, of which knowledge of subjects no more constitutes an actual part, than building materials do of architecture, ... 2, 3

The acceptation of Rhetoric adopted by the present author, contemplates *Argumentative Composition*, generally and exclusively, . . 3

Of the two purposes of Reasoning—"Inferring" and "Proving"—the former belongs to Logic, the latter to Rhetoric; but the Philosophical rules applicable to the one are not to be wholly excluded from the other, ... 3

Rhetoric is not one of the branches of study wherein we can trace progressive improvement from age to age, because its most consummate period was in the youth of science and of literature; Aristotle, the earliest, is also the best systematic writer on the subject, . . 4

Cicero, delighting more in the practice than in the theory of his art, in discursive declamation, more than in philosophical analysis, cannot be ranked amongst the best Rhetoricians, ... 4

Quinctilian contributed but little to the Philosophy of Rhetoric; a great portion of his work is a Treatise on Education generally, . . 5

* The Author of the Treatise on RHETORIC, is not accountable for the Contents of this *Synopsis*.—EDITOR ENCY. MET.

PAGE

Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric," an incomparably superior book to Blair's, is defective, mainly from the author's ignorance of Logic, of which Rhetoric is an off-shoot, ... 5, 6

The decline of Rhetoric, generally attributed to the decline of democratic liberty, may be largely explained by the circumstance, that the characters of Orator, Author, and Politician, which, among the ancients, almost entirely coincided, have, in modern times, assumed distinct positions, and that as regards Rhetoric proper, writers and speakers now seek to disown it, lest they should be charged with Rhetorical artifice, ... 7

Rhetoric skill, considered by the ancients as of questionable public utility is, by the moderns, considered a public advantage; while, conversely, systematic rules, regarded of old as essential in the study of Rhetoric, are, by the moderns, held in light esteem, ... 7, 8

Yet a system of rules for Argumentative Composition, constructed on broad philosophical principles, will materially aid a right judgment upon any subject to impress its convictions upon others, . . 8

The true principle of Rhetoric can only be comprehended by an appreciation of the distinction between *An* Art and *The* Art; between *an* art of Rhetoric which merely instructs how conviction *may* be produced; and *the* art by which it *must* be produced, ... 9

CHAPTER I.

OF THE INVENTION, ARRANGEMENT, AND INTRODUCTION OF ARGUMENTS.

Section 1.—Of Propositions to be Maintained.

In the Rhetorical process of conveying truth to others by reasoning, the first step is to lay down distinctly in one's own mind—though not necessarily to *state*—the form of the proposition to be proved, and where there are several, their order, ... 11, 13

Conviction, in its widest acceptation, comprehends, 1. *Instruction* of those who have not formed an opinion on the subject; 2. *Conviction* of those who entertain a different opinion, or who doubt, . . 11

The form of Proposition or Assertion, *i.e. Conclusion*, to be established for itself, not with a view to an ulterior conclusion, should be kept distinct from any materials involving too wide or general a discussion, 12, 13

Section 2.—Of Arguments.

There are several cross-divisions of Arguments, the non-detection of which has led to much perplexity: 1. (or division of the *forms of stating*,) into Regular and Irregular; 2. (or division of arguments into their *subject-matter*,) into Moral or Probable, and Demonstrative or

PAGE

Necessary; 3. (or division of arguments according to the *intention* of the reasoner,) into Direct and Indirect, the Deictic and Elenctic of Aristotle; 4. (or division of arguments as such,) into arguments from Example, from Testimony, from Cause to Effect, from Analogy; each species occasionally containing the other, . . . 13–15

Arguments may be laid down under two great classes: 1. Such as might have been employed to *account for* the fact or principle maintained, supposing its truth granted; i.e. *a priori* arguments, arguments from Cause to Effect; 2. Such as could not be so employed; the test of distinction being the answer to the question: Supposing the proposition admitted, would their argument serve to account for the truth, or not? 16

The terms Cause, Effect, Accounting for, are used throughout in the popular sense, ... 16

The *A Priori* argument produces that species of the Probable called the Plausible, the only kind of Probability contemplated by poets and fiction-writers, who, not aiming to produce belief, take the Cause for granted; by them it is often called the *Natural*, ... 17

Causes in Argumentative compositions must be either admitted or provable, ... 17

The term *A Priori* extends to any argument drawn from an *Antecedent* or *Forerunner*, whether a cause or not, ... 18

Arguments, other than *A Priori*, are of two kinds: "Sign" and "Example," 18–20

The *Premiss* by which a thing is proved is not necessarily the Cause of the Facts *being such as it is*, but the Cause of our *knowing that it is so*, ... 20

Of Signs, one kind are such as from a certain Effect or Phenomenon infer the Cause; the other, such as in like manner, infer some *Condition*, which is not the Cause, ... 21

In Arguments from Testimony, it is essential to distinguish between Testimony to matters of *Fact*, and to matters of Opinion, . . 21

The *Improbability* of a supposition is deducible, not from the number of chances against it, considered independently, but from the number of chances against it, *compared* with those which *lie* against some other supposition, ... 23

The Argument from *Progressive Approach*, derives its force from the order in which a series of arguments is considered, and from their progressive tendency to produce a certain result, . . . 24, 25

"Example" comprehends Arguments by Induction, by Experience, by Analogy, by parity of Reasoning, all of which are fundamentally the same, ... 25

In arguments of this kind, it is assumed, as a major premiss, that what is true of the individual adduced, is true of the whole class to which

PAGE

he belongs; the minor premiss next asserts something of the individual, and the same is then inferred of the whole class, there being in every example, a *reference* to some *Cause*, though the cause may be unknown, ... 26

"Induction" is contradistinguished from Example by its stopping short at the general conclusion, ... 26

"Example" is strictly applicable only to the premises from which we argue, not to the inferences we draw, ... 27

"Analogy" is contradistinguished from *direct* resemblance, as only "a resemblance of ratios," applicable where the case *from* which and the case *to* which we argue, are not themselves like, but stand in a similar *relation* to something else, ... 27, 28

In this argument, the resemblance or analogy is not to be considered as extending further, *i.e.* to more particulars, than it actually does, . 28

The "Argument from Contraries" falls under this class, since Contraries must have something in common, and it is so far forth only as they *agree* that they are thus employed, ... 28

"Parity of Reasoning" denotes analogical reasoning, ... 29

"Fictitious Examples" if not wanting in *probability*, may be as convincing as Real Examples; but not so where the fiction is a mere *petitio principii*, ... 29

"Fables" are preferable for argumentative purposes, to Tales, not only because of their greater brevity, but because those resemblances are the most *striking*, where the things compared, as in Fables, are of the most *dissimilar nature*, ... 30

It is essential to bear in mind the distinction between Examples used as Arguments to *prove* a thing, and Examples used simply by way of *explanation* or of fanciful illustration, their more frequent use, . 31, 32

Invented Examples, having the force of Arguments, must be distinguished from *Comparisons* introduced for the sake of ornament, in the form either of simile or, more especially, of metaphor, ... 33

SECTION 3.—OF THE VARIOUS USE AND ORDER OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS AND OF ARGUMENTS IN DIFFERENT CASES.

RULE I.—To consider whether the principal object of the discourse is to *give satisfaction to a candid mind* and convey *instruction* to those who are ready to receive it (an object more generally to be accomplished by arguments from Cause to Effect); or to *compel* the assent or silence the objections of an opponent; *arguments* giving satisfaction to a candid mind having often less weight in controversy, and *vice versâ*, ... 31

RULE II.—Matters of opinion (wherein we are not properly said to *know* but to *judge*) are established chiefly by *Antecedent Probability* (argu-

PAGE

ments from Cause to Effect); and the Testimony of wise men; *Past Facts*, chiefly by Signs (including also Testimony); *Future Events* by Antecedent Probabilities and Examples, ... 32

RULE III.—Where both classes of arguments are used, those from Cause to Effect have precedence, in order to remove the common prejudice against the *abstractedly* improbable, ... 34

RULE IV.—A proposition *well-known*, whether easy to be established or not, should in general be stated at once, and the proofs subjoined; if not familiar to the hearers, or likely to be unacceptable, it is better to state the arguments, or some of them, first, and gradually introduce the conclusion, ... 36

RULE V.—The Argument *a priori* having been introduced in the proof of the main propositions, Causes need not be adduced, . . . 37

RULE VI.—The Refutation of Objections, except, perhaps, where these are very powerful, should be placed amidst the other arguments, nearer the beginning than the end, ... 38

There is no distinct class of Refutatory arguments, but a proposition may be refuted—1, by proving the contradictory of it; 2, by overturning the arguments on which it rests, ... 38-39

"Indirect Reasoning," and "Direct Reasoning" are employed indifferently in Refutation; the Direct method being preferable in Sciences, the Indirect in Controversy, ... 40

"Indirect Reasoning" by means of the Destructive Conditional, may be stated directly, ... 40

"Indirect Reasoning," by placing the sophistry of an adversary in a ludicrous point of view, involves the danger that your whole argument may be regarded as a mere joke by those who do not appreciate the combination of wit with sound reasoning, ... 41-42

It is in scientific reasoning alone that all the arguments which lead to a false conclusion must be fallacious; in *moral* or *probable* reasoning there may be sound arguments and valid objections on both sides, the only question being on which side is the *greater* probability, . . 42

RULE VII.—The arguments to be placed first in order are *cæteris paribus* such as naturally first occur; it being advisable, when these are also the strongest arguments, to *recapitulate* in a *reverse order*, so as to destroy the appearance of anti-climax, ... 43

SECTION 4.—OF INTRODUCTION.

A Proem, Preface, Exordium, or Introduction, though not an essential, is an advisable part of Composition; it should be suggested by the main argument, ... 44

The "Introduction Inquisitive" is to show that the subject is important, curious, or otherwise interesting, ... 44

PAGE

The "Introduction Paradoxical" is to arouse the attention by setting forth as strongly as possible, the paradoxical character of any point to be proved, ... 44

The "Introduction Corrective" is to show that the subject has been neglected, misunderstood, or misrepresented by others, . . . 45

The "Introduction Preparatory" is to explain some peculiarity in the reasoning, to guard against any mistake as to the object proposed, or to apologize for some deficiency, ... 45

CHAPTER II.

OF PERSUASION.

Persuasion, *i.e.* the art of influencing the *will*—of which the conviction of the understanding is an essential part—depends on 1. Arguments to prove the expediency of the means proposed; and 2. Exhortation to adopt those means, by representing the end as desirable, . . 46

Appeals are unfair to such Passions or Feelings as *ought not to influence the decision* of the matter in hand, ... 47

The orator must seek to establish for himself, in contrast with his adversary, a character of 1. Good Principle; 2. Good Sense; 3. Good Will toward his audience, but avoiding direct self-commendation, 49, 57, 58, 59, 64

The address to any Passion, Sentiment, &c., must not be introduced openly as such, lest the hearers take offence at the orator's implied superiority in moral feeling; but the case is otherwise with Argumentation, a superiority in which merely suggests in him greater attention to the particular subject, ... 50

Effectually to excite emotion, the orator should dwell in detail, but obliquely, upon striking circumstances collaterally connected with the main object, and affected by it; the case is otherwise in argumentation, where all *Expansion* and Repetition beyond what is necessary to produce conviction, is tedious, ... 51–52

Comparison, *i.e.* a parallel between the case in hand and another of the same class, the former being represented, ultimately, as much stronger than the latter, is a powerful means of exciting or heightening emotion; the recourse to several successive steps of this kind is the principal employment of the Climax, ... 52

As regards the tone of feeling to be manifested by the writer or speaker, in order to excite emotion, he may either express the feeling openly, or seem labouring to suppress it; taking care to avoid exaggeration in the one case, or an appearance of affectation in the other, . . 54

When the occasion or object is not likely to arouse the requisite emotion, it is a common rhetorical artifice, coming under the head of *Irrelevant*

PAGE

Conclusion, to stimulate the attention of the audience by some exciting subject, and then to apply the passion excited to the purpose in hand, ... 55

Mr. Bentham is an instance that powers, however great, must be wasted, where science is applied to party or other purposes, foreign to its precise end, ... 56

In all argumentation, as in all appeals to the feelings, consideration must be had to the character of the audience, whether learned or ignorant, of what profession, &c. 58

The orator must keep his own rhetorical skill out of sight, the object being the conviction of his hearers, not their admiration; but, by way of warning, he may extol that of his adversary, ... 60–61

An appeal to party spirit is a powerful engine, identity of party with one's audience giving a sort of credit, which may be claimed more openly than any other, and throwing discredit on one's adversary, . 62

As to the authority derived from Experience; 1. Time alone does not constitute Experience; and 2. The longest practice in conducting any business in one way does not necessarily confer experience in conducting it in a different way, ... 64

The *place* for the disparagement of an opponent is, for the first speaker, near the close of his discourse, in order to weaken the force of what may be said in reply; for the opponent, near the opening, to lessen the force of what has been said, ... 65

A personal or other feeling against the speaker, must be met by arousing some contrary emotion, or by turning the anger or laughter of the hearers against some other object, ... 65, 66

CHAPTER III.

STYLE.

Section 1.—Perspicuity of Style.

The first requisite of Style in Rhetoric, is Perspicuity, having reference to the class of Persons addressed, and to the *degree* and *kind* of attention likely to be given, ... 67

As in physics, the stomach cannot efficiently act without a certain degree of distention, so the generality of minds cannot digest and assimilate what is presented to them in too small a compass. But a *prolix* style is also attended by danger. As a medium between prolixity and over-conciseness, recourse should be had to Repetition of the same Statement or Argument in different forms, ... 68

Uncommon, or "hard" words should be avoided; and in addressing the lower orders, terms of Saxon origin should be preferred, . . 69

The style addressed to the more illiterate, while strictly perspicuous,

PAGE

must not be dry or unadorned; amongst other ornaments, Metaphor is the clearest mode of expression, ... 70

In the construction of Sentences, let the aim be to have the meaning of each part taken in by the hearers, as you proceed; a very long sentence, so constructed, will be more readily followed than even a short sentence otherwise formed; though, as a rule, long sentences are to be avoided, ... 70

Perspicuity should be the rule, even where the design is sophistical, using style not as a mist to dim the appearance of objects, but as a coloured glass to disguise them, ... 72

Obscurity of Style is, in fact, only apposite, where the object is, *there being nothing to be said*, to *appear to say something*, an artifice distinguishable from Sophistry, in that it does not aim to convince, though with an ignorant or designing audience, it sometimes answers the purpose of argument, while it is always valuable where the object is to *occupy time*, ... 72, 73

Perspicuity, again, may be disregarded where the object is merely to excite admiration of the Speaker's Eloquence, in which case, the mystical and obscure, couched in sounding language, will, with a common audience, suffice, ... 75, 76

Section 2.—Energy of Style.

Energy or Vivacity of Style depends on 1. The choice of words; 2. Their number; 3, Their arrangement.

Words are to be considered under two classes: Proper, Appropriate, and Ordinary Terms; and Uncommon terms, or Common transferred to an uncommon meaning, or employed in an uncommon way, . 76, 77

In choosing Proper Terms, the chief rule is to prefer Specific or Singular Terms, *i.e.*, those which are the least *abstract* and general, . . 77

The "Synecdoche," or use of terms, *less* general than are appropriate, adds greatly to Energy, ... 78

The "Metaphor" differs from the Simile or Comparison only in form: in the latter, the resemblance is *stated*, in the former, implied, . 79

The Metaphor, when sufficiently simple to be at once comprehended, is preferable to the Comparison, especially in Prose; where pure Metaphor is inadmissible, a mixture of metaphor with simile should be had recourse to, ... 80

Metaphors, like Epithets or Metonomy, may be employed either to elevate or degrade the subject, ... 81

Metaphors which illustrate an *intellectual* by a sensible object, largely conduce to Energy; but the greatest energy is effected by Metaphors which attribute *life* and *action* to *inanimate* things, peculiarly in the English language, from its ordinary strict application of the neuter gender to neuter objects, ... 82

PAGE

Metaphors to be thoroughly effective, should be formed for the occasion, and have combined with them an explanatory Proper Term, . 83

Mixed Metaphors, and such as are complex, or so far pursued as to approach the Allegory, must be avoided, ... 83

The question is not whether an expression is *striking* in itself, but whether, better than another phrase, it explains a *meaning*, or more forcibly impresses a *sentiment*, ... 84

High Sounding Epithets, accumulated upon objects in themselves great, beautiful, or otherwise admirable, create, in well-constituted minds, disgust; when used to cover poverty of thought, sentiment, or argument, indignation also; but Epithets moderately and judiciously applied, conduce to Energy, ... 84, 85

Epithets should only be used to *explain* a metaphor, or to express something important to the purpose which might not occur spontaneously to the hearer. Epithets, in fact, are, with a skilful orator, *abridged arguments*, the force of which is conveyed by a mere hint, . . 85

Antiquated, Foreign, New-Coined, or New-Compounded words, should be used sparingly, lest they suggest the idea of Artifice, very detrimental to Energy, ... 86

Prose writers should make no distinct efforts in the choice of words, with a view to their Imitative or Appropriate Sound, but trust for energy and expression in this respect to the spontaneous occurrence of suitable words, ... 86–88

Technical language, when the meaning can be adequately or tolerably expressed in common words, should be avoided, even in the Theological style, ... 88, 89

The fewer words you employ, if these are apposite, the greater the energy, Repetition obviating any disadvantage of conciseness, . 90, 91

One distinction between Verbosity and the *Pleonasm* is, that in the latter there are words which add nothing to the sense; in the former, not only single words, but whole clauses, may have a meaning, and yet it were better to omit them, because what they mean is unimportant. Another reason is, that in a proper *Pleonasm*, a complete correction is always made by razing, which is not always the case with Verbosity, ... 93

The true aim of an author, studious of Energetic brevity, should be a *suggestive* style, putting the hearer's mind into the *same train of thought* with his own, and suggesting to him more than is actually expressed, 96

Real Copiousness of Diction consists not in a multitude of synonymes and circumlocutions, but in the command of a suitable expression for each different modification of thought, ... 97

The Simple rule for the Arrangement of Sentences, is in the Collocation to direct the attention, as nearly as possible, to those which are most emphatic, ... 99, 100

PAGE

A Period, *i.e.*, a sentence, simple or complex, so framed that the grammatical construction will not admit of a close before the end of it, has the advantage, *cæteris paribus*, over a *loose* sentence, in point of energy, ... 101

The component clauses of a period should be framed on the same principle with the period itself; of two clauses the shorter should be put *last*, ... 103

It is greatly conducive to the improvement of style to practise casting sentences into a variety of forms, ... 104

Antithesis adds much to energy when discreetly used. In a true Antithesis the opposition is always in the *ideas* expressed. The Antithesis may sometimes be more happily expressed by sacrificing the Period, 104–106

SECTION 3.—ELEGANCE OF STYLE.

When it is necessary to elect between Energy and Elegance, prefer the former, the universal rule for orators and prose writers, being to convey the effect not by *wanting to say something*, but by *having something to say*. In Poetry, whose ultimate end is to *give pleasure*, the aim, on the contrary, is Elegance or Beauty, ... 108, 109

Good Poetry may be defined,—Elegant and decorated language in metre expressing such and such thoughts; Good Prose,—Such and such thoughts expressed in good language; that which is primary in each being subordinate in the other, ... 110

Poetry has the same relation to Prose, as Dancing to Walking, and Singing to Speaking, ... 112

CHAPTER IV.

ELOCUTION.

The requisites of Elocution correspond, in great measure, with those of style; Correct Enunciation (answering to Purity and Grammatical Propriety), Perspicuity, Energy, and Elegance, . . . 113, 114

The distinction between Reading aloud and Speaking is this: the object of correct reading is to convey to the hearers, through the medium of the ear, what is conveyed to the reader by the eye; Speaking conveys by the sounds which reach the ear, the idea that what is said is the effusion of the speaker's mind, which he is desirous of imparting to others, ... 114

The first requisite in Reading is, that the reader not only Understands, but manifestly appears to Understand what he is reading, . . 118

The Artificial System is imperfect, 1. because though the *emphatic* word in each sentence may easily be pointed out in writing, no variety of marks that could be invented, not even musical notation, would

PAGE

suffice to indicate the different *tones* in which the different emphatic words should be pronounced; 2. because it is wholly circuitous; 3. because it can never secure a Natural delivery, . . . 120–122

To attain the Natural manner, the rule is not only to pay no studied attention to the Voice, but studiously to *withdraw* the thoughts from it, and to dwell as intently as possible on the Sense; trusting to nature to suggest spontaneously the proper emphases and tones, . 122

The advantages of Tuition and Practice are in a great degree precluded by the Natural Manner, but the INFALLIBLE GUIDE, Nature, carefully observed, will produce far higher advantages, . . . 122, 137

The Natural Style equally befits a religious discourse, the speaker, if a man of sense and taste, being guarded by the seriousness of the subject from undue colloquiality, ... 127

The phenomena that a person who can express his sentiments to a friend in language perfectly suitable to a large audience, finds it difficult to address them to a large audience; that the same sentiments in the same language have more effect upon an assembly than upon one or two individuals; that the *agonistic* style, or a bold, though less accurate language, is advisable in addressing a crowd; and the effect upon the multitude of the Ludicrous, are accountable for in the complex play of sympathies which takes place in large audiences, 130, 131

The Natural Manner encourages original composition, from the difficulty of adequately delivering the compositions of other persons, 134

The Recitation of Speeches by boys at school, is not merely useless, but absolutely pernicious, with a view to public speaking in after life, from its inevitable artificiality, ... 135

The Natural Manner enables the speaker to *make himself heard* more distinctly, at a greater distance and with far less exertion and fatigue to himself, ... 136

The requisite degree of *loudness* will be best ascertained, not by thinking about the voice, but by *looking* at the most *distant* of the hearers, and addressing one's self especially to him; the voice rises *spontaneously* when we address a person who is not very near, . . 136

Natural, Spontaneous *gesture*, not ungraceful nor inappropriate in itself, and kept within moderation, should not be repressed. The *Natural* point of time for gesture, is shortly *preceding* the utterance of the words emphasized, and not *during* or *after*, ... 139

RHETORIC.

INTRODUCTORY SECTION.

Of Rhetoric various definitions have been given by different writers; who, however, seem not so much to have disagreed in their conceptions of the nature of the same thing, as to have had different things in view while they employed the same terms. Not only the word Rhetoric itself, but also those used in defining it, have been taken in various senses; as may be observed with respect to the word "Art" in Cic. *de Orat.* where a discussion is introduced as to the applicability of that term to Rhetoric; manifestly turning on the different senses in which "Art" may be understood.

To enter into an examination of all the definitions that have been given, would lead to much uninteresting and uninstructive verbal controversy. It is sufficient to put the reader on his guard against the common error of supposing that a general term has some real object, properly corresponding to it, independent of our conceptions; —that, consequently, some one definition is to be found which will comprehend every thing that is rightly designated by that term;— and that all others must be erroneous; whereas in fact it will often happen, as in the present instance, that both the wider, and the more restricted sense of a term, will be alike sanctioned by use, (the only competent authority;) and that the consequence will be a corresponding variation in the definitions employed, none of which perhaps may be fairly chargeable with error, though none can be framed that will apply to every acceptation of the term.

It is evident that in its primary signification, Rhetoric had reference to public *Speaking* alone, as its etymology implies: but as most of the rules for speaking are of course applicable equally to writing, an extension of the term naturally took place; and we find even Aristotle, the earliest systematic writer on the subject whose works have come down to us, including in his Treatise such compositions as were not intended to be publicly recited.[1] And even as far as relates to Speeches, properly so called, he takes, in the same Treatise, at one time a wider, and at another a more restricted view of the subject; including under the term Rhetoric, in the opening of his work, nothing beyond the finding of topics of Persuasion, as far as regards the

1 Arist. *Rhet.* Book III.

matter of what is spoken; and afterwards embracing the consideration of Style, Arrangement, and Delivery.

The invention of Printing, by extending the sphere of operation of the Writer, has of course contributed to the extension of those terms which in their primary signification had reference to Speaking alone. Many objects are now accomplished through the medium of the Press, which formerly came under the exclusive province of the Orator; and the qualifications requisite for success are so much the same in both cases, that we apply the term "Eloquent" as readily to a Writer as to a Speaker; though etymologically considered it could only belong to the latter. Indeed "Eloquence" is often attributed even to such compositions, *e.g.* Historical works, as have in view an object entirely different from any that could be proposed by an Orator; because *some part* of the rules to be observed in Oratory, or rules analogous to these, are applicable to such compositions. Conformably to this view therefore, some writers have spoken of Rhetoric as the Art of Composition, universally; or, with the exclusion of Poetry alone, as embracing all Prose composition.

A still wider extension of the province of Rhetoric has been contended for by some of the ancient writers; who thinking it necessary to include, as belonging to the Art, every thing that could conduce to the attainment of the object proposed, introduced into their systems Treatises on Law, Morals, Politics, &c. on the ground that a knowledge of these subjects was requisite to enable a man to speak well on them; and even insisted on Virtue,[2] as an essential qualification of a perfect Orator, because a good character, which can in no way be so surely established as by deserving it, has great weight with the audience.

These notions are combated by Aristotle; who attributes them either to the ill-cultivated understanding (ἀπαιδευσία) of those who maintained them, or to their arrogant and pretending disposition, ἀλαζονεία; *i.e.* a desire to extol and magnify the Art they professed. In the present day, the extravagance of such doctrines is so apparent to most readers, that it would not be worth while to take much pains in refuting them. It is worthy of remark, however, that the very same erroneous view is, even now, often taken of Logic, (as was remarked under that article;) which has been considered by some as a kind of system of universal knowledge, on the ground that argument may be employed on all subjects, and that no one can argue well on a subject which he does not understand; and which has been complained of by others as not supplying any such universal instruction as its unskilful advocates have placed within its province; such as in fact no one Art or System can possibly afford.

The error is precisely the same in respect of Rhetoric and of Logic;

[2] See Quinctilian.

both being *instrumental* arts; and, as such, applicable to various kinds of subject-matter, which do not properly come under them.

So judicious an author as Quinctilian would not have failed to perceive, had he not been carried away by an inordinate veneration for his own Art, that as the possession of building materials is no part of the art of Architecture, though it is impossible to build without materials, so, the knowledge of the subjects on which the Orator is to speak, constitutes no part of the art of Rhetoric, though it be essential to its successful employment; and that though virtue and the good reputation it procures, add materially to the Speaker's influence, they are no more to be, for that reason, considered as belonging to the Orator, as such, than wealth, rank, or a good person, which manifestly have a tendency to produce the same effect.

In the present day, however, the province of Rhetoric, in the widest acception that would be reckoned admissible, comprehends all "Composition in Prose;" in the narrowest sense, it would be limited to "Persuasive Speaking."

We propose in the present article to adopt a middle course between these two extreme points; and to treat of *Argumentative Composition* generally, and exclusively; considering Rhetoric (in conformity with our original plan, and with the very just and philosophical view of Aristotle) as an off-shoot from Logic.

It was remarked in our article on that Science, that Reasoning may be considered as applicable to two purposes, which we ventured to designate respectively by the terms "Inferring, and Proving;" *i.e.* the ascertainment of the truth by investigation, and the establishment of it to the satisfaction of another: and it was there remarked, that Bacon, in his *Organon*, had laid down rules for the conduct of the former of these processes, and that the latter belonged to the province of Rhetoric: and it was added, that to *infer* is to be regarded as the proper office of the Philosopher,—to *prove*, of the Advocate. It is not, however, to be understood, that Philosophical works are to be excluded from the class to which Rhetorical rules are applicable; for the Philosopher who undertakes, by writing or speaking, to convey his notions to others, assumes for the time being, the character of Advocate of the doctrines he maintains; the process of *investigation* must be supposed completed, and certain conclusions arrived at by that process, before he begins to impart his ideas to others in a treatise or lecture; the object of which must of course be to *prove* the justness of those conclusions. And in doing this, he will not always find it expedient to adhere to the same course of reasoning by which his own discoveries were originally made; other arguments may occur to him afterwards, more clear or more concise, or better adapted to the understanding of those he addresses. In explaining, therefore, and establishing the truth, he may often have occasion for rules of a different kind from those employed in its discovery. Accordingly,

when we remarked, in the article above alluded to, that it is a common fault, for those engaged in Philosophical and Theological inquiries, to forget their own peculiar office, and assume that of the Advocate, improperly, this caution is to be understood as applicable to the process of *forming their own opinions;* not, as excluding them from advocating by all fair arguments, the conclusions at which they have arrived by candid investigation. But if this candid investigation do not take place in the first instance, no pains that they may bestow in searching for arguments, will have any tendency to ensure their attainment of truth. If a man begins (as is too plainly a frequent mode of proceeding) by hastily adopting or strongly leaning to some opinion, which suits his inclination, or which is sanctioned by some authority that he blindly venerates, and then studies with the utmost diligence, not as an Investigator of Truth, but as an Advocate labouring to prove his point, his talents and his researches, whatever effect they may produce in making converts to his notions, will avail nothing in enlightening his own judgment and securing him from error.

Composition, however, of the Argumentative kind, may be considered (as has been above stated) as coming under the province of Rhetoric. And this view of the subject is the less open to objection, inasmuch as it is not likely to lead to discussions that can be deemed superfluous, even by those who may choose to consider Rhetoric in the most restricted sense, as relating only to "Persuasive Speaking;" since it is evident that *Argument* must be, in most cases at least, the basis of Persuasion.

We propose then, to treat first, and principally, of the Discovery of Arguments, and of their Arrangement; secondly, to lay down some Rules respecting the excitement and management of the Passions, with a view to the attainment of any object proposed,—principally, Persuasion in the strict sense, *i.e.* the influencing of the Will; thirdly, to offer some remarks on Style; and fourthly, to treat of Elocution.

It may be expected that before we proceed to treat of the Art in question, we should present our readers with a sketch of its history. Little, however, is required to be said on this head, because the present is not one of those branches of study in which we can trace with interest a progressive improvement from age to age. It is one, on the contrary, to which more attention appears to have been paid, and in which greater proficiency is supposed to have been made, in the earliest days of Science and Literature, than at any subsequent period. Among the ancients, Aristotle, who was the earliest, may safely be pronounced to be also the best, of the systematic writers on Rhetoric. Cicero is hardly to be reckoned among the number; for he delighted so much more in the practice than in the theory of his art, that he is perpetually drawn off from the rigid Philosophical analysis of its principles, into discursive declamations, always eloquent indeed,

and often highly interesting, but adverse to regularity of system, and frequently as unsatisfactory to the practical student as to the Philosopher. He abounds indeed with excellent practical remarks, though the best of them are scattered up and down his works with much irregularity; but his precepts, though of great weight, as being the result of experience, are not often traced up by him to first principles; and we are frequently left to guess, not only on what basis his rules are grounded, but in what cases they are applicable. Of this latter defect a remarkable instance will be hereafter cited.

Quinctilian is indeed a systematic writer; but cannot be considered as having much extended the Philosophical views of his predecessors in this department. He possessed much good sense, but this was tinctured with pedantry;—with that ἀλαζονεία as Aristotle calls it, which extends to an extravagant degree the province of the Art which he professes. A great part of his work indeed is a Treatise on education generally, in the conduct of which he was no mean proficient; for such was the importance attached to public Speaking, even long after the downfall of the Republic had cut off the Orator from the hopes of attaining, through the means of this qualification, the highest political importance, that he who was nominally a Professor of Rhetoric, had in fact the most important branches of instruction intrusted to his care.

Many valuable maxims however are to be found in this author; but he wanted the profundity of thought, and power of analysis which Aristotle possessed.

The writers on Rhetoric among the ancients whose works are lost, seem to have been numerous; but most of them appear to have confined themselves to a very narrow view of the subject; and to have been occupied, as Aristotle complains, with the minor details of style and arrangement, and with the sophistical tricks and petty artifices of the Pleader, instead of giving a masterly and comprehensive sketch of the essentials.

Among the moderns, few writers of ability have turned their thoughts to the subject; and but little has been added, either in respect of matter, or of system, to what the ancients have left us. It were most unjust however to leave unnoticed Dr. Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric:* a work which does not enjoy indeed so high a degree of popular favour as Dr. Blair's, but is incomparably superior to it, not only in depth of thought and ingenious original research, but also in practical utility to the student. The title of Dr. Campbell's work has perhaps deterred many readers, who had concluded it to be more abstruse and less popular in its character than it really is. Amidst much however that is readily understood by any moderately intelligent reader, there is much also that calls for some exertion of thought, which the indolence of most readers refuses to bestow. And it must be owned that he also in some instances perplexes his readers by being

perplexed himself, and bewildered in the discussion of questions through which he does not clearly see his way. His great defect, which not only leads him into occasional errors, but leaves many of his best ideas but imperfectly developed, is his ignorance and utter misconception of the nature and object of Logic, on which some remarks were made in our article on that Science. Rhetoric being in truth an off-shoot of Logic, that Rhetorician must labour under great disadvantages who is not only ill-acquainted with that system, but also utterly unconscious of his deficiency.

From a general view of the history of Rhetoric, two questions naturally suggest themselves, which on examination will be found very closely connected together: 1st, what is the cause of the careful and extensive cultivation, among the ancients, of an Art which the moderns have comparatively neglected; and 2dly, whether the former or the latter are to be regarded as the wiser in this respect;—in other words, whether Rhetoric be worth any diligent cultivation.

With regard to the first of these questions, the answer generally given is that the nature of the Government in the ancient democratical States caused a demand for public speakers, and for such speakers as should be able to gain influence not only with educated persons in dispassionate deliberation, but with a promiscuous multitude; and accordingly it is remarked, that the extinction of liberty brought with it, or at least brought after it, the decline of Eloquence; as is justly remarked (though in a courtly form) by the author of the dialogue on Oratory, which passes under the name of Tacitus: "*Quid enim opus est longis in Senatu sententiis, cum optimi cito consentiant? quid, multis apud populum concionibus, cum de Republica non imperiti et multi deliberent, sed sapientissimus, et unus?*"

This account of the matter is undoubtedly correct as far as it goes; but the importance of public speaking is so great, in our own, and all other countries that are not under a despotic Government, that the apparent neglect of the study of Rhetoric seems to require some further explanation. Part of this explanation may be supplied by the consideration, that the difference in this respect between the ancients and ourselves, is not so great in reality as in appearance. When the only way of addressing the public was by orations, and when all political measures were debated in popular assemblies, the characters of Orator, Author, and Politician, almost entirely coincided; he who would communicate his ideas to the world, or would gain political power, and carry his legislative schemes into effect, was necessarily a Speaker; since as Pericles is made to remark by Thucydides, "one who forms a judgment on any point, but cannot explain himself clearly to the people, might as well have never thought at all on the subject."[3] The consequence was, that almost all who sought, and

[3] Thucydides, Book II.

all who professed to give, instruction, in the principles of Government, and the conduct of judicial proceedings, combined these, in their minds and in their practice, with the study of Rhetoric, which was necessary to give effect to all such attainments; and in time the Rhetorical writers (of whom Aristotle makes that complaint) came to consider the Science of Legislation and of Politics in general, as a part of their own Art.

Much therefore of what was formerly studied under the name of Rhetoric is still, under other names, as generally and as diligently studied as ever.

It cannot be denied, however, that a great difference, though less, as we have said, than might at first sight appear, does exist between the ancients and the moderns in this point;—that what is strictly and properly called Rhetoric, is much less studied, at least less systematically studied, now, than formerly. Perhaps this also may be in some measure accounted for from the circumstances which have been just noticed. Such is the distrust excited by any suspicion of Rhetorical artifice, that every speaker or writer who is anxious to carry his point, endeavours to disown or to keep out of sight, any superiority of skill; and wishes to be considered as relying rather on the strength of his cause, and the soundness of his views, than on his ingenuity and expertness as an advocate. Hence it is, that even those who have paid the greatest and the most successful attention to the study of Composition and of Elocution, are so far from encouraging others by example or recommendation to engage in the same pursuit, that they labour rather to conceal and disavow their own proficiency; and thus, theoretical rules are decried, even by those who owe the most to them. Whereas among the ancients, the same cause did not, for the reasons lately mentioned, operate to the same extent; since, however careful any speaker might be to disown the artifices of Rhetoric properly so called, he would not be ashamed to acknowledge himself, generally, a student, or a proficient in an Art which was understood to include the elements of Political wisdom.

With regard to the other question proposed, *viz.* concerning the utility of Rhetoric, it is to be observed that it divides itself into two; 1st, whether Oratorical skill be, on the whole, a public benefit, or evil; and 2dly, whether any artificial System of Rules is conducive to the attainment of that skill. The former of these questions was eagerly debated among the ancients; on the latter but little doubt seems to have existed. With us, on the contrary, the state of these questions seems nearly reversed. It seems generally admitted that skill in Composition and in speaking, liable as it evidently is, to abuse, is to be considered, on the whole, as advantageous to the public; because that liability to abuse is neither in this, nor in any other case, to be considered as conclusive against the utility of any kind of art, faculty, or profession;—because the evil effects of misdirected power,

require that equal powers should be arrayed on the opposite side;—and because truth having an intrinsic superiority over falsehood, may be expected to prevail when the skill of the contending parties is equal; which will be the more likely to take place, the more widely such skill is diffused. But many, perhaps most persons, are inclined to the opinion that Eloquence either in writing or speaking, is either a natural gift, or at least, is to be acquired only by practice, and is not to be attained or improved by any system of rules. And this opinion is favoured not least by those (as has been just observed) whose own experience would enable them to decide very differently; and it certainly seems to be in a great degree practically adopted. Most persons, if not left entirely to the disposal of chance in respect of this branch of education, are at least left to acquire what they can by *practice*, such as school or college exercises afford, without much care being taken to initiate them systematically into the principles of the Art; and that, frequently, not so much from negligence in the conductors of education, as from their doubts of the utility of any such regular system.

It certainly must be admitted, that rules not constructed on broad Philosophical principles, are more likely to cramp, than to assist the operations of our faculties;—that a pedantic display of technical skill is more detrimental in this than in any other pursuit, since by exciting distrust, it counteracts the very purpose of it;—that a system of rules imperfectly comprehended, or not familiarized by practice, will, (while that continues to be the case,) prove rather an impediment than a help; as indeed will be found in all other Arts likewise;—and that no system can be expected to equalise men whose natural powers are different: but none of these concessions at all invalidate the positions of Aristotle; that some succeed better than others in explaining their opinions, and bringing over others to them; and that, not merely by superiority of natural gifts, but by acquired habit; and that consequently if we can discover the causes of this superior success,—the means by which the desired end is attained by all who *do* attain it,—we shall be in possession of rules capable of general application: ὅπερ ἐστὶ, says he, τεχνῆς ἔργον.[4] Experience so plainly evinces, what indeed we might naturally be led antecedently to conjecture, that a right judgment on any subject is not necessarily accompanied by skill in effecting conviction,—nor the ability to discover truth, by a facility in explaining it,—that it might be matter of wonder how any doubt should ever have existed as to the possibility of devising, and the utility of employing, a System of Rules for "Argumentative Composition," generally, distinct from any system conversant about the subject-matter of each composition. It is probable that the existing prejudices on this subject may be traced in

[4] *Rhet.* Book I. Ch. I.

great measure to the imperfect or incorrect notions of some writers, who have either confined their attention to trifling minutiæ of style, or at least have in some respect failed to take a sufficiently comprehensive view of the principles of the Art. One distinction especially is to be clearly laid down and carefully borne in mind by those who would form a correct idea of those principles; *viz.* the distinction already noticed under the article Logic, between *an* Art, and *the* Art. "*An* Art of Reasoning" would imply, "a System of Rules by the observance of which one may Reason correctly;" "*the* Art of Reasoning" would imply a System of Rules to which every one *does* conform, (whether knowingly, or not,) who reasons correctly: and such is Logic, considered as an Art. In like manner, "*an* Art of Composition" would imply "a System of Rules by which a good Composition may be produced;" "*the* Art of Composition,"—"such rules as *every* good Composition must conform to," whether the Author of it had them in his mind or not. Of the former character appear to have been (among others) many of the Logical and Rhetorical Systems of Aristotle's predecessors in those departments: he himself evidently takes the other and more Philosophical view of both branches: as appears (in the case of Rhetoric) both from the plan he sets out with, that of investigating the causes of the success of all who do succeed in effecting conviction, and from several passages occurring in various parts of his Treatise, which indicate how sedulously he was on his guard to conform to that plan. Those who have not attended to the important distinction just alluded to, are often disposed to feel wonder, if not weariness, at his reiterated remarks, that "*all* men effect persuasion either in this way or in that;" "it is *impossible* to attain such and such an object in any other way;" &c. which doubtless were intended to remind his readers of the nature of his design; *viz.* not, to teach *an* Art of Rhetoric, but *the* Art;—not, to instruct them merely how conviction *might* be produced, but how it *must*.

If this distinction were carefully kept in view by the teacher and by the learner of Rhetoric, we should no longer hear complaints of the natural powers being fettered by the formalities of a System; since no such complaint can lie against a System whose Rules are drawn from the invariable practice of all who succeed in attaining their proposed object. No one would expect that the study of Sir Joshua Reynolds' lectures, would cramp the genius of the painter. No one complains of the Rules of Grammar as fettering Language; because it is understood that correct use is not founded on Grammar, but Grammar upon correct use. A just system of Logic or of Rhetoric, is analogous, in this respect, to Grammar.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE INVENTION, ARRANGEMENT, AND INTRODUCTION OF ARGUMENTS.

It has been formerly remarked in our Treatise on Logic, that in the process of *Investigation* properly so called, *viz.* that by which we endeavour to discover Truth, it must of course be uncertain to him who is entering on that process, what the conclusion will be, to which his researches will lead; but that in the process of *conveying truth* to others by reasoning, (*i.e.* that which according to the view we have at present taken, may be termed the Rhetorical process,) the conclusion or conclusions which are to be established must be present to the mind of him who is conducting the Argument, and whose business is to find *Proofs* of a given proposition.

It is evident therefore, that the first step to be taken by him, is, to lay down distinctly in his own mind, the proposition or propositions to be proved. It might indeed at first sight appear superfluous even to mention so obvious a rule; but experience shows that it is by no means uncommon for a young or ill-instructed writer to content himself with such a vague and indistinct view of the point he is to aim at, that the whole train of his reasoning is in consequence affected with a corresponding perplexity, obscurity, and looseness. It may be worth while therefore to give some hints for the conduct of this preliminary process,—the choice of propositions. Not, of course, that we are supposing the author to be in doubt what opinion he shall adopt: the process of Investigation (which does not fall within the province of Rhetoric) being supposed to be concluded; but still there will often be room for deliberation as to the form in which an opinion shall be stated, and, when several propositions are to be maintained, in what order they shall be placed.

On this head therefore we shall proceed to propose some rules; after having premised (in order to anticipate some objections or doubts which might arise) one remark relative to the object to be effected. This is of course what may be called, in the widest sense of the word, Conviction; but under that term are comprehended 1st, what is strictly called *Instruction;* and 2dly, *Conviction* in the narrower sense; *i.e.* the Conviction of those who are either of a *contrary opinion* to the one maintained, or who are *in doubt* whether to admit or deny it. By Instruction on the other hand, is commonly meant the Conviction of those who have neither formed an opinion on the subject,

nor are deliberating whether to adopt or reject the proposition in question, but are merely desirous of ascertaining *what* is the truth in respect of the case before them. The former are supposed to have before their minds the terms of the proposition maintained, and are called upon to consider *whether that particular proposition* be true or false; the latter are not supposed to know the terms of the conclusion, but to be inquiring *what proposition* is to be received as true. It is evident that the speaker or writer is, relatively to these last, (though not to himself,) conducting a process of Investigation; as is plain from what has been said of that subject, in the article LOGIC.

The distinction between these two objects gives rise in some points to corresponding differences in the mode of procedure, which will be noticed hereafter; these differences however are not sufficient to require that Rhetoric should on that account be divided into two distinct branches, since, generally speaking, though not universally, the same rules will be serviceable for attaining each of these objects.

§ 1. The first step is, as we have observed, to lay down (in the author's mind,) the proposition or propositions to be maintained, clearly, and in a suitable form. He who makes a point of observing this rule, and who is thus brought to view steadily the point he is aiming at, will be kept clear, in a great degree, of some common faults of young writers; *viz.* entering on too wide a field of discussion, and introducing many propositions not sufficiently connected; an error which destroys the unity of the composition. This last error those are apt to fall into, who place before themselves a *Term* instead of a *Proposition;* and imagine that because they are *treating of one thing,* they are *discussing one question.* In an Ethical work, for instance, one may be *treating of virtue,* while discussing all or any of these questions; "Wherein virtue consists?" "Whence our notions of it arise?" "Whence it derives its obligation?" &c., but if these questions were confusedly blended together, or if all of them were treated of within a short compass, the most just remarks and forcible arguments would lose their interest and their utility in so perplexed a composition.

Nearly akin to this fault, is the other just mentioned, that of entering on too wide a field for the length of the work; by which means the writer is confined to barren and uninteresting generalities; as *e.g.* in general exhortations to virtue, (conveyed, of course, in very general terms,) in the space of a discourse only of sufficient length to give a characteristic description of some one branch of duty, or of some one particular motive to the practice of it. Unpractised composers are apt to fancy that they shall have the greater abundance of matter, the wider extent of subject they comprehend; but experience shows that the reverse is the fact: the more general and extensive view will often suggest nothing to the mind but vague and trite remarks, when upon narrowing the field of discussion, many inter-

esting questions of detail present themselves. Now a writer who is accustomed to state to himself precisely, in the first instance, the conclusions to which he is tending, will be the less likely to content himself with such as consist of very general statements; and will often be led, even where an extensive view is at first proposed, to distribute it into several branches, and waiving the discussion of the rest, to limit himself to the full development of one or two; and thus applying, as it were, a microscope to a small space, will present to the view much that a wider survey would not have exhibited.

It may be useful, for one who is about thus to lay down his propositions, to ask himself these three questions: 1st, What is the fact? 2dly, Why (*i.e.* from what Cause) is it so; or, in other words, how is it accounted for? and 3dly, What Consequence results from it?

The last two of these questions, though they will not in every case suggest such answers, as are strictly to be called the Cause and the Consequence of the principal truth to be maintained, may, at least, often furnish such propositions as bear a somewhat similar relation to it.

It is to be observed, that in recommending the writer to begin by laying down in his own mind the propositions to be maintained, it is not meant to be implied that they are always to be *stated* first; that will depend upon the nature of the case, and rules will hereafter be given on that point.

It is to be observed also, that by the words "Proposition" or "Assertion," throughout this Treatise, is to be understood some *conclusion* to be established *for itself;* not with a view to an ulterior conclusion: those propositions which are intended to serve as premises, being called, in allowable conformity with popular usage, *Arguments;* it being customary to argue in the enthymematic form, and to call, for brevity's sake, the expressed premiss of an enthymeme, the argument by which the conclusion of it is proved.

OF ARGUMENTS.

§ 2. Arguments are divided according to several different principles; *i.e.* logically speaking, there are *several divisions* of them. And these *cross-divisions* have proved a source of endless perplexity to the Logical and Rhetorical student, because the writers on those subjects have not been aware of them. Hardly any thing perhaps has contributed so much to lessen the interest and the utility of systems of Rhetoric, as the indistinctness hence resulting. When in any subject the members of a division are not opposed, but are in fact members of different divisions crossing each other, it is manifestly impossible to obtain any clear notion of the species treated of; nor will any labour or ingenuity bestowed on the subject be of the least avail, till the original source of perplexity is removed;—till, in short, the cross-division is detected and explained.

Arguments then may be divided,

1st, Into Irregular, and Regular, *i.e.* Syllogisms; these last into Categorical and Hypothetical; and the former into Syllogisms in the first Figure, and in the other figures, &c. &c.

2dly, They are frequently divided into "Moral," (or "Probable,") and "Demonstrative," (or "Necessary.")

3dly, Into "Direct" and "Indirect," (or *reductio ad absurdum*,) the Deictic and Elenctic of Aristotle.

4thly, Into Arguments from "Example," from "Testimony," from "Cause to Effect," from "Analogy," &c. &c.

It will be perceived on attentive examination, that several of the different species just mentioned will occasionally *contain* each other; *e.g.* a probable Argument may be at the same time a Categorical Argument, a Direct Argument, and an Argument from Testimony, &c.; this being the consequence of Arguments having been divided on several different principles; a circumstance so obvious the moment it is distinctly stated, that we apprehend such of our readers as have not been conversant in these studies, will hardly be disposed to believe that it could have been (as is the fact) generally overlooked, and that eminent writers should in consequence have been involved in inextricable confusion. We need only remind them however of the anecdote of Columbus breaking the egg; that which is perfectly obvious to any man of common sense, as soon as it is mentioned, may nevertheless fail to occur, even to men of considerable ingenuity.

It will also be readily perceived, on examining the principles of these several divisions, that the last of them alone is properly and strictly a division of *Arguments as such.* The 1st is evidently a division of the *Forms of stating them;* for every one would allow that the *same* Argument may be either stated as an enthymeme, or brought into the strict syllogistic form; and that, either categorically or hypothetically, &c., *e.g.* "Whatever has a beginning has a cause; the earth had a beginning, therefore it had a cause;" or "*If* the earth had a beginning, it had a cause: it had a beginning," &c., every one would call the *same* Argument, differently stated. This, therefore, evidently is not a division of Arguments *as such.*

The 2d is plainly a division of Arguments according to their *subject-matter*, whether Necessary or Probable, certain or uncertain. In Mathematics, *e.g.* every proposition that can be stated is either an immutable truth, or an absurdity and contradiction; while in human affairs the propositions which we assume are only true for the most part, and as general rules; and in Physics, though they must be true as long as the laws of nature remain undisturbed, the contradiction of them does not imply an absurdity; and the conclusions of course, in each case, have the same degree and kind of certainty with the premises. This, therefore, is properly a division, not of *Arguments* as such, but of the *Propositions* of which they consist.

The 3d is a division of Arguments according to the purpose for which they are employed;—according to the *intention* of the reasoner; whether that be to establish "directly" (or "ostensively") the conclusion drawn, or ("indirectly") by means of an absurd conclusion to disprove one of the premises: (*i.e.* to prove its contradictory) since the alternative proposed in every valid Argument is, either to admit the conclusion, or to deny one of the premises. Now it may so happen that in some cases, one person will choose the former, and another the latter, of these alternatives. It is probable, *e.g.* that many have been induced to admit the doctrine of Transubstantiation, from its clear connection with the infallibility of the Romish Church; and many others, by the very same Argument, have surrendered their belief in that infallibility. Again, Berkley and Reid seem to have alike admitted that the non-existence of matter was a necessary consequence of Locke's Theory of Ideas; but the former was hence led, *bonâ fide*, to admit and advocate that non-existence, while the latter was led by the very same Argument to reject the Ideal Theory. Thus, we see it is possible for the very same Argument to be Direct to one person, and Indirect to another; leading them to different results, according as they judge the original conclusion, or the contradictory of a premiss, to be the more probable. This, therefore, is not properly a division of Arguments as such, but a division of the purposes for which they are employed.

The 4th, which alone is properly a division of Arguments as such, and accordingly will be principally treated of, is a division according to the "relation of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion." We say, "of the subject-matter," because the *logical* connection between the premises and conclusion is independent of the meaning of the terms employed, and may be exhibited with letters of the alphabet substituted for the terms; but the relation we are now speaking of between the premises and conclusion, (and the varieties of which form the several species of Arguments,) is in respect of their subject-matter; as *e.g.* an "Argument from Cause to Effect" is so called and considered, in reference to the relation existing between the premiss, which is the Cause, and the conclusion, which is the Effect; and an "Argument from Example," in like manner, from the relation between a known and an unknown instance, both belonging to the same class. And it is plain that the present division, though it has a reference to the subject-matter of the premises, is yet not a division of *propositions* considered by themselves, (as in the case with the division into probable and demonstrative,) but of *Arguments* considered as such; for when we say, *e.g.* that the premiss is a Cause, and the conclusion the Effect, these expressions are evidently relative, and have no meaning, except in reference to each other; and so also when we say that the premiss and the conclusion are two *parallel* cases, that very expression denotes their relation to each other.

In distributing, then, the several kinds of Arguments, according to this division, it will be found convenient to lay down first two great classes, under one or other of which all can be brought; *viz.* 1st, such Arguments as might have been employed to *account for* the fact or principle maintained, supposing its truth granted; 2d, such as could *not* be so employed. The former class (to which in this Treatise, the name of "*A priori*" Argument will be confined,) is manifestly Argument from *Cause* to Effect; since to *account* for any thing, signifies to assign the Cause of it. The other class, of course, comprehends all other Arguments, of which there are several kinds, which will be mentioned hereafter.

The two sorts of proof which have been just spoken of, Aristotle seems to have intended to designate by the titles of ὅτι for the latter, and διότι for the former; but he has not been so clear as could be wished, in observing the distinction between them. The only decisive test by which to distinguish the Arguments which belong to the one, and to the other of these classes is, to ask the question, "Supposing the proposition in question to be admitted, would this Argument serve to *account* for the truth, or not?" It will then be readily referred to the former or to the latter class, according as the answer is in the affirmative or the negative, as, *e.g.* if a murder were imputed to any one on the grounds of his "having a hatred to the deceased, and an interest in his death," the Argument would belong to the former class; because, *supposing* his guilt to be *admitted*, and an inquiry to be made how he came to commit the murder, the circumstances just mentioned would serve to *account* for it; but not so, with respect to such an Argument as his "having blood on his clothes;" which would therefore be referred to the other class.

And here let it be observed, once for all, that when we speak of arguing from Cause to Effect, it is not intended to maintain the real and proper efficacy of what are called Physical Causes to produce their respective Effects, nor to enter into any discussion of the controversies which have been raised on that point, which would be foreign from the present purpose. The word "Cause," therefore, is to be understood as employed in the popular sense; as well as the phrase of "accounting for" any fact.

As far, then, as any Cause, popularly speaking, has a tendency to produce a certain Effect, so far its existence is an Argument for that of the Effect. If the cause be fully *sufficient*, and no *impediments* intervene, the Effect in question follows certainly; and the nearer we approach to this, the stronger the Argument.

This is the kind of Argument which produces, (when short of absolute certainty,) that species of the Probable which is usually called the Plausible. On this subject Dr. Campbell has some valuable remarks in his *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (Book I. § 5. Ch. VII.) though he has been led into a good deal of perplexity, partly by not having

logically analyzed the two species of probabilities he is treating of, and partly by departing, unnecessarily, from the ordinary use of terms, in treating of the Plausible as something *distinct from* the Probable, instead of regarding it as a *species* of Probability.

This is the only kind of Probability which poets, or other writers of fiction, aim at; and in such works it is often designated by the term "natural." Writers of this class, as they aim not at producing belief, are allowed to take their "Causes" for granted, (*i.e.* to assume any hypothesis they please,) provided they make the Effects follow naturally; representing, that is, the personages of the fiction as acting, and the events as resulting, in the same manner as might have been expected, supposing the assumed circumstances to have been real. And hence, the great Father of Criticism establishes his paradoxical maxim, that impossibilities which appear probable, are to be preferred to possibilities which appear improbable. For, as he justly observes, the impossibility of the hypothesis, as *e.g.* in Homer, the familiar intercourse of God with mortals, is no bar to the kind of Probability required, if those mortals are represented as acting in the manner men naturally would have done under those circumstances.

The Probability, then, which the writer of fiction aims at, has, for the reason just mentioned, no tendency to produce a *particular*, but only a *general* belief; *i.e.* not that these particular events actually took place, but that *such* are likely, generally, to take place under such circumstances.[5] In Argumentative Compositions however, as the object of course is to produce conviction as to the particular point in question, the Causes from which our Arguments are drawn, must be such as are either admitted, or may be proved, to be actually existing, or likely to exist.

On the appropriate use of this kind of Argument, (which is probably the εἰκὸς of Aristotle, though unfortunately he has not furnished any example of it,) some Rules will be laid down hereafter; our object at present having been merely to ascertain the nature of it. And here it may be worth while to remark, that though we have applied to this mode of Reasoning the title of "*a priori*," it is not meant to be maintained that all such Arguments as have been by other writers so designated, correspond precisely with what has been just described.[6]

[5] On which ground Aristotle contends that the end of Fiction is more Philosophical than that of History, since it aims at general, instead of particular truth.

[6] Some Rhetorical students accordingly, partly with a view to keep clear of any ambiguity that might hence arise, and partly for the sake of brevity, have found it useful to adopt, in drawing up an outline, or analysis of any composition, certain arbitrary symbols, to denote, respectively, each class of Arguments and of Propositions; *viz.* A, for the former of the two classes of Arguments just described, (to denote "*A priori*," or "Antecedent," probability,) and B, for the latter, which, as consisting of several different kinds, may be denominated "the *Body* of evidence." Again, they designate the proposition, which *accounts for* the principal and original assertion, by a small "a," or Greek α, to denote its identity *in substance* with the *Argument* bearing the symbol "A," though employed for a different purpose; *viz.* not to *establish* a fact that is doubtful, but to *account for* one that is admitted. The proposition, again, which results as a Consequence or Corollary from the prin-

The phrase, "*a priori*" Argument, is not, indeed, employed by all in the same sense; it would however generally be understood to extend to any argument drawn from an *antecedent* or *forerunner*, whether a *Cause* or not; *e.g.* "the mercury sinks, therefore it will rain." Now this Argument being drawn from a circumstance which though an antecedent, is in no sense a Cause, would fall not under the former, but the latter, of the classes laid down, since when rain comes, no one would *account* for the phenomenon by the falling of the mercury; and yet most, perhaps, would class this among "*a priori*" Arguments. In like manner the expression, "*a posteriori*" Arguments, would not in its ordinary use, coincide precisely, though it would, very nearly, with the second class of Arguments. The division, however, which has here been adopted, appears to be both more Philosophical, and also more precise, and consequently more practically useful than any other; since there is so easy and decisive a test by which an Argument may be at once referred to the one or to the other of the classes described.

The second, then, of these classes, (*viz.* "Arguments which could not be used to account for the fact in question, supposing it granted,") may be sub-divided into two kinds; which will be designated by the terms "Sign" and "Example."

By "Sign," (so called from the Σημεῖον of Aristotle,) is meant a species of Argument of which the analysis is as follows: As far as any circumstance is, what may be called, a *Condition* of the existence of a certain effect or phenomenon, so far it may be inferred from the existence of that Effect: if it be a Condition *absolutely essential*, the Argument is, of course, demonstrative; and the Probability is the stronger in proportion as we approach to that case. Of this kind is the Argument in the instance lately given: a man is suspected as the perpetrator of the supposed murder, from the circumstance of his clothes being bloody; the murder being considered as in a certain degree a probable *condition* of that appearance; *i.e.* it is presumed that his clothes would *not otherwise* have been bloody. Again, from the appearance of ice, we infer, decidedly, the existence of a temperature below freezing point, that temperature being an essential Condition of the crystallization of water.

Among the circumstances which are conditional to any Effect, must evidently come the Cause or Causes; and if there be only one possible Cause, this being absolutely essential, may be demonstratively proved from the Effect: if the same Effect might result from other Causes, then the Argument is, at best, but probable. But it is to be observed, that there are also many circumstances which have no tendency to *produce* a certain Effect, though it cannot exist *without* them, and

cipal one, they designate by the symbol C. There seems to be the same convenience in the use of these symbols as Logicians have found in the employment of A, E, I, O, to represent the four kinds of Propositions according to quantity and quality.

from which Effect, consequently, they may be inferred, as Conditions, though not Causes; *e.g.* a man's "being alive one day," is a circumstance necessary, as a Condition, to his "dying the next;" but has no tendency to produce it: his having been alive, therefore, on the former day, may be proved from his subsequent death, but not *vice versâ*.[7]

It is to be observed, therefore, that though it is very common for the Cause to be proved from its Effect, it is never so proved, *so far forth as* [ἦ] it is a *Cause*, but so far forth as it is a *condition*, or necessary circumstance.

A Cause, again, may be employed to prove an Effect, (this being the first class of Arguments already described,) so far as it *has a tendency* to produce the Effect, even though it be not at all *necessary* to it; (*i.e.* when other Causes may produce the same Effect,) and in this case, though the Effect may be inferred from the Cause, the Cause cannot be inferred from the Effect; *e.g.* from a mortal wound you may infer death, but not *vice versâ*.

Lastly, when a Cause is also a necessary or probable *condition*, *i.e.* when it is the *only* possible or likely Cause, then we may argue both ways; *e.g.* we may infer a General's success from his known skill, or, his skill, from his known success: these two Arguments belonging, respectively, to the two classes originally laid down. And it is to be observed that, in such Arguments from Sign as this last, the conclusion which *follows, logically*, from the premiss, being the Cause from which the premiss *follows*, physically, *i.e.* as a natural Effect, there are in this case two different kinds of *Sequence* opposed to each other. In Arguments of the first class, on the contrary, these two kinds of Sequence are combined; *i.e.* the Conclusion which follows logically from the premiss, is also the Effect following physically from it as a Cause; a General's skill, *e.g.* being both the Cause and the Proof of of his being likely to succeed.

It is most important to keep in mind the distinction between these two kinds of Sequence, which are, in Argument, sometimes *combined*, and sometimes *opposed*. There is no more fruitful source of confusion of thought than that ambiguity of language employed on these subjects, which tends to confound together these two things, so entirely distinct in their nature. There is hardly any argumentative writer on subjects involving a discussion of the Causes or Effects of any thing, who has clearly perceived and steadily kept in view the distinction we have been speaking of, or who has escaped the errors and perplexities thence resulting. The wide extent accordingly, and the importance

[7] It is however very common, in the carelessness of common language, to mention, as the Causes of phenomena, circumstances which every one would allow, on consideration, to be not Causes, but only Conditions, of the Effects in question; *e.g.* it would be said of a tender plant, that it was destroyed in consequence of not being covered with a mat; though every one would mean to imply that the *frost* destroyed it; this being a Cause too well known to need being mentioned; and that which is spoken of as the Cause, *viz.* the absence of a covering, being only the Condition, without which the real Cause could not have operated.

of the mistakes and difficulties arising out of the ambiguity complained of, is incalculable. To dilate upon this point as fully as might be done with advantage, would lead us beyond our present limits; but it will not be foreign to the purpose of this article to offer some remarks on the origin of the ambiguity complained of, and on the cautions to be used in guarding against being misled by it.

The premiss by which any thing is proved, is not necessarily the Cause of the fact's *being such* as it is; but it is the Cause of our *knowing* and being convinced that it is so; *e.g.* the wetness of the earth is not the Cause of rain, but it is the Cause of our knowing that it has rained. These two things, the premiss which produces *our conviction*, and the Cause which produces that *of which* we are convinced, are the more likely to be confounded together, in the looseness of colloquial language, from the circumstance that (as has been above remarked) they frequently coincide; as, *e.g.* when we *infer* that the ground will be wet, from the fall of rain which *produces* that wetness. And hence it is that the same words have come to be applied, in common, to each kind of Sequence; *e.g.* an Effect is said to "follow" from a Cause, and a Conclusion to "follow" from the premises; the words "Cause" and "Reason," are each applied indifferently, both to a Cause, properly so called, and to the premiss of an Argument; though "Reason," in strictness of speaking, should be confined to the latter. "Therefore," "hence," "consequently," &c., and also, "since," "because," and "why," have likewise a corresponding ambiguity. The multitude of the words which bear this double meaning, (and that, in all languages,) greatly increases our liability to be misled by it; since thus the very means men resort to for ascertaining the sense of any expression, are infected with the very same ambiguity; *e.g.* if we inquire what is meant by a "Cause," we shall be told that it is that from which something "follows;" or, which is denoted by the words "therefore," "consequently," &c. all which expressions are as equivocal and uncertain in their signification as the original one. It is in vain to attempt ascertaining by the balance the true amount of any commodity, if false weights are placed in the opposite scale. Hence it is that so many writers, in investigating the Cause to which any fact or phenomenon is to be attributed, have assigned that which is not a *Cause*, but only a *Proof* that the fact is so; and have thus been led into an endless train of errors and perplexities.

Several, however, of the words in question, though employed indiscriminately in both significations, seem (as was observed in the case of the word "Reason,") in their primary and strict sense, to be confined to one, "δή," in Greek, and "ergo,"[8] or "itaque," in Latin,

[8] Most Logical writers seem not to be aware of this, as they generally, in Latin Treatises, employ "ergo" in the other sense: it is from the Greek ἔργῳ, *i.e.* "in fact."

seem originally and properly to denote the Sequence of Effect from Cause, "ἄρα"[9] and "igitur," that of conclusion from premises. The English word "accordingly," will generally be found to correspond with the Latin "itaque."

The interrogative "why," is employed to inquire, either, 1st, the "Reason," (or "Proof;") 2dly, the "Cause;" or 3dly, the "object proposed," or final Cause: *e.g.* 1st, Why are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? 2d, Why are the days shorter in winter than in summer? 3d, Why are the works of a watch constructed as they are? If any one were to ask "Why the gospel-revelation is to be received?" he might intend by this question any one of these three inquiries; which would of course require very different answers.

It is to be observed that the discovery of *Causes* belongs properly to the province of the Philosopher; that of "Reasons," strictly so called, (*i.e.* Arguments,) to that of the Rhetorician; and that, though each will have frequent occasion to assume the character of the other, it is most important that these two objects should not be confounded together.

Of Signs, then, one kind are such as from a certain Effect or phenomenon, infer the "Cause" of it; and the other, such as, in like manner, infer some "Condition" which is not the Cause. Of these last, one species is the Argument from Testimony; the premiss being the existence of the Testimony, the Conclusion, the truth of what is attested; which is considered as a "Condition" of the Testimony having been given; since it is evident that so far only as this is allowed, (*i.e.* so far only as it is allowed that the Testimony would not have been given, had it not been true,) can this Argument have any force.

Testimony is of various kinds; but the distinction between them is so obvious, as well as the various circumstances which add to, or diminish the weight of, any Testimony, that it is not necessary to enter into any detailed discussion of the subject. It may be worth remarking, however, that one of the most important distinctions is between Testimony to matters of *Fact*, and to *Doctrines* or Opinions: in estimating the weight of the former, we look chiefly to the *honesty* of the witness, and his means of obtaining information; in the latter, his *ability* to judge is equally to be taken into consideration. With respect, however, to the credibility of witnesses, it is evident that when many coincide in their testimony, (where no previous concert can have taken place,) the probability resulting from this concurrence does not rest on the supposed veracity of each considered separately, but on the improbability of such an agreement taking place by chance. For though in such a case each of the witnesses should be considered as unworthy of credit, and even much more likely to speak falsehood

[9] Ἄρα having a signification of *fitness* or *coincidence*; whence ἄρω.

than truth, still the chances might be infinite against their all agreeing in the *same* falsehood. This remark is applied by Dr. Campbell to the Argument from Testimony; but he might have extended it to other Arguments also, in which a similar calculation of chances will enable us to draw a Conclusion, sometimes even amounting to moral certainty, from a combination of data which singly would have had little or no weight; *e.g.* if any one out of a hundred men throw a stone which strikes a certain object, there is but a slight probability, from that fact alone, that he aimed at that object; but if all the hundred threw stones which struck the same object, no one would doubt that they aimed at it. It is from such a combination of Argument that we infer the existence of an intelligent Creator from the marks of contrivance visible in the Universe, though many of these are such as, taken singly, might well be conceived undesigned and accidental; but that they should *all* be such, is morally impossible. Great care is requisite in setting forth clearly, especially in any popular discourse, Arguments of this nature; the generality of men being better qualified for understanding, (to use Lord Bacon's words,) "particulars, one by one," than for taking a comprehensive view of a whole; and therefore in a *Galaxy* of Evidence, as it may be called, in which the brilliancy of no single star can be pointed out, the lustre of the combination is often lost on them. Hence it is, as was remarked in the Treatise on Fallacies, that the sophism of "Composition," as it is called, so frequently misleads men: it is not improbable, (in the above example,) that *each* of the stones, considered *separately*, may have been thrown at random; and therefore the same is concluded of *all*, considered in *conjunction*. Not that in such an instance as the above, any one would reason so weakly; but that a still greater absurdity of the very same kind is involved in the rejection of the evidences of our religion, will be plain to any one who considers, not merely the individual force, but the *number* and *variety* of those evidences.

And here it may be observed, that though the easiest and most popular way of practically refuting the Fallacy just mentioned, (or indeed any Fallacy,) is, by bringing forward a parallel case, where it leads to a manifest absurdity, a metaphysical objection may still be urged against many cases in which we thus reason from calculation of chances; an objection not likely indeed practically to influence any one, but which may afford the Sophist a triumph over those who are unable to find a solution. If it were answered then to those who maintain that the universe, which exhibits so many marks of design, might be the work of non-intelligent causes, that no one would believe it possible for such a work as the Iliad, *e.g.* to be produced by a fortuitous shaking together of the letters of the alphabet, the Sophist might challenge us to explain why even this last supposition should be regarded as less probable than any other; since the letters of which

the Iliad is composed, if shaken together at random, must fall in *some* form or other; and though the chances are millions of millions to one against that, or any other *determinate* order, *there are precisely as many chances against one, as against another:* and in like manner, astonished as we should be, and convinced of the intervention of artifice, if we saw any one draw out all the cards in a pack in regular sequences, it is demonstrable that the chances are not more against that order, than against any one determinate order we might choose to fix upon. The multitude of the chances, therefore, he would say, against any series of events, does not constitute it improbable; since the like happens to every one every day; *e.g.* a man walking through London streets on his business, meets accidentally hundreds of others passing to and fro on theirs: and he would not say at the close of the day that any thing *improbable* had occurred to him; yet it would almost baffle calculation to compute the Chances against his meeting precisely those very persons, in the order, and at the times and places of his meeting each. The paradox thus seemingly established, though few might be practically misled by it, many would be at a loss to solve. The truth is, than any supposition is justly called improbable, not from the number of chances against it, considered *independently*, but from the number of chances against it *compared* with those which lie against some *other* supposition: we call the drawing of a prize in the lottery improbable, though there be but five to one against it, because there are *more* chances of a blank; on the other hand, if any one was cast on a desert island under circumstances which warranted his believing that the chances were a hundred to one against any one's having been there before him, yet if he found on the sand pebbles so arranged as to form the letters of a man's name, he would not only conclude it probable, but absolutely certain that some human being had been there; because there would be millions of chances against those forms having been produced by the fortuitous action of the waves. So also, in the instance above given, any *unmeaning* form into which a number of letters might fall, would not be called improbable, countless as the chances are against that particular order, because there are just as many against each one of all other unmeaning forms; but if the letters formed a coherent poem, it would then be called incalculably improbable that this form should have been fortuitous, though the chances against it remain the very same; because there must be much *fewer* chances against the supposition of its having been the work of *design.* The probability, in short, of any supposition, is estimated from a *comparison* with each of its alternatives.

The foregoing observations, however, as was above remarked, are not confined to Arguments from Testimony, but apply to all cases in which the degree of probability is estimated from a calculation of chances.

Before we dismiss the consideration of Signs, it may be worth while to notice another case of combined Argument different from the one lately mentioned, yet in some degree resembling it. The combination just spoken of is where several Testimonies or other Signs, singly perhaps of little weight, produce jointly, and by their coincidence, a degree of probability far exceeding the *sum* of their several forces, taken separately; in the case we are now about to notice, the combined force of the series of Arguments resulting from the order in which they are considered, and from their *progressive* tendency to establish a certain conclusion. *E.G.* One part of the law of nature called the "vis inertiæ," is established by the Argument we allude to: *viz.* that a body set in motion will eternally continue in motion with uniform velocity in a right line, so far as it is not acted upon by any causes which retard or stop, accelerate or divert its course. Now, as in every case which can come under our observation, some such causes do intervene, the assumed supposition is practically impossible, and we have no opportunity of verifying the law by direct experiment; but we may *gradually approach* indefinitely near to the case supposed: and on the result of such experiments our conclusion is founded. We find that when a body is projected along a rough surface, its motion is speedily retarded and soon stopped; if along a smoother surface, it continues longer in motion; if upon ice, longer still, and the like with regard to wheels, &c. in proportion as we gradually lessen the friction of the machinery; if we remove the resistance of the air, by setting a wheel or pendulum in motion under an air pump, the motion is still longer continued. Finding, then, that the effect of the original impulse is more and more protracted, in proportion as we more and more remove the impediments to motion from friction and resistance of the air, we reasonably conclude that if this could be *completely* done, (which is out of our power,) the motion would never cease, since what appear to be the only causes of its cessation, would be absent.

Again, in arguing for the existence and moral attributes of the Deity from the authority of men's opinions, great use may be made of a like progressive course of Argument, though it has been often overlooked. Some have argued for the being of a God from the universal or at least general consent of mankind; and some have appealed to the opinions of the wisest and most cultivated portion, respecting both the existence and the moral excellence of the Deity. It cannot be denied that there is a presumptive force in each of these Arguments; but it may be answered that it is conceivable an opinion common to almost all the species, may possibly be an error resulting from a constitutional infirmity of the human intellect;—that if we are to acquiesce in the belief of the majority, we shall be led to Polytheism; such being the creed of the greater part: and that though more weight may reasonably be attached to the opinions of

the wisest and best instructed, still, as we know that such men are not exempt from error, we cannot be perfectly safe in adopting the belief they hold, unless we are convinced that they hold it *in consequence* of their being the wisest and best instructed;—*so far forth* as they are such. Now this is precisely the point which may be established by the above-mentioned progressive Argument. Nations of Atheists, if there are any such, are confessedly among the rudest and most ignorant savages: those who represent their God or Gods as malevolent, capricious, or subject to human passions and vices, are invariably to be found, (in the present day at least,) among those who are brutal and uncivilized; and among the most civilized nations of the ancients, who professed a similar creed, the more enlightened members of society seem either to have rejected altogether, or to have explained away, the popular belief. The Mahometan nations, again, of the present day, who are certainly more advanced in civilisation than their Pagan neighbours, maintain the unity and the moral excellence of the Deity; but the nations of Christendom, whose notions of the divine goodness are more exalted, are undeniably the most civilized part of the world, and possess, generally speaking, the most cultivated and improved intellectual powers. Now if we would ascertain, and appeal to, the sentiments of man *as* a rational being, we must surely look to those which not only prevail most among the *most* rational and cultivated, but towards which also a *progressive* tendency is found in men in proportion to their degrees of rationality and cultivation. It would be most extravagant to suppose that man's advance towards a more improved and exalted state of existence should tend to obliterate true and instil false notions. On the contrary we are authorized to conclude, that those notions would be the most correct, which men would entertain, whose knowledge, intelligence, and intellectual cultivation should have reached the highest pitch of perfection; and that those consequently will approach the nearest to the truth which are entertained, more or less, by various nations, in proportion as they have advanced towards this civilized state.

Many other instances might be adduced, in which truths of the highest importance may be elicited by this process of Argumentation, which will enable us to decide with sufficient probability what consequence would follow from an hypothesis which we have never experienced; it might, not improperly, be termed the Argument from Progressive Approach.

The third kind of Arguments to be considered being the other branch of the second of the two classes originally laid down, may be treated of under the general name of Example, taking that term in its widest acceptation, so as to comprehend the Arguments designated by the various names of Induction, Experience, Analogy, Parity of Reasoning, &c. all of which are essentially the same, as far as regards the fundamental principles we are here treating of; for in all

the Arguments designated by these names it will be found, that we consider one or more, known, individual objects or instances, of a certain class, as fair *specimens*, in respect of some point or other, of that class; and consequently draw an inference from them respecting either the whole class, or other, less known, individuals of it. In Arguments of this kind then it will be found, that universally we assume as a major premiss that what is true, (in regard to the point in question,) of the individual or individuals which we bring forward and appeal to, is true of the whole class to which they belong; the minor premiss next asserts something of that individual; and the same is then inferred respecting the whole class: whether we stop at that general conclusion, or descend from thence to another, unknown, individual; in which last case, which is the most usually called the Argument from Example, we generally omit, for the sake of brevity, the intermediate step, and pass at once in the expression of the Argument from the known, to the unknown, individual. This ellipsis, however, does not, as some seem to suppose, make any essential difference in the mode of Reasoning; the reference to a common class being always, in such a case, understood, though not expressed; for it is evident that there can be no reasoning from one individual to another, unless they come under some common genus, and are considered in that point of view; *e.g.*

Astronomy was decried at its first introduction, as adverse to religion:

Geology is likely to be decried, &c.

therefore every Science is likely to be decried at its first introduction, as adverse to religion. *therefore*

This kind of example, therefore, appears to be a compound Argument, consisting of two enthymemes; and when (as often happens) we infer from a known Effect a certain Cause, and again, from that Cause, another unknown Effect, we then unite in this example, the argument from Effect to Cause, and that from Cause to Effect, *e.g.* we may from the marks of Divine benevolence in this world, argue, that "the like will be shown in the next;" through the intermediate conclusion, that "God is benevolent." This is not indeed always the case; but there seems to be in every example, a *reference* to some Cause, though that Cause may frequently be unknown; *e.g.* we suppose, in the instance above given, that there is some Cause, though we may be at a loss to assign it, which leads men generally to decry a new Science.

The term "Induction" is commonly applied to such Arguments as stop short at the *general* conclusion; and is thus contradistinguished, in common use, from Example. There is also this additional differ-

ence, that when we draw a general conclusion from *several* individual cases, we use the word Induction in the singular number, while each one of these cases, if the application were made to another individual, would be called a distinct Example. This difference, however, is not essential, since whether the inference be made from one instance or from several, it is equally called an Induction, if a general conclusion be legitimately drawn, and this is to be determined by the nature of the subject-matter; in the investigation of the laws of nature, a single experiment, fairly and carefully made, is usually allowed to be conclusive, because we can then pretty nearly ascertain all the circumstances operating: a Chemist who has ascertained, in a single specimen of gold, its capability of combining with mercury, would not think it necessary to try the same experiment with several other specimens, but would draw the conclusion concerning those metals universally, and with certainty; in human affairs on the contrary, our uncertainty respecting many of the circumstances that may affect the result, obliges us to collect many coinciding instances to warrant even a probable conclusion. From one instance, *e.g.* of the assassination of an Usurper, it would not be allowable to infer the certainty, or even the probability, of a like fate attending all Usurpers.[10]

Experience, in its original and proper sense, is applicable to the *premises* from which we argue, not to the *inference* we draw. Strictly speaking, we know by Experience only the *past*, and what has passed under our own observation; thus, we know by *Experience* that the tides *have* daily ebbed and flowed, during such a time; and from the Testimony of others as to their own experience, that they have formerly done so; and *from* this experience, we conclude, *by* Induction, that the same phenomenon will continue.

The word Analogy, again, is generally employed in the case of Arguments in which the instance adduced is somewhat more remote from that to which it is applied; *e.g.* a physician would be said to know by experience the noxious effects of a certain drug on the human constitution if he had frequently seen men poisoned by it; but if he thence conjectured that it would be noxious to some other species of animal, he would be said to reason from *Analogy;* the only difference being that the resemblance is less, between a man and a brute, than between one man and another; and accordingly it is found that many brutes are not acted upon by some drugs which are pernicious to man. But more strictly speaking, Analogy ought to be distinguished from *direct* resemblance, with which it is often confounded in the language even of eminent writers (especially on Chemistry and Natural History) in the present day. Analogy being a "resemblance of ratios,"[11] that should strictly be called an Argument from Analogy, in which the two cases (*viz.* the one *from* which, and the one *to* which

[10] See article LOGIC, "On the province of Reasoning," (p. 85.)
[11] Λογῶν ὁμοιότης, Aristotle.

we argue) are not themselves alike, but stand in a similar *relation* to something else; or in other words, that the common genus which they both fall under, consists in a relation. Thus an egg and a seed are not in themselves alike, but bear a like relation to the parent bird and to her future nestling, on the one hand, and to the old and young plant on the other, respectively; this *relation* being the genus which both fall under: and many Arguments might be drawn from this Analogy. Again the fact that from birth different persons have different bodily constitutions, in respect of complexion, stature, strength, shape, liability to particular disorders, &c. which constitutions, however, are capable of being, to a certain degree, modified by regimen, medicine, &c. affords an Analogy by which we may form a presumption, that the like takes place in respect of mental qualities also; though it is plain that there can be no direct resemblance either between body and mind, or their respective attributes.

In this kind of Argument one error, which is very common, and which is to be sedulously avoided, is that of concluding the *things* in question to be *alike*, because they are *Analogous;*—to resemble each other in themselves, because there is a resemblance in the relation they bear to certain other things; which is manifestly a groundless inference. Another caution is applicable to the whole class of Arguments from Example; *viz.* not to consider the resemblance or Analogy to extend further (*i.e.* to more particulars) than it does. The resemblance of a picture to the object it represents, is direct; but it extends no further than the one sense of seeing is concerned. In the parable of the unjust steward, an Argument is drawn from Analogy, to recommend prudence and foresight to Christians in spiritual concerns; but it would be absurd to conclude that fraud was recommended to our imitation; and yet mistakes very similar to such a perversion of that Argument are by no means rare.[12]

The Argument from *Contraries*, (ἐξ ἐναντίων) noticed by Aristotle, falls under the class we are now treating of; as it is plain that Contraries must have something in common; and it is so far forth only as they *agree*, that they are thus employed in Argument. Two things are called "Contrary," which, coming under the same class, are the *most dissimilar* in that class. Thus, virtue and vice are called Contraries, as being, *both*, "*moral habits*," and the most *dissimilar* of moral habits, mere dissimilarity, it is evident, would not constitute Contrariety; for no one would say that virtue was contrary to a mathematical problem, the two things having nothing in common.

[12] "Thus, because a just Analogy has been discerned between the metropolis of a country, and the heart of the animal body, it has been sometimes contended that its increased size is a disease,—that it may impede some of its most important functions, or even be the cause of its dissolution." Copleston's *Inquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination*, note to Disc. III. q. v. for a very able dissertation on the subject of Analogy, in the course of an analysis of Dr. King's *Discourse on Predestination*.

In this then, as in other Arguments of the same class, we may infer that the two Contrary terms have a similar relation to the same third, or respectively to two corresponding, (*i.e.* in this case, Contrary) terms: we may conjecture, *e.g.* that since virtue may be acquired by education, so may vice; or again, that since virtue leads to happiness, so does vice to misery.

The phrase "Parity of Reasoning," is commonly employed to denote Analogical Reasoning.

Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, has divided Examples into *Real* and *Invented:* the one being drawn from actual matter of fact; the other, from a supposed case. And he remarks, that though the latter is more easily adduced, the former is more convincing. If however due care be taken, that the fictitious instance,—the supposed case, adduced, be not wanting in *probability*, it will often be no less convincing than the other. For it may so happen, that one, or even several historical facts may be appealed to, which being nevertheless exceptions to a general rule, will not prove the probability of the conclusion. Thus, from several known instances of ferocity in black tribes, we are not authorized to conclude, that blacks are universally, or generally ferocious; and in fact, many instances may be brought forward on the other side. Whereas in the supposed case, (instanced by Aristotle, as employed by Socrates,) of mariners choosing their steersman by lot, though we have no reason to suppose such a case ever occurred, we see so plainly the *probability*, that if it did occur, the lot might fall on an unskilful person, to the loss of the ship, that the argument has considerable weight against the practice, so common in the ancient republics, of appointing magistrates by lot. There is, however, this important difference; that a fictitious case which has not this intrinsic probability, has absolutely *no* weight whatever; so that of course such arguments might be multiplied to any amount without the smallest effect: whereas any matter of fact which is well established, however *unaccountable* it may seem, has some degree of weight in reference to a parallel case; and a sufficient number of such arguments may fairly establish a general rule, even though we may be unable, after all, to account for the alleged fact in any of the instances; *e.g.* no satisfactory reason has yet been assigned for a connection between the absence of upper cutting teeth, or of the presence of horns, and rumination; but the instances are so numerous and constant of this connection, that no Naturalist would hesitate, if on examination of a new species, he found those teeth absent, and the head horned, to pronounce the animal a ruminant. Whereas on the other hand, the fable of the countryman, who obtained from Jupiter the regulation of the weather, and in consequence found his crops fail, does not go one step towards proving the intended conclusion; because that consequence is a mere gratuitous assumption without any probability to support it. There is an instance of a like error in a tale of Cumber-

land's, intended to prove the advantage of a public over a private education; he represents two brothers educated on the two plans respectively; the former turning out very well, and the latter very ill: and had the whole been matter of fact, a sufficient number of such instances would have had weight as an Argument; but as it is a fiction, and no reason is shown why the result should be such as represented, except the supposed superiority of a public education, the Argument involves a manifest *petitio principii;* and resembles the appeal made in the well-known fable, to the picture of a man conquering a lion; a result which might just as easily have been reversed, and which would have been so, had lions been painters. It is necessary, in short, to be able to maintain, either that such and such an event *did* actually take place, or that, under a certain hypothesis, it would be likely to take place.

Under the head of Invented Example, a distinction is drawn by Aristotle, between παραβολή *et* λόγος: from the instances he gives, it is plain that the former corresponds (not to Parable, in the sense in which we use the word, derived from that of παραβολή in the Sacred Writers, but) to Illustration; the latter to Fable or Tale. In the former, an *allusion* only is made to a case easily supposable; in the latter, a fictitious story is narrated. Thus, in his instance above cited, of Illustration, if any one, instead of a mere allusion, should relate a tale, of mariners choosing a steersman by lot, and being wrecked in consequence, Aristotle would evidently have placed that under the head of Logos. The other method is of course preferable, from its brevity, whenever the allusion can be readily understood: and accordingly it is common, in the case of well-known fables, to allude to, instead of narrating, them. That, *e.g.* of the horse and the stag, which he gives, would, in the present day, be rather alluded to than told, if we wished to dissuade a people from calling in a too powerful auxiliary. It is evident that a like distinction might have been made in respect of historical examples; those cases which are well known, being often merely alluded to, and not recited. The word "Fable" is at present generally limited to those fictions in which the resemblance to the matter in question is not direct, but analogical; the other class being called Novels, Tales, &c. Those resemblances are (as Dr. A. Smith has observed) the most *striking*, in which the things compared are of the most *dissimilar* nature; as is the case in what we call Fables; and such accordingly are generally preferred for Argumentative purposes, both from that circumstance itself, and also on account of the greater *brevity* which is, for that reason, not only allowed but required in them.[13] For a Fable spun out to a great length becomes an Allegory, which generally satiates and disgusts; on the other hand, a fictitious Tale, having a more direct, and there-

[13] A Novel or Tale may be compared to a Picture; a Fable to a Device.

fore less striking, resemblance to reality, requires that an interest in the events and persons should be created by a longer detail, without which it would be insipid. The Fable of the Old Man and the Bundle of Sticks, compared with the Iliad, may serve to exemplify what has been said; the moral conveyed by each being the same, *viz.* the strength acquired by union, and the weakness resulting from division: the latter fiction would be perfectly insipid if conveyed in a few lines; the former, in twenty-four books, insupportable.

Of the various uses, and of the real or apparent refutation, of Examples, (as well as of other Arguments,) we shall treat hereafter; but it may be worth while here to observe, that we have been speaking of Example as a kind of *Argument*, and with a view therefore to that purpose alone; it often happens, that a resemblance, either direct or analogical, is introduced for other purposes; *viz.* not to *prove* any thing, but either to illustrate and *explain* one's meaning, (which is the strict etymological use of the word Illustration,) or to amuse the fancy by ornament of language. It is of course most important to distinguish, both in our own compositions and those of others, between these different purposes.

OF THE VARIOUS USE AND ORDER OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF PROPOSITION AND OF ARGUMENT, IN DIFFERENT CASES.

§ 3. The *first rule* to be observed is, that it should be considered, whether the principal object of the discourse be, to give *satisfaction to a candid mind*, and convey *instruction* to those who are ready to receive it, or to *compel* the assent, or silence the objections, of an opponent. The former of these purposes is, in general, principally to be accomplished by the former of those two great classes into which arguments were divided; (*viz.* by those from Cause to Effect,) the other, by the latter.

To whatever class, however, the Arguments we resort to may belong, the general tenour of the reasoning will, in many respects, be affected by the present consideration. The distinction in question is nevertheless in general little attended to. It is usual to call an Argument, simply, *strong* or *weak*, without reference to the purpose for which it is designed; whereas the Arguments which afford the most *satisfaction* to a candid mind, are often such as would have less weight in *controversy* than many others, which again would be less suitable for the former purpose.[14] *E.G.* The internal evidence of

[14] Our meaning cannot be better illustrated than by an instance referred to in that incomparable specimen of Reasoning, Dr. Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ*. "When we take into our hands the letters," (*viz.* St. Paul's Epistles,) "which the suffrage and consent of antiquity hath thus transmitted to us, the first thing that strikes our attention is the air of reality and business, as well as of seriousness and conviction, which pervades the whole. Let the sceptic read them. If he be not sensible of these qualities in them, the argument can have no weight with him. If he be; if he perceive in almost every page the language of a mind actuated by real occasions, and operating upon real circumstances, I would wish it to be observed, that the proof

Christianity in general, proves the most satisfactory to a believer's mind, but is not that which makes the most show in the refutation of infidels; the Arguments from Analogy on the other hand, which are the most *unanswerable*, are not so pleasing and consolatory.

Rule second. Matters of Opinion, (as they are called, *i.e.* where we are not said properly to *know*, but to *judge*,) are established chiefly by Antecedent-probability; (Arguments of the first class, *viz.* from Cause to Effect,) though the testimony of wise men is also admissible; past Facts, chiefly by Signs, of various kinds; (that term, it must be remembered, including Testimony,) and future events by Antecedent-probabilities and Examples.

Example, however, is not excluded from the proof of matters of opinion; since a man's judgment in one case, may be aided or corrected by an appeal to his judgment in another similar case. It is in this way that we are directed, by the highest authority, to guide our judgment in those questions, in which we are most liable to deceive ourselves; *viz.* what, on each occasion, ought to be our conduct towards another; we are directed to frame for ourselves a similar supposed case, by imagining ourselves to change places with our neighbour, and then considering how, in that case, we should wish to be treated.

It happens more frequently, however, that, when in the discussion of matters of opinion, an Example is introduced, it is designed, not for Argument, but, strictly speaking, for *Illustration;*—not to *prove* the proposition in question, but to make it more *clearly understood; e.g.* the Proposition maintained by Cicero, (*de Off.* Book III.) is what may be accounted a matter of opinion; *viz.* that "nothing is expedient which is dishonourable;" when then he adduces the Example

which arises from this perception is not to be deemed occult or imaginary, because it is incapable of being drawn out in words, or of being conveyed to the apprehension of the reader in any other way, than by sending him to the books themselves."—P. 403.

There is also a passage in Dr. A. Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which illustrates very happily one of the applications of the principle in question: "Sometimes we have occasion to defend the propriety of observing the general rules of justice by the consideration of their necessity to the support of society. We frequently hear the young and the licentious ridiculing the most sacred rules of morality, and professing, sometimes from the corruption, but more frequently from the vanity of their hearts, the most abominable maxims of conduct. Our indignation rouses, and we are eager to refute and expose such detestable principles. But though it is their intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness which originally inflames us against them, we are unwilling to assign this as the sole reason why we condemn them, or to pretend that it is merely because we ourselves hate and detest them. The reason, we think, would not appear to be conclusive. Yet, why should it not; if we hate and detest them because they are the natural and proper objects of hatred and detestation? But when we are asked why we should not act in such or such a manner, the very question seems to suppose that, to those who ask it, this manner of acting does not appear to be for its own sake the natural and proper object of those sentiments. We must show them, therefore, that it ought to be so for the sake of something else. Upon this account we generally cast about for other arguments, and the consideration which first occurs to us, is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the universal prevalence of such practices. We seldom fail, therefore, to insist upon this topic." (Part II. § 2, p. 151, 152, Vol. I. ed. 1812.)

of the supposed design of Themistocles to burn the allied fleet, which he maintains, in contradiction to Aristides, would not have been expedient, because it would have been unjust, it is manifest, that we must understand the instance brought forward as no more than an Illustration of the general principle he intends to establish; since it would be a plain begging of the question to *argue* from a particular assertion, which could only be admitted by those who assented to the general principle.

It is important to distinguish between these two uses of Example; that on the one hand we may not be led to mistake for an Argument such an one as the foregoing; and that on the other hand, we may not too hastily charge with sophistry him who adduces such an one simply with a view to explanation.

It is also of the greatest consequence to distinguish between Examples, (of the invented kind,) properly so called, *i.e.* which have the force of Arguments, and Comparisons introduced for the ornament of style, in the form, either of simile, as it is called, or a Metaphor. Not only is an ingenious comparison often mistaken for a proof, though it be such as, when tried by the rules laid down in the present article, and under the head of LOGIC, affords no proof at all; but also on the other hand, a real and valid argument is not unfrequently considered merely as an ornament of style, if it happen to be such as to produce that effect; though there is evidently no reason why that should not be fair Analogical Reasoning, in which the new idea introduced by the Analogy chances to be a sublime or a pleasing one. *E.G.* "The efficacy of penitence, and piety, and prayer, in rendering the Deity propitious, is not irreconcileable with the immutability of his nature, and the steadiness of his purposes. It is not in man's power to alter the course of the sun; but it is often in his power to cause the sun to shine or not to shine upon him; if he withdraws from its beams, or spreads a curtain before him, the sun no longer shines on him; if he quits the shade, or removes the curtain, the light is restored to him; and though no change is in the mean time effected in the heavenly luminary, but only in himself, the result is the same as if it were. Nor is the immutability of God any reason why the returning sinner, who tears away the veil of prejudice or of indifference, should not again be blessed with the sunshine of divine favour." The image here introduced is ornamental, but the Argument is not the less perfect; since the case adduced fairly establishes the general principle required, that "a change effected in one of two objects having a certain relation to each other, may have the same practical result as if it had taken place in the other."

The mistake in question, is still more likely to occur when such an Argument is conveyed in a single term employed metaphorically; as is generally the case where the allusion is common and obvious; *e.g.* "we do not receive as the genuine doctrines of the primitive Church

what have passed down the *polluted stream* of Romish tradition." The Argument here is not the less valid for being conveyed in the form of a Metaphor.

The employment, in questions relating to the future, both of the Argument from Example, and of that from Cause to Effect, may be explained from what has been already said concerning the connection between them; some cause, whether known or not, being always *supposed*, whenever an Example is adduced.

Rule third. When Arguments of each of the two formerly-mentioned classes are employed, those from Cause to Effect (Antecedent-probability) have usually the precedence.

Men are apt to listen with prejudice to the Arguments adduced to prove any thing which appears *abstractedly* improbable; *i.e.* according to what has been above laid down, *unnatural*, or (if such an expression might be allowed) *unplausible;* and this prejudice is to be removed by the Argument from Cause to Effect, which thus prepares the way for the reception of the other Arguments; *e.g.* if a man who bore a good character, were accused of corruption, the strongest evidence against him might avail little; but if he were proved to be of a covetous disposition, this, though it would not alone be allowed to substantiate the crime, would have great weight in inducing his judges to lend an ear to the evidence. And thus, in what relates to the future also, the *a priori* Argument and Example support each other, when thus used in conjunction and in the order prescribed; a sufficient cause being established, leaves us still at liberty to suppose that there may be circumstances which will prevent the effect from taking place; but Examples subjoined show that these circumstances do not, at least always, prevent that effect; and on the other hand, Examples introduced at the first, may be suspected of being exceptions to the general rule, (unless they are very numerous,) instead of being instances of it; which an adequate cause previously assigned, will show them to be; *e.g.* if any one had argued, from the temptations and opportunities occurring to a military commander, that Buonaparte was likely to establish a despotism on the ruins of the French Republic, this Argument, by itself, would have left men at liberty to suppose that such a result would be prevented by a jealous attachment to liberty in the citizens, and a fellow feeling of the soldiery with them; then, the Examples of Cæsar and of Oliver Cromwell would have proved, that such preventives are not to be trusted.

Aristotle accordingly has remarked on the expediency of not placing Examples in the foremost rank of Arguments; in which case, he says, a considerable number would be requisite; whereas, in *confirmation*, even one will have much weight. This observation, however, he omits to extend, as he might have done, to Testimony and every other kind of Sign, to which it is no less applicable.

Another reason for adhering to the order here prescribed is, that if

the Argument from Cause to Effect, were placed after the others, a doubt might often exist, whether we were engaged in *proving* the point in question, or (assuming it as already proved) in seeking only to *account* for it; that Argument being, by the very nature of it, such as *would* account for the truth contended for, supposing it were granted. Constant care, therefore, is requisite to guard against any confusion or indistinctness as to the object in each case proposed; whether that be, when a proposition is admitted, to assign a cause which *does* account for it, (which is one of the classes of *Propositions* formerly noticed) or, when it is *not* admitted, to *prove* it by an *Argument* of that kind which *would* account for it, if it *were* granted.

With a view to the Arrangement of Arguments, no rule is of more importance than the one now under consideration; and Arrangement is a more important point than is generally supposed; indeed it is not perhaps of less consequence in Rhetoric than in the Military Art; in which it is well known, that with an equality of forces, in numbers, courage, and every other point, the manner in which they are drawn up, so as either to afford mutual support, or on the other hand, even to impede and annoy each other, may make the difference of victory or defeat.

E.G. In the statement of the Evidences of our Religion, so as to give them their just weight, much depends on the order in which they are placed. The Antecedent-probability that a Revelation should be given to man, and that it should be established by miracles, all would allow to be, considered by itself, in the absence of strong direct testimony, utterly insufficient to establish the Conclusion. On the other hand, miracles considered abstractedly, as represented to have occurred without any occasion or reason for them being assigned, carry with them such a strong intrinsic improbability as could not be wholly surmounted even by such evidence as would fully establish any other matters of fact. But the evidences of the former class, however inefficient alone towards the establishment of the Conclusion, have very great weight in preparing the mind for receiving the other Arguments; which again, though they would be listened to with prejudice if not so supported, will then be allowed their just weight. The writers in defence of Christianity have not always attended to this principle; and their opponents have often availed themselves of the knowledge of it, by combating in detail Arguments the combined force of which would have been irresistible. They argue respecting the credibility of the Christian miracles, abstractedly, as if they were insulated occurrences, without any known or conceivable purpose; as, *e.g.* "what testimony is sufficient to establish the belief that a dead man was restored to life?" and then they proceed to show that the probability of a Revelation, abstractedly considered, is not such at least as to establish the fact that one has been given. Whereas, if it were *first* proved (as may easily be done) merely that there is no such

abstract improbability of a Revelation as to exclude the evidence in favour of it, and that if one were given, it might be expected to be supported by miraculous evidence, then, just enough reason would be assigned for the occurrence of miracles, not indeed to establish them, but to allow a fair hearing for the Arguments by which they are proved.

The importance attached to the Arrangement of Arguments by the two great rival orators of Athens, may serve to illustrate and enforce what has been said. Æschines strongly urged the judges (in the celebrated contest concerning the crown) to confine his adversary to the same order in his reply to the charges brought, which he himself had observed in bringing them forward. Demosthenes, however, was far too skilful to be thus entrapped; and so much importance does he attach to this point, that he opens his speech with a most solemn appeal to the Judges for an impartial hearing; which implies, he says, not only a rejection of prejudice, but no less also a permission for each speaker to adopt whatever *Arrangement* he should think fit. And accordingly he proceeds to adopt one very different from that which his antagonist had laid down; for he was no less sensible than his rival that the same Arrangement which is the most favourable to one side, is likely to be the least favourable to the other.

It is to be remembered, however, that the rules which have been given respecting the Order in which different kinds of Argument should be arranged, relate only to the different kinds of Arguments adduced in support of each separate Proposition; since of course the refutation of an opposed assertion, effected by means of signs, may be followed by an *a priori* Argument in favour of our own Conclusion; and the like in many other such cases.

Rule fourth. A Proposition that is *well known* (whether easy to be established or not) should in general be stated at once, and the Proofs subjoined; but if it be not familiar to the hearers, and especially if it be likely to be unacceptable, it is usually better to state the Arguments first, or at least some of them, and then introduce the Conclusion.

There is no question relating to Arrangement more important than the present; and it is therefore the more unfortunate that Cicero, who possessed so much practical skill, should have laid down no rule on this point, (though it is one which evidently had engaged his attention,) but should content himself with saying that sometimes he adopted the one mode and sometimes the other,[15] (which doubtless he did not do at random,) without distinguishing the cases in which each is to be preferred, and laying down principles to guide our decision. Aristotle also, when he lays down the two great heads into which speech is divisible, the Proposition and the Proof,[16] is equally silent as

[15] *De Orat.* [16] *Rhet.* Book III.

to the order in which they should be placed; though he leaves it to be understood, from his manner of speaking, that the Conclusion (or Question) is to be first stated, and then the Premises, as in Mathematics. This indeed is the usual and natural way of speaking or writing; *viz.* to begin by declaring your Opinion, and then to subjoin the Reasons for it. But there are many occasions on which it will be of the highest consequence to reverse this plan. It will sometimes give an offensively dogmatical air to a Composition to begin by advancing some new and unexpected assertion; though sometimes again this may be advisable, when the Arguments are such as can be well relied on, and the principal object is to excite attention, and awaken curiosity. And accordingly, with this view, it is not unusual to present some doctrine, by no means really novel, in a new and paradoxical shape. But when the Conclusion to be established is one likely to hurt the feelings and offend the prejudices of the hearers, it is essential to keep out of sight, as much as possible, the point to which we are tending, till the principles from which it is to be deduced shall have been clearly established; because men listen with prejudice, if at all, to Arguments which are avowedly leading to a Conclusion which they are indisposed to admit; whereas if we thus, as it were, mask the battery, they will not be able to shelter themselves from the discharge. The observance accordingly, or neglect, of this rule, will often make the difference of success or failure.

And it will often be advisable to advance very gradually to the full statement of the Proposition required, and to prove it, if one may so speak, by instalments, establishing separately, and in order, each part of the truth in question. It is thus that Aristotle establishes many of his doctrines, and among others his definition of happiness, in the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics;* he first proves in what it does *not* consist, and then establishes, one by one, the several points which together constitute his notion.

Rule fifth. If the Argument *a priori* has been introduced in the proof of the main Proposition in question, there will generally be no need of afterwards adducing Causes to account for the truth established; (since that will have been already done in the course of the Argument,) on the other hand, it will often be advisable to do this when Arguments of the other class have alone been employed.

For it is in every case agreeable and satisfactory, and may often be of great utility, to explain, where it can be done, the Causes which produce an Effect that is itself already admitted to exist. But it must be remembered that it is of great importance to make it clearly appear *which* object is, in each case, proposed; whether to establish the fact, or to account for it; since otherwise we may often be supposed to be employing a feeble Argument; for that which is a satisfactory explanation of an admitted fact, will frequently be such as would be very insufficient to prove it, supposing it were doubted.

Rule sixth. Refutation of Objections should generally be placed in the midst of the other Arguments, but nearer the beginning than the end.

If indeed very strong Objections have obtained much currency, or have been just stated by an opponent, so that what is asserted is likely to be regarded as paradoxical, it may be advisable to begin with a Refutation; but when this is not the case, the mention of Objections in the opening will be likely to give a paradoxical air to our assertion, by implying a consciousness that much may be said against it. If again all mention of Objections be deferred till the last, the other Arguments will often be listened to with prejudice by those who may suppose us to be overlooking what may be urged on the other side.

Sometimes indeed it will be difficult to give a satisfactory Refutation of the opposed Opinions till we have gone through the Arguments in support of our own: even in that case however it will be better to take some brief notice of them early in the Composition, with a promise of afterwards considering them more fully, and refuting them. This is Aristotle's usual mode of procedure.

A Sophistical use is often made of this last rule, when the Objections are such as cannot really be satisfactorily answered. The skilful Sophist will often, by the promise of a triumphant Refutation hereafter, gain attention to his own statement, which, if it be made plausible, will so draw off the hearer's attention from the Objections, that a very inadequate fulfilment of that promise will pass unnoticed, and due weight will not be allowed to the Objections.

It may be worth remarking, that Refutation will often occasion the introduction of fresh Propositions; *i.e.* we may have to disprove Propositions, which, though incompatible with the principal one to be maintained, will not be directly contradictory to it; *e.g.* Burke, in order to the establishment of his theory of beauty, refutes the other theories which have been advanced by those who place it in "fitness" for a certain end—in "proportion"—in "perfection," &c.: and Dr. A. Smith, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, combats the opinion of those who make expediency the test of virtue—of the advocates of a "Moral sense," &c. which doctrines respectively are at variance with those of these authors, and *imply*, though they do not express, a contradiction of them.

Though we are at present treating principally of the proper collocation of Refutation, some remarks on the conduct of it will not be unsuitable in this place. In the first place, it is to be observed that there is (as Aristotle remarks, *Rhet.* Book II., apparently in opposition to some former writers) no distinct class of refutatory Arguments, since they become such merely by the circumstances under which they are employed.

There are two ways in which any Proposition may be refuted;[17]

[17] Ἀντιλλογισμὸς and ἔνστασις of Aristotle, Book II.

first, by proving the contradictory of it; second, by overthrowing the Arguments by which it has been supported. The former of these is less strictly and properly called Refutation, being only accidentally such, since it might have been employed equally well had the opposite Argument never existed; and in fact it will often happen that a Proposition maintained by one author may be in this way refuted by another, who had never heard of his Arguments. Thus Pericles is represented by Thucydides as proving, in a speech to the Athenians, the probability of their success against the Peloponnesians, and thus, virtually, refuting the speech of the Corinthian ambassador at Sparta, who had laboured to show the probability of their speedy downfal.[18] In fact, every one who argues in favour of any Conclusion is virtually refuting, in this way, the opposite Conclusion.

But the character of Refutation more strictly belongs to the other mode of procedure; *viz.* in which a reference is made, and an answer given, to some specific arguments in favour of the opposite Conclusion. This may consist either in the denial of one of the *Premises*, or an Objection against the *conclusiveness* of the Reasoning. And here it is to be observed that the Objection is often supposed, from the mode in which it is expressed, to belong to this last class, when in truth it does not, but consists in the contradiction of a Premiss; for it is very common to say, "I admit your principle, but deny that it leads to such a consequence;" "the assertion is true, but it has no force as an Argument to prove that Conclusion;" this sounds like an objection to the Reasoning itself, but it will often be found to amount only to a denial of the *suppressed* Premiss of an Enthymeme; the assertion which is admitted being only the expressed Premiss, whose force as an Argument must of course depend on the other Premiss which is understood. Thus Warburton admits that in the Law of Moses the doctrine of a future state was not revealed; but contends that this, so far from disproving, as the Deists pretend, his Divine mission, does, on the contrary, establish it. But the Objection is not to the Deist's Argument properly so called, but to the other Premiss, which they so hastily took for granted, and which he disproves, *viz.* "that a divinely-commissioned Lawgiver would have been sure to reveal that doctrine." The Objection is then only properly said to lie against the Reasoning itself, when it is shown that granting all that is assumed on the other side, whether expressed or understood, still the Conclusion contended for would not follow from the Premises, either on account of some ambiguity in the Middle Term, or some other fault of that class. (See LOGIC, chapter *on Fallacies.*)

It may be proper in this place to remark, that "Indirect Reason-

[18] The speeches indeed are avowedly the composition of the historian; but he professes to give the substance of what was either actually said, or *likely* to be said, on each occasion; and the Arguments urged in the speeches now in question are undoubtedly such as the respective speakers would be likely to employ.

ing" is sometimes confounded with "Refutation," or supposed to be peculiarly connected with it; which is not the case; either Direct or Indirect Reasoning being employed indifferently for Refutation as well as for any other purpose. The application of the term "elenctic," (from ἐλέγχειν to refute or disprove,) to Indirect Arguments, has probably contributed to this confusion; which, however, principally arises from the very circumstance that occasioned such a use of that term; *viz.* that in the Indirect method the absurdity or falsity of a Proposition (opposed to our own) is proved; and hence is suggested the idea of an *adversary* maintaining that Proposition, and of the Refutation of that adversary being necessarily accomplished in this way. But it should be remembered that Euclid and other mathematicians, though they can have no opponent to refute, often employ the Indirect Demonstration; and that on the other hand, if the contradictory of an opponent's Premiss can be satisfactorily proved in the Direct Method, the Refutation is sufficient. It is true, however, that while in science the Direct Method is considered preferable, in controversy the Indirect is often adopted by choice, as it affords an opportunity for holding up an opponent to scorn and ridicule, by deducing some very absurd Conclusion from the principles he maintains, or according to the mode of arguing he employs. Nor indeed can a fallacy be so clearly exposed to the unlearned reader in any other way. For it is no easy matter to explain, to one ignorant of Logic, the grounds on which you object to an inconclusive Argument, though he will be able to perceive its correspondence with another brought forward to illustrate it, in which an absurd Conclusion may be introduced, as drawn from true Premises.

It is evident that either the Premiss of an opponent or his Conclusion may be disproved, either in the Direct or in the Indirect Method; *i.e.* either by proving the truth of the Contradictory, or by showing that an absurd Conclusion may fairly be deduced from the Proposition in question: when this latter mode of Refutation is adopted with respect to the Premiss, the phrase by which this procedure is usually designated, is, that the "Argument proves too much;" *i.e.* that it proves, besides the Conclusion drawn, another, which is manifestly inadmissible; *e.g.* the Argument by which Dr. Campbell labours to prove that every correct Syllogism must be nugatory, as involving a "*petitio principii*," proves, if admitted at all, more than he intended, since it may easily be shown to be equally applicable to all Reasoning whatever.

It is worth remarking, that that which is in substance an Indirect Argument, may easily be altered in form so as to be stated in the Direct Mode. For, strictly speaking, that is Indirect Reasoning in which we assume as true the Proposition whose Contradictory it is our object to prove; and deducing regularly from it an absurd Conclusion, infer thence that the Premiss in question is false; the alternative proposed in all correct Reasoning being either to admit

the Conclusion, or to deny one of the Premises; but by adopting the form of a Destructive Conditional,[19] the same Argument as this in substance may be stated directly; *e.g.* we may say, let it be admitted that no testimony can satisfactorily establish such a fact as is not agreeable to our experience; thence it will follow, that the Eastern Prince judged wisely and rightly in at once rejecting, as a manifest falsehood, the account given him of the phenomenon of ice; but he was evidently mistaken in so doing; therefore the Principle assumed is unsound. Now the substance of this Argument remaining the same, the form of it may be so altered as to make the Argument Direct; *viz.* "*if* it be true that no testimony, &c. that Eastern Prince must have judged wisely, &c. but he did not; therefore that Principle is not true."

Universally indeed a Conditional Proposition may be regarded as an assertion of the validity of a certain Argument; the Antecedent corresponding to the Premises, and the Consequent to the Conclusion; and neither of them being asserted as true, only the dependence of the one on the other; the alternative then is, to admit the Consequent, (which forms the Constructive Syllogism,) or to deny the Antecedent, which forms the Destructive; and the former accordingly corresponds to Direct Reasoning, the latter to Indirect, being, as has been said, a mode of stating it in the Direct form, as is evident from the examples adduced.

The difference between these two modes of stating such an Argument is considerable, when there is a long chain of Reasoning; for when we employ the Categorical form, and assume as true the Premises we design to disprove, it is evident we must be speaking *ironically*, and in the character, assumed for the moment, of an adversary; when, on the contrary, we use the hypothetical form, there is no irony. Butler's *Analogy* is an instance of the latter procedure; he contends that *if* such and such objections are admissible against Religion, they must be applied equally to the constitution and course of nature. Had he, on the other hand, assumed, for the Argument's sake, that such objections against Religion *are* valid, and had thence proved the condition of the natural world to be totally different from what we see it to be, his Arguments, which would have been the same in substance, would have assumed an ironical form. This form has been adopted by Burke in his celebrated *Defence of Natural Society, by a late noble Lord;*[20] in which, assuming the person of Bolingbroke, he proves, according to the principles of that author, that the Arguments he brought against ecclesiastical, would equally lie against civil institutions.

It is in some respects a recommendation of this latter method, and in others an objection to it, that the sophistry of an adversary will often be exposed by it in a *ludicrous* point of view; and this, even where no such effect is designed; the very essence of jest being its

[19] See LOGIC.

[20] This is an Argument from *Analogy*, as well as Bishop Butler's, though not relating to the same point, Butler's being a defence of the *Doctrines* of Religion.

mimic sophistry.[21] This will often give additional force to the Argument, by the vivid impression which ludicrous images produce: but again, it will not unfrequently have this disadvantage, that weak men, perceiving the wit, are apt to conclude that nothing but wit is designed, and lose sight perhaps of a solid and convincing Argument, which they regard as no more than a good joke. Having been warned that "ridicule is not the test of truth," and that "wisdom and wit" are not the same thing, they distrust every thing that can possibly be regarded as witty; not having judgment to perceive the combination, when it occurs, of wit with sound Reasoning. The ivy-wreath completely conceals from their view the point of the Thyrsus: and moreover if such a mode of Argument be employed on serious subjects, the "weak brethren" are sometimes scandalized by what appears to them a profanation; not having discernment to perceive when it is that the ridicule does, and when it does not, affect the solemn subject itself. But for the respect paid to Holy Writ, the taunt of Elijah against the prophets of Baal would probably appear to such persons irreverent. And the caution now implied will appear the more important when it is considered how large a majority they are, who, in this point, come under the description of "weak brethren:" he that can laugh at what is ludicrous, and at the same time preserve a clear discernment of sound and unsound Reasoning, is no ordinary man.

It may be observed generally that too much stress is often laid, especially by unpractised Reasoners, on Refutation; (in the strictest and narrowest sense, *i.e.* of Objections to the Premises, or to the Reasoning,) they are apt both to expect a Refutation where none can fairly be expected, and to attribute to it, when satisfactorily made out, more than it really accomplishes.

For first, not only specious, but real and solid Arguments, such as it would be difficult or impossible to refute, may be urged against a Proposition which is nevertheless true, and may be satisfactorily established by a *preponderance* of probability. It is in strictly scientific Reasoning alone that all the Arguments which lead to a false Conclusion must be fallacious: in what is called moral or probable Reasoning, there may be sound Arguments and valid objections on both sides;[22] *e.g.* it may be shown that each of two contending parties has some reason to hope for success; and this, by irrefragable Arguments on both sides, leading to Conclusions which are not contradictory to each other; for though only one party can obtain the victory, it may be true that each has some reason to expect it. The real question in such cases is, which event is the *more* probable;—on which side the evidence preponderates. Now it often happens that the inexperienced Reasoner, thinking it necessary

[21] See LOGIC, Chapter *on Fallacies*, at the conclusion.

[22] "There are objections against a *Plenum*, and objections against a *Vacuum*; but one of them must be true."—JOHNSON.

that every Objection should be satisfactorily answered, will have his attention drawn off from the Arguments of the opposite side, and will be occupied perhaps in making a weak defence, while victory was in his hands. The Objection perhaps may be unanswerable, and yet may safely be allowed, if it can be shown that more and weightier Objections lie against every other supposition. This is a most important caution for those who are studying the Evidences of Religion.

Secondly, the force of a Refutation is often overrated: an Argument which is satisfactorily answered ought to *go for nothing;* but it is possible that the Conclusion drawn may nevertheless be true: yet men are apt to take for granted that the Conclusion itself is disproved, when the Arguments brought forward to establish it have been satisfactorily refuted; assuming, when perhaps there is no ground for the assumption, that these are *all* the Arguments that could be urged. This may be considered as the fallacy of denying the Consequent of a Conditional Proposition, from the Antecedent having been denied: "if such and such an Argument be admitted, the Assertion in question is true; but that Argument is inadmissible; *therefore the Assertion is not true.*" Hence the injury done to any cause by a weak advocate; the cause itself appearing to the vulgar to be overthrown when the Arguments brought forward are answered.

On the same principle is founded a most important maxim, that it is not only the fairest, but also the wisest plan, to *state Objections in their full force;* at least, wherever there does exist a satisfactory answer to them; otherwise, those who hear them stated more strongly than by the uncandid advocate who had undertaken to repel them, will naturally enough conclude that they are unanswerable. It is but a momentary and ineffective triumph that can be obtained by manœuvres like those of Turnus's charioteer, who furiously chased the feeble stragglers of the army, and evaded the main front of the battle.

Rule seventh. The Arguments which should be placed first in order are, *cæteris paribus,* the most *Obvious,* and such as naturally first occur.

This is evidently the natural order; and the adherence to it gives an easy, natural air to the Composition. It is seldom, therefore, worth while to depart from it for the sake of beginning with the most powerful Arguments, (when they happen not to be also the most Obvious,) or on the other hand, for the sake of reserving these to the last, and beginning with the weaker; or, again, of imitating, as some recommend, Nestor's plan of drawing up troops, placing the best first and last, and the weakest in the middle. It will be advisable, however, (and by this means you may secure this last advantage,) when the strongest Arguments naturally occupy the foremost place, to *recapitulate in a reverse order;* which will destroy the appearance of anti-climax, and is also in itself the most easy and natural mode of recapitulation. Let, *e.g.* the Arguments be A, B, C, D, E, &c. each less weighty than the preceding; then in recapitulating proceed from E to D, C, B, concluding with A.

OF INTRODUCTION.

§ 4. A Proem, Exordium, or Introduction, is, as Aristotle has justly remarked, not to be accounted one of the essential parts of a Composition, since it is not in every case necessary. In most, however, except such as are extremely short, it is found advisable to premise something before we enter on the main Argument, to avoid an appearance of abruptness, and to facilitate, in some way or other, the Object proposed. In larger works this assumes the appellation of Preface or Advertisement; and not unfrequently two are employed, one under the name of Preface, and another, more closely connected with the main work, under that of Introduction.

The rules which have been laid down already will apply equally to that preliminary course of Argument of which Introductions often consist.

The writers before Aristotle, are censured by him for inaccuracy, in placing under the head of Introductions, as properly belonging to them, many things which are not more appropriate in the beginning than elsewhere; as, *e.g.* the contrivances for exciting the hearer's *attention;* which, as he observes, is an improper Arrangement; since, though such an Introduction may sometimes be required, it is, generally speaking, anywhere else rather than in the *beginning*, that the attention is likely to flag.

The rule laid down by Cicero, (*De Orat.*) not to compose the Introduction first, but to consider first the main Argument, and let that suggest the Exordium, is just and valuable; for otherwise, as he observes, seldom any thing will suggest itself but vague generalities; "*common*" topics, as he calls them, *i.e.* what would equally well suit several different Compositions; whereas the Introduction, which is composed last, will naturally spring out of the main subject, and appear appropriate to it.

1. One of the Objects most frequently proposed in an Introduction, is, to show that the subject in question is *important*, *curious*, or otherwise *interesting*, and worthy of attention. This may be called an "Introduction inquisitive."

2. It will frequently happen also, when the point to be proved or explained is one which may be very fully established, or on which there is little or no doubt, that it may nevertheless be *strange*, and different from what might have been expected; in which case it will often have a good effect in rousing the attention, to set forth as strongly as possible this *paradoxical* character, and dwell on the seeming improbability of that which must, after all, be admitted. This may be called an "Introduction paradoxical."[23]

[23] "If you should see a flock of pigeons in a field of corn: and if (instead of each picking where and what it liked, taking just as much as it wanted, and no more) you should see ninety-nine of them gathering all they got, into a heap; reserving nothing for themselves, but the chaff and the refuse; keeping this heap for one, and that the weakest, perhaps worst, pigeon of the flock; sitting round, and looking

3. What may be called an "Introduction corrective," is also in frequent use; *viz.* to show that the subject has been *neglected*, *misunderstood*, or *misrepresented* by others. This will, in many cases, remove a most formidable obstacle in the hearer's mind, the anticipation of triteness, if the subject be, or may be supposed to be, a hacknied one; and it may also serve to remove or loosen such prejudices as might be adverse to the favourable reception of our Arguments.

4. It will often happen also, that there may be need to explain some *peculiarity* in the mode of Reasoning to be adopted; to guard against some possible *mistake* as to the Object proposed; or to apologise for some *deficiency:* this may be called the "Introduction preparatory."

5. And lastly, in many cases there will be occasion for what may be called a "Narrative Introduction," to put the reader or hearer in possession of the outline of some transaction, or the description of some state of things, to which references and allusions are to be made in the course of the Composition. Thus, in Preaching, it is generally found advisable to detail, or at least briefly to sum up, a portion of Scripture history, or a parable, when either of these is made the subject of a Sermon.

Two or more of the Introductions that have been mentioned are often combined, especially in the Preface to a work of any length.

And very often the Introduction will contain appeals to various passions and feelings in the hearers; especially a feeling of approbation towards the Speaker, or of prejudice against an opponent who has preceded him; but this is, as Aristotle has remarked, by no means confined to Introductions.[24]

on, all the winter, whilst this one was devouring, throwing about, and wasting it; and if a pigeon, more hardy or hungry than the rest, touched a grain of the hoard, all the others instantly flying upon it, and tearing it to pieces; if you should see this, you would see nothing more than what is every day practised and established among men. Among men, you see the ninety and nine toiling and scraping together a heap of superfluities for one, (and this one too, oftentimes the feeblest and worst of the whole set, a child, a woman, a madman, or a fool;) getting nothing for themselves all the while, but a little of the coarsest of the provision, which their own industry produces; looking quietly on, while they see the fruits of all their labour spent or spoiled; and if one of the number take or touch a particle of the hoard, the others joining against him, and hanging him for the theft.

"There must be some very important advantages to account for an institution, which, in the view of it above given, is so paradoxical and unnatural.

"The principal of these advantages are the following:" &c.—Paley's *Moral Philosophy*, Book III. Part I. c. 1 and 2.

[24] It has not been thought necessary to treat of Conclusion, Peroration, or Epilogue, as a distinct head: the general rules, that a Conclusion should be neither sudden and abrupt, (so as to induce the hearer to to say, "I did not know he was going to *leave off*,") nor, again, so long as to excite the hearer's impatience after he has been led to expect an end, being so obvious as hardly to need being mentioned. The matter of which the concluding part of a Composition consists, will, of course, vary according to the subject and the occasion; but that which is most appropriate, and consequently most frequent (in Compositions of any considerable length,) is a Recapitulation, either of a part or the whole of the Arguments that have been used; respecting which a remark has been made at the end of Section 3.

Any thing relative to the Feelings and the Will, that may be especially appropriate to the Conclusion, will be mentioned in its proper place.

CHAPTER II.

OF PERSUASION.

PERSUASION, properly so called, *i.e.* the Art of influencing the *Will*, is the next point to be considered. And Rhetoric is often regarded (as was formerly remarked) in a more limited sense, as conversant about this head alone. But even, according to that view, the rules above laid down will be found not the less relevant; since the *Conviction* of the understanding (of which we have hitherto been treating) is an essential part of Persuasion, and will generally need to be effected by the Arguments of the Writer or Speaker. For in order that the will may be influenced, two things are requisite; *viz.* that the proposed *Object* should appear desirable; and that the *Means* suggested should be proved to be conducive to the attainment of that Object; and this last, evidently, must depend on a process of Reasoning. In order, *e.g.* to induce the Greeks to unite their efforts against the Persian invader, it was necessary to prove that co-operation could alone render their resistance effectual, and also to awaken such feelings of patriotism and abhorrence of a foreign yoke, as might prompt them to make these combined efforts. For it is evident, that however ardent their love of liberty, they would make no exertions if they apprehended no danger; or if they thought themselves able, separately, to defend themselves, would be backward to join the confederacy; and on the other hand, that if they were willing to submit to the Persian yoke, or valued their independence less than their present ease, the fullest conviction that the Means recommended would secure their independence, would have no practical effect.

Persuasion, therefore, depends on 1st, *Argument*, (to prove the expediency of the Means proposed,) and 2dly, What is usually called *Exhortation*, *i.e.* the incitement of men to adopt those Means, by representing the end as sufficiently desirable. It will happen indeed, not unfrequently, that the one or the other of these Objects will have been already, either wholly or in part, accomplished, so that the other shall be the only one that is requisite to insist on; *viz.* sometimes the hearers will be sufficiently intent on the pursuit of the End, and will be in doubt only as to the Means of attaining it; and sometimes, again, they will have no doubt on that point, but will be indifferent, or not sufficiently ardent, with respect to the proposed End, and will need to be stimulated by Exhortations. Not sufficiently ardent, we have said, because it will not so often happen that the object in

question will be one to which they are *totally* indifferent, as that they will, practically at least, not reckon it, or not feel it, to be worth the requisite pains. No one is absolutely indifferent about the attainment of a happy immortality; and yet a great part of the Preacher's business consists of Exhortation, *i.e.* endeavouring to induce men to use those exertions which they themselves know to be necessary for the attainment of it.

Aristotle, and many other writers, have spoken of Appeals to the Passions as an unfair mode of influencing the hearers; in answer to which, Dr. Campbell has remarked, that there can be no Persuasion without an address to the Passions:[25] and it is evident, from what has been just said, that he is right, if under the term Passion is included every active principle of our nature. This however is a greater latitude of meaning than belongs even to the Greek word Πάθη, though the signification of that is wider than, according to ordinary use, that of our term "Passions." But Aristotle by no means overlooked the necessity for Persuasion, properly so termed, calling into action some motive that may influence the Will; it is plain that whenever he speaks with reprobation of an appeal to the Passions, his meaning is, the excitement of such feelings as *ought not to influence* the decision of the question in hand. A desire to do justice may be called, in Dr. Campbell's wide acceptation of the term, a Passion: this is what ought to influence a Judge; and no one would ever censure a Pleader for striving to excite and heighten this desire; but if the decision be influenced by an appeal to Anger, Pity, &c. the feelings thus excited being such as ought not to have operated, the Judge must be allowed to have been unduly biassed; and that this is Aristotle's meaning is evident from his characterising the introduction of such topics, as ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, "foreign to the matter in hand."

[25] "To say, that it is possible to persuade without speaking to the passions, is but at best a kind of specious nonsense. The coolest reasoner always in persuading, addresseth himself to the passions some way or other. This he cannot avoid doing, if he speak to the purpose. To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show that the action will answer some End. That can never be an End to me which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. You assure me, 'It is for my honour.' Now you solicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You say, 'It is for my interest.' Now you bespeak my self-love. 'It is for the public good.' Now you rouse my patriotism. 'It will relieve the miserable.' Now you touch my pity. So far therefore is it from being an unfair method of persuasion to move the passions, that there is no persuasion without moving them.

"But if so much depend on passion, where is the scope for argument? Before I answer this question, let it be observed, that, in order to persuade, there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers; the second is, to satisfy their judgment that there is a connection between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites. This is the analysis of persuasion. The former is effected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object; the latter, unless so evident of itself as to supersede the necessity, by presenting the best and most forcible arguments which the nature of the subject admits. In the one lies the pathetic, in the other the argumentative. These incorporated together constitute that vehemence of contention to which the greatest exploits of Eloquence ought doubtless to be ascribed."—Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Book I. Ch. VII. § 4.

And it is evident that as the motives which ought to operate will be different in different cases, the same may be objectionable and not fairly admissible in one case, which in another would be perfectly allowable.[26] An instance occurs in Thucydides, in which this is very judiciously and neatly pointed out: in the debate respecting the Mityleneans, who had been subdued after a revolt, Cleon is introduced contending for the *justice* of inflicting on them capital punishment; to which Diodotus is made to reply, that the Athenians are not sitting in *judgment* on the offenders, but in *deliberation* as to their own *interest;* and ought therefore to consider, not the *right* they may have to put the revolters to death, but the *expediency* or inexpediency of such a procedure.

In judicial cases, on the contrary, any appeal to the personal interests of the Judge, or even to public expediency, would be irrelevant. In *framing* laws indeed, and (which comes to the same thing) giving those decisions which are to operate as precedents, the public good is the Object to be pursued; but in the mere *administering* of the established laws, it is inadmissible.

There are many feelings, again, which it is evident should in no case be allowed to operate, as Envy, thirst for Revenge, &c. &c. the excitement of which by the Orator is to be reprobated as an unfair artifice; but it is not the less necessary to be well acquainted with them, in order to allay them when previously existing in the hearers, or to counteract the efforts of an adversary in producing or influencing them. It is evident, indeed, that all the weaknesses as well as the powers of the human mind, and all the arts by which the Sophist takes advantage of these weaknesses, must be familiarly known by a perfect Orator; who, though he may be of such a character as to disdain employing such arts, must not want the ability to do so, or he would not be prepared to counteract them. An acquaintance with the nature of poisons is necessary to him who would administer antidotes.

The active principles of our nature may be classed in various ways; the arrangement adopted by Mr. Dugald Stewart[27] is, perhaps, the most correct and convenient; the heads he enumerates are *Appetites*, (which have their origin in the body,) *Desires* and *affections;* these last being such as imply some kind of disposition relative to another *Person;* to which must be added, Self-love, or the desire of Happiness as such, and the Moral faculty, called by some writers Conscience, by others the Moral sense, and by Dr. A. Smith, the sense of Propriety.

Under the head of Affections may be included the sentiments of Esteem, Regard, Admiration, &c. which it is so important that the audience should feel towards the Speaker. Aristotle has considered

[26] See the Treatise on FALLACIES, § 14.

[27] *Outlines of Moral Philosophy.*

this as a distinct head, separating the consideration of the speaker's Character (Ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος) from that of the disposition of the hearers; under which, however, it might, according to his own views, have been included; it being plain from his manner of treating of the speaker's Character, that he means, not his real character, (according to the fanciful notion of Quinctilian,) but the impression produced on the minds of the hearers, by the speaker, respecting himself. He remarks, justly, that the Character to be established is that of, 1st, Good Principle, 2dly, Good Sense, and 3dly, Goodwill and friendly disposition towards the audience addressed;[28] and that if the Orator can completely succeed in this, he will persuade more powerfully than by the strongest Arguments. He might have added, (as indeed he does slightly hint at the conclusion of his Treatise,) that, where there is an opponent, a like result is produced by exciting the contrary feelings respecting him; *viz.* holding him up to contempt, or representing him as an object of reprobation or suspicion.

To treat fully of all the different emotions and springs of action which an Orator may at any time find it necessary to call into play, or to contend against, would be to enter on an almost boundless field of Metaphysical inquiry, which does not properly fall within the limits of the subject now before us: and on the other hand, a *brief* definition of each passion, &c. &c. a few general remarks on it, could hardly fail to be trite and uninteresting. A few miscellaneous Rules therefore may suffice, relative to the conduct, generally, of those parts of any Composition which are designed to influence the Will.

§ 1. The first and most important point to be observed in every address to any Passion, Sentiment, Feeling, &c. is, that it should not be introduced as such, and plainly avowed; otherwise the effect will be, in great measure, if not entirely lost. This circumstance forms a remarkable distinction between the head now under consideration, and that of Argumentation. When engaged in Reasoning, properly so called, our purpose not only need not be concealed, but may, without prejudice to the effect, be distinctly declared: on the other hand, even when the feelings we wish to excite are such as ought to operate, so that there is no reason to be ashamed of the endeavours thus to influence the hearer, still, our purpose and drift should be, if not absolutely concealed, yet not openly declared and made prominent. Whether the motives which the Orator is endeavouring to call into action, be suitable or unsuitable to the occasion, such as it is right, or wrong for the hearer to act upon, the same rule will hold good. In the latter case it is plain, that the speaker who is seeking to bias unfairly the minds of the audience, will be the more likely to succeed by going to work clandestinely, in order that his hearers may not be on their guard, and prepare and fortify their minds against the

[28] Ἀρετὴ Φρόνησις Εὔνοια, Book II. Ch. I.

impressions he wishes to produce; in the other case, where the motives dwelt on are such as ought to be present and strongly to operate, men are not likely to be pleased with the idea that they *need* to have these motives urged upon them, and that they are not already sufficiently under the influence of such sentiments as the occasion calls for. A man may indeed be convinced that he is in such a predicament, and may ultimately feel obliged to the Orator for exciting or strengthening such sentiments; but while he confesses this, he cannot but feel a degree of mortification in making the confession, and a kind of jealousy of the apparent assumption of superiority in a speaker, who seems to say, "now I will exhort you to feel as you ought on this occasion;" "I will endeavour to inspire you with such noble and generous, and amiable sentiments as you ought to entertain;" which is, in effect, the tone of him who avows the purpose of Exhortation. The mind is sure to revolt from the humiliation of being thus moulded and fashioned, in respect to its feelings, at the pleasure of another; and is apt, perversely, to resist the influence of such a discipline.

Whereas there is no such implied superiority in avowing the intention of convincing the understanding: men know, and (what is more to the purpose) feel, that he who presents to their minds a new and cogent train of Argument, does not necessarily possess or assume any offensive superiority, but may, by merely having devoted a particular attention to the point in question, succeed in setting before them Arguments and Explanations which had not occurred to themselves; and even if the Arguments adduced, and the Conclusions drawn, should be opposite to those with which they had formerly been satisfied, still there is nothing in this so humiliating, as in that which seems to amount to the imputation of a moral defect.

It is true that Sermons not unfrequently prove popular, which consist avowedly and almost exclusively of Exhortation, strictly so called,—in which the design of influencing the sentiments and feelings is not only apparent, but prominent throughout; but it is to be feared, that those who are the most pleased with such discourses, are more apt to apply these Exhortations to their neighbours than to themselves; and that each bestows his commendation rather from the consideration that such admonitions are much needed, and must be generally useful, than from finding them thus useful to himself.

When indeed the speaker has made some progress in exciting the feelings required, and has in great measure gained possession of his audience, a direct and distinct Exhortation to adopt the conduct recommended will often prove very effectual; but never can it be needful or advisable to *tell* them (as some do) that you are *going* to *exhort* them.

It will, indeed, sometimes happen that the excitement of a certain feeling will depend, in some measure, on a process of Reasoning;

e.g. it may be requisite to prove, where there is a doubt on the subject, that the person recommended to the Pity, Gratitude, &c. of the hearers, is really an object deserving of these sentiments: but even then, it will almost always be the case, that the chief point to be accomplished shall be to raise those feelings to the requisite height, after the understanding is convinced that the occasion calls for them. And this is to be effected not by Argument, properly so called, but by presenting the circumstances in such a point of view, and so fixing and detaining the attention upon them, that corresponding sentiments and emotions shall gradually, and as it were spontaneously, arise.

§ 2. Hence arises another Rule, closely connected with the foregoing, though it also so far relates to Style that it might with sufficient propriety have been placed under that head; *viz.* that in order effectually to excite feelings of any kind, it is necessary to employ some copiousness of detail, and to dwell somewhat at large on the several circumstances of the case in hand; in which respect there is a wide distinction between strict Argumentation, with a view to the conviction of the understanding alone, and the attempt to influence the will by the excitement of any emotion. With respect to Argument itself indeed, different occasions will call for different degrees of Copiousness, Repetition, and Expansion; the chain of Reasoning employed may, in itself, consist of more or fewer links; abstruse and complex Arguments must be unfolded at greater length than such as are more simple; and the more uncultivated the audience, the more full must be the explanation and illustration, and the more frequent the repetition of the Arguments presented to them; but still the same general principle prevails in all these cases, *viz.* to aim merely at letting the Arguments be fully *understood and admitted;* this will indeed occupy a shorter or longer space, according to the nature of the case and the character of the hearers; but all Expansion and Repetition *beyond* what is necessary to accomplish conviction, is in every instance tedious and disgusting. On the contrary, in a description of any thing that is likely to act on the feelings, this effect will by no means be produced as soon as the understanding is sufficiently informed; detail and expansion are here not only admissible, but absolutely necessary, in order that the mind may have leisure and opportunity to form vivid and distinct ideas. For as Quinctilian well observes, he who tells us that a city was sacked, although that one word implies all that occurred, will produce little, if any, impression on the feelings, in comparison of one who sets before us a lively description of the various lamentable circumstances; to tell the *whole,* he adds, is by no means the same as to tell *every thing.*

§ 3. It is not, however, always advisable to enter into a *direct* detail of circumstances, which would often have the effect of wearying the hearer beforehand, with the expectation of a long description of something in which he probably does not as yet feel much interest;

and would also be likely to prepare him too much, and forewarn him as it were of the object proposed,—the design laid against his feelings. It will often, therefore, have a better effect to describe obliquely, (if we may so speak,) by introducing circumstances connected with the main Object or event, and affected by it, but not absolutely forming a part of it. And circumstances of this kind may not unfrequently be selected, so as to produce a more striking impression of any thing that is in itself great and remarkable, than could be produced by a minute and direct description; because in this way the general and collective result of a whole, and the effects produced by it on other objects, may be vividly impressed on the hearer's mind; the circumstantial detail of *collateral* circumstances not drawing off the mind from the contemplation of the principal matter as one and complete. Thus the woman's application to the King of Samaria, to compel her neighbour to fulfil her agreement of sharing with her the infant's flesh, gives a more frightful impression of the horrors of the famine than any more direct description could have done; since it presents to us the picture of that hardening of the heart to every kind of horror, and that destruction of the ordinary state of human sentiment, which is the *result* of long-continued and extreme misery. Nor could any detail of the particular vexations suffered by the exiled Jews for their disobedience, convey so lively an idea of them as that description of their *result* contained in the denunciation of Moses; "In the evening thou shalt say, Would God it were morning! and in the morning thou shalt say, Would God it were evening!"

In the poem of Rokeby, a striking exemplification occurs of what has been said: Bertram in describing the prowess he had displayed as a Buccaneer, does not particularize any of his exploits, but alludes to the terrible impression they had left:

> "Panama's maids shall long look pale,
> When Risingham inspires the tale;
> Chili's dark matrons long shall *tame*
> *The froward child* with Bertram's name."

The first of Dramatists, who might have been perhaps the first of Orators, has afforded some excellent exemplifications of this rule, especially in the speech of Antony over Cæsar's body.

§ 4. Comparison is one powerful means of exciting or heightening any emotion; *viz.* by presenting a parallel between the case in hand and some other that is calculated to call forth such emotions: taking care, of course, to represent the present case as stronger than the one it is compared with, and such as ought to affect us more powerfully.

When several successive steps of this kind are employed to raise the feelings gradually to the highest pitch, (which is the principal employment of what Rhetoricians call the Climax,[29]) a far stronger

[29] An analogous Arrangement of *Arguments* in order to set forth the full force of the one we mean to dwell upon, would also receive the same appellation, and in fact is very often combined and blended with that which is here spoken of.

effect is produced than by the mere presentation of the most striking object at once. It is observed by all travellers who have visited the Alps, or other stupendous mountains, that they form a very inadequate notion of the vastness of the greater ones, till they ascend some of the less elevated, (which yet are huge mountains,) and thence view the others still towering above them. And the mind, no less than the eye, cannot so well take in and do justice to any vast object, at a single glance, as by several successive approaches and repeated comparisons. Thus in the well known Climax of Cicero in the oration against Verres, shocked as the Romans were likely to be at the bare mention of the crucifixion of one of their citizens, the successive steps by which he brings them to the contemplation of such an event, were calculated to work up their feelings to a much higher pitch: "It is an outrage to bind a Roman citizen; to scourge him is an atrocious crime; to put him to death is almost parricide; but to *crucify* him —what shall I call it?"

It is observed, accordingly, by Aristotle, in speaking of Panegyric, that the person whom we would hold up to admiration, should always be compared, and advantageously compared, if possible, with those that are already illustrious, but if not, at least with *some* person whom he excels: to *excel*, being in itself, he says, a ground of admiration. The same rule will apply, as has been said, to all other feelings as well as to Admiration; Anger, or Pity, for instance, are more effectually excited if we produce cases such as would call forth those passions, and which though similar to those before us, are not so strong; and so with respect to the rest.

When it is said, however, that the Object which we compare with another, should be one which ought to excite the feeling in question in a higher degree than that other, it is not meant that this must actually be, already, the impression of the hearers: the reverse will more commonly be the case; that the instances adduced will be such as actually affect their feelings more strongly than that to which we are endeavouring to turn them, till the flame spreads, as it were, from the one to the other. This will especially hold good in every case where *self* is concerned; *e.g.* men feel naturally more indignant at a slight affront offered to themselves, or those closely connected with them, than at the most grievous wrong done to a stranger; if therefore you would excite their utmost indignation in such a case, it must be by comparing it with a parallel case that concerns themselves; *i.e.* by leading them to consider how they would feel were such and such an injury done to themselves. And, on the other hand, if you would lead them to a just sense of their own faults, it must be by leading them to contemplate like faults in others; of which the celebrated parable of Nathan, addressed to David, affords an admirable instance.

§ 5. Another Rule, (which also is connected in some degree with

Style) relates to the tone of feeling to be manifested by the writer or speaker himself, in order to excite the most effectually the desired emotions in the minds of the hearers. And this is to be accomplished by two opposite methods: the one, which is most obvious, is to *express* openly the feeling in question; the other, to seem labouring to *suppress* it: in the former method, the most forcible remarks are introduced,—the most direct as well as impassioned kind of description is employed,—and something of exaggeration introduced, in order to carry the hearers as far as possible in the same direction in which the Orator seems to be himself hurried, and to infect them to a certain degree with the emotions and sentiments which he thus manifests: the other method, which is often no less successful, is to abstain from all remarks, or from all such as come up to the expression of feeling which the occasion seems to authorize,—to use a gentler mode of expression than the case might fairly warrant,—to deliver "an unvarnished tale," leaving the hearers to make their own comments,—and to appear to stifle and studiously to keep within bounds such emotions as may seem natural. This produces a kind of reaction in the hearers' minds; and being struck with the inadequacy of the expressions, and the laboured calmness of the speaker's manner of stating things, compared with what he may naturally be disposed to feel, they will often rush into the opposite extreme, and become the more strongly affected by that which is set before them in so simple and modest a form. And though this method is in reality more artificial than the other, the artifice is the more likely (perhaps for that very reason) to escape detection; men being less on their guard against a speaker who does not seem so much labouring to work up *their* feelings, as to repress or moderate his own; provided that this calmness and coolness of manner be not carried to such an extreme as to bear the appearance of affectation; which caution is also to be attended to in the other mode of procedure no less; an excessive hyperbolical exaggeration being likely to defeat its own object. Aristotle mentions, (*Rhet.* Book IX.) though very briefly, these two modes of rousing the feelings, the latter under the name of *Eironeia*, which in his time was commonly employed to signify, not according to the modern use of "Irony, saying the *contrary* to what is meant," but what later writers usually express by *Litotes*, *i.e.* "saying *less* than is meant."

The two methods may often be both used on the same occasion, beginning with the calm, and proceeding to the impassioned, afterwards, when the feelings of the hearers are already wrought up to a certain pitch: ὅταν ἔχῃ ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς, καὶ, ποίησῃ ἐνθουσιάσαι.[30] Universally, indeed, it is a fault carefully to be avoided, to express feeling more vehemently than that the audience can go along with the speaker; who would, in that case, as Cicero observes, seem like

[30] Aristotle, *Rhet.* Book III. Ch. VII.

one raving among the sane, or intoxicated in the midst of the sober. And accordingly, except where from extraneous causes the audience are already in an excited state, we must carry them forward gradually, and allow time for the fire to kindle. The blast which would heighten a strong flame, would, if applied too soon, extinguish the first faint spark. The speech of Antony over Cæsar's corpse, which has been already mentioned, affords an admirable example of that combination of the two methods which has been just spoken of.

Generally, however, it will be found that the same Orators do not excel equally in both modes of exciting the Passions; and it should be recommended to each to employ principally that in which he succeeds best, since either, if judiciously managed, will generally prove effectual for its object. The well known tale of Inkle and Yarico, which is an instance of the *extenuating* method, (as it may be called,) could not, perhaps, have been rendered more affecting, if equally so, by the most impassioned vehemence and rhetorical heightening.

§ 6. When the occasion or object in question is not such as calls for, or as is likely to excite in those particular readers or hearers, the emotions required, it is a common Rhetorical artifice to turn their attention to some Object which *will* call forth these feelings; and when they are too much excited to be capable of judging calmly, it will not be difficult to turn their Passions, once roused, in the direction required, and to make them view the case before them in a very different light. When the metal is heated, it may easily be moulded into the desired form. Thus vehement indignation against some crime, may be directed against a person who has not been proved guilty of it; and vague declamations against corruption, oppression, &c. or against the mischiefs of anarchy; with high-flown panegyrics on liberty, rights of man, &c. or on social order, justice, the constitution, law, religion, &c. will gradually lead the hearers to take for granted, without proof, that the measure proposed will lead to these evils or these advantages; and it will in consequence become the object of groundless abhorrence or admiration. For the very utterance of such words as have a multitude of what may be called *stimulating* ideas associated with them, will operate like a charm on the minds, especially of the ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a tumult of feeling, as will effectually blind their judgment; so that a string of vague abuse or panegyric, will often have the effect of a train of sound Argument. This artifice falls under the head of "Irrelevant Conclusion," or *ignoratio elenchi*, mentioned in the Treatise on *Fallacies*. (Art. LOGIC, Ch. V. § 14.) Mr. Bentham has treated of the employment of these "passion-kindling appellatives," as he calls them, under the head of "Fallacies of Confusion," in his work entitled the *Book of Fallacies*. Many other observations, also occurring in that Treatise, will be found very nearly to coincide with that which has been said in the fifth chapter

of the Article on LOGIC just referred to; though not to be so strictly tried by Logical rules. Of many popular Sophisms he has given (though in a singular manner) an able exposure; and of many others, unfortunately, the most striking exemplifications may be found in his own reasonings; in which *petitio principii* in particular, occurs perpetually; as well as the one now before us, the employment of vituperative, or as he calls it, "Dyslogistic" language: that also which we there described as the "Fallacy of Objections," (which might be called by a lover of new-coined epithets, in language similar to that often employed by Mr. Bentham, a reverse-of-wrong-for-right-mistaking Fallacy,) is skilfully described, and but too often employed; as if, because existing abuses are maintained by those who have an interest in *keeping* what they have, no apprehension were to be entertained of new evils being introduced through the interested conduct of those who wish to *acquire* what they have not;[31] and as if, because many are misled by a blind veneration for "Authority" and the "Wisdom of our Ancestors," there did not exist also, as antagonist muscles, as it were, to these, an equally blind craving after novelty for its own sake, and a veneration for the ingenuity of one's own inventions.

It is matter of regret that the powers of such a mind as that of Mr. Bentham, should be to so great a degree wasted. Such, however, must always be the case, when a Scientific work is composed (with whatever sincerity) for party purposes, or with any object foreign to the precise End of the Science in question. Many Arguments accordingly are, in the work alluded to, stigmatised as Fallacies, which may be, either Sophistical, or sound and fair, according to the circumstances in which they are employed; such as that a certain proposed reformation ought to be effected "gradually;" that we must "wait awhile, the present not being the time for such and such a measure;" or that "this or that proposal comes from a suspicious quarter," &c. which are topics that may be fairly or unfairly urged. And it is but too plain that the line is drawn not with a view to the *mode* in which, but to the *object* for which, and the *party* by which, each Argument is urged. It is only when certain classes of Propositions are distinctively pointed out as absolutely false, inadmissible, or irrelevant, or certain deductions from true ones shown to be unfair, that any useful warning can be supplied. The hopes, therefore, which the author entertains, (p. 410,) that by the general study and adoption of his Principles,

[31] Those who will not profit by the lessons of the French Revolution, are not, perhaps, likely to learn wisdom from the great historian of Greece, who has so well described the workings of human passion as manifested in the civil commotions of Corcyra and other States. But to such as are willing to receive instruction, that which he affords can never cease to be valuable.—Ἐν δ' οὖν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν πρωτολμήθη, καὶ ὅπόσα ὕβρει μὲν ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλέον ἢ σωφροσύνῃ, ὑπὸ τῶν, τὴν τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων, οἱ ἀνταμυνόμενοι δράσειαν· ΠΕΝΙΑΣ ΔΕ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΩΘΟΤΙ ΑΣ ΑΠΑΛΛΑΞΕΙΟΝΤΕΣ τινὲς, μάλιστα δ' ἂν διὰ πάθους ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν, παρὰ δίκην γιγνώσκοιεν· . . . . ξυνταραχθέντος τε τοῦ βίου, ἐς τὸν παιρὸν τοῦτον, τῇ πόλει, καὶ τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις, ἰωθῦια καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν, ἀσμένη ἐδήλωσεν, ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὖσα, κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, ΠΟΛΕΜΙΑ ΔΕ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΥΧΟΝΤΟΣ.—Thucy. Book III. § 84.

debates may be cleared and shortened, (each Fallacy being detected, exposed by name, and exploded, as soon as uttered,) seem more sanguine than well-founded. If the general adoption, by the great majority of the audience, of the same system, means, their being of the same party, no doubt they would readily and easily silence by clamour every opposite Argument; but if they are merely to agree in adopting Logical principles as ill-defined as those we are speaking of, the proposed plan for the ready exposure of each fallacious Argument, resembles that by which children are deluded, of catching a bird by laying salt on its tail; the existing doubts and difficulties of debate being no greater than, on the proposed system, would be found in determining *what* Arguments were, and what not, to be classed with the Fallacies in question.

The work, however, may be read safely, and, perhaps, not without advantage, by those who have sufficient interest in the subject to encounter the obscurity of the style, and sufficient patience in investigation, and power of discrimination, to separate the particles of gold dust from the mass of sand and weed with which they are blended. It has been thought advisable, therefore, to make this reference to an author who is, perhaps, too generally regarded, except by the very small number of disciples who idolize him, with that unmixed contempt which is due to a *portion* only (though certainly no inconsiderable portion) of his tenets. Among posterity, the opinions entertained of him may probably be less violently contrasted, and, on the whole, more favourable; at least it usually happens that those who have manifested any considerable original powers, and have elicited valuable truths, however contaminated by the most extravagant errors, are remembered, even more favourably than is strictly their due; their absurdities are gradually forgotten, like the inscription on plaster on the lighthouse of Pharos, which mouldered away by the action of the weather; while the value of their discoveries is durably recorded, and becomes more and more conspicuous, like the inscription engraved on the marble beneath.

§ 7. In raising a favourable impression of the speaker, or an unfavourable one of his opponent, a peculiar tact will of course be necessary; especially in the former, since direct self-commendation will usually be disgusting to a greater degree, even than a direct personal attack on another; though, if the Orator is pleading his own cause, or one in which he is personally concerned, (as was the case in the speech of Demosthenes concerning the Crown,) a greater allowance will be made for him on this point; especially if he be a very eminent person, and one who may safely appeal to public actions performed by him. Thus Pericles is represented by Thucydides as claiming directly, when speaking in his own vindication, exactly the qualities (good Sense, good Principle, and Good-will,) which Aristotle lays down as constituting the character which we must seek to appear

in. But then it is to be observed, that the historian represents him as accustomed to address the people with more authority than others for the most part ventured to assume. It is by the expression of wise, amiable, and generous *Sentiments*, that Aristotle recommends the speaker to manifest his own character; but even this must generally be done in an *oblique*[32] and seemingly incidental manner, lest the hearers be disgusted with a pompous and studied display of fine sentiments; and care must also be taken not to affront them by seeming to inculcate as something likely to be new to them, maxims which they regard as almost truisms. Of course the application of this last caution must vary according to the character of the persons addressed; that might excite admiration and gratitude in one audience, which another would receive with indignation and ridicule. Most men, however, are disposed rather to overrate than to extenuate their own moral judgment; or at least to be jealous of any one's appearing to underrate it.

Universally, indeed, in the Arguments used, as well as in the appeals made to the Feelings, a consideration must be had of the hearers, whether they are learned or ignorant—of this or that profession—nation—character, &c. and the address must be adapted to each; so that there can be no excellence of writing or speaking in the abstract; nor can we any more pronounce on the Eloquence of any Composition, than upon the wholesomeness of a medicine, without knowing for whom it is intended. The less enlightened the hearers, the harder, of course, it is to make them comprehend a long and complex train of Reasoning; so that sometimes the Arguments, in themselves the most cogent, cannot be employed at all with effect; and the rest will need an expansion and copious illustration which would be needless, and therefore tiresome, (as has been above remarked,) before a different kind of audience: on the other hand, their feelings may be excited by much bolder and coarser expedients; such as those are the most ready to employ, and the most likely to succeed in, who are themselves but a little removed above the vulgar; as may be seen in the effects produced by fanatical preachers. But there are none whose feelings do not occasionally need and admit of excitement by the powers of Eloquence; only there is a more exquisite skill required in thus affecting the educated classes than the populace.[33]

[32] *E.G.* "It would be needless to impress upon you the maxim," &c. "You cannot be ignorant," &c. &c. "I am not advancing any high pretensions in expressing the sentiments which such an occasion must call forth in every honest heart," &c.

[33] "The less improved in knowledge and discernment the hearers are, the easier it is for the speaker to work upon their passions, and by working on their passions, to obtain his end. This, it must be owned, appears on the other hand, to give a considerable advantage to the preacher, as in no congregation can the bulk of the people be regarded as on a footing, in point of improvement, with either House of Parliament, or with the Judges in a Court of Judicature. It is certain, that the more gross the hearers are, the more avowedly may you address yourself to their passions, and the less occasion there is for argument; whereas, the more intelligent they are, the more covertly must you operate on their passions, and the more attentive must you be in regard to the justness, or at least the speciousness of your reasoning. Hence

In no point more than in that now under consideration, *viz.* the Conciliation (to adopt the term of the Latin writers) of the hearers, is it requisite to consider who and what the hearers are; for when it is said that good Sense, good Principle, and Good-will, constitute the character which the speaker ought to establish of himself, it is to be remembered that every one of these is to be considered in reference to the opinions and habits of the audience. To think very differently from his hearers, may often be a sign of the Orator's wisdom and worth; but *they* are not likely to consider it so. A witty Satirist,[34] has observed, that "it is a short way to obtain the reputation of a wise and reasonable man, whenever any one tells you his opinion, to agree with him." Without going the full length of completely acting on this maxim, it is absolutely necessary to remember, that in proportion as the speaker manifests his dissent from the opinions and principles of his audience, so far he runs the risk at least, of impairing their estimation of his judgment. But this it is often necessary to do when any serious object is proposed; because it will commonly happen that the very End aimed at shall be one which implies a change of sentiments, or even of principles and character, in the hearers. Those indeed who aim only at popularity, are right in conforming their sentiments to those of the hearers, rather than the contrary; but it is plain that though in this way they obtain the greatest reputation for Eloquence, they deserve it the less; it being much easier, according to the tale related of Mahomet, to go to the mountain, than to bring the mountain to us.[35] There is but little Eloquence in convincing men

some have strangely concluded, that the only scope for eloquence is in haranguing the multitude; that in gaining over to your purpose men of knowledge and breeding, the exertion of Oratorical talents hath no influence. This is precisely as if one should argue, because a mob is much more easily subdued than regular troops, there is no occasion for the art of war, nor is there a proper field for the exertion of military skill, unless when you are quelling an undisciplined rabble. Every body sees in this case, not only how absurd such a way of arguing would be, but that the very reverse ought to be the conclusion. The reason why people do not so quickly perceive the absurdity in the other case, is, that they affix no distinct meaning to the word *eloquence*, often denoting no more by that term than simply the power of moving the passions. But even in this improper acceptation, their notion is far from being just; for wherever there are men, learned or ignorant, civilized or barbarous, there are passions; and the greater the difficulty is in affecting these, the more art is requisite."—Campbell's *Rhetoric*, Book I. Ch. X. § 2. pp. 224, 225.

[34] Swift.

[35] "Little force is necessary to push down heavy bodies placed on the verge of a declivity, but much force is requisite, to stop them in their progress, and push them up. If a man should say, that because the first is more frequently effected than the last, it is the best trial of strength, and the only suitable use to which it can be applied, we should at least not think him remarkable for distinctness in his ideas. Popularity alone, therefore, is no test at all of the eloquence of the speaker, no more than velocity alone would be, of the force of the external impulse originally given to the body moving. As in this the direction of the body, and other circumstances, must be taken into the account; so in that, you must consider the tendency of the teaching, whether it favours or opposes the vices of the hearers. To head a sect, to infuse party-spirit, to make men arrogant, uncharitable, and malevolent, is the easiest task imaginable, and to which almost any blockhead is fully equal. But to produce the contrary effect, to subdue the spirit of faction, and that monster spiritual pride, with which it is invariably accompanied, to inspire equity, moderation, and charity into men's sentiments and conduct with regard to others, is the genuine test of eloquence."—Campbell's *Rhetoric*, Book I. Ch. X. § 5. p. 239.

that they are in the right, or inducing them to approve a character which coincides with their own.

The Christian preacher therefore is in this respect placed in a difficult dilemma, since he may be sure that the less he complies with the depraved judgments of man's corrupt nature, the less acceptable is he likely to be to that depraved judgment.

But he who would claim the highest rank as an Orator, (to omit all higher considerations,) must be the one who is the most successful, not in gaining popular applause, but in *carrying his point*, whatever it be. The preacher, however, who is intent on this object, should use all such precautions as are not inconsistent with it, to avoid raising unfavourable impressions in his hearers. Much will depend on a gentle and conciliatory manner; nor is it necessary that he should, at once, in an abrupt and offensive form, set forth *all* the differences of sentiment between himself and his congregation, but win them over by degrees; and in whatever point, and to whatever extent, he may suppose them to agree with him, it is allowable, and for that reason advisable, to dwell on that agreement; as the Apostles began every address to the Jews by an appeal to the Prophets, whose authority they admitted; and as St. Paul opens his discourse to the Athenians (though unfortunately the words of our translation are likely to convey an opposite idea,[36]) by a commendation of their respect for religion. And above all, where censure is called for, the speaker should avoid, on Christian, as well as on Rhetorical principles, all appearance of exultation in his own superiority,—of contempt,—or of uncharitable triumph in the detection of faults; "in *meekness*, *instructing* them that oppose themselves."

Of intellectual qualifications, there is one which it is evident, should not only not be blazoned forth, but should in a great measure be concealed, or kept out of sight; *viz.* Rhetorical skill; since whatever is attributed to the Eloquence of the speaker is so much deducted from the strength of his cause. Hence, Pericles is represented by Thucydides as artfully claiming, in his vindication of himself, the power of *explaining* the measures he proposes, not, Eloquence in *persuading* their adoption. And accordingly a skilful Orator seldom fails to notice and extol the Eloquence of his opponent, and to warn the hearers against being misled by it. It is a peculiarity therefore in the Rhetorical art, that in it, more than in any other, vanity has a direct and immediate tendency to interfere with the proposed object. Excessive vanity may indeed, in various ways, prove an impediment to success in other pursuits; but in the endeavour to Persuade, all wish to appear excellent in that art, operates as a hinderance. A Poet, a Statesman, or a General, &c., though extreme covetousness of applause may mislead them, will, however, attain their respective

[36] Δεισιδαιμονεστέρους, not "too superstitious," but (as almost all commentators are now agreed) "very much disposed to the worship of Divine beings."

Ends, certainly not the less for being admired as excellent in Poetry, Politics, or War; but the Orator attains his End the better the less he is regarded as an Orator; if he can make the hearers believe that he is not only a stranger to all unfair artifice, but even destitute of all Persuasive skill whatever, he will Persuade them the more effectually; and if there ever could be an absolutely perfect Orator, no one would, at the time at least, discover that he was so. And this consideration may serve to account for the fact which Cicero remarks upon (*De Oratore*, Book I.) as so inexplicable; *viz.* the small number of persons who, down to his time, had obtained high reputation as Orators, compared with those who had attained excellence in other pursuits. Few men are destitute of the desire of admiration; and most are especially ambitious of it in the pursuit to which they have chiefly devoted themselves; the Orator therefore is continually tempted to sacrifice the substance to the shadow, by aiming rather at the admiration of the hearers, than their conviction; and thus to fail of that excellence in his art which he might otherwise be well qualified to attain, through the desire of a reputation for it. And on the other hand, some may have been really Persuasive speakers, who yet may not have ranked high in men's opinion, and may not have been known to possess that art of which they gave proof by their skilful concealment of it. There is no point, in short, in which report is so little to be trusted.

Of the three points which Aristotle directs the Orator to claim credit for, it might seem at first sight that one, *viz.* "Good-will," is unnecessary to be mentioned; since Ability and Integrity would appear to comprehend, in most cases at least, all that is needed; a virtuous man, it may be said, must wish well to his countrymen, or to any persons whatever, whom he may be addressing. But on a more attentive consideration, it will be manifest that Aristotle had good reason for mentioning this head; if the speaker were believed to wish well to his *Country*, and to every individual of it, yet if he were suspected of being unfriendly to the political or other *Party* to which his hearers belonged, they would listen to him with prejudice. The abilities and the conscientiousness of Phocion seem not to have been doubted by any; but they were so far from gaining him a favourable hearing among the Democratical party at Athens, (who knew him to be no friend to Democracy,) that they probably distrusted him the more; as one whose public spirit would induce him, and whose talents would enable him, to subvert the existing Constitution.

One of the most powerful engines, accordingly, of the Orator, is this kind of appeal to party-spirit. Party-spirit may, indeed, be considered in another point of view, as one of the Passions which may be *directly* appealed to, when it can be brought to operate in the direction required; *i.e.* when the conduct the writer or speaker is recommending appears likely to gratify party-spirit; but it is the *indirect* appeal to it which is now under consideration; *viz.* the favour, credit, and

weight which the speaker will derive from appearing to be of the same party with the hearers, or at least not opposed to it. And this is a sort of credit which he may claim more openly and avowedly than any other; and likewise may throw discredit on his opponent in a less offensive, but not less effectual manner. A man cannot say in direct terms, "I am a wise and worthy man, and my adversary the reverse;" but he is allowed to say, "I adhere to Whig or Tory principles," (as the case may be,) and "my opponent the reverse;" which is not regarded as an offence against modesty, and yet amounts virtually to as strong a self-commendation, and as decided vituperation, in the eyes of those imbued with party-spirit, as if every kind of merit and of demerit had been enumerated: for to zealous party men, zeal for their party will very often either imply, or stand as a substitute for, every other kind of worth.

Hard, indeed, therefore is the task of him whose object is to counteract party-spirit and to soften the violence of those prejudices which spring from it.[37] His only resource must be to take care that he give no ground for being supposed imbued with the violent and unjust prejudices of the opposite party,—that he give his audience credit (since it rarely happens but that each party has some tenets that are reasonable,) for whatever there may be that deserves praise,—that he proceed gradually and cautiously in removing the errors with which they are infected,—and above all, that he studiously disclaim and avoid the appearance of any thing like a feeling of *personal* hostility, or personal contempt.

If the Orator's character can be sufficiently established in respect of Ability, and also of Good-will towards the hearers, it might at first sight appear as if this would be sufficient; since the former of these would imply the Power, and the latter, the Inclination, to give the best advice, whatever might be his Moral character; but Aristotle (in his *Politics*) justly remarks that this last is also requisite to be insisted on, in order to produce entire confidence; for, says he, though a man cannot be suspected of wanting Good-will towards *himself*, yet many very able men act most absurdly, even in their own affairs, for want of Moral virtue, being either blinded or overcome by their Passions, so as to sacrifice their own most important interests to their present gratification; and much more, therefore, may they be expected to be thus seduced by personal temptations, in the advice they give to others. Pericles, accordingly, in the speech which has been already referred to, is represented by Thucydides as insisting not only on his political ability and his patriotism, but also on his unimpeached

[37] "Of all the prepossessions in the minds of the hearers, which tend to impede or counteract the design of the speaker, party-spirit, where it happens to prevail, is the most pernicious, being at once the most inflexible, and the most unjust. * * * Violent party men not only lose all sympathy with those of the opposite side, but even contract an antipathy to them. This, on some occasions, even the divinest eloquence will not surmount."—Campbell's *Rhetoric.*

integrity, as a qualification absolutely necessary to entitle him to their confidence; for "the man," says he, "who possesses every other requisite, but is overcome by the temptation of a bribe, will be ready to sell every thing for the gratification of his avarice."

From what has been said of the speaker's recommendation of himself to the audience, and establishment of his authority with them, sufficient Rules may readily be deduced for the analogous process, the depreciation of an opponent. Both of these, and especially the latter, under the offensive title of *personality*, are by many indiscriminately decried as unfair Rhetorical artifices; and, doubtless they are, in the majority of cases, sophistically employed; and by none more effectually than by those who are perpetually declaiming against such Fallacies; the unthinking hearers not being prepared to expect them from those who represent themselves as holding them in such abhorrence. But surely it is not in itself an unfair topic of Argument, in cases not admitting of decisive and unquestionable proof, to urge that the one party deserves the hearers' confidence, or that the other is justly an object of their distrust. "If the measure is a good one," says Mr. Bentham, "will it become bad because it is supported by a bad man? if it is bad, will it become good, because supported by a good man? If the measure be really inexpedient, why not at once show that it is so? Your producing these irrelevant and inconclusive Arguments, in lieu of direct ones, though not sufficient to prove that the measure you thus oppose is a good one, contributes to prove that you yourself regard it as a good one." Now there is no doubt that the generality of men are too much disposed to consider more, *who* proposes a measure, than *what* it is that is proposed; and probably would continue to do so, even under a system of annual Parliaments and universal suffrage; and if a warning be given against an excessive tendency to this way of judging, it is reasonable, and may be useful; nor should any one escape censure who *confines* himself to these topics, or dwells principally on them, in cases where "direct" Arguments are to be expected; but they are not to be condemned *in toto* as "irrelevant and inconclusive," because they are only probable, and not in themselves decisive; it is only in matters of strict science, and that too, in arguing to scientific men, that the character of the advisers (as well as all other *probable* Arguments,) should be wholly put out of the question. And it is remarkable that the necessity of allowing some weight to this consideration, in political matters, increases in proportion as any country enjoys a free government; if all the power be in the hands of a few of the higher orders, who have the opportunity at least, of obtaining education, it is conceivable, whether probable or not, that they may be brought to try each proposed measure exclusively on its intrinsic merits, by abstract Arguments; but can any man, in his senses, really believe that the great mass of the people, or even any considerable portion of them, can ever

possess so much political knowledge, patience in investigation, and sound Logic, (to say nothing of candour,) as to be able and willing to judge, and to judge correctly, of every proposed political measure, in the abstract, without any regard to their opinion of the person who proposes it? And it is evident that in every case, in which the hearers are not completely competent judges, they not only will, but must, take into consideration the characters of those who propose, support, or dissuade any measure;—the persons they are connected with,—the designs they may be supposed to entertain, &c.; though, undoubtedly, an *excessive* and *exclusive* regard to Persons rather than Arguments, is one of the chief Fallacies against which men ought to be cautioned.

In no way, perhaps, are men, not bigoted to party, more likely to be misled by their favourable or unfavourable judgment of their advisers, than in what relates to the authority derived from *Experience;* not that Experience ought not to be allowed to have great weight; but that men are apt not to consider with sufficient attention, what it is that constitutes Experience in each point; so that frequently one man shall have credit for much Experience, in what relates to the matter in hand, and another, who, perhaps, possesses as much, or more, shall be underrated as wanting it. The vulgar, of all ranks, need to be warned, 1st, that *time* alone does not constitute Experience; so that many years may have passed over a man's head, without his even having had the same opportunities of acquiring it, as another, much younger: 2d, that the longest practice in conducting any business in *one* way, does not necessarily confer any Experience in conducting it in a different way; *e.g.* an experienced Husbandman, or a Minister of State, in Persia, would be much at a loss in Europe; and if they had some things less to learn than an entire novice, on the other hand they would have much to unlearn: and, 3d, that merely being conversant about a certain class of *subjects*, does not confer Experience in a case where the *Operations* and the *End* proposed, are different. It is said that there was an Amsterdam merchant, who had dealt largely in corn all his life, who had never seen a field of wheat growing; this man had doubtless acquired, by Experience, an accurate judgment of the qualities of each description of corn,—of the best methods of storing it,—of the arts of buying and selling it at proper times, &c.; but he would have been greatly at a loss in its cultivation; though he had been, in a certain way, long *conversant* about corn. Nearly similar is the Experience of a practised Lawyer, (supposing him to be nothing more) in a case of *Legislation;* because he has been long *conversant about Law*, the unreflecting attribute great weight to his judgment; whereas his constant habits of fixing his thoughts on what the law *is*, and withdrawing it from the irrelevant question of what the law *ought* to be; —his careful observance of a multitude of Rules, (which afford the more scope for the display of his skill, in proportion as they are

arbitrary, unreasonable, and unaccountable,) with a studied indifference as to that which is foreign from his business, the *convenience* or *inconvenience* of those Rules, may be expected to operate unfavourably on his judgment in questions of Legislation; and are likely to counterbalance the advantages of his superior knowledge, even in such points as do bear on the question. The consideration then of the character of the speaker, and of his opponent, being of so much importance, both as a legitimate source of Persuasion, in many instances, and also as a topic of Fallacies, it is evidently incumbent on the Orator to be well versed in this branch of the art, with a view both to the justifiable advancement of his own Cause, and to the detection and exposure of unfair artifice in an opponent. It is neither possible, nor can it, in justice be expected, that this mode of Persuasion should be totally renounced and exploded, great as are the abuses to which it is liable; but the speaker is bound, in conscience, to abstain from those abuses himself, and, in prudence, to be on his guard against them in others.

It only remains to observe, on this head, that, as Aristotle teaches, the *place* for the disparagement of an opponent is, for the first speaker, near the close of his discourse, to weaken the force of what may be said in reply; and for the opponent, near the opening, to lessen the influence of what has been already said.

§ 8. Either a personal prejudice, such as has been just mentioned, or some other passion unfavourable to the speaker's Object, may already exist in the minds of the hearers, which it must be his business to allay.

It is obvious that this will the most effectually be done, not by endeavouring to produce a state of perfect calmness and apathy, but by exciting some contrary emotion. And here it is to be observed that some passions may be, Rhetorically speaking, opposite to each other, though in strictness they are not so; *viz.* whenever they are incompatible with each other: *e.g.* the opposite, strictly speaking, to Anger, would be a feeling of Good-will and approbation towards the person in question; but it is not by the excitement of this, alone, that Anger may be allayed; for Fear is, practically, contrary to it also; as is remarked by Aristotle; who Philosophically accounts for this, on the principle that Anger implying a desire to inflict *punishment*, must imply also a supposition that it is *possible* to do so; and accordingly men do not, he says, feel Anger towards one who is so much superior as to be manifestly out of their reach; and the Object of their Anger ceases to be so, as soon as he becomes an Object of Apprehension. Of course the converse also of this holds good; Anger, when it prevails, in like manner subduing Fear. Compassion, likewise, may be counteracted either by Disapprobation, by Jealousy, by Fear, or by Disgust and Horror; and Envy, either by Good-will, or by Contempt.

This is the more necessary to be attended to, in order that the Orator may be on his guard against inadvertently defeating his own Object, by exciting feelings at variance with those he is endeavouring to produce, though not strictly contrary to them. Aristotle accordingly notices, with this view, the difference between the "Pitiable," (ἐλεεινὸν) and the "Horrible or Shocking," (δεινὸν;) which, as he observes, excite different feelings, destructive of each other; so that the Orator must be warned, if the former is his Object, to keep clear of any thing that may excite the latter.

It will often happen that it will be easier to a give a *new direction* to the unfavourable passion, than to subdue it; *e.g.* to *turn* the indignation or the laughter of the hearers against a different object. Indeed, whenever the case will admit of this, it will generally prove the more successful expedient, because it does not imply the accomplishment of so great a change in the minds of the hearers.

CHAPTER III.

OF STYLE.

THOUGH the consideration of Style has been laid down as holding a place in a Treatise of Rhetoric, it would be neither necessary nor pertinent, to enter fully into a *general* discussion of the subject, which would evidently embrace much that by no means peculiarly belongs to our present inquiry. It is requisite for an Orator, *e.g.* to observe the rules of Grammar; but the same may be said of the Poet and the Historian, &c. nor is there any *peculiar* kind of grammatical propriety belonging to Persuasive or Argumentative compositions; so that it would be a departure from our subject to treat at large, under the head of Rhetoric, of such rules as equally concern every other of the purposes for which Language is employed.

Conformably to this view we shall, under the present head, notice but slightly such principles of composition as do not exclusively or peculiarly belong to the present subject; confining our attention chiefly to such observations on Style as have an especial reference to Argumentative and Persuasive works.

§ 1. It is sufficiently evident (though the maxim is often practically disregarded) that the first requisite of Style not only in Rhetorical, but in all compositions, is Perspicuity; since, as Aristotle observes, language which is not intelligible, or not clearly and readily intelligible, fails, in the same proportion, of the purpose for which language is employed. And it is equally self-evident (though this truth is still more frequently overlooked) that Perspicuity is a *relative* quality, and consequently cannot properly be predicated of any work, without a tacit reference to the class of readers or hearers for whom it is designed. Nor is it enough that the Style be such as they are *capable* of understanding, *if* they bestow their utmost attention: the degree and the kind of attention, which they have been accustomed, or are likely to bestow, will be among the circumstances that are to be taken into the account, and provided for. The *kind*, as well as the degree, of attention, is mentioned, because some hearers and readers will be found slow of apprehension indeed, but capable of taking in what is very copiously and gradually explained to them; while others on the contrary, who are much quicker at catching the sense of what is expressed in a short compass, are incapable of *long* attention, and are not only wearied, but absolutely bewildered, by a diffuse Style.

When a numerous and very mixed audience is to be addressed, much skill will be required in adapting the Style, (both in *this*, and in other respects,) and indeed the Arguments also, and the whole structure of the discourse, to the various minds which it is designed to impress; nor can the utmost art and diligence prove after all more than partially successful in such a case; especially when the diversities are so many and so great, as exist in the congregations to which most Sermons are addressed, and in the readers for whom popular works of an argumentative, instructive, and hortatory character, are intended. It is possible, however, to approach indefinitely to an object which cannot be completely attained, and to adopt such a Style and such a mode of Reasoning, as shall be level to the comprehension of the greater part, at least, even of a promiscuous audience, without being distasteful to any.

It is obvious, and sufficiently well known, that extreme conciseness is ill suited to hearers or readers, whose intellectual powers and cultivation are but small: the usual expedient, however, of employing a *prolix* Style by way of accommodation to such minds, is seldom successful: most of those who could have comprehended the meaning, if more briefly expressed, and many of those who could not do so, are likely to be bewildered by tedious expansion; and being unable to maintain a steady attention to what is said, they forget part of what they have heard before the whole is completed. Add to which, that the feebleness produced by excessive dilution, (if such an expression may be allowed,) will occasion the attention to languish; and what is imperfectly attended to, however clear in itself, will usually be but imperfectly understood. Let not an author, therefore, satisfy himself by finding that he has expressed his meaning so that, if attended to, he cannot fail to be understood; he must consider also (as was before remarked) what attention is likely to be paid to it: if on the one hand much matter is expressed in very few words, to an unreflecting audience, or if, on the other hand, there is a wearisome prolixity, the requisite attention may very probably not be bestowed.[38]

The best general rule for avoiding the disadvantages both of conciseness and of prolixity, is to employ *Repetition:* to repeat, that is, the same sentiment and Argument in many different forms of expression; each in itself brief, but all, together, affording such an

[38] It is remarked by Anatomists that the nutritive quality is not the only requisite in food;—that a certain degree of *distention* of the stomach is required, to enable it to act with its full powers;—and that it is for this reason hay and straw must be given to horses, as well as corn, in order to supply the necessary bulk. Something analogous to this takes place with respect to the generality of minds, which are incapable of thoroughly digesting and assimilating what is presented to them, however clearly, in a very small compass. Many a one is capable of deriving that instruction from a moderate sized volume, which he could not receive from a very small pamphlet, even more perspicuously written, and containing every thing that is to the purpose. It is necessary that the attention should be detained for a certain time on the subject: and persons of unphilosophical mind, though they can attend to what they read or hear, are unapt to dwell upon it in the way of subsequent meditation.

expansion of the sense to be conveyed, and so detaining the mind upon it, as the case may require. Cicero among the ancients, and Burke among the modern writers, afford, perhaps, the most abundant practical exemplifications of this rule. The latter sometimes shows a deficiency in correct taste, and lies open to Horace's censure of an author, "*Qui variare cupit rem prodigaliter unam;*" but it must be admitted that he seldom fails to make himself thoroughly understood, and does not often weary the attention, even when he offends the taste of his readers.

Care must of course be taken that the repetition may not be too glaringly apparent; the variation must not consist in the mere use of other, synonymous, words; but what has been expressed in appropriated terms may be repeated in metaphorical; the antecedent and consequent of an Argument, or the parts of an antithesis may be transposed; or several different points that have been enumerated, presented in a varied order, &c.

It is not necessary to dwell on that obvious rule laid down by Aristotle, to avoid uncommon, as they are vulgarly called, *hard* words, *i.e.* those which are such to the persons addressed; but it may be worth remarking, that to those who wish to be understood by the lower orders, one of the best principles of selection is to prefer terms of *Saxon* origin, which will generally be more familiar to them, than those derived from the Latin, (either directly or through the medium of the French,) even when the latter are more in use among persons of education. Our language being (with very trifling exceptions) made up of these elements, it is very easy for any one, though unacquainted with Saxon, to observe this precept, if he has but a knowledge of French or of Latin; and there is a remarkable scope for such a choice as we are speaking of, from the multitude of synonymes derived, respectively, from those two sources. The compilers of our Liturgy being anxious to reach the understandings of all classes, at a time when our language was in a less settled state than at present, availed themselves of this circumstance in employing many synonymous, or nearly synonymous expressions, most of which are of the description just alluded to. Take as an instance, the Exhortation: "acknowledge" and "confess;" "dissemble" and "cloak;" "humble" and "lowly;" "goodness" and "mercy;" "assemble" and "meet together:" and here it may be observed that, as in this last instance, a word of French origin will very often not have a *single word* of Saxon derivation corresponding to it, but may find an exact equivalent in a *phrase* of two or more words: *e.g.* "constitute," "go to make up;" "arrange," "put in order;" "substitute," "put in the stead," &c. &c.

It is worthy of notice that a Style composed chiefly of the words of French origin, while it is less intelligible to the lowest classes, is characteristic of those who in cultivation of taste are below the high-

est. As in dress, furniture, deportment, &c. so also in language, the dread of vulgarity constantly besetting those who are half conscious that they are in danger of it, drives them into the extreme of affected finery. So that the precept which has been given with a view to perspicuity, may, to a certain degree, be observed with an advantage in point of elegance also.

In adapting the Style to the comprehension of the illiterate, a caution is to be observed against the ambiguity of the word "*Plain;*" which is opposed sometimes to *Obscurity*, and sometimes to *Ornament;* the vulgar require a perspicuous, but by no means, a dry and unadorned Style; on the contrary, they have a taste rather for the overflorid, tawdry, and bombastic: nor are the ornaments of style by any means necessarily inconsistent with perspicuity; Metaphor, which is among the principal of them, is indeed, in many cases, the clearest mode of expression that can be adopted; it being usually much easier for uncultivated minds to comprehend a similitude or analogy, than an abstract term. And hence the language of savages, as has often been remarked, is highly metaphorical; and such appears to have been the case with all languages in their earlier, and consequently ruder and more savage state; many terms relating to the mind and its operations, being, as appears from their etymology, originally metaphorical, though by long use they have ceased to be so: *e.g.* the words "ponder," "deliberate," "reflect," and many other such, are evidently drawn by analogy from external sensible bodily actions.

In respect to the Construction of sentences, it is an obvious caution to abstain from such as are too long; but it is a mistake to suppose that the obscurity of many long sentences depends on their length alone; a well constructed sentence of very considerable length may be more readily understood, than a shorter one which is more awkwardly framed. If a sentence be so constructed that the meaning of each part can be taken in as we proceed, (though it be evident that the sense is not brought to a close,) its length will be little or no impediment to perspicuity; but if the former part of the sentence convey no distinct meaning till we arrive nearly at the end, however plain it may then appear, it will be on the whole deficient in perspicuity; for it will need to be read over, or *thought over*, a second time, in order to be fully comprehended; which is what few readers or hearers are willing to be burthened with. Take as an instance such a sentence as this: "It is not without a degree of patient attention and persevering diligence, greater than the generality are willing to bestow, though not greater than the object deserves, that the habit can be acquired of examining and judging of our own conduct with the same accuracy and impartiality as that of another:" this labours under the defect we are speaking of, which may be remedied by some such alteration as the following: "the habit of examining our own conduct as accurately as that of another, and judging of it with the

same impartiality, cannot be acquired without a degree of patient attention and persevering diligence, not greater indeed than the object deserves, but greater than the generality are willing to bestow." The two sentences are nearly the same in length, and in the words employed; but the alteration of the arrangement allows the latter to be understood clause by clause, as it proceeds. The caution just given is the more necessary to be insisted on, because an author is apt to be misled by reading over a sentence to himself, and being satisfied on finding it perfectly intelligible, forgetting that he himself has the advantage, which a hearer has not, of knowing at the beginning of the sentence what is coming in the close.

Universally, indeed, an unpractised writer is liable to be misled by his own knowledge of his own meaning, into supposing those expressions clearly intelligible, which are so to himself; but which may not be so to the reader, whose thoughts are not in the same train. And hence it is that some do not write or speak with so much perspicuity on a subject which has long been very familiar to them, as on one which they understand indeed, but with which they are less intimately acquainted, and in which their knowledge has been more recently acquired. In the former case it is a matter of some difficulty to keep in mind the necessity of carefully and copiously explaining principles which by long habit have come to assume in our minds the appearance of self-evident truths. So far is Blair's notion from being correct, that obscurity of Style necessarily springs from indistinctness of Conception.

The foregoing rules have all, it is evident, proceeded on the supposition that it is the writer's *intention* to be understood; and this cannot but be the case in every legitimate exercise of the Rhetorical art; and generally speaking, even where the design is Sophistical. For, as Dr. Campbell has justly remarked, the Sophist may employ for his purpose what are in themselves real and valid Arguments, since probabilities may lie on opposite sides, though truth can be but on one; his fallacious artifice consisting only in keeping out of sight the stronger probabilities which may be urged against him, and in attributing an undue weight to those which he has to allege. Or again he may, either directly or indirectly, assume as self-evident a premiss which there is no sufficient ground for admitting; or he may draw off the attention of the hearers to the proof of some irrelevant point, &c. according to the various modes described in the Treatise on FALLACIES; but in all this there is no call for any departure from perspicuity of Style, properly so called; not even when he avails himself of an ambiguous term. "For though," as Dr. Campbell says, "a Sophism can be mistaken for an Argument only where it is not rightly understood," it is the aim of him who employs it, rather that the matter should be *misunderstood* than *not* understood;—that his language should be deceitful rather than obscure or unintelligible.

The hearer must not indeed form a *correct*, but he must form some, and if possible, a distinct, though erroneous idea of the Arguments employed, in order to be misled by them. The obscurity in short, if it is to be so called, must not be obscurity of *Style;* that must be, not like a mist which dims the appearance of objects, but like a coloured glass which disguises them.

There are, however, certain spurious kinds, as they may be called, of writing or speaking, (distinct from what is strictly termed Sophistry,) in which obscurity of Style may be apposite. The object which has all along been supposed, is that of convincing or persuading; but there are some kinds of Oratory, if they are to be so named, in which different ends are proposed. One of these ends is, (when the cause is such that it cannot be sufficiently supported even by specious Fallacies,) to *appear to say something*, when there is in fact nothing to be said; so as at least to avoid the ignominy of being silenced. To this end, the more confused and unintelligible the language, the better, provided it carry with it the appearance of profound wisdom, and of being something to the purpose.

"Now though nothing (says Dr. Campbell) would seem to be easier than this kind of Style where an Author falls into it naturally; that is, when he deceives himself as well as his reader, nothing is more difficult when attempted of design. It is beside requisite, if this manner must be continued for any time, that it be artfully blended with some glimpses of meaning; else, to persons of discernment, the charm will at length be dissolved, and the nothingness of what has been spoken will be detected; nay even the attention of the unsuspecting multitude, when not relieved by any thing that is level to their comprehension, will infallibly flag. The Invocation in the Dunciad admirably suits the Orator who is unhappily reduced to the necessity of taking shelter in the unintelligible:

> "Of darkness visible so much be lent,
> As half to show, half veil the deep intent."
> Chap. VIII. sec. 1. p. 119.

This artifice is distinguished from Sophistry, properly so called, (with which Dr. Campbell seems to confound it,) by the circumstance that its tendency is not, as in Sophistry, to convince, but to have the appearance of arguing, when in fact, nothing is urged; for in order for men to be convinced, on however insufficient grounds, they must, (as was remarked above) understand *something* from what is said, though, if it be fallacious, they must not understand it *rightly;* but if this cannot be accomplished, the Sophist's next resort is the unintelligible, which indeed is very often intermixed with the Sophistical, when the latter is of itself too scanty or too weak. Nor does the adoption of this Style serve merely to save his credit as an Orator or Author; it frequently does more: ignorant and unreflecting persons, though they cannot be, strictly speaking, convinced, by what they do

not understand, yet will very often suppose, each, that the rest understand it; and each is ashamed to acknowledge, even to himself, his own darkness and perplexity; so that if the speaker with a confident air announces his conclusion as established, they will often, according to the maxim "*omne ignotum pro mirifico*," take for granted that he has advanced valid Arguments, and will be loth to seem behind hand in comprehending them. It usually requires that a man should have some confidence in his own understanding, to venture to say, "what has been spoken is unintelligible to me."

Another purpose sometimes answered by a discourse of this kind, is that it serves to furnish an excuse, flimsy indeed, but not unfrequently sufficient, for men to vote or act according to their own inclinations; which they would perhaps have been ashamed to do, if strong Arguments had been urged on the other side, and had remained confessedly unanswered; but they satisfy themselves if something has been said in favour of the course they wish to adopt, though that something be only fair-sounding sentences that convey no distinct meaning. They are content that *an answer* has been made, without troubling themselves to consider what it is.

Another end, which in speaking, is sometimes proposed, and which is, if possible, still more remote from the legitimate province of Rhetoric, is to *occupy time*. When an unfavourable decision is apprehended, and the protraction of the debate may afford time for fresh voters to be summoned, or may lead to an adjournment, which will afford scope for some other manœuvre;—when there is a chance of so wearying out the attention of the hearers, that they will listen with languor and impatience to what shall be urged on the other side; —when an advocate is called upon to plead a cause in the absence of those whose opinion it is of the utmost importance to influence, and wishes to reserve all his Arguments till they arrive, but till then, must apparently proceed in his pleading; in these and many similar cases, which it is needless to particularize, it is a valuable talent to be able to pour forth with fluency an unlimited quantity of well-sounding language which has little or no meaning;—which shall not strike the hearers as unintelligible or nonsensical, though it convey to their minds no distinct idea. Perspicuity of Style, real, not apparent perspicuity, is in this case never necessary, and sometimes studiously avoided. If any distinct meaning were conveyed, and that which was said were irrelevant, it would be perceived to be so, and would produce impatience in the hearers, or afford an advantage to the opponents; if, on the other hand, the speech were relevant, and there were no Arguments of any force to be urged, except such as either had been already dwelt on, or were required to be reserved (as in the case last alluded to) for a fuller audience, the speaker would not further his cause by bringing them forward. So that the usual resource on these occasions, of such Orators as thoroughly understand the tricks of their

art, and do not disdain to employ them, is to amuse their audience with specious emptiness.

Another kind of spurious Oratory, and the last that will be noticed, is that which has for its object the hearer's admiration of the Eloquence displayed. This, indeed, constitutes one of the three kinds of Oratory enumerated by Aristotle, and is regularly treated of by him along with the deliberative and judicial branches; though it hardly deserves the place he has bestowed on it.

When this is the end pursued, perspicuity is not indeed to be avoided, but it may often without detriment be disregarded.[39] Men

[39] In Dr. Campbell's ingenious Dissertation, (*Rhetoric*, Book II. Ch. VII.) "on the causes that nonsense often escapes being detected, both by the writer and the reader," he remarks, (Sec. 2,) that "there are particularly three sorts of writing wherein we are liable to be imposed upon by words without meaning.

"The first is, where there is an exuberance of metaphor. Nothing is more certain than that this trope, when temperately and appositely used, serves to add light to the expression, and energy to the sentiment. On the contrary, when vaguely and intemperately used, nothing can serve more effectually to cloud the sense, where there is sense, and by consequence to conceal the defect, where there is no sense to show. And this is the case, not only where there is in the same sentence a mixture of discordant metaphors, but also where the metaphoric Style is too long continued, and too far pursued. [*Ut modicus autem atque opportunus translationis usus illustrat orationem: ita frequens et obscurat et tædio complet; continuus vero in allegoriam et ænigmata exit.* Quint. Lib. viii. c. vi.] The reason is obvious. In common speech the words are the immediate signs of the thought. But it is not so here; for when a person, instead of adopting metaphors that come naturally and opportunely in his way, rummages the whole world in quest of them, and piles them one upon another, when he cannot so properly be said to use metaphor, as to talk in metaphor, or rather when from metaphor he runs into allegory, and thence into enigma, his words are not the immediate signs of his thought; they are at best but the signs of the signs of his thought. His writing may then be called, what Spenser not unjustly styled his Fairy Queen, *a perpetual allegory or dark conceit*. Most readers will account it much to bestow a transient glance on the literal sense, which lies nearest; but will never think of that meaning more remote, which the figures themselves are intended to signify. It is no wonder then that this sense, for the discovery of which it is necessary to see through a double veil, should, where it is, more readily escape our observation, and that where it is wanting we should not so quickly miss it.

"There is, in respect of the two meanings, considerable variety to be found in the tropical Style. In just allegory and similitude there is always a propriety, or, if you choose to call it, congruity, in the literal sense, as well as a distinct meaning or sentiment suggested, which is called the figurative sense. Examples of this are unnecessary. Again, where the figurative sense is unexceptionable, there is sometimes an incongruity in the expression of the literal sense. This is always the case in mixed metaphor, a thing not unfrequent even in good writers. Thus, when Addison remarks that 'there is not a single view of human nature, which is not sufficient to *extinguish* the *seeds* of pride,' he expresses a true sentiment somewhat incongruously; for the terms *extinguish* and *seeds* here metaphorically used, do not suit each other. In like manner, there is something incongruous in the mixture of tropes employed in the following passage from Lord Bolingbroke: 'Nothing less than the *hearts* of his people will content a patriot Prince, nor will he think his *throne* established, till it is established *there*.' Yet the thought is excellent. But in neither of these examples does the incongruity of the expression hurt the perspicuity of the sentence. Sometimes, indeed, the literal meaning involves a direct absurdity. When this is the case, as in the quotation from *The Principles of Painting* given in the preceding chapter, it is natural for the reader to suppose that there must be something under it; for it is not easy to say how absurdly even just sentiments will sometimes be expressed. But when no such hidden sense can be discovered, what, in the first view conveyed to our minds a glaring *absurdity*, is rightly on reflection denominated *nonsense*. We are satisfied that De Piles neither thought, nor wanted his readers to think, that Rubens was really the original performer, and God the copier. This then was not his meaning. But what he actually thought and wanted them to think, it is impossible to elicit from his words. His words then may justly be attributed *bold*, in respect

frequently admire as eloquent, and sometimes admire the most, what they do not at all, or do not fully comprehend, if elevated and high sounding words be arranged in graceful and sonorous periods. Those of uncultivated minds especially, are apt to think meanly of any thing that is brought down perfectly to the low level of their capacity; though to do this with respect to valuable Truths which are not trite, is one of the most admirable feats of genius; they admire the profundity of one who is mystical and obscure; mistaking the muddiness of the water for depth; and magnifying in their imaginations what is viewed through a fog; and they conclude that brilliant language must

of their literal import, but *unmeaning* in respect of the author's intention.

"It may be proper here to observe, that some are apt to confound the terms *absurdity* and *nonsense* as synonymous, which they manifestly are not. An absurdity, in the strict acceptation, is a proposition either intuitively or demonstratively false. Of this kind are these: 'Three and two make seven.' 'All the angles of a triangle are greater than two right angles.' That the former is false we know by intuition; that the latter is so, we are able to demonstrate. But the term is further extended to denote a notorious falsehood. If one should affirm, that 'at the vernal equinox the sun rises in the north and sets in the south,' we should not hesitate to say, that he advances an absurdity; but still what he affirms has a meaning; insomuch, that on hearing the sentence we pronounce its falsity. Now *nonsense* is that whereof we cannnot say either that it is true, or that it is false. Thus, when the Teutonic Theosopher enounces, that 'all the voices of the celestial joyfulness, qualify, commix, and harmonize in the fire which was from eternity in the good quality,' I should think it equally impertinent to aver the falsity as the truth of this enunciation. For, though the words grammatically form a sentence, they exhibit to the understanding no judgment, and consequently admit neither assent nor dissent. In the former instances I say the meaning, or what they affirm, is absurd; in the last instance I say there is no meaning, and therefore properly nothing is affirmed. In popular language, I own, the terms absurdity and nonsense are not so accurately distinguished. Absurd positions are sometimes called nonsensical. It is not common, on the other hand, to say of downright nonsense, that it comprises an absurdity.

"Further, in the literal sense there may be nothing unsuitable, and yet the reader may be at a loss to find a figurative meaning, to which his expressions can with justice be applied. Writers immoderately attached to the florid, or highly figured diction, are often misled by a desire of flourishing on the several attributes of a metaphor, which they have pompously ushered into the discourse, without taking the trouble to examine whether there be any qualities in the subject, to which these attributes can with justness and perspicuity be applied." This immoderate use of metaphor, Dr. Campbell observes, "is the principal source of all the nonsense of Orators and Poets.

"The second species of writing wherein we are liable to be imposed on by words without meaning, is that wherein the terms most frequently occurring, denote things which are of a complicated nature, and to which the mind is not sufficiently familiarised. Many of those notions which are called by Philosophers mixed modes, come under this denomination. Of these the instances are numerous in every tongue; such as *government*, *church*, *state*, *constitution*, *polity*, *power*, *commerce*, *legislature*, *jurisdiction*, *proportion*, *symmetry*, *elegance*. It will considerably increase the danger of our being deceived by an unmeaning use of such terms, if they are besides (as very often they are) of so indeterminate, and consequently equivocal significations, that a writer, unobserved either by himself or by his reader, may slide from one sense of the term to another, till by degrees he fall into such applications of it as will make no sense at all. It deserves our notice also, that we are in much greater danger of terminating in this, if the different meanings of the same word have some affinity to one another, than if they have none. In the latter case, when there is no affinity, the transition from one meaning to another, is taking a very wide step, and what few writers are in any danger of; it is, besides, what will not so readily escape the observation of the reader. So much for the second cause of deception, which is the chief source of all the nonsense of writers on politics and criticism.

"The third and last, and I may add, the principal species of composition, wherein we are exposed to this illusion by the abuse of words, is that in which the terms employed are very abstract, and consequently of very extensive signification. It is an observation that plainly ariseth from the nature and structure of language, and may be deduced as a corollary from what hath been said of the use of artificial signs,

represent some brilliant ideas, without troubling themselves to inquire what those ideas are.

Many an enthusiastic admirer of a "fine discourse," or a piece of "fine writing," would be found on examination to retain only a few sonorous, but empty phrases; and not only to have no notion of the general drift of the Argument, but not even to have ever considered whether the Author had any such drift or not.

It is not meant to be insinuated that in every such case the composition is in itself unmeaning, or that the Author had no other object than the credit of Eloquence: he may have had a higher end in view; and he may have expressed himself very clearly to *some* hearers, though not to all: but it is most important to be fully aware of the fact, that it is possible to obtain the highest applause from those who not only receive no edification from what they hear, but absolutely do not understand it. So far is popularity from being a safe criterion of the usefulness of a Preacher.

§ 2. The next quality of Style to be noticed is what may be called Energy; the term being used in a wider sense than the Ἐνέργεια of Aristotle, and nearly corresponding with what Dr. Campbell calls Vivacity; so as to comprehend every thing that may conduce to stimulate attention,—to impress strongly on the mind the Arguments adduced,—to excite the Imagination, and to arouse the Feelings.

This Energy then, or Vivacity of Style, must depend (as is likewise the case in respect of Perspicuity,) on three things; 1st, the *Choice* of words, 2d, their *Number*, and 3d, their *Arrangement*.

With respect to the Choice of words, it will be most convenient to consider them under those two classes which Aristotle has described under the titles of Κύρια and Ξένα, for which our language does not afford precisely corresponding names: "Proper," "Appropriate,"

that the more general any name is, as it comprehends the more individuals under it, and consequently requires the more extensive knowledge in the mind that would rightly apprehend it, the more it must have of indistinctness and obscurity. Thus the word *lion* is more distinctly apprehended by the mind than the word *beast*, beast than *animal*, animal than *being*. But there is, in what are called abstract subjects, a still greater fund of obscurity, than that arising from the frequent mention of the most general terms. Names must be assigned to those qualities as considered abstractly, which never subsist independently, or by themselves, but which constitute the generic characters and the specific differences of things. And this leads to a manner which is in many instances remote from the common use of speech, and therefore must be of more difficult conception." (Book II. § 2. pp. 102, 103.)

It is truly to be regretted that an author who has written so justly on this subject, should within a few pages so strikingly exemplify the errors he has been treating of, by indulging in a declamation against Logic which could not even to himself have conveyed any distinct meaning. When he says that a man who had learned Logic was "qualified without any other kind of knowledge, to defend any position whatever, however contradictory to common sense; and that that art observed the most absolute indifference to truth and error," he cannot mean that a false conclusion could be logically proved from true premises; since, ignorant as he was of the subject, he was aware, and has in another place distinctly acknowledged, that this is not the case; nor could he mean merely that a false conclusion could be proved from a false premiss, since that would evidently be a nugatory and ridiculous objection. He seems to have had, in truth, no meaning at all; though like the authors he had been so ably criticising, he was perfectly unaware of the emptiness of what he was saying.

or "Ordinary," terms, will the most nearly designate the former; the latter class including all others;—all that are in any way removed from common use; whether uncommon terms, or ordinary terms, either transferred to a different meaning from that which strictly belongs to them, or employed in a different manner from that of common discourse. All the Tropes and Figures, enumerated by Grammatical and Rhetorical Writers, will of course fall under this head.

With respect then to "Proper" terms, the principle rule for guiding our Choice with a view to Energy, is to prefer, ever, those words which are the least *abstract* and *general.* Individuals alone having a real existence,[40] the terms denoting them (called by Logicians "Singular terms,") will of course make the most vivid impression on the mind, and exercise most the power of Conception; and the less remote any term is from these, *i.e.* the more *specific,* the more Energy it will possess, in comparison of such as are more general. The impression produced on the mind by a Singular term, may be compared to the distinct view taken in by the eye of any object (suppose a man) near at hand, in a clear light, which enables us to distinguish the features of the individual; in a fainter light, or rather farther off, we merely perceive that the object is *a man;* this corresponds with the idea conveyed by the name of the Species; yet further off, or in a still feebler light, we can distinguish merely some *living object,* and at length, merely *some object;* these views corresponding respectively with the terms denoting the genera, less or more remote: and as each of these views conveys, as far as it goes, an equally *correct* impression to the mind, (for we are equally certain that the object at a distance is *something,* as that the one close to us is such and such an individual,) though each, successively, is less *vivid;* so, in language, a General term may be as clearly *understood,* as a Specific or Singular term, but will convey a much less *forcible* impression to the hearer's mind. "The more General the terms are," (as Dr. Campbell justly remarks,) "the picture is the fainter; the more Special they are, the brighter. The same sentiment may be expressed with equal justness, and even equal perspicuity, in the former way, as in the latter; but as the colouring will in that case be more languid, it cannot give equal pleasure to the fancy, and by consequence will not contribute so much either to fix the attention, or to impress the memory."

It might be supposed at first sight, that an Author has little or no

[40] Thence called by Aristotle, (*Categ.* § 3,) "primary substances," (πρῶται οὐσίαι,) Genus and Species, being denominated "secondary," as not properly denoting a "really-existing-thing," (τόδε τι,) but rather an attribute. He has, indeed, been considered as the great advocate of the opposite doctrine; *i.e.* of the system of "Realism;" which was certainly embraced by many of his professed followers; but his own language is sufficiently explicit. Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει· ἄτομον γὰρ, καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενον ἐστιν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ. ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ζῶον· ΟΥ ΜΗΝ ΓΕ ΑΛΗΘΕΣ· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει· κ. τ λ. Aristotle, *Categ.* § 3.

Choice on this point, but must employ either more or less General terms according to the objects he is speaking of. There is, however, in almost every case, great room for such a Choice as we are speaking of; for, in the first place, it depends on our Choice whether or not we will employ terms *more* General than the subject requires; which may almost always be done consistently with Truth and Propriety, though not with Energy: if it be true that a man has committed *murder*, it may be correctly asserted, that he has committed a *crime;* if the Jews were "exterminated," and "Jerusalem demolished" by "Vespasian's army," it may be said, with truth, that they were "subdued" by "an Enemy," and their "Capital" taken. This substitution then of the General for the Specific, or of the Specific for the Singular, is always within our reach; and many, especially unpractised Writers, fall into a feeble Style by resorting to it unnecessarily; either because they imagine there is more appearance of refinement or of profundity, in the employment of such terms as are in less common use among the vulgar, or, in some cases, with a view to give greater comprehensiveness to their Reasonings, and to increase the utility of what they say by enlarging the field of its application. Inexperienced Preachers frequently err in this way, by dwelling on Virtue and Vice, Piety and Irreligion, in the abstract, without particularizing; forgetting that while they *include* much, they *impress* little or nothing.

The only Appropriate occasion for this Generic language, (as it may be called,) is when we wish to *avoid* giving a vivid impression,—when our object is to soften what is offensive, disgusting, or shocking; as when we speak of an "execution," for the infliction of the sentence of death on a criminal: of which kind of expressions, common discourse furnishes numberless instances. On the other hand, in Antony's speech over Cæsar's body, his object being to *excite* horror, Shakspeare puts into his mouth the most *particular* expressions: "those honourable men (not, who *killed* Cæsar, but) whose *daggers* have *stabbed* Cæsar."

But in the second place, not only does a regard for Energy require that we should not use terms *more* General than are exactly adequate to the objects spoken of, but we are also allowed, in many cases, to employ *less* General terms than are exactly Appropriate. In which case we are employing words not "Appropriate," but belonging to the second of the two classes just mentioned. The use of this Trope,[41] (enumerated by Aristotle among the Metaphors, but since more commonly called Synecdoche) is very frequent, as it conduces much to the Energy of the expression, without occasioning, in general, any risk of its meaning being mistaken. The passage cited by Dr. Campbell,[42]

[41] From τρέπω; any word *turned* from its primary signification.

[42] The ingenious Author cites this in the Section treating of "*Proper* terms," which is a trifling oversight; as it is plain that "lily" is used for the Genus "flower,"—"Solomon," for the Species "King," &c.

from one of our Lord's discourses, (which are in general of this character,) together with the remarks made upon it, will serve to illustrate what has been just said: "'Consider,' says our Lord, 'the lilies how they grow: they toil not, they spin not; and yet I say unto you, that Solomon in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these. If then God so clothe the grass which to-day is in the field, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how much more will he clothe you?'[43] Let us here adopt a little of the tasteless manner of modern paraphrasts, by the substitution of more General terms, one of their many expedients of infrigidating, and let us observe the effect produced by this change. 'Consider the flowers, how they gradually increase in their size, they do no manner of work, and yet I declare to you, that no king whatever, in his most splendid habit, is dressed up like them. If then God in his providence doth so adorn the vegetable productions, which continue but a little time on the land, and are afterwards devoted to the meanest uses, how much more will he provide clothing for you?' How spiritless is the same sentiment rendered by these small variations? The very particularizing of *to-day*, and *to-morrow*, is infinitely more expressive of transitoriness, than any description wherein the terms are General, that can be substituted in its room." It is a remarkable circumstance that this characteristic of Style is perfectly retained in *translation*, in which every other excellence of expression is liable to be lost; so that the prevalence of this kind of language in the Sacred writers, may be regarded as something providential. It may be said with truth, that the book which it is the most necessary to translate into every language, is chiefly characterised by that kind of excellence in diction which is least impaired by translation.

But to proceed with the consideration of Tropes; the most employed and most important of all those kinds of expressions which depart from the plain and strictly Appropriate Style,—all that are called by Aristotle Ξένα,—is the Metaphor, in the usual and limited sense; *viz.* a word substituted for another, on account of the Resemblance or Analogy between their significations. The Simile or Comparison may be considered as differing in form only from a Metaphor; the Resemblance being in that case *stated*, which in the Metaphor is implied. Each may be founded either on Resemblance, strictly so called, *i.e. direct* Resemblance between the objects themselves in question, (as when we speak of "*table*-land," or compare great waves to *mountains*,) or on Analogy, which is the Resemblance of ratios,—a similarity of the relations they bear to certain other objects; as when we speak of the "*light* of reason," or of "revelation;" or compare a wounded and captive warrior to a stranded ship.[44] The Analogical Metaphors and Comparisons are both the most frequent and the most

[43] Luke xii. 27, 28.

[44] Roderic Dhu, in the *Lady of the Lake*.

striking. They are the most frequent, because almost every object has such a multitude of relations, of different kinds, to many other objects; and they are the most striking, because (as Dr. A. Smith has well remarked,) the more remote and unlike in themselves any two objects are, the more is the mind impressed and gratified by the perception of some point in which they agree.

It has been already observed, under the head of Example, (Ch. I.) that we are carefully to distinguish between an *Illustration*, *i.e.* an *Argument* from Analogy or Resemblance, and what is properly called a Simile or Comparison, introduced merely to give force or beauty to the *expression*. The aptness and beauty of an Illustration sometimes leads men to overrate, and sometimes to underrate, its force as an Argument. (Vol. i. p. 255.)

With respect to the choice between the Metaphorical form and that of Comparison, it may be laid down as a general rule, that the former is always to be preferred,[45] wherever it is sufficiently simple and plain to be immediately comprehended; but that which as a Metaphor would sound obscure and enigmatical, may be well received if expressed as a Comparison. We may say, *e.g.* with propriety, that "Cromwell *trampled* on the laws:" it would sound flat to say that "he treated the laws with the same contempt as a man does any thing which he tramples under his feet." On the other hand it would be harsh and obscure to say, "the stranded vessel lay shaken by the waves," meaning the wounded chief tossing on the bed of sickness; it is therefore necessary in such a case to *state* the Resemblance. But this is never to be done more fully than is necessary to perspicuity, because all men are more gratified at catching the Resemblance for themselves, than at having it pointed out to them.[46] And accordingly the greatest masters of this kind of Style, when the case will not admit of pure Metaphor, generally prefer a mixture of Metaphor with Simile; first pointing out the similitude, and afterwards employing metaphorical terms which imply it; or, *vice versâ*, explaining a Metaphor by a statement of the Comparison. To take examples from an Author who particularly excels in this point; (speaking of a morbid Fancy,)

> "———like the bat of Indian brakes,
> Her pinions fan the wound she makes,
> And soothing thus the dreamer's pain,
> She drinks the life-blood from the vein."[47]

The word "*like*" makes this a Comparison; but the three succeeding lines are Metaphorical. Again, to take an instance of the other kind,

> "They *melted* from the field, *as* snow,
> When streams are swoln, and south winds blow,
> Dissolves in silent dew."[48]

[45] Ἔστιν ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορὰ, διαφέρουσα προθέσει· διὸ ἧττον ἡδὺ, ὅτι μακροτέρως· κ. τ. λ. Aristotle, *Rhet.* Book III. Ch. 10.

[46] Τὸ μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἡδὺ φύσει. Aristotle, *Rhet.* Book III. Ch. 5.

[47] Rokeby.

[48] Marmion.

Of the words here put in italics, the former is a Metaphor, the latter, introduces a Comparison. Though the instances here adduced are taken from a Poet, the judicious management of Comparison which they exemplify, is even more essential to a Prose writer, to whom less license is allowed in the employment of them. It is a remark of Aristotle (*Rhet.* Book III. Ch. 4,) that the Simile is more suitable in Poetry, and that Metaphor is the only ornament of language in which the Orator may freely indulge. He should therefore be the more careful to bring a Simile as near as possible to the Metaphorical form. The following is an example of the same kind of expression: "These metaphysic rights entering into common life, like rays of light which pierce into a dense medium, are, by the laws of nature, refracted from their straight line. Indeed, in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the primitive rights of man undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them, as if they continued in the simplicity of their original direction."[49]

Metaphors may be employed, as Aristotle observes, either to elevate or to degrade the subject, according to the design of the Speaker; being drawn from similar or corresponding objects of a higher or lower character. Thus a loud and vehement Speaker may be described either as *bellowing*, or as *thundering*. And in both cases, if the Metaphor is apt and suitable to the purpose designed, it is alike conducive to Energy. He remarks that the same holds good with respect to Epithets also, which may be drawn either from the highest or the lowest attributes of the thing spoken of.[50] Metonymy likewise (in which a part is put for a whole, a cause for an effect, &c.) admits of a similar variety in its applications.

Any *Trope* (as is remarked by Dr. Campbell) adds force to the expression, when it tends to fix the mind on that part, or *circumstance*, in the object spoken of, which is most essential to the purpose in hand. Thus, there is an Energy in Abraham's Periphrasis for "God," when he is speaking of the allotment of divine punishment: "shall not the *Judge of all the earth* do right?" If again we were alluding to His *omniscience*, it would be more suitable to say, "this is known only to the *Searcher of hearts:*" if, to his *power*, we should speak of him as "the *Almighty*," &c.

Of Metaphors, those generally conduce most to that Energy or Vivacity of Style we are speaking of, which illustrate an *intellectual* by a *sensible* object; the latter being always the most early familiar to the mind, and generally giving the most distinct impression to it.

[49] Burke, *On the French Revolution.*

[50] A happier example cannot be found than the one which Aristotle cites from Simonides, who, when offered a small price for an Ode to celebrate a victory in a *mule*-race, expressed his contempt for *half-asses*, (ἡμίονοι) as they were commonly called; but when a larger sum was offered, addressed them in an Ode as "Daughters of Steeds swift-as-the-storm." ἀελλοποδῶν θύγατρες ἵππων.

Thus we speak of "*unbridled* rage," "*deep-rooted* prejudice," "*glowing* eloquence," a "*stony* heart," &c. And a similar use may be made of Metonymy also; as when we speak of the "*Throne*," or the "*Crown*" for "Royalty,"—the "*sword*" for "military violence," &c.

But the highest degree of Energy (and to which Aristotle chiefly restricts the term) is produced by such Metaphors as attribute *life* and *action* to things inanimate; and that, even when by this means the last mentioned rule is violated, *i.e.* when sensible objects are illustrated by intellectual. For the disadvantage is overbalanced by the vivid impression produced by the idea of *personality* or *activity;*[51] as when we speak of the *rage* of a torrent, a *furious* storm, a river *disdaining* to endure its bridge, &c.[52] Many such expressions, indeed, are in such common use as to have lost all their Metaphorical force, since they cease to suggest the idea belonging to their primary signification, and thus are become, practically, Proper terms. But a new, or at least, unhackneyed, Metaphor of this kind, if it be not far-fetched and obscure, adds greatly to the force of the expression. This was a favourite figure with Homer, from whom Aristotle has cited several examples of it; as "the *raging* arrow," "the darts *eager* to taste of flesh,"[53] "the *shameless*" (or as it might be rendered with more exactness, though with less dignity, "the *provoking*) stone," (λᾶας ἀναιδὴς) which mocks the efforts of Sisyphus, &c. Our language possesses one remarkable advantage, with a view to this kind of Energy, in the constitution of its *genders*. All nouns in English, which express objects that are really neuter, are considered as strictly of the neuter gender; the Greek and Latin, though possessing the advantage, which is wanting in the languages derived from them, of having a neuter gender, yet lose the benefit of it by fixing the masculine or feminine genders upon many nouns denoting things inanimate; whereas in English, when we speak of any such object in the masculine or feminine gender, that form of expression at once confers *personality* upon it. When "Virtue," *e.g.* or our "Country," are spoken of as females, or "Ocean" as a male, &c. they are, by that very circumstance, *personified;* and a stimulus is thus given to the imagination, from the very circumstance that in calm discussion or description, all of these would be neuter; whereas in Greek or Latin, as in French or Italian, no such distinction could be made. The employment of "*Virtus*," and "Ἀρετὴ," in the feminine gender, can

[51] The figure called by Rhetoricians Prosopopœia (literally, Personification) is, in fact, no other than a Metaphor of this kind: thus, in Demosthenes, *Greece* is represented as *addressing* the Athenians. So also in the book of Genesis, (ch. iv. ver. 10,) "the *voice* of thy brother's blood *crieth* unto me from the ground."

[52] *Pontem indignatus.*

[53] There is a peculiar aptitude in some of these expressions which the modern student is very likely to overlook; an arrow or dart, from its flying with *a spinning* motion, *quivers* violently when it is fixed; thus suggesting the idea of a person *trembling with eagerness.*

contribute, accordingly, no animation to the Style, when they could not, without a Solecism, be employed otherwise.

There is, however, very little, comparatively, of Energy produced by any Metaphor or Simile that is in common use, and already familiar to the hearer; indeed, what were originally the boldest Metaphors, are become, by long use, virtually Proper terms; as is the case with the words "source," "reflection," &c. in their transferred senses; and frequently are even nearly obsolete in the literal sense, as in the words "ardour," "acuteness," "ruminate," &c. If, again, a Metaphor or Simile that is not so hackneyed as to be considered common property, be taken from any known Author, it strikes every one, as no less a plagiarism than if an entire argument or description had been thus transferred. And hence it is, that, as Aristotle remarks, the skilful employment of these, more than of any other, ornaments of language, may be regarded as a mark of genius; (*εὐφυΐας σημεῖον,*) not that he means to say, as some interpreters suppose, that this power is entirely a gift of nature, and in no degree to be learnt; on the contrary, he expressly affirms, that the "perception of Resemblances,"[54] on which it depends, is the fruit of "Philosophy;"[55] but he means that Metaphors are not to be, like other words and phrases, selected from common use, and transferred from one composition to another,[56] but must be formed for the occasion. Some care is accordingly requisite, in order that they may be readily comprehended, and may not have the appearance of being far-fetched and extravagant; for this purpose it is usual to combine with the Metaphor a Proper term which explains it; *viz.* either attributing to the term in its *transferred* sense, something which does not belong to it in its *literal* sense; or, *vice versâ*, denying of it in its transferred sense, something which *does* belong to it in its literal sense. To call the Sea the "*watery* bulwark" of our island, would be an instance of the former kind; an example of the latter is the expression of a writer who speaks of the dispersion of some hostile fleet by the winds and waves, "those ancient and *unsubsidized* allies of England."

It is hardly necessary to mention the obvious and hackneyed cautions against *mixture* of Metaphors;[57] and against any that are complex and far pursued, so as to approach to Allegory. In this last case, the more apt and striking is the Analogy suggested, the more will it have of an artificial appearance; and will draw off the reader's attention

[54] Τὸ ὅμοιον ἰδεῖν. Aristotle, *Rhet.* Book II.

[55] Ῥᾴδιον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας. Ibid. Book II. and III.

[56] Οὐκ ἔστι παρ' ἄλλου λαβεῖν. Aristotle, *Rhet.* Book III.

[57] Dr. Johnson justly censures Addison for speaking of "*bridling* in his muse, who longs to *launch* into a nobler strain;" "which," says the Critic, "is an act that was never restrained by a bridle." Some, however, are too fastidious on this point. Words, which by long use in a transferred sense, have lost nearly all their metaphorical force, may fairly be combined in a manner which, taking them literally, would be incongruous. It would savour of hypercriticism to object to such an expression as "fertile source."

from the subject, to admire the ingenuity displayed in the Style. Young writers, of genius, ought especially to be admonished to ask themselves frequently, not whether this or that is a *striking expression*, but whether it makes the *meaning* more striking than another phrase would,—whether it impresses more forcibly the *sentiment* to be conveyed.

It is a common practice with some writers to endeavour to add force to their expressions by accumulating high-sounding Epithets,[58] denoting the greatness, beauty, or other admirable qualities of the thing spoken of; but the effect is generally the reverse of what is intended. Most readers, except those of a very vulgar or puerile taste, are disgusted at studied efforts to point out and force upon their attention whatever is remarkable; and this, even when the ideas conveyed are themselves striking. But when an attempt is made to cover poverty of thought with mock sublimity of language, and to set off trite sentiments and feeble arguments by tawdry magnificence, the only result is, that a kind of indignation is superadded to contempt; as when (to use Quinctilian's comparison) an attempt is made to supply, by paint, the natural glow of a youthful and healthy complexion.[59]

We expect, indeed, and excuse in ancient writers, as a part of the unrefined simplicity of a ruder language, such a redundant use of Epithets as would not be tolerated in a modern, even in a translation of their works; the "white milk," and "dark gore," &c. of Homer, must not be retained, at least, not so frequently as they occur in the original. Aristotle, indeed, gives us to understand that in his time this liberty was still allowed to Poets; but later taste is more fastidious. He censures, however, the adoption by prose writers of this, and of every other kind of ornament that might seem to border on the *poetical;* and he bestows on such a Style, the appellation of "*frigid,*" (ψυχρὸν,) which, at first sight, may appear somewhat remarkable, (though the same expression, "frigid," might very properly be so applied by us,) because "*warm,*" "*glowing,*" and such like Metaphors, seem naturally applicable to Poetry. This very circumstance, however, does not in reality account for the use of the other expression. We are, in poetical prose, *reminded* of, and for that reason disposed to *miss*, the "warmth and glow" of poetry: it is on the same principle that we are disposed to speak of *coldness* in the rays of the *moon*, because they *remind* us of sunshine, but want its warmth;

[58] Epithets, in the Rhetorical sense, denote, not every adjective, but those only which do not add to the sense, but signify something already implied in the noun itself; as if one says, "the *glorious* sun;" on the other hand, to speak of the "*rising*" or "*meridian* sun," would not be considered as, in this sense, employing an Epithet.

[59] "A principal device in the fabrication of this Style," (the mock-eloquent,) "is to multiply epithets,—dry epithets, laid on the outside, and into which none of the vitality of the sentiment is found to circulate. You may take a great number of the words out of each page, and find that the sense is neither more nor less for your having cleared the composition of these Epithets of chalk of various colours, with which the tame thoughts had submitted to be rubbed over, in order to be made fine."—Foster, *Essay* IV.

and that (to use an humbler and more familiar instance) an empty fire-place is apt to suggest an idea of cold.

The use of Epithets, however, in prose composition, is not to be proscribed; as the judicious employment of them is undoubtedly conducive to Energy. It is extremely difficult to lay down any precise rules on such a point. The only safe guide in practice must be a taste formed from a familiarity with the best Authors, and from the remarks of a skilful Critic, on one's own composition. It may, however, be laid down as a general caution, more particularly needful for young writers, that an excessive luxuriance of Style, and especially a redundancy of Epithets, is the worse of the two extremes; as it is a positive fault, and a very offensive one; while the opposite is but the absence of an excellence. It is also an important rule that the boldest and most striking, and almost poetical, turns of expression, should be reserved (as Aristotle has remarked, Book III. Ch. 7,) for the most impassioned parts of a discourse; and that an Author should guard against the vain ambition of expressing *every thing* in an *equally* high-wrought, brilliant, and forcible Style. The neglect of this caution often occasions the imitation of the best models to prove detrimental. When the admiration of some fine and animated passages leads a young writer to take those passages for his *general* model, and to endeavour to make every sentence he composes equally fine, he will, on the contrary, give a flatness to the whole, and destroy the effect of those portions which would have been forcible if they had been allowed to stand *prominent*. To brighten the dark parts of a picture, produces much the same result as if one had darkened the bright parts; in either case there is a want of *relief* and *contrast;* and Composition, as well as Painting, has its lights and shades, which must be distributed with no less skill, if we would produce the desired effect.[60]

In no place, however, will it be advisable to introduce any Epithet which does not fulfil one of these two purposes; 1st, to *Explain a Metaphor;* a use which has been noticed under that head, and which will justify, and even require, the introduction of an Epithet, which, if it had been joined to the Proper term, would have been glaringly superfluous; thus, Æschylus[61] speaks of the "*winged hound* of Jove," meaning the Eagle: to have said the "*winged eagle*," would have had a very different effect: 2dly, when the Epithet expresses something which, though *implied* in the subject, would not have been likely to occur at once spontaneously to the hearer's mind, and yet is important to be noticed with a view to the purpose in hand. Indeed it will generally happen, that the Epithets employed by a skilful Orator, will be found to be, in fact, so many *abridged arguments*, the force of which is sufficiently conveyed by a mere hint; *e.g.* if any one

[60] Omnia *vult belle Matho dicere; dic aliquando*
Et bene; dic neutrum; dic aliquando male.
[61] Prometheus.

says, "we ought to take warning from the *bloody* revolution of France," the Epithet suggests one of the reasons for our being warned; and that, not less clearly, and more forcibly, than if the Argument had been stated at length.

With respect to the use of Antiquated, Foreign, New-coined or New-compounded words,[62] or words applied in an unusual sense, it may be sufficient to observe, that all writers, and prose writers most, should be very cautious and sparing in the use of them; not only because in excess they produce a barbarous dialect, but because they are so likely to suggest the idea of *artifice;* the perception of which is most especially adverse to Energy. The occasional apt introduction of such a term, will sometimes produce a powerful effect; but whatever may seem to savour of affectation, or even of great solicitude and study in the Choice of terms, will effectually destroy the true effect of Eloquence. The language which betrays art, and carries not an air of simplicity and sincerity, may, indeed, by some hearers, be thought not only very fine, but even very Energetic; this very circumstance, however, may be taken for a proof that it is not so; for if it *had* been, *they would not have thought about it*, but would have been occupied, exclusively, with the *subject*. An unstudied and natural air, therefore, is an excellence to which the true Orator, *i.e.* he who is aiming to *carry his point*, will be ready to sacrifice any other that may interfere with it.

The principle here laid down will especially apply to the Choice of words, with a view to their Imitative, or otherwise, Appropriate *sound*. The attempt to make the sound an echo to the sense, is indeed more frequently to be met with in poets than in prose writers; but it may be worth remarking, that an evident *effort* after this kind of excellence, as it is offensive in any kind of Composition, would in prose appear peculiarly disgusting. Critics treating on this subject have gone into opposite extremes; some fancifully attributing to words, or combinations of words, an Imitative power far beyond what they can really possess,[63] and representing this kind of Imitation as deserving to be studiously aimed at; and others, on the contrary, considering nearly the whole of this kind of excellence as no better than imaginary, and regarding the examples which do occur, and

[62] It is a curious instance of whimsical inconsistency, that many who, with justice, censure as *pedantic*, the frequent introduction of *Greek* and *Latin* words, neither object to, nor refrain from, a similar pedantry with respect to *French* and *Italian*.

This kind of affectation is one of the "dangers" of "a *little* learning:" those who are really good linguists are seldom so anxious to display their knowledge.

[63] Pope has accordingly been justly censured for his inconsistency in making the Alexandrine represent both a quick and a slow motion:

1. "Flies o'er the unbending corn, and skims along the main."
2. "Which, like a wounded snake, drags its slow length along."

In the first instance, he forgot that an *Alexandrine* is long, from containing more *feet* than a common verse; whereas a long *hexameter* has but the same number of feet as a short one, and therefore being pronounced in the same *time*, seems to move more rapidly.

have been cited, of a congruity between the sound and the sense as purely accidental. The truth probably lies between these two extremes. In the first place, that words denoting *sounds*, or employed in describing them, may be Imitative of those sounds, must be admitted by all; indeed this kind of Imitation is, to a certain degree, almost unavoidable, in our language at least, which abounds perhaps more than any other, in these, as they may be called, naturally expressive terms; such as "hiss," "rattle," "clatter," "splash," and many others. In the next place, it is also allowed by most, that quick or slow *motion* may, to a certain degree at least, be imitated or represented by words; many short syllables (unincumbered by a clash either of vowels, or consonants coming together,) being pronounced in the same time with a smaller number of long syllables, abounding with these incumbrances, the former seems to have a natural correspondence to a quick, and the latter to a slow motion, since in the one a greater, and in the other a less space, seem to be passed over in the same time. In the ancient Poets their hexameter verses being always considered as of the same *length, i.e.* in respect of the *time* taken to pronounce them, whatever proportion of dactyls or spondees they contained, this kind of Imitation of quick or slow motion, is the more apparent; and after making all allowances for fancy, it seems impossible to doubt that in many instances it does exist; as, *e.g.* in the often-cited line which expresses the rolling of Sisyphus's stone down the hill:

Αὖθις ἔπειτα πεδονδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδὴς.

The following passage from the *Æneid* can hardly be denied to exhibit a correspondence with the slow and quick *motions* at least, which it describes; that of the Trojans laboriously hewing the foundations of a tower on the top of Priam's palace, and that of its sudden and violent fall:

[64] "*Aggrēssī fĕrrō cīrcūm, quā sūmma labantes,*
Jūnctūrās tabulata dabat, divellimus altis
Sedĭbŭs, impŭlĭmusque, ĕă lapsă rĕpentĕ rŭinam
Cum sŏnĭtu dēdĭt, et Dănăum sŭpĕr agmĭnă late
Concĭdĭt."

But, lastly, it seems not to require any excessive exercise of fancy to perceive, if not, properly speaking, an *Imitation*, by words, of other things besides sound and motion, at least, an Analogical aptitude. That there is at least an apparent Analogy between things sensible, and things intelligible, is implied by numberless Metaphors; as when we speak of "*rough*, or *harsh*, *soft*, or *smooth* manners," "*turbulent* passions," the "*stroke*, or the *storms* of adversity," &c. Now if there

[64] The slow movement of this line would be much more perceptible, if we pronounced (as doubtless the Latins did,) the *doubled consonants*; "*ag-gres-si fer-ro—sum-ma:*" but in English, and consequently in the English way of reading Latin or Greek, the doubling of a consonant only serves to fix the place of the accent; the latter of the two being never pronounced, except in a very few compound words; as "innate," "connatural," "poor-rate," "hop-pole."

are any words, or combinations of words, which have in their sound a congruity with certain sensible objects, there is no reason why they should not have the same congruity with those *emotions, actions,* &c. to which these sensible objects are analogous. Especially, as it is universally allowed that certain musical combinations are, respectively, appropriate to the expression of grief, anger, agitation, &c.

On the whole, the most probable conclusion seems to be, that many at least of the celebrated passages that are cited as Imitative in sound, were, on the one hand, not the result of *accident,* nor yet, on the other hand, of *study;* but that the idea in the author's mind spontaneously suggested appropriate sounds: thus, when Milton's mind was occupied with the idea of the opening of the infernal gates, it seems natural that his expression—

"And on their hinges grate harsh thunder,"

should have occurred to him without any distinct intention of imitating sounds.

It will be the safest rule, therefore, for a prose writer at least, never to make any distinct effort after this kind of Energy of expression, but to trust to the spontaneous occurrence of suitable sounds on every occasion where the introduction of them is likely to have a good effect.

It is hardly necessary to give any warning, generally, against the unnecessary introduction of *Technical* language of any kind, when the meaning can be adequately, or even tolerably, expressed in common, *i.e.* unscientific words; the terms and phrases of Art have an air of pedantic affectation, for which they do not compensate, by even the smallest appearance of increased Energy. But there is an apparent exception to this rule, in the case of what may be called the "Theological Style;" a peculiar phraseology, adopted more or less by a large proportion of writers of Sermons and other religious works; consisting partly of peculiar terms, but chiefly of common words used in a peculiar sense or combination, so as to form altogether a kind of diction widely differing from the classical standard of the language. This phraseology having been formed partly from the Style of some of the most eminent Divines, partly, and to a much greater degree, from that of the Scriptures, *i.e.* of our Version, has been supposed to carry with it an air of appropriate dignity and sanctity, which greatly adds to the force of what is said. And this may, perhaps, be the case when what is said is of little or no intrinsic weight, and is only such meagre common-place as many religious works consist of; the associations which such language will excite in the minds of those accustomed to it, supplying, in some degree, the deficiencies of the matter. But this diction, though it may serve as a veil for poverty of thought, will be found to produce no less the effect of obscuring the lustre of what is truly valuable: if it adds an appearance of strength to what is weak, it adds weakness to what is strong; and if

pleasing to those of narrow and ill cultivated mind, it is in a still higher degree repulsive to persons of taste. It may be said, indeed, with truth, that the improvement of the majority is a higher object than the gratification of a refined taste in a few; but it may be doubted whether any real Energy, even with respect to any class of hearers, is gained by the use of such a diction as that of which we are speaking. For it will often be found that what is received with great approbation, is yet, even if, strictly speaking, understood, but very little attended to or impressed upon the minds of the hearers. Terms and phrases which have been long familiar to them, and have certain vague and indistinct notions associated with them, men often suppose themselves to understand much more fully then they do; and still oftener give a sort of indolent assent to what is said, without making any effort of thought. It is justly observed by Mr. Foster, (*Essay* IV.) when treating on this subject, that "with regard to a considerable proportion of christian readers and hearers, a reformed language would be excessively strange to them;" but that "its *being* so strange to them, would be a proof of the necessity of adopting it, at least, in part, and by degrees. For the manner in which some of them would receive this altered diction, would prove that the customary phraseology had scarcely given them any clear ideas. It would be found that the peculiar phrases had been not so much the vehicles of ideas, as the substitutes for them. These readers and hearers have been accustomed to chime to the sound, without apprehending the sense; insomuch, that if they hear the very ideas which these phrases signify, expressed ever so simply in other language, they do not recognise them." He observes also, with much truth, that the studied incorporation and imitation of the language of the Scriptures in the texture of any Discourse, neither indicates reverence for the Divine composition, nor adds to the dignity of that which is human; but rather diminishes that of such passages as might be introduced from the sacred writings in pure and distinct quotation, standing contrasted with the general Style of the work.

Of the Technical terms, as they may be called, of Theology, there are many the place of which might easily be supplied by corresponding expressions in common use; there are others, doubtless, which, denoting ideas exclusively belonging to the subject, could not be avoided without a tedious circumlocution; these, therefore, may be admitted as allowable peculiarities of diction; and the others, perhaps, need not be entirely disused: but it is highly desirable that *both* should be very frequently exchanged for words or phrases entirely free from any Technical peculiarity, even at the expense of some circumlocution. Not that this should be done so constantly as to render the terms in question obsolete; but by introducing frequently both the term and a sentence explanatory of the same idea, the evil just mentioned,—the habit of not thinking, or not thinking attentively, on the meaning of

what is said, will be, in great measure, guarded against,—the Technical words themselves will make a more forcible impression,—and the danger of sliding into unmeaning *cant* will be materially lessened. Such repetitions, therefore, will more than compensate for, or rather will be exempt from, any appearance of tediousness, by the addition both of Perspicuity and Energy.[65] It may be asserted, with but too much truth, that a very considerable proportion of Christians have a habit of laying aside, in a great degree, their *common sense*, and letting it, as it were, lie dormant, when points of Religion come before them;—as if Reason were utterly at variance with Religion, and the ordinary principles of sound judgment were to be completely superseded on that subject; and accordingly it will be found, that there are many errors which are adopted, many truths which are overlooked, or not clearly understood, and many difficulties which stagger and perplex them, for want, properly speaking, of the exercise of their common sense; *i.e.* in cases precisely *analogous* to such as daily occur in the ordinary affairs of life, in which those very same persons would form a correct, clear, prompt, and decisive judgment. It is well worthy of consideration, how far the tendency to this habit might be diminished by the use of a diction conformable to the suggestions which have been here thrown out.

With respect to the *Number* of words employed, "it is certain," as Dr. Campbell observes, "that of whatever kind the sentiment be, witty, humorous, grave, animated, or sublime, the more *briefly* it is expressed, the Energy is the greater."—"As when the rays of the sun are collected into the focus of a burning-glass, the smaller the spot is which receives them, compared with the surface of the glass, the greater is the splendour; so, in exhibiting our sentiments by speech, the narrower the compass of words is, wherein the thought is comprised, the more energetic is the expression. Accordingly, we find that the very same sentiment expressed diffusely, will be admitted barely to be just;—expressed concisely, will be admired as spirited."

[65] "It must indeed be acknowledged, that in many cases innovations have been introduced, partly by the ceasing to employ the words designating those doctrines which were designed to be set aside: but it is probable they may have been still more frequently and successfully introduced under the advantage of *retaining the terms*, while the principles were gradually subverted. And therefore, since the peculiar words can be kept to one invariable signification only by keeping that signification clearly in sight, by means of something separate from these words themselves, it might be wise in Christian authors and speakers sometimes to express the ideas in common words, either in connexion with the peculiar terms, or, occasionally, instead of them. Common words might less frequently be applied, as affected denominations of things, which have their own direct and common denominations, and be less frequently combined into uncouth phrases. Many peculiar and antique words might be exchanged for other single words of equivalent signification, and in common use. And the small number of peculiar terms acknowledged and established, as of permanent use and necessity, might, even separately from the consideration of modifying the diction, be, occasionally, with advantage to the explicit declaration and clear comprehension of Christian truth, made to give place to a fuller expression, in a number of common words, of those ideas of which they are the single signs."—Foster, *Essay* IV. p. 304.

He afterwards remarks, that though a languid redundancy of words is in all cases to be avoided, the energetic brevity which is the most contrary to it, is not adapted alike to every subject and occasion. "The kinds of writing which are less susceptible of this ornament, are, the Descriptive, the Pathetic, the Declamatory,[66] especially the last. It is, besides, much more suitable in writing than in speaking. A reader has the command of his time; he may read fast or slow, as he finds convenient; he can peruse a sentence a second time when necessary, or lay down the book and think. But if, in haranguing the people, you comprise a great deal in few words, the hearer must have uncommon quickness of apprehension to catch the meaning, before you have put it out of his power, by engaging his attention to something else." The mode in which this inconvenience should be obviated, and in which the requisite expansion may be given to any thing which the persons addressed cannot comprehend in a very small compass, is, as we have already remarked, not so much by increasing the number of words in which the sentiment is conveyed in each sentence, (though in this some variation must of course be admitted,) as by *repeating* it in various forms. The uncultivated and the dull will require greater expansion, and more copious illustration of the same thought, than the educated and the acute; but they are even still more liable to be wearied or bewildered by prolixity. If the material is too stubborn to be speedily cleft, we must patiently continue our efforts for a longer time, in order to accomplish it: but this is to be done, not by making each blow fall *more slowly*, which would only enfeeble them, but by *often-repeated* blows.

It is needful to insist the more on the energetic effect of Conciseness, because so many, especially young writers and speakers, are apt to fall into a style of pompous verbosity, not from negligence, but from an idea that they are adding both Perspicuity and Force to what is said, when they are only incumbering the sense with a needless load of words. And they are the more likely to commit this mistake, because such a style will often appear not only to the author, but to the vulgar (*i.e.* the vulgar in *intellect*,) among his hearers, to be very majestic and impressive. It is not uncommon to hear a speaker or writer of this class, mentioned as having a "very fine command of language," when, perhaps, it might be said with more correctness, that "his language has a command of him;" *i.e.* that he follows a train of words rather than of thought, and strings together all the striking expressions that occur to him on the subject, instead of first forming a clear notion of the sense he wishes to convey, and then seeking for the most appropriate vehicle in which to convey it. If, indeed, any class of men are found to be the most effectually *convinced*, *persuaded*, or *instructed*, by a turgid amplification, it is the

[66] This remark is made, and the principle of it (which Dr. Campbell has omitted) subjoined, in Chap. II. § 2, of this Article, p. 51.

Orator's business, true to his object, not to criticise or seek to improve their taste, but to accommodate himself to it. But it will be found that this is not near so often the case as many suppose. The Orator may often by this kind of style gain great *admiration*, without being the nearer to his proper end, which is to *carry his point*. It will frequently happen that not only the approbation, but the whole attention of the hearers will have been confined to the Style, which will have drawn their minds, not *to* the subject, but *from* it. In those spurious kinds of Oratory, indeed, which have been above mentioned, (pp. 72—74,) in which the inculcation of the Subject-matter is not the principal object proposed, a redundancy of words may often be very suitable; but in all that comes within the legitimate province of Rhetoric, there is no fault to be more carefully avoided.[67]

It will therefore be advisable for a tyro in composition to look over what he has written, and to strike out every word and clause which he finds will leave the passage neither less perspicuous nor less forcible than it was before; "*quamvis invita recedant;*" remembering that, as has been aptly observed, "nobody knows what good things you leave out:" if the general effect is improved, that advantage is enjoyed by the reader unalloyed by the regret which the author may feel at the omission of any thing which he may think in itself excellent. But this is not enough; he must study contraction, as well as omission. There are many sentences which would not bear the *omission* of a single word consistently with perspicuity, which yet may be much more concisely expressed, with equal clearness, by the employment of different words, and by *recasting* a great part of the expression. Take for example such a sentence as the following: "A severe and tyrannical exercise of power must become a matter of necessary policy with Kings, when their subjects are imbued with such principles as justify and authorize rebellion;" this sentence could not be advantageously, nor to any considerable degree, abridged, by the mere *omission* of any of the words; but it may be expressed in a much shorter compass, with equal clearness and far greater energy; thus, "Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels from principle."[68] The hints we have thrown out on this point coincide pretty nearly with Dr. Campbell's remark on "*Verbosity*," as contradistinguished from "*Tautology*,"[69] and from "*Pleonasm*." "The

[67] "By a multiplicity of words, the sentiment is not set off and accommodated, but, like David in Saul's armour, it is incumbered and oppressed.

"Yet this is not the only, or perhaps the worst, consequence resulting from this manner of treating Sacred writ," [*paraphrasing*] "we are told of the torpedo, that it has the wonderful quality of numbing every thing it touches; a paraphrase is a torpedo. By its influence the most vivid sentiments become lifeless, the most sublime are flattened, the most fervid chilled, the most vigorous enervated. In the very best compositions of this kind that can be expected, the Gospel may be compared to a rich wine of a high flavour, diluted in such a quantity of water as renders it extremely vapid."—Campbell, *Rhetoric*, Book III. Chap. II. § 2.

[68] Burke.

[69] Tautology, which he describes as "either a repetition of the same sense in different words, or a representation of

third and last fault I shall mention against vivid Conciseness is *Verbosity*. This it may be thought coincides with the Pleonasm already discussed. One difference however is this; in the Pleonasm there are words which add nothing to the sense; in the Verbose manner, not only single words, but whole clauses, may have a meaning, and yet it were better to omit them, because what they mean is unimportant. Instead, therefore, of enlivening the expression, they make it languish. Another difference is, that in a proper Pleonasm, a complete correction is always made by razing. This will not always answer in the Verbose style; it is often necessary to alter as well as blot."[70]

It is of course impossible to lay down precise rules as to the degree of Conciseness which is, on each occasion that may arise, allowable and desirable; but to an author who is, in his expression of any sentiment, wavering between the demands of Perspicuity and of Energy, (of which the former of course requires the first care, lest he should fail of both,) and doubting whether the phrase which has the most forcible brevity will be readily taken in, it may be recommended to use *both* expressions;—first to expand the sense, sufficiently to be clearly understood, and then to contract it into the most compendious and striking form. This expedient might seem at first sight the most decidedly adverse to the brevity recommended; but it will be found in practice that the addition of a compressed and pithy expression of the sentiment, which has been already stated at greater length, will produce the *effect* of brevity. For it is to be remembered that it is not on account of the actual *Number of words* that diffuseness is to be condemned, (unless one were limited to a certain space, or time,) but to avoid the flatness and tediousness resulting from it; so that if this appearance can be obviated by the insertion of such an abridged repetition as is here recommended, which adds poignancy and spirit to the whole, Conciseness will be, practically, promoted by the addition. The hearers will be struck by the forcibleness of the sentence which they will have been prepared to comprehend; they will *understand* the longer expression, and *remember* the shorter. But the force will, in general, be totally destroyed, or much enfeebled, if the order be reversed,—if the brief expression be put first, and afterwards expanded and explained; for it loses much of its force if it be not clearly understood the moment it is uttered; and if it be, there is no need of the subsequent expansion. The sentence recently quoted

any thing as the cause, condition, or consequence, of itself," is, in most instances, (of the latter kind at least,) accounted an offence rather against *correctness* than *brevity*; the example he gives from Bolingbroke, "how many are there by whom these *tidings* of good *news* were never heard," would usually be reckoned a *blunder* rather than an instance of *prolixity*; like the expression of "*Sinecure* places which have no duty annexed to them." "The Pleonasm," he observes, "implies merely superfluity. Though the words do not, as in the Tautology, repeat the sense, they add nothing to it; *e.g.* They returned [back again] to the [same] city [from] whence they came [forth.]" Book III. Chap. II. § 2.

[70] Campbell, *Rhetoric*, Book III. Chap. II. § 2, Part III.

from Burke, as an instance of Energetic brevity, is in this manner brought in at the close of a more expanded exhibition of the sentiment, as a condensed conclusion of the whole. "Power, of some kind or other, will survive the shock in which manners and opinions perish; and it will find other and worse means for its support. The usurpation which, in order to subvert ancient institutions, has destroyed ancient principles, will hold power by arts similar to those by which it has acquired it. When the old feudal and chivalrous spirit of *fealty*, which, by freeing kings from fear, freed both kings and subjects from the precaution of tyranny, shall be extinct in the minds of men, plots and assassinations will be anticipated by preventive murder and preventive confiscation, and that long roll of grim and bloody maxims, which form the political code of all Power, not standing on its own honour, and the honour of those who are to obey it. Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels from principle." Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, *Works*, vol. v. p. 153.

The same writer, in another passage of the same work, has a paragraph in like manner closed and summed up by a striking metaphor, (which will often prove the most *concise*, as well as in other respects, striking, form of expression,) such as would not have been so readily taken in if placed at the beginning. "To avoid therefore the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice, we have consecrated the State, that no man should approach to look into its defects or corruptions but with due caution; that he should never dream of beginning its reformation by its subversion; that he should approach to the faults of the State as to the wounds of a father, with pious awe and trembling solicitude. By this wise prejudice we are taught to look with horror on those children of their country who are prompt rashly to hack that aged parent in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds, and wild incantations, they may regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their father's life."[71] Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, *Works*, vol. v. p. 183.

So great, indeed, is the effect of a skilful interspersion of short, pointed, forcible sentences, that even a considerable violation of some of the foregoing rules may be by this means, in a great degree, concealed; and vigour may thus be communicated (if vigour of thought

[71] This, however, being an instance of what may be called the *classical* Metaphor, no preparation or explanation, even though sufficient to make it *intelligible*, could render it very *striking* to those not thoroughly and early familiar with the ancient fables of Medea.

The Preacher has a considerable resource, of an analogous kind, in similar allusions to the history, description, parables, &c., of Scripture, which will often furnish useful illustrations and forcible metaphors, in an address to those well acquainted with the Bible; though these would be frequently unintelligible, and always comparatively feeble, to persons not familiar with Scripture.

be not wanting) to a Style chargeable even with Tautology. This is the case with much of the language of Dr. Johnson, who is certainly, on the whole, an Energetic writer, though he would have been much more so, had not an over attention to the roundness, and majestic sound of his sentences, and a delight in balancing one clause against another, led him so frequently into a faulty redundancy. Take, as an instance, a passage in his life of Prior, which may be considered as a favourable specimen of his style: "Solomon is the work to which he intrusted the protection of his name, and which he expected succeeding ages to regard with veneration. His affection was natural; it had undoubtedly been written with great labour; and who is willing to think that he has been labouring in vain? He had infused into it much knowledge, and much thought; had often *polished* it to *elegance*, often *dignified* it with *splendour*, and sometimes *heightened* it to *sublimity*; he perceived in it many excellences, and did not discover that it wanted that without which all others are of small avail, the power of *engaging attention and alluring curiosity*. Tediousness is the most fatal of all faults; negligences or errors are single and local; but tediousness pervades the whole; other faults are censured and forgotten, but the power of tediousness propagates itself. He that is weary the first hour, is more weary the second; as bodies forced into motion contrary to their tendency, pass more and more slowly through every successive interval of space. Unhappily this pernicious failure is that which an author is least able to discover. We are seldom tiresome to ourselves: and the act of composition fills and delights the mind with change of language and succession of images; every couplet when produced is new, and novelty is the great source of pleasure. Perhaps no man ever thought a line superfluous when he first wrote it, or contracted his work till his ebullitions of invention had subsided." It would not have been just to the author, nor even so suitable to the present purpose, to cite less than the whole of this passage, which exhibits the characteristic merits, even more strikingly than the defects, of the writer. Few could be found in the works of Johnson, and still fewer in those of any other writer, more happily and forcibly expressed; yet it can hardly be denied that the parts here distinguished by italics are chargeable, more or less, with Tautology.

It happens, unfortunately, that Johnson's Style is particularly easy of imitation, even by writers utterly destitute of his vigour of thought; and such imitators are intolerable. They bear the same resemblance to their model, that the armour of the Chinese, as described by travellers, consisting of thick quilted cotton covered with stiff glazed paper, does to that of the ancient knights; equally glittering, bulky, and cumbersome, but destitute of the temper and firmness which was its sole advantage. At first sight, indeed, this kind of Style appears far from easy of attainment, on account of its being remote from the colloquial, and having an elaborately artificial appearance; but in

reality, there is none less difficult to acquire. To string together *substantives*, connected by conjunctions, which is the characteristic of Johnson's Style, is, in fact, the rudest and clumsiest mode of expressing our thoughts: we have only to find *names* for our ideas, and then put them together by connectives, instead of interweaving, or rather *felting* them together, by a due admixture of verbs, participles, prepositions, &c. So that this way of writing, as contrasted with the other, may be likened to the primitive rude carpentry, in which the materials were united by coarse external implements, pins, nails, and cramps, when compared with that art in its most improved state, after the invention of dovetail joints, grooves, and mortices, when the junctions are effected by forming properly the extremities of the pieces to be joined, so as at once to consolidate and conceal the juncture.

If any one will be at the pains to compare a few pages, taken from almost any part of Johnson's works, with the same quantity from any other of our admired writers, noting down the number of *substantives* in each, he will be struck with the disproportion. This would be still greater, if he were to examine with the same view an equal portion of Cicero; but it must be acknowledged that the genius of the Latin language allows and requires a much smaller proportion of substantives than are necessary in our own.

In aiming at a Concise Style, however, care must of course be taken that it be not *crowded;* the frequent occurrence of considerable ellipses, even when obscurity does not result from them, will produce an appearance of affected and laborious compression, which is offensive. The author who is studious of Energetic brevity, should aim at what may be called a *Suggestive* Style; such, that is, as, without making a distinct, though brief, mention of a multitude of particulars, shall put the hearer's mind into the same *train of thought* as the speaker's, and suggest to him more than is actually expressed.[72] Aristotle's Style, which is frequently so elliptical as to be dry and obscure, is yet often, at the very same time, unnecessarily diffuse, from his enumerating much that the reader would easily have supplied, if the rest had been fully and forcibly stated. He seems to have regarded his readers as capable of going *along with him* readily, in the deepest discussions, but not, of going *beyond him*, in the most simple; *i.e.* of filling up his meaning, and inferring what he does not actually express; so that in many passages a free translator might convey his sense in a shorter compass, and yet in a less cramped and elliptical diction. A particular statement, of which the general application is obvious, will often save a long abstract rule, which needs much explanation and limitation; and will thus suggest much that is not actually said;

[72] Such a Style may be compared to a good map, which marks distinctly the great outlines, setting down the principal rivers, towns, mountains, &c. and leaving the imagination to supply the villages, hillocks, and streamlets; which if they were all inserted in their due proportions would crowd the map, though, after all, they could not be discerned without a microscope.

thus answering the purpose of a mathematical diagram, which though itself an individual, serves as a representative of a class. Slight *hints* also respecting the subordinate branches of any subject, and notices of the principles that will apply to them, &c. may often be substituted for digressive discussions, which, though laboriously compressed, would yet occupy a much greater space. Judicious divisions likewise and classifications, save much tedious enumeration; and, as has been formerly remarked, a well chosen epithet may often suggest, and therefore supply the place of, an entire argument. It would not be possible, within a moderate compass, to lay down precise rules for the Suggestive kind of writing we are speaking of; but if the slight hints here given are sufficient to convey an idea of the object to be aimed at, practice will enable a writer gradually to form the habit recommended. It may be worth while, however, to add, that those accustomed to rational *conversation*, will find in that a very useful exercise with a view to this point, (as well as to almost every other connected with Rhetoric;) since, in conversation, a man naturally tries first one and then another mode of expressing his thoughts, and stops as soon as he perceives that his companion fully comprehends his sentiments, and is sufficiently impressed with them.

We have dwelt the more earnestly on the head of Conciseness, because it is a quality in which young writers (who are the most likely to seek for practical benefit in a Treatise of this kind,) are usually most deficient; and because it is commonly said that, in them, exuberance is a promising sign; without sufficient care being taken to qualify this remark, by adding, that this over-luxuriance must be checked by judicious pruning. If an early proneness to redundancy be an indication of natural genius, those who possess this genius should be the more sedulously on their guard against it; and those who do not, should be admonished that the want of a *natural* gift cannot be supplied by copying its attendant defects. The praises which have been bestowed on *Copiousness* of diction, have probably tended to mislead authors into a cumbrous verbosity. It should be remembered, that there is no real Copiousness in a multitude of synonymes and circumlocutions. A house would not be the better furnished for being stored with ten times as many of some kinds of articles as were needed, while it was perhaps destitute of those required for other purposes; nor was Lucullus's wardrobe, which, according to Horace, boasted five thousand mantles, necessarily well stocked, if other articles of dress were wanting. The completeness of a library does not consist in the number of volumes, especially if many of them are *duplicates*; but in its containing copies of all the most valuable works. And in like manner, true Copiousness of language consists in having at command, as far as possible, a suitable expression for each *different* modification of thought. This, consequently, will often *save* much circumlocution; so that the greater our command of language, the

more concisely we shall be enabled to write. In an author who is attentive to these principles, diffuseness may be accounted no dangerous fault of Style, because practice will gradually correct it: but it is otherwise with one who *pleases himself* in stringing together well-sounding words into an easy, flowing, and (falsely-called) Copious Style, destitute of nerve; and who is *satisfied* with a small portion of matter; seeking to increase, as it were, the appearance of his wealth by hammering out his metal thin. *This* is far from a curable fault. When the Style is fully formed in other respects, pregnant fulness of meaning is seldom superadded; but when there is a basis of Energetic condensation of thought, the faults of harshness, baldness, or even obscurity, are much more likely to be remedied. Solid gold may be new moulded and polished; but what can give solidity to gilding?

Lastly, the *Arrangement* of words may be made highly conducive to Energy. The importance of an attention to this point, with a view to Perspicuity, has been already noticed: but of two sentences equally perspicuous, and consisting of the very same words, the one may be a feeble and languid, the other a striking and Energetic expression, merely from the difference of Arrangement.

Some, among the moderns, are accustomed to speak of the *Natural* order of the words in a sentence, and to consider, each, the established Arrangement of his own language as the nearest to such a natural order; regarding that which prevails in Latin and in Greek as a sort of deranged and irregular structure. We are apt to consider that as most natural and intrinsically proper, which is the most familiar to ourselves; but there seems no good ground for asserting, that the customary structure of sentences in the ancient languages is less natural, or less suitable for the purposes for which language is employed, than in the modern. Supposing the established order in English or in French, for instance, to be more closely conformed to the grammatical or logical analysis of a sentence, than that of Latin or Greek, because we place the Subject first, the Copula next, and the Predicate last, &c. it does not follow that such an Arrangement is necessarily the best fitted in every case to excite the attention,—to direct it to the most essential points,—to gratify the imagination,—or to affect the feelings: it is, surely, the natural object of language to express as strongly as possible the speaker's sentiments, and to convey the same to the hearers; and that Arrangement of words may fairly be accounted the most natural by which all men are naturally led, as far as the rules of their respective languages allow them, to accomplish this object. The rules of many of the modern languages do indeed frequently confine an author to an order which he would otherwise never have chosen; but what translator of any taste would ever *voluntarily* alter the Arrangement of the words in such a sentence, as Μεγάλη ἡ Ἄρτεμις Ἐφεσίων, which our language allows us to render exactly, "*Great* is Diana of the Ephesians!" How feeble in com-

parison is the translation of Le Clerc, "*La Diane des Ephesiens est une grande Déesse!*" How imperfect that of Beausobre, "*La grande Diane des Ephesiens!*" How undignified that of Saci, "*Vive la grande Diane des Ephesiens!*"

Our language indeed is, though to a less degree, very much hampered by the same restrictions; it being in general necessary, for the expression of the sense, to adhere to an order which may not be in other respects the most eligible: "Cicero praised Cæsar," and "Cæsar praised Cicero," would be two very different propositions; the situation of the words being all that indicates, (from our want of *Cases*,) *which* is to be taken as the nominative, and which as the accusative; but such a restriction is far from being an advantage. The transposition of words which the ancient languages admit of, conduces, not merely to variety, but to Energy, and even to Precision. If, for instance, a Roman had been directing the attention of his hearers to the circumstance that *Cæsar* had been the object of Cicero's praise, he would, most likely, have put "*Cæsarem*" first; but he would have put "Cicero" first, if he had been remarking that not only others, but even *he*, had praised Cæsar.

It is for want of this liberty of Arrangement that we are often compelled to mark the *emphatic* words of our sentences by the voice, in speaking, and by italics, in writing; which would, in Greek or in Latin, be plainly indicated, in most instances, by the collocation alone. The sentence which has been often brought forward as an example of the varieties of expression which may be given to the same words, "Will you ride to London to-morrow?" and which may be pronounced and understood in, at least, five different ways, according as the first, second, &c. of the words is printed in italics, would be, by a Latin or Greek writer, arranged in as many different orders, to answer these several intentions. The advantage thus gained must be evident to any one who considers how important the object is which is thus accomplished, and for the sake of which we are often compelled to resort to such clumsy expedients; it is like the proper distribution of the *lights* in a picture; which is hardly of less consequence than the correct and lively representation of the objects.

It must be the aim then of an author, who would write with Energy, to avail himself of all the liberty which our language does allow, so to arrange his words that there shall be the least possible occasion for under-scoring and italics; and this, of course, must be more carefully attended to by the *writer* than by the *speaker*, who may, by his mode of utterance, conceal, in great measure, a defect in this point. It may be worth observing, however, that some writers, having been taught that it is a fault of Style to require many of the words to be in italics, fancy they avoid the fault, by omitting those indications where they are really needed; which is no less absurd than to attempt remedying the intricacies of a road by remov-

ing the direction-posts.[73] The proper remedy is, to endeavour so to construct the Style, that the collocation of the words may, as far as is possible, direct the attention to those which are emphatic. And the general maxim that should chiefly guide us, is, as Dr. Campbell observes, the homely saying, "Nearest the heart, nearest the mouth;" the idea, which is the most forcibly impressed on the author's mind, will naturally claim the first utterance, as nearly as the rules of the language will permit. And it will be found that, in a majority of instances, the most emphatic word will be the *Predicate;* contrary to the rule which the nature of our language compels us, in most instances, to observe. It will often happen, however, that we do place the Predicate first, and obtain a great increase of Energy by this Arrangement. Of this license our translators of the Bible have, in many instances, very happily availed themselves; as, *e.g.* in the sentence lately cited, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians;" so also, "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord:" it is evident how much this would be enfeebled by altering the Arrangement into "He that cometh in the name of the Lord is blessed." And, again, "To Him gave all the prophets witness:" here, indeed, it may be said, that that is properly the Subject which comes first; since that of which we are speaking is He, of whom we assert, that all the prophets bear Him witness; but still, the placing of the oblique case first, is a departure from the most common, and, what many call, the Grammatical order of our language. And, again, "Silver and Gold have I none; but what I have, that give I unto thee."[74] Another passage, in which they might advantageously have adhered to the order of the original, is, "Ἔπεσεν, ἔπεσε Βαβυλὼν, ἡ μεγάλη,"[75] which would certainly have been rendered as correctly, and more forcibly, as well as more closely, "Fallen, fallen is Babylon, that great city," than, "Babylon is fallen, is fallen."

The word "IT" is frequently very serviceable in enabling us to alter the Arrangement: thus, the sentence, "Cicero praised Cæsar," which admits of at least two modifications of sense, may be altered so as to express either of them, by thus varying the order: "It was Cicero that praised Cæsar," or, "It was Cæsar that Cicero praised." "IT" is, in this mode of using it, the *representative* of the Subject,[76] which it thus enables us to place, if we will, after the Predicate.

[73] The censure of frequent and long Parentheses also leads some writers into the like preposterous expedient of leaving out the marks ( ) by which they are indicated, and substituting commas; instead of so framing each sentence that they shall not be needed. It is no cure to a lame man, to take away his crutches.

[74] Acts v. 6.

[75] Rev. xviii. 2.

[76] Of whatever *gender* or *number* the subject referred to may be, "IT" may, with equal propriety, be employed to represent it. Our translators of the Bible have not scrupled to make "IT" refer to a *masculine* noun: "It is I, be not afraid;" but they seem to have thought it not allowable, as perhaps it was not, at the time when they wrote, to make such a reference to a *plural* noun. "Search the Scriptures—— *they are they* which testify of Me:" we should now say, without any impropriety, "*IT is they*," &c.

With respect to *Periods*, it would be neither practically useful, nor even suitable to the present object, to enter into an examination of the different senses in which various authors have employed the word. A technical term may allowably be employed, in a scientific work, in any sense not very remote from common usage (especially when common usage is not uniform, and invariable, in the meaning affixed to it,) provided it be clearly defined, and the definition strictly adhered to. By a Period, then, is to be understood in this place, any sentence, whether simple or complex, which is so framed that the Grammatical construction will not admit of a close, before the end of it; in which, in short, the meaning remains suspended, as it were, till the whole is finished. A *loose* sentence, on the contrary, is, any that is not a Period;—any whose construction will allow of a stop, so as to form a perfect sentence, at one or more places, before we arrive at the end. *E.G.* "We came to our journey's end—at last—with no small difficulty—after much fatigue—through deep roads—and bad weather." This is an instance of a *very* loose sentence; (for it is evident that this kind of structure admits of degrees,) there being no less than five places, marked by dashes, at any one of which the sentence might have terminated, so as to be grammatically perfect. The same words may be formed into a Period, thus: "At last, after much fatigue, through deep roads, and bad weather, we came, with no small difficulty, to our journey's end." Here, no stop can be made at any part, so that the preceding words shall form a sentence before the final close. These are both of them *simple* sentences; *i.e.* not consisting of several clauses, but having only a single verb; so that it is plain we ought not, according to this view, to confine the name of Period to *complex* sentences, as Dr. Campbell has done, notwithstanding his having adopted the same definition as has been here laid down.

Periods, or sentences nearly approaching to Periods, have certainly, when other things are equal, the advantage in point of Energy. An unexpected continuation of a sentence which the reader had supposed to be concluded, especially if in reading aloud, he had, under that supposition, dropped his voice, is apt to produce a sensation in the mind of being disagreeably balked, analogous to the unpleasant jar which is felt, when in ascending or descending stairs, we meet with a step more than we expected: and if this be often repeated, as in a *very* loose sentence, a kind of weary impatience results from the uncertainty when the sentence is to close. This, however, must have been much more the case in the ancient languages, than in the modern; because the variety of Arrangement which they permitted, and, in particular, the liberty of reserving the *verb*, on which the whole sense depends, to the end, made that structure natural and easy, in many instances in which, in our language, it would appear forced, unnatural, and affected. But the agreeableness of a certain degree, at least, of Periodic structure, in all languages, is apparent

from this; that they all contain words which may be said to have no other use or signification but to *suspend the sense*, and lead the hearer of the first part of the sentence to expect the remainder. He who says, "the world is not eternal, nor the work of chance," expresses the same sense as if he said, "The world is *neither* eternal, nor the work of chance;" yet the latter would be generally preferred. So also, "The vines afforded *both* a refreshing shade, and a delicious fruit;" the word "both," would be missed, though it adds nothing to the sense. Again, "While all the Pagan nations consider Religion as one part of Virtue, the Jews, on the contrary, regard Virtue as a part of Religion;"[77] the omission of the first word would not alter the sense, but would destroy the Period; to produce which is its only use. The MEN, ΔE, and TE of the Greek are, in many places, subservient to this use alone.

The modern languages do not indeed admit, as was observed above, of so Periodic a Style as the ancient do: but an author, who does but clearly understand what a Period is, and who applies the test we have laid down, will find it very easy, after a little practice, to compose in Periods, even to a greater degree than, in an English writer, good taste will warrant. His skill and care will be chiefly called for in avoiding all appearance of stiffness and affectation in the construction of them,—in not departing, for the sake of a Period, too far from colloquial usage,—and in observing such moderation in the employment of this Style, as shall prevent any betrayal of artifice,—any thing savouring of elaborate stateliness, which is always to be regarded as a worse fault than the slovenliness and languor which accompany a very loose Style.

It should be observed, however, that, as a sentence which is not *strictly* a Period, according to the foregoing definition, may yet approach indefinitely near to it, so as to produce nearly the same effect, so on the other hand, Periods may be so constructed as to produce much of the same feeling of weariness and impatience which results from an excess of loose sentences. If the clauses be very long, and contain an enumeration of many circumstances, though the sentence be so framed, that we are still kept in expectation of the conclusion, yet it will be an impatient expectation; and the reader will feel the same kind of uneasy uncertainty *when* the *clause* is to be finished, as would be felt respecting the *sentence*, if it were loose. And this will especially be the case, if the rule formerly given with a view to Perspicuity be not observed,[78] of taking care that each part of the sentence be understood, as it proceeds. Each clause, if it consist of several parts, should be continued with the same attention to their mutual connection, so as to suspend the sense, as is employed in the whole sentence; that it may be, as it were, a *Periodic* clause; and if

[77] Josephus. [78] P. 70.

one clause be long and another short, the *shorter* should, if possible, be put *last.* Universally, indeed, a sentence will often be, practically, too long, *i.e.* will have a tedious, dragging effect, merely from its concluding with a much longer clause than it began with; so that a composition which most would censure as abounding too much in long sentences, may often have its defect, in great measure, remedied without shortening any of them; merely by reversing the order of each. This, of course, holds good with respect to all complex sentences of any considerable length, whether Periods or not. An instance of the difference of effect produced by this means, may be seen in such a sentence as the following: "The State was made, under the pretence of serving it, in reality, the prize of their contention, to each of those opposite parties, who professed in specious terms, the one, a preference for moderate Aristocracy, the other, a desire of admitting the people at large, to an equality of civil privileges." This may be regarded as a complete Period; and yet, for the reason just mentioned, has a tedious and cumbrous effect. Many critics might recommend, and perhaps with reason, to break it into two or three; but it is to our present purpose to remark that it might be, in some degree at least, decidedly improved, by merely reversing the clauses; as thus: "The two opposite parties, who professed in specious terms, the one, a preference for moderate Aristocracy, the other, a desire of admitting the people at large to an equality of civil privileges, made the State, which they pretended to serve, in reality the prize of their contention."[79] Another instance may be cited from a work, in which any occasional awkwardness of expression is the more conspicuous, on account of its general excellence—the Church Liturgy; the style of which is so justly admired for its remarkable union of energy with simplicity, smoothness, and elegance: the following passage from the Exhortation is one of the very few, which, from the fault just noticed, it is difficult for a good reader to deliver with spirit: "And although we ought at all times humbly to acknowledge our sins before God,‖ yet ought we most chiefly so to do,‖ when we assemble and meet together—to render thanks for the great benefits that we have received at his hands,—to set forth his most worthy praise, to hear his most holy word, and to ask those things which are requisite and necessary,—as well for the body as the soul." This is evidently a very loose sentence, as it might be supposed to conclude at any one of the three places which are marked by dashes (—); this disadvantage, however, may easily be obviated by the suspension of voice, by which a good reader, acquainted with the passage, would indicate that the sentence was not concluded; but the great fault is the length of the *last* of the three principal clauses, in comparison of the former two; (the conclusions of which we have marked ‖) by

[79] Thucydides on the Corcyrean sedition.

which a dragging and heavy effect is produced, and the sentence is made to appear longer than it really is. This would be more manifest to any one not familiar, as most are, with the passage; but a good reader of the Liturgy will find hardly any sentence in it so difficult to deliver to his own satisfaction. It is perhaps the more profitable to notice a blemish occurring in a composition so well known, and so deservedly valued for the excellence, not only of its sentiments, but of its language.

It is a useful admonition to young writers, with a view to what has lately been said, that they should always attempt to *recast* a sentence which does not please; altering the Arrangement and entire construction of it, instead of merely seeking to change one word for another. This will give a great advantage in point of *Copiousness* also: for there may be, suppose, a *substantive*, which, either because it does not fully express our meaning, or for some other reason, we wish to remove, but can find no other to supply its place; but the object may perhaps be easily accomplished by means of a *verb*, adverb, or some other part of speech, the substitution of which implies an alteration of the construction. It is an exercise accordingly which may be recommended as highly conducive to the improvement of Style, to practise casting a sentence into a variety of different forms.

It is evident, from what has been said, that in compositions intended to be delivered, the Periodic Style is much less necessary, and therefore much less suitable, than in those designed for the closet. The speaker may, in most instances, by the skilful suspension of his voice, give to a loose sentence the effect of a Period: and though, in both species of composition the display of art is to be guarded against, a more unstudied air is looked for in such as are spoken.

The study of the best Greek and Latin writers may be of great advantage towards the improvement of the Style in the point concerning which we have now been treating, (for the reason lately mentioned,) as well as in most others: and there is this additional advantage, (which, at first sight, might appear a disadvantage,) that the Style of a foreign writer cannot be so *closely* imitated as that of one in our own language: for this reason there will be the less danger of falling into an *obvious* and *servile* imitation. Bolingbroke may be noted as one of the most Periodic of English writers; Swift and Addison, (though in other respects very different,) are among the most loose.

Antithesis has been sometimes reckoned as one form of the Period; but it is evident that, according to the view here taken, it has no necessary connection with it. One clause may be *opposed* to another, by means of some *contrast* between corresponding words in each, whether or not the clauses be so connected that the former could not, by itself, be a complete sentence. Tacitus, who is one of the most Antithetical, is at the same time one of the least Periodic, of all the Latin writers.

There can be no doubt that this figure is calculated to add greatly to

Energy. Every thing is rendered more striking by contrast; and almost every kind of subject-matter affords *materials* for contrasted expressions. Truth is *opposed* to error; wise conduct to foolish; different causes often produce opposite effects; different circumstances dictate to prudence opposite conduct; opposite impressions may be made by the same object, on different minds; and every extreme is opposed both to the Mean, and to the other extreme. If, therefore, the language be so constructed as to contrast together these opposites, they throw light on each other by a kind of mutual reflection, and the view thus presented will be the more striking. By this means also we may obtain, consistently with Perspicuity, a much greater degree of Conciseness; which in itself is so conducive to Energy; *e.g.* "When Reason is against a man, he will be against Reason;"[80] it would be hardly possible to express this sentiment, not Antithetically, so as to be clearly intelligible, except in a much longer sentence. Again, "Words are the Counters of wise men, and the Money of fools;" here we have an instance of the combined effect of Antithesis and Metaphor in producing increased Energy, both directly, and at the same time, (by the Conciseness resulting from them,) indirectly; and accordingly, in such pointed and pithy expressions, we obtain the gratification which, as Aristotle remarks, results from "the act of *learning* quickly and easily." It is a remark of the same author, that, in Antithesis, either "contraries are joined to contraries," in the two clauses respectively, or "the *same* thing is joined to contraries;" of this last, the former of the two examples, just cited, is an instance;—the condemnation pronounced on any one's principles or conduct, by Reason, being contrasted with his dislike and defiance of it: the other example is an instance of the former kind; "Counters" being opposed to "Money," and "wise men" to "fools." Of the same nature is the Antithetical expression, "Party is the madness of many, for the gain of a few;" which affords, likewise, an instance of this construction in a sentence which does not contain two distinct clauses. Frequently the same words, placed in different relations with each other, will stand in contrast to themselves; as in the expression, "A fool with judges; among fools, a judge;"[81] and in that given by Quinctilian, "*non ut edam vivo, sed ut vivam edo;*" "I do not live to eat, but eat to live;" both of these are instances also of perfect Antithesis, without Period; for each of these sentences might, grammatically, be concluded in the middle. Of the same kind is an expression in a Speech of Mr. Wyndham's, "Some contend that I disapprove of this plan, because it is not my own; it would be more correct to say, that it is not my own, because I disapprove it."

The use of Antithesis has been censured by some, as if it were a paltry and affected decoration, unsuitable to a chaste, natural, and

[80] Hobbes. [81] Cowper.

masculine Style. Pope, accordingly, himself one of the most Antithetical of our writers, speaks of it in the *Dunciad* with contempt:—

> "I see a Chief who leads my chosen sons,
> All arm'd with Points, Antitheses, and Puns."

The excess, indeed, of this Style, by betraying artifice, effectually destroys Energy; and draws off the attention, even of those who are *pleased* with effeminate glitter, from the matter to the Style. But, as Dr. Campbell observes, "the excess itself into which some writers have fallen, is an evidence of its value—of the lustre and emphasis which Antithesis is calculated to give to the expression. There is no risk of intemperance in using a liquor which has neither spirit nor flavour."

It is, of course, impossible to lay down precise rules for determining, *what* will amount to excess, in the use of this, or of any other figure: the great safeguard will be the formation of a pure taste, by the study of the most chaste writers, and unsparing self-correction. But one rule always to be observed in respect to the antithetical construction, is to remember that in a true Antithesis the opposition is always in the *ideas* expressed. Some writers abound with a kind of mock-antithesis, in which the same, or nearly the same sentiment which is expressed by the first clause, is repeated in a second; or at least, in which there is but little of real contrast between the clauses which are expressed in a contrasted form. This kind of style not only produces disgust instead of pleasure, when once the artifice is detected, which it soon must be, but also, instead of the brevity and vigour resulting from true Antithesis, labours under the fault of prolixity and heaviness. Sentences which might have been expressed simply, are expanded into complex ones, by the addition of clauses, which add little or nothing to the sense; and which have been compared to the false handles and keyholes with which furniture is decorated, that serve no other purpose than to *correspond to the real ones*. Much of Dr. Johnson's writing is chargeable with this fault.

Bacon, in his Rhetoric, furnishes, in his common-places, (*i.e.* heads of Arguments, *pro* and *contra*, on a variety of subjects,) some admirable specimens of compressed and striking Antitheses; many of which are worthy of being enrolled among the most approved proverbs: *e.g.* "He who dreads new remedies, must abide old evils." "Since things alter for the worse spontaneously, if they be not altered for the better designedly, what end will there be of the evil?" "The humblest of the virtues the vulgar praise, the middle ones they admire, of the highest, they have no perception," &c.

It will not unfrequently happen that an Antithesis may be even more happily expressed by the sacrifice of the Period, if the clauses are by this means made of a more convenient length, and a resting-place provided at the most suitable point: *e.g.* "The persecutions undergone by the Apostles, furnished both a trial to *their* faith, and a confirmation to *our's*:—a trial to them, because if human honours

and rewards had attended them, they could not, even themselves, have been certain that these were not their object; and a confirmation to us, because they would not have encountered such sufferings in the cause of imposture." If this sentence were not broken as it is, but compacted into a Period, it would have more heaviness of effect, though it would be rather shorter: *e.g.* "The persecutions undergone by the Apostles, furnished both a trial of their faith, since if human honours, &c. &c. and also a confirmation of our's, because," &c. Universally, indeed, a complex sentence, whether Antithetical or not, will often have a degree of spirit and liveliness from the latter clause being made to *turn back*, as it were, upon the former, by containing, or referring to, some word that had there been mentioned: *e.g.* "The introducers of the now-established principles of political economy may fairly be considered to have made a great *discovery;* a *discovery* the more creditable, from the circumstance that the facts on which it was founded had long been well known to all." This kind of Style also may, as well as the Antithetical, prove offensive if carried to such an excess as to produce an appearance of affectation or mannerism.

Lastly, to the *Speaker* especially, the occasional employment of the *Interrogative* form, will often prove serviceable with a view to Energy. It calls the hearer's attention more forcibly to some important point, by a personal appeal to each, either to assent to what is urged, or to frame a reasonable objection; and it often carries with it an air of triumphant defiance of an opponent to refute the argument if he can. Either the Premiss or the Conclusion, or both, of any argument, may be stated in this form; but it is evident that if it be introduced too frequently, it will necessarily fail of the object of directing a *particular* attention to the most important points. To attempt to make every thing emphatic, is to make nothing emphatic. The utility, however, of this figure, to the Orator at least, is sufficiently established by the single consideration, that it abounds in the Speeches of Demosthenes.

§ 3. On the last quality of Style to be noticed, Elegance or Beauty, it is the less necessary to enlarge, both because the most appropriate and characteristic excellence of the class of compositions here treated of, is, that Energy of which we have been speaking, and also because many of the rules laid down under that head, are equally applicable with a view to Elegance; the same Choice, Number, and Arrangement of words, will, for the most part, conduce both to Energy and to Beauty. The two qualities, however, are by no means undistinguishable: a Metaphor, for instance, may be apt, and striking, and consequently conducive to Energy of expression, even though the new image, introduced by it, have no intrinsic beauty, or be even unpleasant; in which case it would be at variance with Elegance, or at least would not conduce to it. Elegance requires that all homely and coarse words and phrases should be avoided, even at the expense of circumlocution; though they may be the most apt and forcible that language

can supply. And Elegance implies a smooth and easy flow of words in respect of the sound of the sentences; though a more harsh and abrupt mode of expression may often be, at least equally, energetic.

Accordingly, many are generally acknowledged to be forcible writers, to whom no one would give the credit of Elegance; and many others, who are allowed to be elegant, are yet by no means vigorous and energetic.

When the two excellences of Style are at variance, the general rule to be observed by the Orator, is to prefer the energetic to the elegant. Sometimes, indeed, a plain, or even a somewhat homely expression, may have even a *more* energetic effect, from that very circumstance, than one of more studied refinement, since it may convey the idea of the Speaker's being thoroughly in earnest, and anxious to convey his sentiments, where he uses an expression that can have no other recommendation; whereas a strikingly elegant expression may sometimes convey a suspicion that it was introduced *for the sake* of its Elegance; which will greatly diminish the force of what is said. Universally, a writer or speaker should endeavour to maintain the appearance of expressing himself, not, as if he *wanted to say something*, but as if he *had something to say: i.e.* not as if he had a subject set him, and was anxious to compose the best essay or declamation on it that he could; but as if he had some ideas to which he was anxious to give utterance;—not as if he wanted to compose (for instance) a sermon, and was desirous of performing that task satisfactorily, but as if there was something in his mind which he was desirous of communicating to his hearers. This is probably what Dr. Butler means when he speaks of a man's writing "with simplicity and in earnest." *His* manner has this advantage, though it is not only inelegant, but often obscure: Dr. Paley's is equally earnest, and very perspicuous; and though often homely, is more impressive than that of many of our most polished writers. It is easy to discern the prevalence of these two different manners in different authors, respectively, and to perceive the very different effects produced by them; it is not so easy for one who is not really writing "with simplicity and in earnest," to assume the appearance of it. But certainly nothing is more adverse to this appearance than over-refinement. Any expression indeed that is vulgar, in bad taste, and unsuitable to the dignity of the subject, or of the occasion, is to be avoided; since, though it might have, with some hearers, an energetic effect, this would be more than counterbalanced by the disgust produced in others; and where a *small* accession of Energy is to be gained at the expense of a *great* sacrifice of Elegance, the latter will demand a preference. But still, the general rule is not to be lost sight of by him who is in earnest aiming at the true ultimate end of the Orator, to which all others are to be made subservient; *viz.* not the amusement of his hearers, nor their admiration of himself, but their Conviction or Persuasion. It is from

this view of the subject that we have dwelt most on that quality of Style which seems most especially adapted to that object. Perspicuity is required in *all* compositions; and may even be considered as the ultimate end of a *Scientific* writer, considered as such; he may indeed practically increase his utility by writing so as to excite curiosity, and recommend his subject to general attention; but in doing so, he is, in some degree, superadding the office of the Orator to his own; as a Philosopher, he may *assume* the existence in his reader of a desire for knowledge, and has only to convey that knowledge in language that may be *clearly understood.* Of the Style of the Orator, (in the wide sense in which we have been using this appellation, as including all who are aiming at Conviction,) the appropriate object is to *impress* the meaning strongly upon men's minds. Of the Poet, as such, the ultimate end is to *give pleasure;* and accordingly Elegance or Beauty (in the most extensive sense of those terms,) will be the appropriate qualities of his language.

Some indeed have contended, that to give pleasure is not the ultimate end of Poetry;[82] not distinguishing between the object which the Poet may have in view, *as a man,* and that which is the object of Poetry, as Poetry. Many, no doubt, may have proposed to themselves the far more important object of producing moral improvement in their hearers through the medium of Poetry; and so have others, the inculcation of their own political or philosophical tenets, or (as is supposed in the case of the *Georgics,*) the encouragement of Agriculture: but if the views of the individual are to be taken into account, it should be considered that the personal fame or emolument of the author is very frequently *his* ultimate object. The true test is easily applied: that which to competent judges affords the appropriate *pleasure* of Poetry, is *good* poetry, whether it answer any other purpose or not; that which does *not* afford this pleasure, however instructive it may be, is not good *Poetry,* though it may be a valuable *work.*

It may be doubted, however, how far these remarks apply to the question respecting Beauty of *Style;* since the chief gratification afforded by Poetry, arises, it may be said, from the Beauty of the *thoughts;* and undoubtedly if these be mean and common-place, the Poetry will be worth little; but still, it is not any quality of the thoughts that *constitutes* Poetry. Notwithstanding all that has been advanced by some French critics,[83] to prove that a work, not in metre, may be a Poem, (which doctrine was partly derived from a misinterpretation of a passage in Aristotle's *Poetics,*[84]) universal opinion has always given a contrary decision. Any composition in *verse,* (and none that is not,) is always called, whether good or bad, a Poem, by

[82] Supported in some degree by the authority of Horace:—
Aut prodesse volunt, aut delectare Poetæ.

[83] See Preface to *Telemaque.*

[84] Ψιλοὶ λόγοι has been erroneously interpreted language *without metre,* in a passage where it certainly means metre *without music;* or, as he calls it in another passage of the same work, ψιλομετρία.

all who have no favourite hypothesis to maintain. It is indeed a common figure of speech to say, in speaking of any work that is deficient in the qualities which Poetry *ought* to exhibit, that it is not a Poem; just as we say of one who wants the characteristic excellences of the species, or the sex, that he is *not a man*:[85] and thus some have been led to confound together the appropriate *excellence* of the thing in question, with its *essence:* but the use of such an expression as, an "*indifferent*," or "a *dull Poem*," shows plainly that the title of Poetry does not necessarily imply the requisite *Beauties* of Poetry.

Poetry is not distinguished from Prose by superior Beauty of thought or of expression, but is a distinct kind of composition;[86] and they produce, when each is excellent in its kind, distinct kinds of pleasure. Try the experiment, of merely breaking up the metrical structure of a fine Poem, and you will find it *inflated and bombastic* Prose: remove this defect by altering the words and the Arrangement, and it will be *better* Prose than before; then arrange this again into metre, without any other change, and it will be *tame* and *dull* Poetry; but still it will *be* Poetry, as is indicated by the very censure it will incur; for if it were not, there would be no fault to be found with it; since, while it remained Prose, it was (as we have supposed,) unexceptionable. The circumstance that the same Style which was even required in one kind of composition, proved offensive in the other, shows that a different kind of language is suitable for a composition in metre.

Another indication of the essential difference between the two kinds of composition, and of the superior importance of the *expression* in Poetry, is, that a good *translation* of a Poem, (though, perhaps, strictly speaking, what is so called is rather an *imitation*,) is read with equal, or even superior pleasure by one well acquainted with the original; whereas the best translation of a Prose work, (at least of one not principally valued for beauty of Style,) will seldom be read by one familiar with the original. And for the same reason, a fine passage of Poetry will be reperused, with unabated pleasure, for the twentieth time, even by one who knows it by heart.

According to the views here taken, good Poetry might be defined, "*Elegant and decorated language in metre, expressing* such and such thoughts;" and good Prose composition, "*such and such thoughts expressed in* good language;" that which is primary in each being subordinate in the other.

[85] "I dare do all that may become a *man*;
Who dares do more, is *none*."—*Macbeth.*

[86] It is hardly necessary to remark, that we are not defending or seeking to introduce any *unusual* or *new* sense of the word Poetry; but, on the contrary, explaining and vindicating that which is the most customary among all men who have no particular theory to support. The mass of mankind often need, indeed, to have the meaning of a word (*i.e.* their *own* meaning) *explained* and *developed;* but not, to have it determined *what* it shall mean, since *that* is determined by their use; the true sense of each word being, *that which is understood by it.*

What has been said may be illustrated as fully, not as it might be, but as is suitable to the present occasion, by the following passages from Dr. A. Smith's admirable fragment of an *Essay on the Imitative Arts:* "Were I to attempt to discriminate between Dancing and any other kind of movement, I should observe, that though in performing any ordinary action,—in walking, for example, across the room, a person may manifest both grace and agility, yet if he betrays the least intention of showing either, he is sure of offending more or less, and we never fail to accuse him of some degree of vanity and affectation. In the performance of any such ordinary action, every one wishes to appear to be solely occupied about the proper purpose of the action; if he means to show either grace or agility, he is careful to conceal that meaning; and in proportion as he betrays it, which he almost always does, he offends. In Dancing, on the contrary, every one professes and avows, as it were, the intention of displaying some degree either of grace or of agility, or of both. The display of one or other, or both of these qualities, is, in reality, the proper purpose of the action; and there can never be any disagreeable vanity or affectation in following out the proper purpose of any action. When we say of any particular person, that he gives himself many affected airs and graces in Dancing, we mean either that he exhibits airs and graces unsuitable to the nature of the Dance, or that he exaggerates those which are suitable. Every Dance is, in reality, a succession of airs and graces of some kind or other, which, if I may say so, profess themselves to be such. The steps, gestures, and motions which, as it were, avow the intention of exhibiting a succession of such airs and graces, are the steps, gestures, and motions which are peculiar to Dancing. * * * * The distinction between the sounds or tones of Singing, and those of Speaking, seems to be of the same kind with that between the step, &c. of Dancing, and those of any other ordinary action. Though in Speaking a person may show a very agreeable tone of voice, yet if he seems to *intend* to show it,—if he appears to listen to the sound of his own voice, and as it were to tune it into a pleasing modulation, he never fails to offend, as guilty of a most disagreeable affectation. In Speaking, as in every other ordinary action, we expect and require that the speaker should attend only to the proper purpose of the action,—the clear and distinct expression of what he has to say. In Singing, on the contrary, every one professes the intention to please by the tone and cadence of his voice; and he not only appears to be guilty of no disagreeable affectation in doing so, but we expect and require that he should do so. To please by the Choice and Arrangement of agreeable sounds, is the proper purpose of all music, vocal, as well as instrumental; and we always expect that every one should attend to the proper purpose of whatever action he is performing. A person may appear to sing, as well as to dance, affectedly; he may

endeavour to please by sounds and tones which are unsuitable to the nature of the song; or he may dwell too much on those which are suitable to it. The disagreeable affectation appears to consist always, not in attempting to please by a proper, but by some improper modulation of the voice." It is only necessary to add, (what seems evidently to have been in the author's mind, though the Dissertation is left unfinished,) that Poetry has the same relation to Prose, as Dancing to Walking, and Singing to Speaking; and that what has been said of *them*, will apply exactly, *mutatis mutandis*, to the other. It is needless to state this at length, as any one, by going over the passages just cited, merely substituting for "Singing," "Poetry," for "Speaking," "Prose," for "Voice," "Language," &c. will at once perceive the coincidence.

What has been said will not be thought an unnecessary digression, by any one who considers (not to mention the direct application of Dr. Smith's remarks, to *Elocution*,) the important principle thus established in respect of the decorations of Style: *viz.* that though it is possible for a poetical Style to be affectedly and offensively ornamented, yet the same degree and kind of decoration which is not only allowed, but required, in Verse, would in Prose be disgusting; and that the *appearance of attention* to the Beauty of the expression, and to the Arrangement of the words, which in Verse is essential, is to be carefully avoided in Prose.

And since, as Dr. Smith observes, "such a design, when it exists, is almost always betrayed; the safest rule is, never, during the act of composition, to study Elegance, or think about it at all. Let an author study the best models—mark their beauties of Style, and dwell upon them, that he may insensibly catch the habit of expressing himself with Elegance; and when he has completed any composition, he may revise it, and cautiously alter any passage that is awkward and harsh, as well as those that are feeble and obscure: but let him never, *while writing*, think of any beauties of Style; but content himself with such as may occur spontaneously. He should carefully study *Perspicuity* as he goes along; he may also, though more cautiously, aim, in like manner, at Energy; but if he is endeavouring after Elegance, he will hardly fail to betray that endeavour; and in proportion as he does this, he will be so far from giving pleasure, to good judges, that he will offend more than by the rudest simplicity."

CHAPTER IV.

OF ELOCUTION.

On the importance of this branch, it is hardly necessary to offer any remark. Few need to be told that the effect of the most perfect composition may be entirely destroyed, even by a Delivery which does not render it unintelligible;—that one, which is inferior both in matter and style, may produce, if better spoken, a more powerful effect than another which surpasses it in both those points; and that even such an Elocution as does not spoil the effect of what is said, may yet fall far short of doing full justice to it. "What would you have said," observed Æschines, when his recital of his great rival's celebrated Speech on the Crown was received with a burst of admiration, —"what would you have said had you heard *him* speak it?"

The subject is far from having failed to engage attention: of the prevailing deficiency of this, more than of any other qualification of a perfect Orator, many have complained; and several have laboured to remove it: but it may safely be asserted, that their endeavours have been, at the very best, entirely unsuccessful. Probably not a single instance could be found of any one who has attained by the study of any system of instruction that has appeared, a really good Delivery; but there are many, probably nearly as many as have fully tried the experiment, who have by this means been totally spoiled;—who have fallen irrecoverably into an affected style of *spouting*, worse, in all respects, than their original mode of Delivery. Many accordingly have, not unreasonably, conceived a disgust for the subject altogether; considering it hopeless that Elocution should be *taught* by any rules; and acquiescing in the conclusion that it is to be regarded as entirely a gift of nature, or an accidental acquirement of practice. It is to counteract the prejudice which may result from these feelings, that we profess in the outset a dissent from the principles generally adopted, and lay claim to some degree of originality in our own. Novelty affords at least an opening for hope, and the only opening, when former attempts have met with total failure.

Requisites of Elocution.

The requisites of Elocution correspond in great measure with those of Style: *Correct Enunciation*, in opposition both to *indistinct* utterance, and to *vulgar* and *dialectic* pronunciation, may be considered as answering to Purity, and Grammatical Propriety. These qualities

of Style and of Elocution, being equally required in common conversation, do not properly fall within the province of Rhetoric. The three qualities, again, which have been treated of, under the head of Style, Perspicuity, Energy, and Elegance, may be regarded as equally requisites of Elocution; which, in order to be perfect, must convey the meaning *clearly*, *forcibly*, and *agreeably*.

READING AND SPEAKING.

Before however we enter upon any separate examination of these requisites, it will be necessary to premise a few remarks on the distinction between the two branches of Delivery, *viz. Reading* aloud, and *Speaking*. The object of *correct* Reading is, to convey to the hearers, through the medium of the ear, what is conveyed to the reader by the eye;—to put them in the same situation with him who has the book before him;—to exhibit to them, in short, by the voice, not only each word, but also all the stops, paragraphs, italic characters, notes of interrogation, &c.,[87] which his sight presents to him. His voice seems to indicate to them, "thus and thus it is written in the book or manuscript before me." *Impressive* reading superadds to this, some degree of adaptation of the tones of voice to the character of the subject, and of the Style. What is usually termed *fine* Reading seems to convey, in addition to this, a kind of admonition to the hearers respecting the feelings which the composition ought to excite in them: it appears to say, "this deserves your admiration;—this is sublime;—this is pathetic," &c. But Speaking, *i.e. natural* speaking, when the Speaker is uttering his own sentiments, and is thinking exclusively of *them*, has something in it distinct from all this: it conveys, by the sounds which reach the ear, the idea, that what is said is the effusion of the Speaker's own mind, which he is desirous of imparting to others. A decisive proof of which is, that if any one overhears the voice of another, to whom he is an utter stranger—suppose in the next room—without being able to catch the sense of what is said, he will hardly ever be for a moment at a loss to decide whether he is *Reading* or *Speaking;* and this, though the hearer may

[87] It may be said, indeed, that even tolerable Reading aloud supplies more than is exhibited by a book to the eye; since though italics, *e.g.* indicate which word is to receive the emphasis, they do not point out the *tone* in which it is to be pronounced; which may be essential to the right understanding of the sentence; *e.g.* in such a sentence as in *Genesis*, chap. i. "God said, let there be light, and there *was* light:" here we can indicate indeed that the stress is to be upon "*was;*" but it may be pronounced in different tones; one of which would alter the sense, by implying that there *was* light *already*. This is true indeed; and it is also true, that the very words themselves are not always presented to the eye with the same distinctions as are to be conveyed to the ear; as *e.g.* "abuse," "refuse," "project," and many others are pronounced differently, as nouns and as verbs. This ambiguity however in our written signs, as well as the other, relative to the emphatic words, are imperfections which will not mislead a moderately practised reader. Our meaning in saying that such Reading as we are speaking of, puts the hearers in the same situation as if the book were before them, is to be understood on the supposition of their being able not only to read, but to read so as to take in the full sense of what is written.

not be one who has ever paid any critical attention to the various modulations of the human voice. So wide is the difference of the tones employed on these two occasions, be the subject what it may.[88]

The difference of effect produced is proportionably great: the personal *sympathy* felt towards one who appears to be delivering his own sentiments is such, that it usually rivets the attention, even involuntarily, though to a discourse which appears hardly worthy of it. It is not easy for an auditor to fall asleep while he is hearing even perhaps feeble reasoning clothed in indifferent language, delivered extemporaneously, and in an unaffected style; whereas it is common for men to find a difficulty in keeping themselves awake, while listening even to a good dissertation, of the same length, or even shorter, on a subject, not uninteresting to them, when *read*, though with propriety, and not in a languid manner. And the thoughts, even of those not disposed to be drowsy, are apt to wander, unless they use an effort from time to time to prevent it; while, on the other hand, it is notoriously difficult to withdraw our attention, even from a trifling talker, of whom we are weary, and to occupy the mind with reflections of its own.

Of the two branches of Elocution which have been just mentioned, it might at first sight appear as if one only, that of the Speaker, came under the province of Rhetoric. But it will be evident, on consideration, that both must be, to a certain extent, regarded as connected with our present subject; not merely because many of the same principles are applicable to both, but because any one who delivers (as is so commonly the case) a written composition of his own, may be reckoned as belonging to either class; as a Reader who is the author of what he reads, or as a Speaker who supplies the deficiency of his memory by writing. And again, in the (less common) case where a Speaker is delivering without book, and from memory alone, a written composition, either his own or another's, though this cannot in strictness be called Reading, yet the tone of it will be very likely to resemble that of Reading. In the other case, that where the author is actually reading his own composition, he will be still more likely, notwithstanding its being his own, to approach, in the Delivery of it, to the Elocution of a Reader; and, on the other hand, it is possible for him, even without actually deceiving the hearers into the

[88] "At every sentence let them ask themselves this question, How should I utter this, were I Speaking it as my own immediate sentiments?——I have often tried an experiment to show the great difference between these two modes of utterance, the natural and the artificial; which was, that when I found a person of vivacity delivering his sentiments with energy, and of course with all that variety of tones which nature furnishes, I have taken occasion to put something into his hand to read, as relative to the topic of conversation; and it was surprising to see what an immediate change there was in his Delivery, from the moment he began to read. A different pitch of voice took place of his natural one, and a tedious uniformity of cadence succeeded to a spirited variety; insomuch that a blind man could hardly conceive the person who Read to be the same who had just been Speaking."—Sheridan, *Art of Reading*.

belief that he is speaking extempore, to approach indefinitely near to that Style.

The difficulty however of doing this to one who has the writing actually before him, is considerable; and it is of course far greater when the composition is *not* his own. And as it is evident from what has been said, that this, as it may be called, Extemporaneous style of Elocution, is much the more impressive, it becomes an interesting inquiry, how the difficulty in question may best be surmounted.

ARTIFICIAL STYLE OF ELOCUTION.

Little, if any, attention has been bestowed on this point by the writers on Elocution; the distinction above pointed out between Reading and Speaking, having seldom or never been precisely stated and dwelt on. Several, however, have written elaborately on "good Reading," or on Elocution, *generally;* and it is not to be denied, that some ingenious and (in themselves) valuable remarks have been thrown out relative to such qualities in Elocution as might be classed under the three heads we have laid down, of Perspicuity, Energy, and Elegance: but there is one principle running through all their precepts, which being, according to our views, radically erroneous, must (if those views be correct) vitiate every system founded on it. The principle we mean is, that in order to acquire the best style of Delivery, it is requisite to study analytically the emphases, tones, pauses, degrees of loudness, &c., which give the proper effect to each passage that is well delivered—to frame *rules* founded on the observation of these—and then, in practice, deliberately and carefully to conform the utterance to these rules, so as to form a complete artificial system of Elocution.

That such a plan not only directs us into a circuitous and difficult path, towards an object which may be reached by a shorter and straighter, but also, in most instances, completely fails of that very object, and even produces, oftener than not, effects the very reverse of what is designed, is a doctrine for which it will be necessary to offer some reasons; especially as it is undeniable that the system here reprobated, as employed in the case of Elocution, is precisely that recommended and taught in this very article, in respect of the conduct of *Arguments.* By analyzing the best compositions, and observing what kinds of arguments, and what modes of arranging them, in each case, prove most successful, general rules have been formed, which an author is recommended studiously to observe in Composition: and this is precisely the procedure which, in Elocution, we deprecate. The reason for making such a difference in these two cases is this: whoever (as Dr. A. Smith remarks in the passage lately cited[89]) appears to be attending to his own utterance, which will almost

[89] See Ch. III. § 3. p. 111.

inevitably be the case with every one who *is* doing so, is sure to give offence, and to be censured for an affected delivery; because every one is expected to attend exclusively to the proper object of the action he is engaged in; which, in this case, is the expression of the thoughts —not the sound of the expressions. Whoever therefore learns and endeavours to apply in practice, any artificial rules of Elocution, so as deliberately to modulate his voice conformably to the principles he has adopted, (however sound they may be in themselves) will hardly ever fail to betray his intention; which always gives offence when perceived. Arguments, on the contrary, *must* be deliberately framed: whether any one's course of reasoning be sound and judicious, or not, it is necessary, and it is expected, that it should be the result of thought. No one, as Dr. Smith observes, is charged with affectation for giving his attention to the proper object of the action he is engaged in. As therefore the proper object of the Orator is to adduce convincing arguments, and topics of Persuasion, there is nothing offensive in his appearing deliberately to aim at this object. He may indeed weaken the force of what is urged, by *too great* an appearance of elaborate composition, or by exciting suspicion of Rhetorical *trick;* but he is so far from being expected to pay no attention to the sense of what he says, that the most powerful argument would lose much of its force, if it were supposed to have been thrown out casually, and at random. *Here* therefore the employment of a regular system (if founded on just principles) can produce no such ill effect as in the case of Elocution; since the habitual attention which that implies to the choice and arrangement of arguments, is such as *must* take place, at any rate; whether it be conducted on any settled principles or not. The only difference is, that he who proceeds on a correct system, will think and deliberate concerning the course of his Reasoning to *better purpose* than he who does not: he will do *well* and *easily*, what the other does ill, and with more labour. Both alike must bestow their attention on the *Matter* of what they say, if they would produce any effect; both are not only allowed, but expected to do so.

The two opposite modes of procedure therefore which are recommended in respect of these two points, (the Argument and the Delivery,) are, in fact, both the result of the same circumstance; *viz.* that the Speaker is expected to bestow his attention on the proper ultimate object of his Speech; which is, not the Elocution, but the Matter.[90]

When however we protest against all artificial systems of Elocution, and all *direct* attention to Delivery, *at the time*, it must not be supposed that a *general* inattention to that point is recommended; or that the

[90] Style occupies in some respects an intermediate place between these two; in what degree each quality of it should or should not be made an object of attention *at the time of composing*, and how far the appearance of such attention is tolerated, has been already treated of in the preceding chapter.

most perfect Elocution is to be attained by never thinking at all on the subject; though it may safely be affirmed that even this negative plan would succeed far better than a studied modulation. But it is evident that if any one wishes to *assume the Speaker* as far as possible; *i.e.* to deliver a written composition with some degree of the manner and effect of one that is extemporaneous, he will have a considerable difficulty to surmount: since though this may be called, in a certain sense, the NATURAL MANNER, it is far from being what he will naturally, *i.e. spontaneously*, fall into. It is by no means natural for any one to *read* as if he were *not* reading, but speaking. And again, even when any one is reading what he does not wish to deliver as his own composition, as, for instance, a portion of the Scriptures, or the Liturgy, it is evident that this may be done, better or worse, in infinite degrees; and that though (according to the views here taken) a studied attention to the sounds uttered, at the time of uttering them, leads to an affected and offensive delivery, yet, on the other hand, an utterly careless reader cannot be a good one.

READING.

With a view to Perspicuity then, the first requisite in all Delivery, *viz.* that quality which makes the meaning fully understood by the hearers, the great point is that the Reader (to confine our attention for the present to that branch) should appear to *understand* what he reads. If the composition be, in itself, intelligible to the persons addressed, he will make them fully understand it, by so delivering it. But to this end, it is not enough that he should himself *actually* understand it; it is possible, notwithstanding, to read it as if he did not. And in like manner with a view to the quality, which has been here called Energy, it is not sufficient that he should himself feel, and be impressed with the force of what he utters; he may, notwithstanding, deliver it as if he were unimpressed.

The remedy that has been commonly proposed for these defects, is to point out in such a work, for instance, as the Liturgy, which words ought to be marked as emphatic,—in what places the voice is to be suspended, raised, lowered, &c. One of the best writers on the subject, Sheridan, in his *Lectures on the Art of Reading*,[91] (whose remarks on many points coincide with the principles here laid down, though he differs from us on the main question—as to the System to be practically followed with a view to the proposed object,) adopts a peculiar set of marks for denoting the different pauses, emphases, &c. and applies these, with accompanying explanatory observations, to the greater part of the Liturgy, and to an Essay subjoined;[92] recom-

[91] See note [88], p. 115.

[92] "For the benefit of those who are desirous of getting over their bad habits, and discharging that important part of the Sacred office, the Reading the Liturgy with due decorum, I shall first enter into a minute examination of some parts of the Service, and afterwards deliver the rest, accompanied by such marks as will enable the Reader, in a short time, and with

mending that the habit should be formed of regulating the voice by his marks; and that afterwards readers should "write out such parts as they want to deliver properly, without any of the usual stops; and, after having considered them well, mark the pauses and emphases by the new signs which have been annexed to them, according to the best of their judgment," &c.

moderate pains, to make himself master of the whole.

"But first it will be necessary to explain the marks which you will hereafter see throughout the rest of this course. They are of two kinds; one, to point out the emphatic words, for which I shall use the Grave accent of the Greek, [`].

"The other, to point out the different pauses or stops, for which I shall use the following marks:

"For the shortest pause, marking an incomplete line, thus '.

"For the second, double the time of the former, two ".

"And for the third or full stop, three '".

"When I would mark a pause longer than any belonging to the usual stops, it shall be by two horizontal lines, as thus =.

"When I would point out a Syllable that is to be dwelt on some time, I shall use this —, or a short horizontal over the Syllable.

"When a Syllable should be rapidly uttered, thus ˘, or a curve turned upwards; the usual marks of long and short in Prosody.

"The Exhortation I have often heard delivered in the following manner:

"'Dearly beloved brethren, the Scripture moveth us in sundry places to acknowledge and confess our manifold sins and wickedness. And that we should not dissemble nor cloke them before the face of Almighty God our Heavenly Father, but confess them with an humble lowly penitent and obedient heart, to the end that we may obtain, forgiveness of the same, by his infinite goodness and mercy. And although we ought at àll times humbly to acknówledge our sins before God, yet ought we most chiefly sò to do, when we assemble and meet together. To render thànks for the great benefits we have received at his hands, to set forth his most worthy praise, to hear his most holy word, and to ask those things that are requisite and necessary, as well for the body as the soul. Wherefore I pray and beseech you, as many as are here present, to accompany me with a pure heart and humble voice to the throne of the heavenly grace, saying after me.'

"In the latter part of the first period, 'but confess them with an humble lowly penitent and obedient heart, to the end that we may obtain, forgiveness of the same, by his infinite goodness and mercy,' there are several faults committed. In the first place, the four epithets preceding the word 'heart,' are huddled together, and pronounced in a monotone, disagreeable to the ear, and enervating to the sense; whereas each word rising in force above the other, ought to be marked by a proportional rising of the notes in the voice; and, in the last, there should be such a note used as would declare it at the same time to be the last—'with an humble' lowly' penitent and obèdient heart,' &c. At first view it may appear, that the words 'humble' and 'lowly,' are synonymous; but the word 'lowly,' certainly implies a greater degree of humiliation than the word 'humble.' The word 'penitent' that follows, is of stronger import than either; and the word 'obedient,' signifying a perfect resignation to the will of God, in consequence of our humiliation and repentance, furnishes the climax. But if the climax in the words be not accompanied by a suitable climax in the notes of the voice, it cannot be made manifest. In the following part of the sentence, 'to the ènd that we may obtaìn' forgĭveness of the sàme'' there are usually three emphases laid on the words, *end*, *obtain*, *same*, where there should not be any, and the only emphatic word, *forgiveness*, is slightly passed over; whereas it should be read—'to the end that we may obtain forgivèness of the same,' keeping the words, *obtain*, and *forgiveness*, closely together, and not disuniting them, both to the prejudice of the Sense and Cadence, &c. &c.

"I shall now read the whole, in the manner I have recommended; and if you will give attention to the marks, you will be reminded of the manner, when you come to practise in your private reading. 'Dearly belòved brethren! = The Scripture moveth us' in sundry places' to acknowledge and confess our manifold sins and wickedness" and that we should not dissèmble nor clòke them' before the face of Almighty God' our Heàvenly Father" but confess them' with an humble' lowly' penitent' and obèdient heart' to the end that we may obtain forgìveness of the same' by hĭs ìnfinite goodness and mercy"' And although we ought at àll times' humbly to acknowledge our sins before Gòd" yet ought we most chiefly so to do' when we assemble and meet together' to render thanks' for the great benefits we have received at his hands" to set forth' his most worthy pràise" to hèar' his most hòly

To the adoption of any such artificial scheme there are three weighty objections; 1st, that the proposed system must necessarily be *imperfect;* 2dly, that if it were perfect, it would be a circuitous path to the object in view; and 3dly, that even if both those objections were removed, the object would not be effectually obtained.

IMPERFECTION OF THE ARTIFICIAL SYSTEM.

1st, Such a system must necessarily be imperfect, because though the *emphatic* word in each sentence may easily be pointed out in writing, no variety of marks that could be invented,—not even musical notation,—would suffice to indicate the different *tones*[93] in which the different emphatic words should be pronounced; though on this depends frequently the whole force, and even sense of the expression. Take as an instancce the words of Macbeth in the witches' cave, when he is addressed by one of the Spirits which they raise, "Macbeth! Macbeth! Macbeth!" on which he exclaims, "Had I three ears I'd

wòrd and to àsk those things' which are requisite and necessary' as well for the bòdy' as the sòul'" Wherefore I pray and beseèch yōu' as màny as are here present' to accompany mè' with a pùre heart' and hùmble voice' to the throne of the heavenly grace' saying,' &c."

The generality of the remarks respecting the way in which each passage of the Liturgy should be read, are correct; though the mode recommended for attaining the proposed end, is totally different from what is suggested in the present chapter. In some points, however, the author is mistaken as to the emphatic words: *e.g.* in the Lord's Prayer, he directs the following passage to be read thus; "thy will' bè done' on earth' as it ìs' in Heaven," with the emphasis on the words "be" and "is;" these, however, are not the emphatic words, and do not even *exist, in the original Greek*, but are supplied by the translator; the latter of them might, indeed, be omitted altogether without any detriment to the sense; "thy will be done, as in Heaven, so also on earth," which is a more literal translation, is perfectly intelligible. A passage in the second Commandment again, he directs to be read, according indeed to the usual mode, both of reading and pointing it,—"visit the sins of the fàthers' upon the children' unto the third and fourth generation of them that hàte me;" which mode of reading destroys the sense, by making a pause at "children," and none at "generation;" for this implies that the third and fourth generations, who suffer these judgments, are *themselves* such as hate the Lord, instead of being merely, as is meant to be expressed, the *children* of such; "*of* them that hate me," is a genitive not governed by "generation," but by "children:" it should be read (according to Sheridan's marks) "visit the sins of the fathers' upon the children unto the third and fourth generation' of them that hate me:" *i.e.* "visit the sins of the fathers who hate me, upon the third and fourth generations of their descendants." The same sanction is given to an equally common fault in reading the fifth Commandment; "that thy days' may be long in the land' which the Lord thy God giveth thee:" the pause should evidently be at "*long*" not at "*land.*" No one would say in ordinary conversation, "I hope you will find enjoyment in the garden'——which you have planted." He has also strangely omitted an emphasis on the word "covet," in the tenth Commandment. He has, however, in the negative or prohibitory Commands avoided the common fault of accenting the word "*not.*" And here it may be worth while to remark, that in some cases the Copula ought to be made the emphatic word; (*i.e.* the "*is*" if the proposition be affirmative, the "*not*," if negative) *viz.* where the proposition may be considered as in opposition to its *contradictory*. If, *e.g.* it had been a question, *whether* we ought to steal or not, the commandment, in answer to that, would have been rightly pronounced, "thou shalt *not* steal:" but the question being, *what* things we are forbidden to do, the answer is, that "to steal" is one of them, "thou shalt not *steal.*" In such a case as this, the proposition is considered as opposed, not to its *contradictory*, but to one with a *different Predicate.* The question being not, *which Copula* (negative or affirmative) shall be employed, but *what* shall be affirmed or denied of the subject: *e.g.* "it is lawful to *beg;* but not to *steal:*" in such a case, the *Predicate* will usually be the emphatic word, not the *Copula.*

[93] See note [87], p. 114.

hear thee:" no one would dispute that the stress is to be laid on the word "three;" and thus much might be indicated to the reader's eye; but if he had nothing else to trust to, he might chance to deliver the passage in such a manner as to be utterly absurd; for it is possible to pronounce the emphatic word "three," in such a tone as to indicate that "since he has but *two* ears, he cannot hear." It would be nearly as hopeless a task to attempt adequately to convey, by any written marks, precise directions as to the *rate*,—the degree of rapidity or slowness,—with which each sentence and clause should be delivered. Longer and shorter pauses may indeed be easily denoted; and marks may be used, similar to those in music, to indicate, generally, quick, slow, or moderate time; but it is evident that the variations which actually take place are infinite;—far beyond what any marks could suggest; and that much of the force of what is said depends on the degree of rapidity with which it is uttered; chiefly on the *relative* rapidity of one part in comparison of another; for instance in such a sentence, as the following in one of the Psalms, which one may usually hear read at one uniform rate; "all men that see it shall say, this hath God done; for they shall perceive that it is his work;" the four words, "this hath God done," though monosyllables, ought to occupy very little less time in utterance than all the rest of the verse put together.

CIRCUITOUSNESS OF THE ARTIFICIAL SYSTEM.

2dly, But were it even possible to bring to the highest perfection the proposed system of marks, it would still be a circuitous road to the desired end. Suppose it could be completely indicated to the eye, in what tone each word and sentence should be pronounced according to the several occasions, the learner might ask, "but *why* should this tone suit the awful,—this, the pathetic, this, the narrative style? *why* is this mode of delivery adopted for a command,—this, for an exhortation,—this, for a supplication?" &c. The only answer that could be given, is, that these tones, emphases, &c. are a part of the language;—that nature, or custom, which is a second nature, suggests, spontaneously, these different modes of giving expression to the different thoughts, feelings, and designs, which are present to the mind of any one who, without study, is speaking in earnest his own sentiments. Then, if this be the case, why not leave nature to do her own work! Impress but the mind fully with the sentiments, &c. to be uttered; withdraw the attention from the sound, and fix it on the sense; and nature, or habit, will spontaneously suggest the proper Delivery. That this will be the case, is not only true, but is the very supposition on which the artificial system proceeds; for it professes to teach the mode of delivery *naturally* adapted to each occasion. It is surely, therefore, a circuitous path that is proposed, when the learner is directed, first to consider how each passage ought to be read; *i.e.* what mode of delivering each part of it would *spon-*

taneously occur to him, if he were attending exclusively to the matter of it; then to observe all the modulations, &c. of voice, which take place in such a Delivery; then, to note these down by established marks, in writing; and, lastly, to pronounce according to these marks. This seems like recommending, for the purpose of raising the hand to the mouth, that he should first observe, when performing that action, without thought of any thing else, what muscles are contracted,—in what degrees,—and in what order; then, that he should note down these observations; and, lastly, that he should, in conformity with these notes, contract each muscle in due degree, and in proper order; to the end that he may be enabled, after all, to—lift his hand to his mouth; which, by supposition, he had already done. Such instruction is like that bestowed by Moliere's pedantic tutor upon his *Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, who was taught, to his infinite surprise and delight, what configurations of the mouth he employed in pronouncing the several letters of the alphabet, which he had been accustomed to utter all his life, without knowing how.[94]

APPEARANCE OF AFFECTATION RESULTING FROM THE ARTIFICIAL SYSTEM.

3dly, Lastly, waiving both the above objections, if a person could learn thus to read and speak, as it were, *by note*, with the same fluency and accuracy as are attainable in the case of singing, still the desired object of a perfectly *natural* as well as correct Elocution, would never be in this way attained. The reader's attention being fixed on his own voice, the inevitable consequence would be that he would betray more or less, his studied and artificial Delivery; and would, in the same degree, manifest an offensive affectation.[95]

NATURAL MANNER.

The practical rule then to be adopted, in conformity with the principles here maintained, is, not only to pay no studied attention to the voice, but studiously to *withdraw* the thoughts from it, and to dwell as intently as possible on the Sense; trusting to nature to suggest spontaneously the proper emphases and tones.[96] He who not

[94] "*Qu'est ce que vous faites quand vous prononcez O? Mais, je dis, O!*"
An answer which, if not savouring of Philosophical analysis, gave at least a good practical solution of the problem.

[95] It should be observed, however, that, in the reading of the Liturgy especially, so many gross faults are become quite familiar to many, from what they are accustomed to hear, if not from their own practice, as to render it peculiarly difficult to unlearn, or even detect them; and as an aid towards the exposure of such faults, there may be great advantage in studying Sheridan's observations and directions respecting the delivery of it; provided care be taken, *in practice*, to keep clear of his faulty principle, by withdrawing the attention from the sound of of the voice, as carefully as he recommends it to be directed to that point.

[96] Many persons are so far impressed with the truth of the doctrine here inculcated, as to acknowledge that "it is a great fault for a reader to be *too much* occupied with thoughts respecting his own voice;" and thus they think to steer a middle course between opposite extremes: but it should be remembered that this middle course entirely nullifies the whole advantage proposed by the plan recommended. A reader is sure to pay *too much*

only understands fully what he is reading, but is earnestly occupying his mind with the matter of it, will be likely to read as if he understood it, and thus, to make others understand it;[97] and in like manner, he who not only feels it, but is exclusively absorbed with that feeling, will be likely to read as if he felt it, and to communicate the impression to his hearers. But this cannot be the case if he is occupied with the thought of what their opinion will be of his reading, and, how his voice ought to be regulated;—if, in short, he is thinking of *himself*, and, of course, in the same degree, abstracting his attention from that which ought to occupy it exclusively.

It is not, indeed, desirable, that in reading the Bible, for example, or any thing which is not intended to appear as his own composition, he should deliver what are, avowedly, another's sentiments, in the same style, as if they were such as arose in his own mind; but it is desirable that he should deliver them as if he were *reporting* another's sentiments, which were both fully understood and felt in all their force by the reporter; and the only way to do this effectually,—with such modulations of voice, &c. as are suitable to each word and passage,—is to fix his mind earnestly on the meaning, and leave nature and habit to suggest the utterance.

Some may, perhaps, suppose that this amounts to the same thing as *taking no pains at all;* and if, with this impression, they attempt to try the experiment of a natural Delivery, their ill-success will probably lead them to censure the proposed method, for the failure resulting from their own mistake. In truth, it is by no means a very easy task, to fix the attention on the meaning, in the manner, and to the degree, now proposed. The thoughts of one who is reading any thing very familiar to him, are apt to wander to *other* subjects, though perhaps such as are connected with that which is before him; if, again, it be something new to him, he is apt (not indeed to wander to *another* subject, but) to get the start, as it were, of his hearers, and to be thinking, while uttering each sentence, not of that, but of the sentence which comes next. And in both cases, if he is careful to avoid those faults, and is desirous of reading well, it is a matter of no small difficulty, and calls for a constant effort, to prevent the mind from wandering in another direction; *viz.* into thoughts respecting his own voice,—respecting the effect produced by each sound,—the approbation he hopes for from the hearers, &c. And this is the prevailing fault of those who are commonly said to take *great pains* in their reading; pains which will always be taken in vain, with a view to the true object to be aimed at, as long as the effort is thus applied in a wrong direction. With a view, indeed, to a very different object,

attention to his voice, not only if he pays *any at all*, but if he does not strenuously *labour to withdraw* his attention from it altogether.

[97] Who, for instance, that was really *thinking* of a resurrection from the dead, would ever tell any one that our Lord "rose *again* from the dead," (which is so common a mode of reading the Creed,) as if He had done so more than once?

the approbation bestowed on the reading, this artificial delivery will often be more successful than the natural. Pompous spouting, and many other descriptions of unnatural tone and measured cadence, are frequently admired by many as excellent reading; which admiration is itself a proof that it is not deserved; for when the Delivery *is really* good, the hearers (except any one who may deliberately set himself to observe and criticise,) never think about it, but are exclusively occupied with the sense it conveys, and the feelings it excites.

ADVANTAGES OF IMITATION AND OF PRACTICE PRECLUDED BY THE ADOPTION OF THE NATURAL MANNER.

Still more to increase the difficulty of the method here recommended, (for it is no less wise than honest to take a fair view of difficulties) this circumstance is to be noticed, that he who is endeavouring to bring it into practice, is in a great degree precluded from the advantages of *imitation*. A person who hears and approves a good *reader in the Natural manner*, may, indeed, so far imitate him with advantage, as to *adopt his plan*, of fixing his attention on the matter, and not thinking about his voice; but this very plan, evidently by its nature, precludes any further imitation; for if, while reading, he is thinking of copying the manner of his model, he will, for that very reason, be unlike that model; the main principle of the proposed method being, carefully to exclude every such thought. Whereas, any artificial system may as easily be learned by imitation as the notes of a song. Practice also, (*i.e.* private practice for the sake of learning,) is much more difficult in the proposed method; because the rule being to use such a Delivery as is suited, not only to the *matter* of what is said, but also, of course, to the *place*, and *occasion*, and this, not by any studied modulations, but according to the spontaneous suggestions of the matter, place, and occasion, to one whose mind is fully and exclusively occupied with these, it follows, that he who would practise this method in *private*, must, by a strong effort of a vivid imagination, figure to himself a place and an occasion which are not present; otherwise, he will either be *thinking of his Delivery*, (which is fatal to his proposed object,) or else will use a Delivery suited to the situation in which he actually *is*, and not, to that for which he would prepare himself. Any system, on the contrary, of studied emphasis and regulation of the voice, may be learned in private practice, as easily as singing.

Some additional objections to the method recommended, and some further remarks on the counter-balancing advantages of it, will be introduced presently, when we shall have first offered some observations on *Speaking*, and on that branch of Reading which the most nearly approaches to it.

When any one delivers a written composition, of which he is, or is supposed to profess himself the author, he has peculiar difficulties to

encounter,[98] if his object be to approach as nearly as possible to the extemporaneous style. It is indeed impossible to produce the *full* effect of that style, while the audience are aware that the words he utters are before him: but he may approach indefinitely near to such an effect; and in proportion as he succeeds in this object, the impression produced will be the greater. It has been already remarked, how easy it is for the hearers to keep up their attention,—indeed, how difficult for them to withdraw it,—when they are addressed by one who is *really speaking* to them in a natural and earnest manner; though perhaps the discourse may be incumbered with a good deal of the repetition, awkwardness of expression, and other faults incident to extemporaneous language; and though it be prolonged for an hour or two, and yet contain no more matter than a good *writer* could have clearly expressed in a discourse of half an hour; which last, if read to them, would not, without some effort on their part, have so fully detained their attention. The advantage in point of Style, Arrangement, &c. of written, over extemporaneous discourses, (such at least as any but the most accomplished orators can produce,) is sufficiently evident:[99] and it is evident also that other advantages, such as have been just

[98] It must be admitted, however, that the difficulty of reading the Liturgy with spirit, and even with propriety, is something peculiar, on account of (what has been already remarked) the inveterate and long-established faults to which almost every one's ears are become familiar; so that such a delivery as would shock any one of even moderate taste, in any other composition, he will, in this, be likely to tolerate, and to practise. Some, *e.g.* in the Liturgy, read, "have mercy *upon* us, miserable sinners;" and others, "have mercy upon *us*, miserable sinners;" both, laying the stress on a wrong word, and making the pause in the wrong place, so as to disconnect "us" and "miserable sinners," which the context requires us to combine. Every one, in expressing his own natural sentiments, would say "have *mercy*, upon us-miserable-sinners."

Many are apt even to commit so gross an error, as to lay the chief stress on the words which denote the *most important things;* without any consideration of the emphatic *word* of each sentence: *e g.* in the Absolution many read, "let us beseech Him to grant us *true repentance;*" because "forsooth true repentance" is an important thing; not considering that, as it has been just mentioned, it is not the *new idea*, to which the attention should be directed by the emphasis; the sense being, that since God pardoneth all that have true repentance, therefore, we should "beseech Him to *grant* it to *us.*"

In addition to the other difficulties of reading the Liturgy well, it should be mentioned, that prayer, thanksgiving, and the like, even when avowedly not of our own composition, should be delivered as (what in truth they ought to *be*,) the genuine sentiments of our own minds at the moment of utterance; which is not the case with the Scriptures, or with any thing else that is read, not professing to be the speaker's own composition.

[99] Practice in public speaking, generally, —practice in speaking on the particular subject in hand,—and (on each occasion) premeditation of the matter and arrangement, are, all, circumstances of great consequence to a speaker. Nothing but a *miraculous gift* can supersede these advantages. The Apostles accordingly were forbidden *to use any premeditation*, being assured that "it should be *given* them, in that same hour, what they should say:" and when they found, in effect, this promise fulfilled to them, they had experience, within themselves, of a sensible miracle. This circumstance may furnish a person of sincerity with a useful test for distinguishing (in his own case) the emotions of a fervid imagination, from actual inspiration. It is evident that an *inspired* preacher can have nothing to gain from practice, or study of any kind: he therefore who finds himself *improve* by practice, either in Argument, Style, or Delivery,—or who observes that he speaks more fluently and better on subjects on which he has been *accustomed* to speak, or better, with *premeditation*, than on a sudden, may indeed deceive his hearers by a pretence to inspiration, but can hardly deceive *himself.*

alluded to, belong to the latter. Which is to be preferred on each occasion, and by each orator, it does not belong to the present discussion to inquire: but it is evidently of the highest importance to *combine*, as far as possible, in each case, the advantages of both. A perfect familiarity with the rules laid down in the first Chapter of this Essay, would be likely, it is hoped, to give the extemporaneous orator that habit of *quickly* methodizing his thoughts on a given subject, which is essential (at least where no very long premeditation is allowed,) to give to a *speech* something of the weight of argument and clearness of arrangement which characterise good Writing.[100] In order to attain the corresponding advantage,—to impart to the delivery of a written discourse something of the vivacity and interesting effect of real, earnest, *speaking*, the plan to be pursued, conformably with the principles we have been maintaining, is, for the reader to draw off his mind as much as possible from the thought that he *is* reading, as well as from thought respecting his own utterance; —to fix his mind as earnestly as possible on the *matter*, and to strive to adopt as his *own*, and as his *own at the moment* of utterance, every sentiment he delivers;—and to *say* it to the audience, in the manner which the occasion and subject spontaneously suggest to him who has abstracted his mind both from all consideration of *himself*, and from the consideration that he is reading.

The advantage of this NATURAL MANNER, (*i.e.* the manner which one naturally falls into who is *really speaking*, in earnest, and with a mind *exclusively* intent on what he has to say,) may be estimated from this consideration; that there are few who do not *speak* so as to give effect to what they are saying: some, indeed, do this much better than others:—some have, in ordinary conversation, an indistinct or incorrect pronunciation,—an embarrassed and hesitating utterance, or a bad choice of words: but hardly any one fails to deliver,[101] (when speaking earnestly,) what he does say, so as to convey the sense and the force of it, much more completely than even a good reader would, if those same words were written down and read. The latter might, indeed, be more *approved;* but that is not the present question; which is, concerning the *impression* made on the hearers' minds. It is not the polish of the blade, that is to be considered, nor the grace with

[100] Accordingly, it may be remarked, that, (contrary to what might at first sight be supposed,) though the preceding Chapters, as well as the present, are intended for general application, yet it is to the *extemporary speaker* that the rules laid down in the former part (supposing them correct,) will be the most peculiarly useful; while the suggestions offered in this last, respecting Elocution, are more especially designed for the use of the *reader*.

[101] There is, indeed, a wide difference between different men, in respect of the degrees of impressiveness with which, in earnest conversation, they deliver their sentiments; but it may safely be laid down, that he who delivers a written composition with the same degree of spirit and energy, with which he would naturally speak on the same subject, has attained, not indeed, necessarily, *absolute* perfection, but the utmost excellence attainable by *him*. Any attempt to out-do his own Natural manner, will inevitably lead to something worse than failure.

which it is brandished, but the keenness of the edge, and the weight of the stroke.

On the contrary, it can hardly be denied that the elocution of most readers, when delivering their own compositions, is such as to convey the notion, at the very best, not that the preacher is expressing his own sentiments, but that he is making known to his audience what is written in the book before him: and, whether the composition is professedly the reader's own, or not, the usual mode of delivery, though grave and decent, is so remote from the energetic style of real Natural Speech, as to furnish, if one may so speak, a kind of running comment on all that is uttered, which says, "I do not mean, think, or feel, all this; I only mean to recite it with propriety and decorum:" and what is usually called *fine* Reading, only superadds to this, (as has been above remarked,) a kind of admonition to the hearers, that *they* ought to believe, to feel, and to admire, what is read.

It is easy to anticipate an objection which many will urge against, what they will call, a *colloquial* style of delivery; *viz.* that it is indecorous, and unsuitable to the solemnity of a serious, and especially, of a Religious discourse. The objection is founded on a mistake. Those who urge it, derive all their notions of a Natural Delivery from two, irrelevant, instances; that of ordinary conversation, the usual subjects of which, and consequently its usual tone, are comparatively light;—and, that of the coarse and extravagant rant of vulgar fanatical preachers. But to conclude that the objections against either of these styles, would apply to the Natural Delivery of a man of sense and taste, speaking earnestly, on a serious subject, and on a solemn occasion, or that he would naturally adopt, and is advised to adopt, such a style as those objected to, is no less absurd than if any one, being recommended to walk in a natural and unstudied manner, rather than in a dancing step, (to employ Dr. A. Smith's illustration,) or a formal march, should infer that the natural gait of a clown following the plough, or of a child in its gambols, were proposed as models to be imitated in walking across a room. It is evident, that what is *natural* in one case, or for one person, may be, in a different one, very unnatural. It would not be by any means natural, to an educated and sober-minded man, to speak like an illiterate enthusiast; nor to discourse on the most important matters in the tone of familiar conversation respecting the trifling occurrences of the day. Any one who does but notice the style in which a man of ability, and of good choice of words, and utterance, delivers his sentiments in *private*, when he is, for instance, earnestly and seriously admonishing a friend, —defending the doctrines of Religion,—or speaking on any other grave subject on which he is intent, may easily observe how different his tone is from that of *light* and familiar conversation,—how far from deficient in the decent seriousness which befits the case: even a stranger to the language might guess that he was not engaged in any

frivolous topic: and when an opportunity occurs of observing how he delivers a written discourse, of his own composition, on perhaps the very same, or a similar subject, one may generally perceive how comparatively stiff, languid, and unimpressive is the effect. It may be said, indeed, that a sermon should not be preached before a congregation assembled in a place of worship, in the same style as one would employ in conversing across a table, with equal seriousness, on the same subject: this is undoubtedly true: and it is evident that it has been implied in what has here been said; the Natural manner having been described as accommodated, not only to the *subject* but to the *place*, *occasion*, and all other circumstances: so that he who should *preach* exactly as if he were *speaking in private*, though with the utmost earnestness, on the same subject, would so far be *departing* from the genuine Natural manner; but it may be safely asserted, that even *this* would be by far the less fault of the two. He who appears unmindful, indeed, of the place and occasion, but deeply impressed with the *subject*, and utterly forgetful of himself, would produce a much stronger effect than one, who, going into the opposite extreme, is, indeed, mindful of the place and the occasion, but not fully occupied with the subject, (though he may strive to *appear* so;) being partly engaged in thoughts respecting his own voice. The latter would, indeed, be less likely to incur censure; but the other would produce the deeper impression. The object, however, to be aimed at, (and it is not unattainable,) is to avoid both faults;—to keep the mind impressed both with the matter spoken, and with all the circumstances also of each case, so that the voice may spontaneously accommodate itself to *all*; carefully avoiding all studied modulations, and, in short, all thoughts of *self*, which, in proportion as they intrude, will not fail to diminish the effect.

It must be admitted, indeed, that the different kinds of Natural Delivery of any one, on different subjects and occasions, various as they are, do yet bear a much greater resemblance to each other, than any of them does to the Artificial style usually employed in reading: a proof of which is, that a person familiarly acquainted with the Speaker, will seldom fail to *recognise his voice*, amidst all the variations of it, when he is *speaking* naturally and earnestly; though it will often happen that, if he have never before heard him *read*, he will be at a loss, when he happens accidentally to hear without seeing him, to know who it is that is reading; so widely does the artificial cadence and intonation differ in many instances from the natural. And a consequence of this is, that the Natural manner, however perfect,—however exactly accommodated to the subject, place, and occasion, will, even when these are the most solemn, in some degree *remind* the hearers of the tone of conversation: amidst all the differences that will exist, this one point of resemblance, that of the delivery being unforced and unstudied, will be likely, in some degree,

to strike them. Those who are good judges will perceive at once, and the rest, after being a little accustomed to the Natural manner, that there is not necessarily any thing irreverent or indecorous in it; but that, on the contrary, it conveys the idea of the speaker's being deeply impressed with that which is his proper business. But, for a time, many will be disposed to find fault with such a kind of elocution. But even while this disadvantage continues, a preacher of this kind may be assured that the *doctrine* he delivers is much more forcibly impressed, even on those who censure his style of delivering it, than it could be in the other way. A discourse delivered in this style has been known to elicit the remark, from one of the lower orders, who had never been accustomed to any thing of the kind, that "it was an excellent sermon, and it was great pity it had not been *preached:*" a censure which ought to have been very satisfactory to the preacher: had he employed a pompous spout, or modulated whine, it is probable such an auditor would have admired his *preaching*, but would have known and thought little or nothing about the *matter* of what was taught. Which of the two objects ought to be preferred by a Christian minister, on Christian principles, is a question not hard to decide, but foreign to the present discussion: it is important, however, to remark, that an orator is bound, as such, not merely on moral, but, if such an expression may be used, on *rhetorical* principles, to be mainly, and indeed exclusively, intent on *carrying his point;* not, on gaining approbation, or even avoiding censure, except with a view to that point. He should, as it were, adopt as a motto, the reply of Themistocles to the Spartan commander, Eurybiades, who lifted his staff to chastise the earnestness with which his own opinion was controverted: "Strike, but hear me."

Besides the inconvenience just mentioned,—the censure to which the proposed style of elocution will be liable from perhaps the majority of hearers, till they shall have become somewhat accustomed to it,—this circumstance also ought to be mentioned, among what many, perhaps, would reckon, (or at least *feel*,) as the disadvantages of it, that, after all, even when no disapprobation is incurred, no praise will be bestowed, (except by observant critics,) on a truly Natural Delivery: on the contrary, the more perfect it is, the more will it withdraw, from itself, to the arguments and sentiments delivered, the attention of all but those who are studiously directing their view to the mode of utterance, with a design to criticise or to learn. The credit, on the contrary, of having a very fine elocution, is to be obtained at the expense of a very moderate share of pains; though at the expense also, inevitably, of much of the force of what is said.

One inconvenience, which will at first be experienced by a person who, after having been long accustomed to the Artificial Delivery, begins to adopt the Natural, is, that he will be likely suddenly to feel an embarrassed, bashful, and, as it is frequently called, *nervous*

sensation, to which he had before been comparatively a stranger. He will find himself in a new situation,—standing before his audience in a different character—stripped, as it were, of the sheltering veil of a conventional and Artificial Delivery;—in short, delivering to them his thoughts, as one man *speaking to* other men; not, as before, merely *reading in public.* And he will feel that he attracts a much greater share of their attention, not only by the novelty of a manner to which most congregations are little accustomed, but also, (even supposing them to have been accustomed to extemporary discourses,) from their perceiving themselves to be personally *addressed*, and feeling that he is not merely reciting something *before* them, but saying it *to* them. The speaker and the hearers will thus be brought into a new, and closer relation to each other: and the increased interest thus excited in the audience, will cause the speaker to feel himself in a different situation,—in one which is a greater trial of his confidence, and which renders it more difficult than before to withdraw his attention from himself. It is hardly necessary to observe that this very change of feelings experienced by the speaker, ought to convince him the more, if the causes of it (to which we have just alluded,) be attentively considered, how much greater impression this manner is likely to produce. As he will be likely to feel much of the bashfulness which a really extemporary speaker has to struggle against, so, he may produce much of a similar effect.

After all, however, the effect will never be completely the same. A composition delivered from writing, and one actually extemporaneous, will always produce feelings, both in the hearer and the speaker, considerably different; even on the supposition of their being word for word the same, and delivered so exactly in the same tone, that by the ear alone no difference could be detected: still the audience will be differently affected, according to their knowledge that the words uttered, are, or are not, written down and before the speaker's eyes: and the consciousness of this, will produce a corresponding effect on the mind of the speaker. For were this not so, any one who, on any subject, can speak (as many can,) fluently and correctly in private conversation, would find no greater difficulty in saying the same things before a large congregation, than in reading to them a written discourse.

And here it may be worth while briefly to inquire into the causes of that remarkable phenomenon, as it may justly be accounted, that a person who is able with facility to express his sentiments in private to a friend, in such language, and in such a manner, as would be perfectly suitable to a certain audience, yet finds it extremely difficult to address to that audience the very same words, in the same manner; and is, in many instances, either completely struck dumb, or greatly embarrassed, when he attempts it.[102] It cannot be from any superior

[102] Most persons are so *familiar* with the fact, as hardly to have ever considered that it requires explanation: but attentive consideration shows it to be a very curious, as well as important one.

deference which he thinks it right to feel for their judgment; for it will often happen that the single friend, to whom he is able to speak fluently, shall be one whose good opinion he more values, and to whose wisdom he is more disposed to look up, than that of all the others together. The speaker may even feel that he himself has a decided and acknowledged superiority over every one of the audience; and that he should not be the least abashed in addressing any two or three of them, separately; yet still all of them, collectively, will often inspire him with a kind of dread.

Closely allied in its causes with the phenomenon we are considering, is, that other curious fact, that the very same sentiments expressed in the same manner, will often have a far more powerful effect on a large audience than they would have, on any one or two of these very persons, separately. That is in a great degree true of all men, which was said of the Athenians, that they were like sheep, of which a flock is more easily driven than a single one.

Another remarkable circumstance, connected with the foregoing, is the difference in respect of the style which is suitable, respectively, in addressing a multitude, and two or three even of the same persons. A much *bolder*, as well as less accurate, kind of language is both allowable and advisable, in speaking to a considerable number; as Aristotle has remarked,[103] in speaking of the *Graphic* and *Agonistic* styles,—the former suited to the closet, the latter to public speaking before a large assembly. And he ingeniously compares them to the different styles of painting; the greater the crowd, he says, the more distant is the view; so that in scene-painting, for instance, coarser and bolder touches are required, and the nice finish, which would delight a close spectator, would be lost. He does not, however, account for the phenomena in question.

The solution of them will be found by attention to a very curious and complex play of sympathies which takes place in a large assembly; and, (within certain limits,) the more, in proportion to its numbers. First, it is to be observed that we are disposed to sympathize with any emotion which we believe to exist in the mind of any one present; and hence, if we are at the same time otherwise disposed to feel that emotion, such disposition is in consequence heightened. In the next place, we not only ourselves feel this tendency, but we are sensible that others do the same; and thus, we sympathize not only with the other emotions of the rest, but also, with their sympathy towards us. Any emotion accordingly which we feel, is still further heightened by the knowledge that there are others present who not only feel the same, but feel it the more strongly in consequence of their sympathy with ourselves. Lastly, we are sensible that those around us sympathize not only with ourselves, but with each other also; and as we

[103] *Rhetoric*, Book III.

enter into this heightened feeling of theirs likewise, the stimulus to our own minds is thereby still further increased.

The case of the *Ludicrous* affords the most obvious illustration of these principles, from the circumstance that the effects produced are so open and palpable. If any thing of this nature occurs, a man is disposed, by the character of the thing itself, to laugh: but much more, if any one else is known to be present whom he thinks likely to be diverted with it; even though that other should not know of the presence of the first; but much more still, if he does know it; because his companion is then aware that sympathy with his own emotion heightens that of the other: and most of all will the disposition to laugh be increased, if many are present, because each is then aware that they all sympathize with each other, as well as with himself. It is hardly necessary to mention the exact correspondence of the fact with the above explanation. So important, in this case, is the operation of the causes here noticed, that hardly any one ever laughs when he is quite alone: or if he does, he will find on consideration, that it is from a *conception* of the presence of some companion whom he thinks likely to have been amused, had he been present, and to whom he thinks of describing, or repeating, what had diverted himself. Indeed, in other cases, as well as the one just instanced, almost every one is aware of the *infectious* nature of any emotion excited in a large assembly. It may be compared to the increase of sound by a number of echoes, or of light, by a number of mirrors; or to the blaze of a heap of firebrands, each of which would have speedily gone out, if kindled separately, but which, when thrown together, help to kindle each other.

The application of what has been said to the case before us, is sufficiently obvious. The speaker who is addressing a large assembly, knows that each of them sympathizes both with his own anxiety to acquit himself well, and also with the same feeling in the minds of the rest. He knows also, that every slip he may be guilty of, that may tend to excite ridicule, pity, disgust, &c. makes the stronger impression on each of the hearers, from their mutual sympathy, and their consciousness of it. This augments his anxiety. Next, he knows that each hearer, putting himself, mentally, in the speaker's place,[104] sympathizes with this augmented anxiety; which is by this thought increased still further. And if he becomes at all embarrassed, the knowledge that there are so many to sympathize, not only with that embarrassment, but also with each other's feelings, on the perception of it, heightens the speaker's confusion to the utmost.

The same causes will account for a skilful orator's being able to rouse so much more easily, and more powerfully, the passions of a *multitude:* they inflame each other by mutual sympathy, and mutual

104 Hence it is that *shy* persons are, as is matter of common remark, the more distressed by this infirmity when in company with those who are subject to the same.

consciousness of it. And hence it is that a bolder kind of language is suitable to such an audience: a passage which, in the closet, might just at the first glance tend to excite awe, compassion, indignation, or any other such emotion, but which would, on a moment's cool reflection, appear extravagant, may be very suitable for the *Agonistic* Style; because before that moment's reflection could take place in each hearer's mind, he would be aware that every one around him sympathized in that first emotion; which would thus become so much heightened as to preclude, in a great degree, the ingress of any counteracting sentiment.

If one could suppose such a case as that of a speaker, (himself aware of the circumstances,) addressing a multitude, each of whom believed himself to be the *sole* hearer, it is probable that little or no embarrassment would be felt, and a much more sober, calm, and finished style of language would be adopted.

The impossibility of bringing the delivery of a written composition *completely* to a level with real extemporary speaking, (though, as has been said, it may approach indefinitely near to such an effect,) is explained on the same principle. Besides that the audience are more sure that the thoughts they hear expressed, are the genuine emanation of the speaker's mind at the moment, their attention and interest are the more excited by their sympathy with one whom they perceive to be carried forward solely by his own unaided and unremitted efforts, without having any book to refer to: they view him as a swimmer supported by his own constant exertions; and in every such case, if the feat be well accomplished, the *surmounting of the difficulty* affords great gratification; especially to those who are conscious that they could not do the same. And one proof, that part of the pleasure conveyed does arise from this source, is, that as the spectators of an exhibition of supposed unusual skill in swimming, would instantly withdraw most of their interest and admiration, if they perceived that the performer was supported by corks, or the like; so would the feelings alter of the hearers of a supposed extemporaneous discourse, as soon as they should perceive, or even suspect, that the orator had it written down before him.

The way in which the respective inconveniences of both kinds of discourses may best be avoided, is evident from what has been already said. Let both the extemporary Speaker, and the Reader of his own composition, study to avoid, as far as possible, all thoughts of *self*, earnestly fixing the mind on the matter of what is delivered; and the one will feel the less of that embarrassment which arises from the thought of what opinion the hearers will form of him; while the other will appear to be speaking, because he actually *will be* speaking, the sentiments, not indeed which at that time first *arise* in his own mind, but, which are then really *present* to, and occupy his mind.

One of the consequences of the adoption of the mode of elocution

here recommended, is that he who endeavours to employ it will find a growing reluctance to the delivery, as his own, of any but his own compositions. Doctrines, indeed, and arguments he will freely borrow; but he will be led to compose his own discourses, from finding that he cannot deliver those of another to his own satisfaction, without laboriously studying them, as an actor does his part, so as to *make* them, in some measure, his own. And with this view, he will generally find it advisable to introduce many alterations in the expression, not with any thought of improving the style, *absolutely*, but only with a view to his *own delivery*. And indeed, even his own *former* compositions, he will be led to alter, almost as much, in point of expression, in order to accommodate them to the Natural manner of delivery.[105] Much that would please in the closet,—much of the *Graphic* style described by Aristotle, will be laid aside for the *Agonistic*;—for a style somewhat more blunt and homely,—more simple and, apparently, unstudied in its structure, and, at the same time, more daringly energetic. And if again he is desirous of fitting his discourses for the press, he will find it expedient to reverse this process, and alter the style afresh. A mere *sermon-reader*, on the contrary, will avoid this inconvenience, and this labour; he will be able to preach another's discourses nearly as well as his own; and may send his own to the press, without the necessity of any great preparation: but to these advantages he will sacrifice more than half the force which might have been given to the sentiments uttered. And he will have no right to complain that his discourses, though replete perhaps with good sense, learning, and eloquence, are received with languid apathy, or that many are seduced from their attendance on his teaching, by the vapid rant of an illiterate fanatic. Much of these evils must, indeed, be expected, after all, to remain: but he does not give himself a fair chance for diminishing them, unless he does justice to his own arguments, instructions, and exhortations, by *speaking* them, in the only effectual way, to the hearts of his hearers, that is, as uttered naturally *from* his own.[106]

[105] In many instances, accordingly, the perusal of a manuscript sermon would afford, from the observation of its style, a tolerably good ground of conjecture as to the author's customary elocution.

[106] The principles here laid down may help to explain a remarkable fact, which is usually attributed to other than the true causes. The powerful effects often produced by some fanatical preachers, not superior in pious and sincere zeal, and inferior in learning, in good sense, and in taste, to men who are listened to with comparative apathy, are frequently considered as proofs of superior *eloquence;* though an eloquence tarnished by barbarism, and extravagant mannerism. But may not such effects result, not from any superior powers in the preacher, but merely from the intrinsic beauty and sublimity, and the measureless importance of the *subject?* Why then, it may be replied, does not the other preacher, whose subject is the same, produce the same effect? The answer is, because he is but *half-attended to*. The ordinary measured cadence of reading, is not only in itself dull, but is what men are *familiarly* accustomed to: Religion itself also, is a subject so *familiar*, in a certain sense, (familiar, that is, to the *ear*,) as to be *trite*, even to those who *know* and *think* little about it. Let but the attention be thoroughly roused, and intently fixed on such a stupendous subject, and that subject itself will produce the most overpowering emotion. And not

One important practical maxim resulting from the views here taken, is the decided condemnation of all *recitation of speeches* by schoolboys; a practice so much approved and recommended by many, with a view to preparing youths for public Speaking in after-life. It is to be condemned, however, (supposing the foregoing principle correct,) not as useless merely, but absolutely pernicious, with a view to that object. The *justness*, indeed, of this opinion will, doubtless, be disputed; but its *consistency* with the plan we have been recommending, is almost too obvious to be insisted on. In any one who should think a Natural Delivery desirable, it would be an obvious absurdity to think of attaining it by practising that which is the most completely artificial. If there is, as is evident, much difficulty to be surmounted, even by one who is delivering, on a serious occasion, his own composition, before he can completely succeed in abstracting his mind from all thoughts of his own voice,—of the judgment of the audience on his performance, &c. and in fixing it on the Matter, Occasion, and Place, —on every circumstance which *ought* to give the character to his elocution,—how much must this difficulty be enhanced, when neither the sentiments he is to utter, nor the character he is to assume, are his own, or even supposed to be so, or in anywise connected with him:— when neither the place, the occasion, nor the audience, which are *actually present*, have any thing to do with the substance of what is said. It is therefore almost inevitable, that he will studiously form to himself an Artificial manner;[107] which, especially if he succeeds in it, will probably cling to him through life, even when he is delivering his own compositions on real occasions. The very best that can be expected, is, that he should become an accomplished *actor*,—possessing the plastic power of putting himself, in imagination, so completely into the situation of him whom he personates, and of adopting, for the moment, so perfectly, all the sentiments and views of that character, as to express himself exactly as such a person would have done, in the supposed situation. Few are likely to attain such perfection; but he who shall have succeeded in accomplishing this, will have taken a most circuitous rout to his proposed object, if that object be, not to

only unaffected earnestness of manner, but, perhaps, even still more, any uncouth oddity, and even ridiculous extravagance, will, by the stimulus of *novelty*, have the effect of thus rousing the hearers from their ordinary lethargy. So that a preacher of little or no real eloquence, will sometimes, *on such a subject*, produce the effects of the greatest eloquence, by merely forcing the hearers (often, even by the excessively glaring *faults* of his style and delivery,) to *attend*, to a subject which no one can *really* attend to unmoved.

It will not of course be supposed that our intention is to *recommend* the adoption of extravagant rant. The good effects which it undoubtedly does sometimes produce, incidentally, in some, is more than counterbalanced by the mischievous consequences to others.

[107] Some have used the expression of "a *conscious* manner," to denote that which results, either in conversation,—in the ordinary actions of life,—or in public Speaking, from the anxious attention which some persons feel to the opinion which the company may form of them;— a *consciousness* of being watched and scrutinized in every word and gesture, together with an extreme anxiety for approbation, and dread of censure.

qualify himself for the stage, but to deliver in public, on real and important occasions, his own sentiments. He will have been carefully learning to *assume*, what, when the real occasion occurs, need not be assumed, but only *expressed*. Nothing surely can be more preposterous than labouring to acquire the art of *pretending* to be, what he is *not*, and, to feel, what he does not feel, in order that he may be enabled, on a real emergency, to *pretend* to be and to feel just what the occasion itself requires and suggests.[108]

Let all studied recitation, therefore,—every kind of speaking which, from its nature, must necessarily be artificial,—be carefully avoided, by one whose object is to attain the only truly impressive,—the Natural Delivery.[109]

The last circumstances to be noticed among the results of the mode of delivery recommended, is, that the speaker will find it much easier, in this Natural manner, to *make himself heard:* he will be heard, that is, much more distinctly,—at a greater distance,—and with far less exertion and fatigue to himself. This is the more necessary to be mentioned, because it is a common, if not a prevailing opinion, that the reverse of this is the fact. There are not a few who assign as a reason for their adoption of a certain unnatural tone and measured cadence, that it is necessary, in order to be heard by a large congregation. But though such an artificial voice and utterance will often appear to produce a *louder sound*, (which is the circumstance that probably deceives such persons,) yet a natural voice and delivery, provided it be clear, though it be less laboured, and may even seem low to those who are near at hand, will be distinctly heard at a much greater distance. The only decisive proof of this must be sought in experience; which will not fail to convince of the truth of the assertion any one who will fairly make the trial.

The requisite degree of loudness will be best obtained, conformably with the principles here inculcated, not by thinking about the voice, but by *looking* at the most *distant* of the hearers, and addressing one's self especially to him. The voice rises *spontaneously*, when we are speaking to a person who is not very near.

And that the organs of voice are much less strained and fatigued by the Natural action which takes place in real speaking, than by any other, (besides that it is, what might be expected, *a priori*,) is evident

[108] The Barmecide, in the *Arabian Nights*, who amused himself by setting down his guest to an imaginary feast, and trying his skill in imitating, at an empty table, the actions of eating and drinking, did not propose this as an advisable mode of instructing him how to perform those actions in reality.

[109] It should be observed, that the censure here pronounced on school-recitations, and all exercises of the like nature, relates, exclusively, to the effect produced on the style of *Elocution*. With any other objects that may be proposed, the present argument has, obviously, no concern. Nor can it be doubted that a familiarity with the purest forms of the Latin and Greek languages, may be greatly promoted by committing to memory, and studying, not only to understand, but to recite with propriety, the best orations and plays in those languages. But let no one seek to attain a natural, simple, and forcible *Elocution*, by a practice which, the more he applies to it, will carry him still the farther from the object he aims at.

from daily experience. An extemporary Speaker will usually be much less exhausted in two hours, than an elaborate reciter, (though less distinctly heard,) will be, in one. Even the ordinary tone of *reading* aloud is so much more fatiguing than that of conversation, that feeble patients are frequently unable to continue it for a quarter of an hour without great exhaustion; even though they may feel no inconvenience from *talking*, with few or no pauses, and in no lower voice, for more than double that time.

He then who shall determine to aim at the Natural manner, though he will have to contend with considerable difficulties and discouragements, will not be without corresponding advantages in the course he is pursuing. He will be at first, indeed, repressed to a greater degree than another, by emotions of bashfulness; but it will be more speedily and more completely subdued: the very system pursued, since it forbids all thoughts of *self*, striking at the root of the evil. He will, indeed, on the outset, incur censure, not only critical but moral;—he will be blamed for using a *colloquial* delivery; and the censure will very likely be, as far as relates to his earliest efforts, not wholly undeserved; his manner will probably at first too much resemble that of conversation, though of serious and earnest conversation: but by perseverance he may be sure of avoiding deserved, and of mitigating, and ultimately overcoming, undeserved, censure. He will, indeed, never be praised for a very fine delivery; but his matter will not lose the approbation it may deserve; as he will be the more sure of being heard and attended to. He will not, indeed, meet with many who can be regarded as models of the Natural manner; and those he does meet with, he will be precluded, by the nature of the system, from minutely imitating; but he will have the advantage of carrying within him an INFALLIBLE GUIDE, as long as he is careful to follow the suggestions of nature, abstaining from all thoughts respecting his own utterance, and fixing his mind intensely on the business he is engaged in. And though he must not expect to attain perfection at once, he may be assured that, while he steadily adheres to this plan, he is in the right road to it; instead of becoming, as on the other plan, more and more artificial, the longer he studies: and every advance he makes will produce a proportional effect: it will give him more and more of that hold on the attention, the understanding, and the feelings, of the audience, which no studied modulation can ever attain. And though others may be more successful in escaping censure, and insuring admiration, he will far more surpass them, in respect of the proper object of the Orator, which is, *to carry his point.*

Much need not be said on the subject of *Action*, which is at present so little approved, or, designedly, employed, in this country, that it is hardly to be reckoned as any part of the Orator's art.

Action, however, seems to be natural to man, when speaking earnestly: but the state of the case at present seems to be. that the

disgust excited, on the one hand, by awkward and ungraceful motions, and, on the other, by studied gesticulations, has led to the general disuse of Action altogether; and has induced men to form the habit (for it certainly *is* a *formed* habit) of keeping themselves quite still, or nearly so, when speaking. This is supposed to be, and perhaps is, the more rational and dignified way of speaking: but so strong is the tendency to indicate strong internal emotion by some kind of outward gesture, that those who do not encourage or allow themselves in any, frequently fall unconsciously into some awkward trick of swinging the body,[110] folding a paper, twisting a string, or the like. But when any one is reading, or even speaking, in the Artificial manner, there is little or nothing of this tendency; precisely, because the mind is *not* occupied by that strong internal emotion which occasions it. And the prevalence of this manner may reasonably be conjectured to have led to the disuse of all gesticulation, even in extemporary speakers; because if any one, whose delivery is artificial, does use action, it will of course be, like his voice, studied and artificial; and savouring still more of disgusting affectation, from the circumstance that it evidently might be entirely omitted.[111] And hence, the practice came to be generally disapproved, and exploded.

It need only be observed, that in conformity with the principles maintained throughout this Chapter, no *care* should, in any case, be taken to use graceful or appropriate action; which, if not perfectly unstudied, will always be (as has been just remarked,) intolerable. But if any one spontaneously falls into any gestures that are unbecoming, care should *then* be taken to break the habit; and that, not only in public speaking, but on all occasions. The case, indeed, is the same with utterance: if any one has, in common discourse, an indistinct, hesitating, dialectic, or otherwise faulty, delivery, *his* Natural manner certainly is not what he should adopt in public speaking; but he should endeavour, by care, to remedy the defect, not in public speaking only, but in ordinary conversation also. And so also, with respect to attitudes and gestures. It is in these points, principally, if not exclusively, that the remarks of an intelligent friend will be beneficial.

If, again, any one finds himself naturally and spontaneously led to use, in speaking, a moderate degree of action, which he finds from the observation of others, not to be ungraceful or inappropriate, there is no reason that he should study to repress this tendency.

It would be inconsistent with the principle just laid down, to deliver any *precepts* for gesture; because the *observance* of even the best

[110] Of one of the ancient Roman Orators it was satirically remarked, (on account of his having this habit,) that he must have learned to speak *in a boat*. Of some other Orators whose favourite action is rising on tiptoe, it would perhaps have been said, that they had been accustomed to address their audience over a high wall.

[111] ——*Gratas inter mensas symphonia discors,*
Et crassum unguentum, et Sardo cum melle papaver
Offendunt; poterat duci quia cœna sine istis.
Horace, *Ars Poet.*

conceivable precepts, would, by destroying the natural appearance, be fatal to their object: but there is a *remark*, which is worthy of attention, from the illustration it affords of the erroneousness, in detail, as well as in principle, of the ordinary systems of instruction in this point. Boys are generally taught to employ the prescribed action either *after*, or *during* the utterance of the words it is to enforce. The best and most appropriate action, must, from this circumstance alone, necessarily appear a feeble affectation. It suggests the idea of a person speaking to those who do not fully understand the language, and striving by signs to explain the meaning of what he has been saying. The very same gesture, had it come at the proper, that is, the *natural*, point of time, might perhaps have added greatly to the effect; *viz.* had it *preceded* somewhat the utterance of the words. *That* is always the natural order of action. An emotion,[112] struggling for utterance, produces a tendency to a bodily gesture, to express that emotion more *quickly* than *words* can be framed; the words follow, as soon as they *can* be spoken. And this being always the case with a real, earnest, unstudied speaker, this mode of placing the action foremost, gives (if it be otherwise appropriate,) the appearance of earnest emotion actually present in the mind. And the reverse of this natural order would alone be sufficient to convert the action of Demosthenes himself into unsuccessful and ridiculous mimicry.

[112] *Format enim Natura priùs nos intus ad omnem*
Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad iram;
Aut ad humum mœrore gravi deducit, et angit;
Pòst *effert animi motus interprete linguâ.*
Horace. *Ars Poet.*

INDEX.*

Abstract terms. 77.
Action, 137.
Advantages of written extemporaneous discourses, 125.
Agonistic Style, 131, 134.
Allegory, 30.
Analogy, 27.
Antecedent-Probability, 32.
Antiquated words, bad, 86.
Antithesis, 104, 107.
Appeals to the Passions, 47, 66.
Argumentative Composition, 3.
Arguments à posteriori, 18.
——— à Priori, 16, 18.
——— Arrangement of, 12, 31, 43.
——— from Contraries, 28.
——— Division of, 13.
——— from Progressive approach, 24.
——— Invention of, 11.
——— Object of, 31.
Argumentative Composition contemplated, 3.
Aristotle, 4.
Artificial Style of Elocution, 116.
Assertion, 13.
Audience, conciliation of, 58.

Bashfulness, 130.
Beauty of Style, 107.
Bentham, 56.
Blair, Dr, 5.
Brevity of Style, 90.
Burke, Edmund, 94.

Campbell, Dr., 5.
Cause and Effect, 18.
Cicero, 4.
Climax, 52.
Colloquial Style, 127.
Comparison, 33, 52, 80.
Complex Sentences, 101.
Conciseness, 91, 93.
Construction of Sentences, 70.
Conviction, 11.
Copiousness, 97.

Destructive Conditional, 41.
Diffidence, 130.

Elegance of Style, 107.
Elocution, 113.
——— Artificial, 116.
——— Natural, 122.
Emotions, excitement of, 51.
Emphatic words, 99.
Energy of Style, 76.
Enunciation, 113.
Epithets, 84.
Evidences of our Religion, 35.
Example, 18, 25, 29.
Examples discriminated, 31.
Exhortation, 46.
Exordium, 44.
Experience, 27, 64.

Fable, 30.
Fable and Tale, 30.
Feeling in the speaker, Tone of, 54.
Fictitious Examples, 39.
Figures of Speech, 77.
Fine Reading, 114, 127.
Fine Writing, 76.
Foreign words, 86.

General rules, 1.
General terms, 77.
Gesture, 138.
Good Reading, 116.
Good will, essential to the orator's character, 62.
Graphic Style, 131, 134.

Hard Words, 69.

* The author of the Treatise on RHETORIC is not accountable for the contents of this INDEX.—EDITOR ENCY. MET.

Illustration, 80.
Imitative sound of words, 86.
Indirect reasoning, 40.
Induction, 26.
Inferring, province of, 3.
Interrogative form, 107.
——— Johnson, Dr., 95.
Introduction, Inquisitive, 44.
——————— Paradoxical, 44.
——————— Corrective, 45.
——————— Preparatory, 45.
Irrelevant Conclusion, 55.
"It," use of the word, 100.

Litany, reading of the, 125.
Liturgy, Sheridan's instructions for reading the, 118.
Logic an off-shoot of Rhetoric, 6.
Long sentences, 70.
Loose sentences, 102.
Ludicrous, the, 132.

Matters of opinion, 32.
Metaphor, 79, 84.
Metonymy, 81.
Mixed Metaphors, 80.
Mock-antithesis, 106.

Natural manner of Reading, 122.
New coined words, 86.

Obscurity of Style, 72.

Paley, (Horæ Paulinæ,) 31.
Parity of Reasoning, 29.
Party Spirit, 61.
Period, 101, 104.
Periodic Style, 101, 104.
Personification, 82.
Perspicuity of Style, 67.
Persuasion, 46.
Plain, an ambiguous word, 70.
Plausible, the, 16, 17.
Pleonasm, 93.
Poetical Style, 84, 109.
Poetry, its characteristics, 110.
Probable, the, 17.
Proem, 44.
Proof, 20.
Proper terms, 77.
Proposition, 13.
Prose and Poetry, difference between, 110.
Prosopopœia, 82.

Proving, province of, 3.

Quinctilian, 2, 5.

Reading, 114, 118.
Reading, Sheridan's Art of, 118.
Reason, 20.
Reasoning, 3, 39.
Recitation of speeches by schoolboys pernicious, 135.
Refutation, 38, 43.
Repetition, 68.
Resemblances, which most striking, 30.
Rhetoric, account of, 4.
———— early perfection of, 4.
———— decline of, 6.
———————— definition of, 1.
———————— progress of the term, 1.
———————— province of, 2, 3.
———————— utility of, 7, 9.
Rhetorical skill, 60.
———————————— various estimate of, 7.

Saxon words, 69.
Sentences, Construction of, 70.
Sheridan, Dr., 118.
Sign, 18
Simile, 80.
Simple Sentences, 101.
Sophistry, 71.
Speaking, 114.
Style, 67.
—— for the Vulgar, 70, 75.
—— obscurity of, 70, 73.
—— Suggestive, 96.
Synecdoche, 78.

Talking against time, 73.
Tautology, 93.
Technical language, 88.
Testimony, 21, 25.
Theological Style, 88.
Tone, in reading, its importance, 120.
Tropes, 77.

Verbosity, 91, 92.

Words, Antiquated and New, 86.
——— Choice of, 76.
———— Emphatic, 99.
——— "Hard," 69.
——— Imitative, 86.
——— Natural order of, 98.
——— Number of, 90.
——— Saxon, 69.

THE SCIENCE OF BOTANY.

Just Published, in One Volume crown octavo, 664 pages, very closely printed,

PRICE 12s. 6d. BOUND IN CLOTH,

A MANUAL OF BOTANY,

BEING AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

OF THE

STRUCTURE, PHYSIOLOGY, AND CLASSIFICATION OF PLANTS,

BY

JOHN HUTTON BALFOUR, M.D., F.L.S., F.R.S.E.

Professor of Medicine and Botany in the University of Edinburgh.

ILLUSTRATED BY 831 WOOD ENGRAVINGS.

Contents.

PART 1.—VEGETABLE ANATOMY, ORGANOGRAPHY, AND PHYSIOLOGY. *Chap.* 1. *Elementary Organs, or Vegetable Tissues—a*) Cellular Tissue; *b*) Vascular Tissue. *Chap.* 2. *Compound Organs formed by the Tissues. a*) Organs of Nutrition or Vegetation; *b*) General View of the Functions of the Nutritive Organs; *c*) Organs of Reproduction; *d*) Some General Phenomena connected with Vegetation.

PART 2.—SYSTEMATIC BOTANY, TAXONOMY, OR THE CLASSIFICATION OF PLANTS. *Chap.* 1. *Systems of Classification. Chap.* 2. *Arrangement and Characters of the Classes and Natural Orders.* Section 1. Phanerogamous Plants. Class 1, Dicotyledones or Exogeæ; Class 2, Monocotyledones or Endogenæ. Section 2. Cryptogamous Plants. Class 3, Acotyledones.

PART 3.—GEOGRAPHICAL BOTANY, OR THE DISTRIBUTION OF PLANTS OVER THE GLOBE.

PART 4.—FOSSIL BOTANY.

APPENDIX.—1, On the Use of the Microscope in Botanical Researches. 2, On Collecting and Examining Plants, and on the Formation of a Herbarium.

INDEX AND GLOSSARY.

LONDON:

PUBLISHED BY JOHN J. GRIFFIN AND COMPANY,

53 BAKER-STREET, PORTMAN SQUARE;

AND RICHARD GRIFFIN AND CO. GLASGOW.

1849.

CRITICAL OPINIONS

OF

PROFESSOR BALFOUR'S MANUAL OF BOTANY.

" . . . Perhaps the most masterly digest of the Science which has yet appeared, and, at the same time, one of the most readable. . . . Professor Balfour's Manual will be found of peculiar value. To an amazing amount of fact, condensed into rather more than six hundred closely-printed pages, and illustrated by more than eight hundred woodcuts, it adds the higher philosophy of the science. . . . It is the work of a man to whom Botany has been the passion and study of a lifetime, and who to an intimate acquaintance with what had been previously known, adds much that has been the result of original observation. . . . We have been much interested by the brief but masterly sketch which the work contains of the Fossil Flora." —*Witness, June* 13.

" Dr. Balfour is entitled to great praise for the clear and comprehensive manner in which he has presented the student with this most serviceable Introduction to the Science. The work is admirably arranged. It is fortunate when elementary works are, as in the present instance, the production of competent hands."—*Bentley's Magazine, June.*

" In this Manual we have a succinct view of the Science in all its parts. The work is by a thoroughly practical hand, skilled to guide the student through the preliminary perplexities of the Science. The arrangement is remarkable for clearness; the style is plain and perspicuous; an immense amount and variety of information is condensed into little bulk; and the pages are thickly strewn with illustrative woodcuts. In short, this is the best Introduction, beyond all comparison, which has yet appeared, to the most delightful of all Sciences."—*North British Mail, May* 21.

" An Introductory book of this kind has long been wanted. Hitherto the student has had to seek his knowledge of Physiology from one source, of Classification from a second, of Medical Botany from a third, of Agricultural Chemistry from a fourth, of Botanical Geography from a fifth, and of Geological Botany from a sixth—all equally *expensive* works, and some of them not generally accessible. Thanks to the talent of a zealous and accomplished Botanist and excellent Teacher, and the enterprise of a publishing Firm long identified with the interests of Science, the Elements of all these departments of the study are embodied within the plan of the present work, which is as remarkable for comprehensiveness as for cheapness. . . . . The pages of the book are profusely interspersed with neat illustrative woodcuts. Nothing, in short, is wanting to facilitate the progress of the student."—*Scottish Guardian, May* 11.

" This mere outline of the contents of the volume will show the variety of subjects considered, and the amount of information it contains. It is thus well adapted as a Text-Book for students, and as a work of reference. We can recommend it as a convenient and pleasant Manual to such of our readers as may wish to study the curious phenomena of vegetable life."—*Scotsman, July* 28.

" This book of Dr. Balfour's is a very complete one, much more so than the generality of elementary books. The chapters devoted to the Structure of Plants are particularly well done."—*Atlas, June* 16.

" For a mass of valuable and interesting information—as a monument of industry and research—we can hardly speak too highly of this Manual of Botany."—*Jerrold's Weekly News.*

" The Manual of Professor Balfour is modelled on the celebrated works of Jussieu and Henfrey, adopting the System of De Candolle, but following Walker Arnott in the arrangement and definition of the Natural Orders. The most novel and agreeable portion of its contents is the constant notice which has been introduced of the medical and economical properties of plants, on the unimpeachable authority of Christison, Royle, Burnett, and Lindley. And when we add that nearly 1,000 of the most beautiful woodcuts of 'Jussieu's Cours Elementaire,' 'Beudant's Geology,' and the works of Raspail, St. Hilaire, Schleiden, Amici, and Maout are employed in the illustration of the text, we believe that we certify to the unwonted value of the information contained in this epitome. . . . . Now for the fruits, and we have done sufficient justice to this rare and most readable work of the whole botanic library—for we have gleaned a full and fair example of its varied, interesting, and instructive contents. It is not a mere System; it is a Philosophy of Botany, to which the Systematic part serves subordinately the office of an Index. Well, to have done then for good and all. The fruit—ah! reader, does not thy mouth water?—the fruit is the matured pistil, and that is all. We need not tell some people what are acorns, nor others what are pistachio nuts; but assuredly, whoever wants to know all the rest, with the least possible trouble, and within the most limited extent of verbiage, will not fail to consult Professor Balfour's model Manual of Botany."—*Tait's Magazine, July*, 1849.

" Besides a comprehensive view of all the departments of Botany, the important application of the science to agriculture has obtained its due share of consideration; and the works of Liebig, Mülder, and our own Johnston, have furnished valuable matter for this purpose. The volume is copiously illustrated with cuts, and a fine tone of religious feeling runs through and consecrates the whole. The index and glossary occupy about twenty pages, with some 200 entries on each, or 4000 entries."—*Literary Gazette.*

GRIFFIN'S SCIENTIFIC CIRCULAR,

A MONTHLY DESCRIPTIVE AND ILLUSTRATED CATALOGUE

OF

CHEMICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPARATUS, PREPARATIONS, SPECIMENS, AND BOOKS,

OFFERED FOR SALE AT THE AFFIXED PRICES

BY

JOHN JOSEPH GRIFFIN AND COMPANY,

Chemical Museum, 53, Baker Street, Portman Square, London;

AND

RICHARD GRIFFIN & Co., GLASGOW.

The Apparatus is in all cases catalogued at the lowest cash prices. The expense of Packing Cases and Packing Materials is charged in addition. If the goods are to be sent a long journey by land conveyance, over bad roads, as happens in India, South America, and other foreign countries, they must be packed in small boxes. Our foreign customers are requested to give us particular instructions on this head. We employ very careful and experienced persons to pack the goods securely; but we do not hold ourselves responsible for any breakage that may take place during the carriage of the goods to their places of destination. The packing-cases being charged at the cost price, and often being made expressly to fit the goods, and never having been received in a state fit to use again when returned to us empty by carriers, &c., we beg to intimate, that we cannot take them back, nor make any allowance for them.

No. 2. **JUNE, 1849.** PRICE 1D.

BALLOONS FOR INFLATION WITH HYDROGEN GAS, very neatly made and Coloured.

		Diameter.	
1862.	Spherical,	6 inches,	1*s.*
1863.	—	9 inches,	1*s.* 6*d.*
1864.	—	10½ inches,	2*s.* 6*d.*
1865.	—	12 inches,	3*s.*
1866.	—	15 inches,	4*s.*
1867.	Spherical,	17 inches,	5*s.*
1868.	—	18 inches,	6*s.* 6*d.*
1869.	—	20 inches,	7*s.* 6*d.*
1870.	—	36 inches,	1*l.* 16*s.*

1871. Oval Shape, 3 feet high, 2 feet diameter, 15*s.*
1872. Fish Shape, 15 inches by 9 inches, painted with Scales, 3*s.*
1873. — 30 inches by 12 inches, painted with Scales, 6*s.*
1874. Punch, a Figure 6 feet high, and about 9 feet in circumference, 3*l.* 3*s.*

These Balloons are made of gold-beater's skin. When not in use, they should be kept in a close tin case, with a little camphor to preserve them from insects. They ought never to be wetted. When they are expanded with air from the mouth, the lips ought not to touch the mouth of the balloon. All except Nos. 1862 and 1863 will ascend with coal gas. The small ones must be filled with hydrogen gas, free from common air and carbonic acid. In filling a balloon the gas should be passed through a glass tube containing pieces of chloride of calcium, to free the gas from water. The large sizes of balloons, when in good condition, may be kept suspended two or three days, fastened by a string to the table.—The hydrogen gas with which a Balloon is to be filled must all be prepared before the filling is attempted, and should be contained in a gasholder, or in a large jar provided with a stop-cock.



1882.



1875.



1888.

ALCALIMETERS.—Alcalimeters of any Pattern, adapted to contain any given quantity of liquid, and graduated to any Scale, can be supplied to order. The following are quoted as examples.

GAY-LUSSAC'S POURET (French Burette) for Chlorimetry, Alcalimetry, &c., consisting of a tube with a spout for decanting and dropping; form of *fig.* 1875, *d*.

1875. Graduated into 100 divisions=700 grains of water (= 100 septems) 7*s.* 6*d.*
1876. Graduated into 100 divisions=1000 grains of water, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1877. Graduated into 100 divisions=1 ounce of water, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1878. Graduated into 100 divisions=2 ounces of water, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1879. Graduated into 100 divisions=50 cubic centimeters, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1880. BLOCK AND SCREEN for placing Gay-Lussac's Pouret in a vertical position, and to assist the correct reading of the level of the liquid in the tube, *fig.* 1875, *b*, *c*, price 2*s.*

In order to obtain the maximum degree of correctness with this pouret, it is necessary to observe the height of the liquid whilst the instrument is held in a *vertical* position; to effect this, the block and screen 1875 must be employed. This consists of a cylindrical block of wood, *b*, the ends of which are cut at right angles with the sides, and which has a vertical groove in the front. When the block is placed on a horizontal table, *a*, and the wide tube of the alcalimeter, *d*, is pressed against the groove by the thumb, the tube is placed at once in a perfectly vertical position; *c* is a circular japanned tin plate with a horizontal opening, covered with white tissue paper. When the surface of the liquor in the pouret is placed against this narrow opening, and the whole apparatus placed between the observer and the light, the height of the liquor can be observed with exactness. The lowest part of the dark curve formed by the surface of the liquor is to be taken in all cases as the true level.

1881. SUPPORT FOR GAY-LUSSAC'S POURET, *fig.* 1881, 2*s.*

As this pouret is round at the bottom, it requires a separate foot to support it when filled with test liquor. This foot is shown in *fig.* 1881: *c* is the pouret; *a* is a wooden pillar, perforated by an oval hole that supports the pouret in an upright position. When the pouret has been washed, it can be inverted on the peg *b* to drain.

BINKS'S ALCALIMETER, form of *fig.* 1882.

1882. Graduated into 100 divisions=700 grains of water (= 100 septems) 7*s.* 6*d.*
1883. Graduated into 100 divisions=1000 grains of water, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1884. Graduated into 100 divisions=1 ounce of water, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1885. Graduated into 100 divisions=2 ounces of water, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1886. Graduated into 100 divisions=50 cubic centimeters, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1887. FOOT OR SUPPORT FOR BINKS'S ALCALIMETER, 1*s.* 6*d.*

The block and screen, No. 1880, described above as being necessary to the correct reading of the height of liquid in Gay-Lussac's Pouret, is equally necessary for use with Binks's Alcalimeter.

ALCALIMETER ON FOOT, with a grooved stopper, to control the delivery of the Test Acid, form of *fig.* 1888.

1888. Graduated into 100 Divisions=700 grains of water (=100 septems) 7*s.* 6*d.*
1889. Graduated into 100 Divisions=1000 grains of water, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1890. Graduated into 100 Divisions=1 ounce of water, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1891. Graduated into 100 Divisions=2 ounces of water, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1892. Graduated into 100 Divisions=50 cubic centimeters, 7*s.* 6*d.*

1893.



1881.

1894.

1893. SCHUSTER'S ALCALIMETER, *fig.* 1893, 2*s.*

A very light stoppered glass bottle, of about 2 ounces capacity, in which the Normal Test Acid is weighed, then slowly dropped from a fine orifice until a given weight of Alcali is neutralised. The residual acid is again weighed, and the value of the Alcali is determined from the quantity of Acid used.—See *Analysis of Soda Ash*, "Chemical Recreations," p. 460.

1894. MIXING JAR, for Alcalimetry, Chlorimetry, &c., form of *fig.* 1894, 1*s.*

All other articles requisite in Alcalimetry, Acidimetry, Chlorimetry, and other kinds of Centigrade Testing.

1895. Artificial Gems (Illustrations of), a collection of twelve specimens of Bohemian Coloured Pastes, in blocks, 15*s.*

1896. Bohemian Pyrope (Garnets), for Counterpoising, Washing of Bottles, &c., possessing many advantages over metallic shot; per lb, 1*s.* 6*d.*

1897. Bolognian Flask, made of unannealed glass, which is so solid as to bear the stroke of a hammer on the outside, but flies to pieces when a small fragment of glass is dropped into it, *fig.* 1897, 3*d.*

1897.

BALANCES FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES.

Nos. 1898 to 1908 are in POLISHED MAHOGANY GLASS CASES, fitted up in the most convenient style.

1898. Brass Beam, 12 inches long, 7*l.* 15*s.*

The pans hang free, but the beam is supported. With a set of square weights from 500 to $\frac{1}{10}$ grain. Will carry 1000 grains in each pan. Will turn with $\frac{1}{100}$ grain, when loaded with 500 grains in each pan. The beam is divided.

1899. Brass Beam, 12 inches long, 8*l.* 10*s.*

Similar to the above, but with a separate box of round weights with knobs, instead of the square weights.

1900. Brass Beam, 12 inches long, 10*l.* 10*s.*

The beam has all the necessary adjustments, and is divided into ten parts from the centre to the end. Will carry 1000 grains in each pan. Will turn with $\frac{1}{100}$ grain when thus loaded. The pans are suspended by platinum wire. The case is provided with adjusting screws to set it level. With a set of weights from 600 to $\frac{1}{100}$ grain.

1901. Brass Beam, 16 inches long, 14*l.* 14*s.*

The beam is divided into ten parts, and has an apparatus placed over it by which the *rider* can be moved on the beam without opening the glass case. Will carry 1000 grains in each pan, and turn with $\frac{1}{200}$ grain when loaded. With a set of weights from 1000 grains to $\frac{1}{100}$ grain, including *riders* of $\frac{1}{10}$ grain each. There is a short pan cut out to receive the "potash apparatus," used in Organic Analysis. The glass case is provided with adjusting-screws.

1902. Brass Beam, 16 inches long, 16*l.* 16*s.*

This beam has knife-edges at the ends, upon which the pans are suspended by agate planes. When the balance is at rest, the beam is relieved from the weight of the pans. The beam is divided and provided with an apparatus by which the *rider* can be moved along the beam without opening the glass case. Will carry from 1000 to 1500 grains in each pan, and indicate $\frac{1}{500}$ grain when loaded.

1903. Brass Beam, 16 inches long, 18*l.* 18*s.*

The same Balance as No. 1902, but with an additional apparatus for steadying the pans. This is connected, by means of an eccentric, with the axis that moves the balance, so that one movement serves to steady the pans and set the beam free for action.

1904. Brass Beam, 16 inches long, 21*l.*

The same balance as the last, but with agate knife edges instead of steel. This apparatus is particularly recommended for damp climates.

1905. ASSAY BALANCE, Brass Beam, 10 inches long, 12*l.* 12*s.*

Will carry 500 grains in each pan, and turn with $\frac{1}{1000}$ grain when loaded. With a set of weights from 300 grains to $\frac{1}{1000}$ grain.

ACCURATE BALANCES TO WEIGH LARGE QUANTITIES.

1906. Brass Beam, 16 inches long, 8*l.* 8*s.*

Will carry 1 lb. in each pan, and turn with $\frac{1}{10}$ grain when loaded.

1907. Brass Beam, 16 inches long, 12*l.* 12*s.*

The beam has knife-edge ends, upon which the pans are suspended by agate planes. Will carry 1 lb. in each pan, and turn with $\frac{1}{100}$ grain when loaded. The case is provided with adjusting screws.

1908. Brass Beam, 18 inches long, 13*l.* 13*s.*

The beam has knife-edge ends, upon which the pans are suspended by agate planes. Will carry 3 lbs. in each pan, and turn with $\frac{1}{50}$ grain when loaded. The case is provided with adjusting screws.



1909.



1911.

BALANCES, consisting of GILDED STEEL BEAMS, of the form shown in *fig.* 1909. When not in use, they are placed in a japanned tin case, *fig.* 1911. When in use, they are suspended on the support, *fig.* 1909.

1909. Steel Beam, 8 inches long, 1*l.* 1*s.*
Will carry 500 grains, and turn with $\frac{1}{20}$ grain when loaded.
1910. Polished Hardwood Support, *fig.* 1909, 5*s.*
1911. Japanned Tin Case, *fig.* 1911, 2*s.*
} 1*l.* 8*s.*

1912. Steel Beam, 10 inches long, 1*l.* 15*s.*
Will carry 800 grains, and turn with $\frac{1}{50}$ grain when loaded.
1913. Polished Mahogany Support, and Brass Mountings, 7*s.* 6*d.*
1914. Japanned Tin Case, *Fig.* 1911, 3*s.*
} 45*s.* 6*d.*

BALANCES IN PORTABLE BOXES.

1915. Balance with a brass beam, 8 inches long, in a mahogany box, with a support adapted to the top of the box. The pans rest on the box, and are raised by a lever. Will carry 500 grains in each pan, and turn with $\frac{1}{100}$ grain when loaded. 3*l.* 3*s.*

1916. Balance with a brass beam 12 inches long, in a mahogany box, with a support adapted to the top of the box. The pans rest on the box, and are moved by a lever. Will carry 1000 grains in each pan, and turn with $\frac{1}{100}$ grain when loaded with 500 grains in each pan. The beam is divided into 10 parts from the fulcrum to the end, for a *rider*. With a set of square weights from 500 grains to $\frac{1}{10}$ grain. 5*l.* 5*s.*

SETS OF DECIMAL GRAIN WEIGHTS, MINT STANDARD. All in Mahogany Boxes.

1917. Set of 600 grains to $\frac{1}{100}$ grain, 1*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.*
1918. „ 1000 grains to $\frac{1}{100}$ grain, 1*l.* 15*s.*
1919. „ 10,000 grains to 1000 grains, 2*l.* 5*s.*
1920. „ 6000 grains to $\frac{1}{100}$ grain, 3*l.* 3*s.*
1921. „ 10,000 grains to $\frac{1}{100}$ grain, 3*l.* 10*s.*

SETS OF FRENCH DECIMAL WEIGHTS, in Mahogany Boxes.

1922. From 50 grammes to 1 milligramme, 1*l.* 15*s.*
1923. „ 1 kilogramme to 100 grammes, 2*l.* 10*s.*
1924. „ 1 kilogramme to 1 milligramme, 3*l.* 15*s.*

FLAT GLASS CAPSULES, of thin hard white Bohemian Glass, in Pairs, ground to fit close ; to contain hygroscopic substances while being weighed.

1925. Diameter 1½ inches, 6*d.* *per pair.*
1926. „ 2 inches, 6*d.* „
1927. „ 2½ inches, 6*d.* „

1928. BRASS SPRING to hold the above close together while being weighed, 3 sizes, *each* 6*d.*

1929. Blowpipe (Kreidl's Hydrostatic) for Glass-blowing, which acts by the pressure of a high column of water, *complete*, 12*s.*

BOTTLES.

1930.

1934.

1945.

1947.

TEST BOTTLES, Bohemian Glass, narrow mouth, with ground Stoppers and ground Caps, *fig.* 1930, but without inscriptions.

		s.	*d.*			*s.*	*d.*
1930.	Contents 1 oz. . .	0	6	1932.	Contents 4 oz. . .	1	0
1931.	„ 2 oz. . . .	0	9	1933.	„ 8 oz. . . .	1	6

TEST BOTTLES, ground Stoppers, without Caps, Bohemian Glass, narrow mouth, *fig.* 1934.

		s.	*d.*			*s.*	*d.*
1934.	Contents ½ oz. . .	0	4	1940.	Contents 8 oz. . .	0	9
1935.	„ 1 oz. . . .	0	4	1941.	„ 10 oz. . .	0	10
1936.	„ 2 oz. . .	0	5	1942.	„ 12 oz. . .	0	11
1937.	„ 3 oz. . . .	0	6	1943.	„ 16 oz. . .	1	0
1938.	„ 4 oz. . .	0	7	1944.	„ 20 oz. . .	1	2
1939.	„ 6 oz. . . .	0	8		*Also larger Sizes.*		

1945. TEST BOTTLES, Bohemian Glass, with flat-headed, cut, octagon Stopper, 3 oz., *fig.* 1945, without label, 10*d.*

1946. Ditto with the Name of a Test, 3 oz., 60 sorts, each 1*s.* 6*d.*

POWDER BOTTLES, Bohemian Glass, wide mouth, ground Stoppers, *fig.* 1947.

		s.	*d.*			*s.*	*d.*
1947.	Contents ½ oz. . .	0	5	1950.	Contents 3 oz. . .	0	7
1948.	„ 1 oz. . . .	0	5	1951.	„ 4 oz. . . .	0	8
1949.	„ 2 oz. . .	0	6	1952.	„ 6 oz. . .	0	9

1953. Candle Bombs, which explode when stuck in a burning candle and heated, showing the explosive power of steam, 1*d.* or per doz. 9*d.*

1954. CARBONATES (ANALYSIS OF). FRESENIUS AND WILLS' ALCALIMETER; adapted for the Analysis of the Carbonates of Potash, Soda, Lime, &c. *fig.* 1954. With the Addition of a Chloride of Calcium Tube, and Acid Tube, complete, 3*s.*



1954.

Instructions for Use.—"The Carbonate to be tested is weighed in the flask A. A quantity of strong sulphuric acid is put into the flask B. The tubes are then affixed as shown in the figure, where all parts are represented in relative proportions. The point *b* is closed by a ball of wax. The whole is then weighed. A small Chloride of Calcium tube is to be fixed upon the tube *d*, and a little air is to be sucked from the flask B by the mouth. This causes air to pass, by the tube *c*, from A into B. When the mouth is removed, the pressure of the atmosphere at *d* forces a portion of sulphuric acid from B into A by the tube *c*. This acid decomposes part of the carbonate, and the carbonic acid set free passes through the tube *c* into the flask B, and thence into the air. As the gas passes through the sulphuric acid into which the tube *c* dips, the carbonic acid is deprived of moisture, and escapes in a dry state. By repeating the suction at *d*, other portions of acid are driven into the flask A, until enough is present to decompose the carbonate entirely. When the evolution of gas ceases, the wax is removed from the point *b*, suction is again applied at *d*, and atmospheric air drawn through till it is thought the carbonic acid gas is all expelled from the apparatus. The vessels are then allowed to cool, wiped dry, and weighed. The loss shows the quantity of carbonic acid expelled during the process."—*Griffin's Chemical Recreations*, p. 389.

COVERS (ROUND GLASS), for Jars, Funnels, Test Glasses, &c., of crown glass, cut perfectly smooth and round.

1955. Thin Glass, 2 inch, 2½ inch, 3 inch diameter, per dozen assorted, 1*s.*
1956. Ditto 3½ inch, 4 inch, 4½ inch diameter, per dozen assorted, 2*s.*
1957. Ditto a set of Six Covers assorted, 9*d.*

1958.	Thick Glass 2 inch diam., *each*	2*d.*	1962.	4 inch diam., *each*	3*d.*
1959.	Ditto 2½ inch ditto . .	2*d.*	1963.	4½ inch ditto .	4*d.*
1960.	Ditto 3 inch ditto .	2*d.*	1964.	5 inch ditto .	5*d.*
1961.	Ditto 3½ inch ditto . .	2½*d.*	1965.	6 inch ditto .	8*d.*

1966. A Set of Eight Thick Covers assorted, 2*s.*
1967. A similar Set, Ground on One Side, 4*s.*

Any of the Covers may be had, Ground on One Side, at twice the price of the Plain Covers.

CRYSTAL DRAINERS. [See also Nos. 1747, 1748]

Colander, or Strainer, for Dyers, for separating Crystals from mother liquor, &c., German semi-porcelain, with hard close porcelain glaze, not attacked by acids or colours, form of a basin, *fig.* 1968, pierced with holes.


1968.

	Diameter.	Contents.	Price.
1968.	13 inches.	9 pints.	9*s.*
1969.	14 inches.	11 pints.	10*s.*
1970.	16 inches.	15 pints.	11*s.*

1971. CRYSTALLOGRAPHY.—A Series of ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY MODELS OF CRYSTALS, 2*l.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

These Models represent the most important Natural Crystals, both of simple and complicated forms. Their Size is from 2 to 4 inches in diameter. The Material of which they are formed is Cream-Coloured Biscuit Porcelain, which presents the following advantages:—The Models are much *stronger* than those made of paper. Their edges are sufficiently sharp, and their planes sufficiently even, to permit very good *approximate measurements* to be taken by means of the common goniometer. They can be *written upon*, either with a black lead pencil, the marks from which can be effaced by India rubber, or with common ink, which is easily removable by muriatic acid. Consequently, the names of the Crystals, or their symbols, or the angles across their edges, or the names of the minerals they represent, can be written upon them and removed at pleasure. These properties are not possessed in the same degree by Models made of glass or wood. When soiled, they can be *cleaned* by soap and water. Finally, they are *cheaper* than Models made of any other material.

Unless it is otherwise directed, the MODELS are delivered marked and numbered to agree with the system described in J. J. GRIFFIN'S TREATISE ON CRYSTALLOGRAPHY, 8vo, *price* 9*s.*

COLLECTION OF MODELS OF CRYSTALS, arranged to Illustrate NICOL'S "*Manual of Mineralogy.*" In biscuit porcelain, as above described.

1972. First Selection, 40 Models, 21*s.*
1973. Second Selection, 40 Models, 21*s.*
1974. Third Selection, 40 Models, 21*s.*
1975. The Collection of 120 Models, 2*l.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

1976. GONIOMETER for measuring the Angles of Detached Crystals and Models of Crystals, consisting of a graduated brass semicircle, and a Steel Index, 7*s.* 6*d.*

This is the first GONIOMETER, practically useful to students of CRYSTALLOGRAPHY, that has been offered under the price of a guinea. The present instrument is quite sufficient to take the measurements that are necessary in studying the principles of the science.

1977. DYER (THE) AND COLOUR MAKER'S COMPANION, 12mo, 7*s.* 6*d. cloth gilt.*

"Containing upwards of Two Hundred Receipts for making Colours, on the most approved principles, for all the various Styles and Fabrics now in existence: together with the Scouring Process, and plain directions for Preparing, Washing-off, and Finishing the goods."

1978. DISTILLING APPARATUS, for the preparation of Pure Water, *fig.* 1978. Adapted for use over a common kitchen or parlour fire, and giving a gallon of Distilled Water in three hours, 12*s.*



1978.

S, a tinplate still of the capacity of two quarts; *p*, *a*, *e*, a block tin pipe; A, a japanned tinplate or zinc condenser, into which water is to be run constantly by the pipe *h*, and from which the warm water escapes by the water-pipe *c*. The cold water may be supplied from a water bottle, No. 1982. Whenever steam issues from the funnel *f*, more water must be poured into the still.

LARGE DISTILLING APPARATUS, *fig.* 1979.

This apparatus is more powerful than the foregoing, and applicable, not only to the distillation of water, but to that of volatile oils, rose water, lavender water, &c. It presents the great advantage over many forms of distilling apparatus, that every part of the interior, both of the Still and the Condenser, can be readily got at for the purpose of thorough cleaning. The STILL, S, has nearly the same shape as that already described. It has, however, a moveable head, which can be fastened on by five screws, a washer of many folds of filtering paper being placed on a broad flange between the head and the Still. There is also a moveable pierced false bottom, which is only used in the distillation of volatile oils, the use of it being to prevent rose leaves, &c., from touching the bottom of the Still, to sodden in the water, or to suffer from burning. The heat is supplied by a PORTABLE IRON FURNACE, fed with charcoal. An iron jacket is put upon the furnace round the still, to prevent the loss of heat by radiation. The carbonic acid of the fire escapes by a large hole in the upper part of this jacket.



1979.

The CONDENSER, C, consists of a hollow cylindrical body, the two concentric walls of which form a space that is kept continually full of cold water. This is supplied from a Water Bottle, 1982, by the funnel F, and the warm water flows away by the waste pipe, P. The head of the Condenser is separate from the body, and fastened on by screw nuts, in the same manner as the head of the Still. The steam passes from the Still directly into the cavity, C, of the Condenser, where it comes into contact with the circular cistern containing the cold water, close against which it is pressed by the solid block, B, which allows only one quarter of an inch of space all round for the steam to pass by; and as the steam comes at the bottom into contact with the coldest water issuing continually from the lower end of the long funnel, F, it is effectually condensed, and flows out of the pipe, W, in the state of water, more or less warm according to the more or less effective state of the condensing power. In adjusting the apparatus for use, the Condenser is first mounted on a three-legged stool, having a hole in the centre of the top for the reception of the delivery pipe, W. The furnace is then brought to a proper level by means of a stack of loose bricks. With this apparatus several gallons of distilled water may be prepared in a day. When a distillation is ended, all the vessels should be emptied, washed, and dried without delay, to prevent their becoming rusty. The outside of the Condenser is japanned.

1979. TINPLATE STILL, one gallon, with Furnace, Condenser, and Stool, 4*l.*

1980. TINPLATE STILL, two gallons, with Furnace, Condenser, and Stool, 5*l.* 5*s.*

1981. COPPER STILL, tinned inside, two gallons, with Furnace, Condenser, and Stool, 6*l.* 16*s.* 6*d.*

1982. WATER BOTTLES, to supply cold water for Condensation in Distillation, with stop-cock, *fig.* 1982, one gallon, 4*s.*

1983. Ditto, two gallons, 6*s.*

The figure exhibits the Water Bottle fitted up as an Aspirator.



1982.

FILTRATION (APPARATUS FOR).

FILTERING PAPER, prepared with care from the PUREST MATERIALS. Perfectly free from plaster of Paris, chlorine, smalts, and other common impurities. Filters with rapidity; contains no soluble matter; and gives only $\frac{1}{264}$ of its weight of ashes.

1984. Demy size, 18 by 22½ inches, per Quire, 1*s.* 3*d.*
Cut into Circular Filters, and sold in packets of 100, as particularised below.

FUNNELS FOR FILTRATION, of Glass, so formed that the vertical section is an equilateral triangle, which adapts them to the shape of a plain filter, *fig.* 1992.

1992.

FILTER BOXES, made of japanned Tinplate, round, *fig.* 1999, with cover to lift off, adapted to the seven sizes of CIRCULAR FILTERS, of which each box holds 200.



1999.

CIRCULAR FILTERS.			FUNNELS.			FILTER BOXES.		
No.	Diameter in Inches.	Price per 100.	No.	Diameter in Inches.	Price.	No.	Diameter in Inches.	Price.
1985.	2	3*d.*	1992.	1	3*d.*	1999.	2½	4*d.*
1986.	2¼	3*d.*	1993.	1¼	3*d.*	2000.	3	6*d.*
1987.	2¾	5*d.*	1994.	1½	3*d.*	2001.	3½	6*d.*
1988.	3¼	7*d.*	1995.	2	4*d.*	2002.	4½	7*d.*
1989.	4½	8*d.*	1996.	2½	5*d.*	2003.	5½	8*d.*
1990.	5½	12*d.*	1997.	3	6*d.*	2004.	6½	12*d.*
1991.	7½	16*d.*	1998.	4	8*d.*	2005.	8	15*d.*

2006. Circular Filters, per set of 700,—4*s.* 6*d.*
2007. Funnels, per set of 7,—2*s.* 8*d.*
2008. Filter Boxes, per set of 7,—4*s.* 10*d.*
The articles in the same line in the above Table match with one another.
If the Funnels are ground on the edge so as to be closed air-tight by ground glass covers [see No. 1955], they cost 2*d.* extra each funnel.



2009.

2009. FILTER CASES, adapted to contain 700 CIRCULAR FILTERS, cut ready for use, namely, 100 each of seven sizes, Nos. 1985 to 1991, or 2 inches to 7½ inches diameter, each size of Filter being kept in a separate receptacle, the whole closing with a common door, secured by a snap. *Japanned Tinplate*, 9*s.*
2010. Ditto filled with 700 Filters, 13*s.* 6*d.*

2011. Filtering Apparatus, for Solutions of Caustic Potash, &c. (Donovan's), where the Filtration takes place without any change of atmospheric air, and consequently without the continuous absorption of carbonic acid, *fig.* 2011, 14*s.*



2011.

2012. Filtering Frame, for supporting a linen or woollen cloth filter, *fig.* 2012 ; Plate Glass, with German silver pins, 10 inches diameter, 7*s.*



2012.

2013. Filtering Paper for Tinctures, woollen, grey colour, very stout, size 21 inches square, *per quire* 2*s.* 6*d.*

Funnel Holders :

2014. Funnel Holder, polished black wooden rod and foot, with a glazed earthenware arm, similar to *fig.* F, fixed by a screw at 11 inches above the foot, *fig.* 2014, 1*s.*



2015. Funnel Holder, made entirely of polished black wood, the rod 16 inches high, the arm moveable and adapted for funnels of all sizes, *fig.* 2015, 1*s.* 6*d.*

2016. Funnel Holder, *fig.* 2016, solid mahogany, French polished, with good screws. Large size, foot 10 inches diameter, rod 24 inches long, $1\frac{1}{8}$ inch diameter, 6*s.* 6*d.*



2014.



2015.



2016.

FUNNEL HOLDERS, which also serve as COVERS TO THE SOLUTION JARS, to keep out dust, &c., in the manner shown by *fig.* 2017, *a.*

2017, *a.*



2017, *b.*

2017. Circular Glass Cover, with a Funnel-hole in the centre. Diameter of cover, 4 inches, *fig.* 2017, *b*, 6*d.*

2018. Ditto, diameter 4 inches, with a hole at the side, 8*d.*

2019. Circular Covers of White glazed German Porcelain, slightly concave, with a Funnel-hole in the centre, having serrated edges, 4 inches diameter, 8*d.*

Filter Ring, for supporting a Paper Filter over a Solution Jar, without the help of a Funnel; useful in rapid filtration, when the liquid alone is required; it has two flat horizontal arms to rest on the Solution Jar; Yellow glazed China, *fig.* 2020.



2020.

2023.

2020. Ring, 1¼ inch diameter, 3*d.*

2021. Ring, 1½ inch diameter, 3*d.*

2022. The same Filter Ring, in White glazed Berlin Porcelain, 6*d.*

2023. Filter Ring, White glazed Berlin Porcelain, with three arms, *fig.* 2023, 1*s.*

2024. GRIFFIN'S HOLDER FOR GLASS FILTER RINGS, by which a Filter is held without a funnel, in such a manner that the point of the Filter is made to touch the inner surface of the receiving jar, so as to ensure effectual draining, *fig.* 2024. In mahogany, French polished, 2*s.*

There are two moveable blocks by which the height of the solution glass can be adjusted to agree with the point of the filter.

2025. Glass Ring with flat handle, adapted to this support, ¾ inch diameter, 4*d.*

2026. Ditto, ditto, 1 inch diameter, 4*d.*

2027. Ditto, ditto, 1¼ inch diameter, 5*d.*

2028. GRIFFIN'S HOLDER FOR GLASS FILTER RINGS, consisting of a double cylinder of japanned tinplate filled with corks, one of which slides on an upright rod, while the other is perforated to receive the bent handle of the Glass Filter Ring, *fig.* 2028; the rod and foot of polished black wood, 1*s*

a



2028.

b

2024.

2029. Glass Ring, with bent handle, Ring ¾ inch diameter, 4*d.*

2030. Ditto 1 inch diameter, 4*d.*

FLASKS.

2031.

HARD GERMAN GLASS FLASKS, olive green colour, for SOLUTIONS, DIGESTIONS, PREPARATION OF GASES, &c., form of *fig.* 2031, very difficult of fusion, and proof against the Corrosion of Chemical Solutions. These have a slight punty mark at the bottom, but are extremely well annealed, and not subject to crack at the bottom. The mouth is vial-lipped, and well adapted for corking.

		s.	*d.*
2031.	Contents, 1 ounce	0	3
2032.	„ 2	0	3
2033.	„ 4	0	4
2034.	„ 6	0	4
2035.	„ 8	0	5
2036.	„ 10	0	6
2037.	„ 12	0	6
2038.	Contents, 14 ounces	0	6
2039.	„ 16	0	7
2040.	„ 20	0	8
2041.	„ 24	0	9
2042.	„ 30	1	0
2043.	„ 40	1	3
2044.	„ 50	1	6

HARD GERMAN GLASS FLASKS, tinted pale green, for preparing SOLUTIONS, GASES, &c., flat bottoms, well formed vial mouths like 2046, to bear corking, uniformly thin throughout, without punty mark. Not acted on by corrosive liquors.

2045.

2046.

		s.	*d.*
2045.	Contents, 3 oz., *fig.* 2045	0	6
2046.	„ 3 „ 2046	0	6
2047.	„ 5 „ 2045	0	6
2048.	„ 5 „ 2046	0	6
2049.	„ 6 „ 2045	0	8
2050.	„ 9 „ 2046	0	9
2051.	Contents, 10 oz., *fig.* 2045	1	0
2052.	„ 12 „ 2045	1	2
2053.	„ 12 „ 2046	1	2
2054.	„ 18 „ 2046	1	6
2055.	„ 20 „ 2045	1	6
2056.	„ 20 „ 2046	1	6

There are two kinds of pale-green glass Flasks made in England;—one kind, of the glass used for making soda-water bottles; the other of flint glass, coloured by a small admixture of green glass. Both of these kinds of Flasks are readily acted upon by chemical solutions: even pure water decomposes them at a boiling heat; by which means, the solutions heated in them become contaminated by the products of the decomposition of the glass. The German green glass Flasks, Nos. 2031 to 2056, are not subject to this defect.—This remark generally applies, also, to English green glass RETORTS.

JARS FOR COLD SOLUTIONS, Bohemian Glass, strong, and of a convenient form for handling, *fig.* 2057, suitable for Filtrations, Lixiviations, &c.

2057.

2057.	Contents, 1 pint, 1*s.*	
2058.	„ 1½ „ 1*s.* 3*d.*	
2059.	„ 2 „ 1*s.* 6*d.*	
2060.	Contents, 3 pints, 1*s.* 9*d.*	
2061.	„ 4 „ 2*s.*	
2062.	„ 5 „ 2*s.* 6*d.*	

GRADUATED MEASURES, WARRANTED ACCURATE, Cylindrical Form, on Foot.

N.B.—The Graduation agrees with the bottom of the curve formed by the surface of the liquid.

2063. Contents, 1 ounce, 1*s.* 3*d.*
2064. „ 2 ounces, 1*s.* 6*d.*
2065. „ 5 ounces, 2*s.*
2066. „ 10 ounces, 2*s.* 6*d.*
2067. „ 20 ounces, 4*s.*
2068. „ 40 ounces, 7*s.*



2068.

These Measures are graduated with the same degree of accuracy as our Alcalimeters and Gas Tubes, and are not done by the glass-cutter's wheel.

2069. Graduated Measure, in the form of a Test Tube, with spout: Contents, 1 ounce, divided into half-drachms, 1*s.* 6*d.*

LAMP FURNACE, for use in preparing Solutions of small quantities of Salts, Minerals, &c., for TESTING, *fig.* 2070.

2070. Perforated Stone-ware Cylinder, *a*, size 6 by 4 inches, 9*d.*
2071. Glass Spirit Lamp, 1*s.* 3*d.* [See No. 2080.]
2072. Tinplate Sandbath, 5 inches diameter, *b*, 6*d.*
2073. Tube Support, *c*, for supporting Tubes in an upright position in the Sandbath, with seven holes for Tubes, salt-glazed stoneware, 9*d.*
2074. Short Wide Glass Tubes, *d*, to contain the Solutions, 3 inches by $\frac{5}{4}$ inch, *each* 3*d.*
2075. Ditto, 4 inches by $\frac{3}{4}$ inch, 3*d.*
2076. Ditto, 3 inches by 1 inch, 5*d.*
[See No. 1855, &c.]



2070.

2077. Small Berlin Porcelain Capsule, with Handle, for evaporating solutions on the Lamp Furnace, *fig.* 2077, 4*d.*


2077.

2078.

2078. Small thick Berlin Porcelain Capsules, *fig.* 2078, three sizes, per set, 6d.

These are for use when small quantities of solution are to be evaporated to dryness. When the liquor is *nearly*, but not *quite*, dry, the capsule is removed from the Sandbath, when the heat retained in the thick mass of porcelain suffices to finish the evaporation, without decomposing the dried salt.

2079. The LAMP FURNACE, COMPLETE, Nine Articles, Nos. 2070 to 2078, 5*s.*

SPIRIT LAMPS, Bohemian Glass, with Ground Caps, and incorrodible stoneware Wick-holders, *fig.* 2080.

		s.	d.
2080.	Contents, 2 oz.	1	3
2081.	„ 3 oz.	1	6
2082.	„ 5 oz.	2	0
2083.	„ 7 oz.	2	6

2084. Cotton Wick for the Spirit Lamps, per yard, 1½*d.*

2085. Iron Chimney, to steady the flame of the Spirit Lamp, and increase its power, 6*d.*

2080.

SUGAR. The following Apparatus is in preparation :—

2086. A SET of APPARATUS, recommended by Dr. Shier, Colonial Chemist to the Colony of British Guiana, for use in COLONIAL SUGAR WORKS, in determining the Density of Cane Juice, and the exact amount of Lime required for Clarifying the same properly.

To be accompanied by Instructions for performing the Experiments.

Supports for Test Tubes when placed on a Sand Bath, *fig.* 2070, *c*, of Salt-glazed Stoneware.

2087. Support with holes for 3 tubes, 6*d.*
2088. „ „ 4 „ 7*d.*
2089. „ „ 7 „ 9*d.*

2090. WASHING of PRECIPITATES by STEAM, Apparatus for. By Dr. Shier, 5*s.*

a, is a water bottle; *b*, a narrow glass tube of ⅕ inch bore; *c*, a very shallow glass capsule, perforated in the centre; *d*, a glass funnel. *Use.*—The precipitate is supposed to be on a paper filter in the funnel. Water is boiled in the bottle *a*, and the steam passed into the funnel, where it condenses into boiling hot distilled water, which rapidly washes the precipitate. The pressure of the steam and the high temperature greatly facilitate the process. If the steam comes off too fast, it blows out between the capsule and the funnel, and does no harm. But it is easy, when the water is boiled by a gas flame, or over a lamp, to provide against waste of steam. Care must be taken that the water in the funnel does not rise so high as to touch the slant-cut end of the steam-pipe. The use of this Apparatus effects a great saving of time in one of the most tedious operations of Analytical Chemistry.



2090.

WATER TEST (Professor Clark's).

The Commissioners of Woods and Forests require, as one of the indispensable conditions to a Bill for supplying water to a town being presented by them to Parliament, that there shall be given, in reference to the waters already supplied to the town, as well as in reference to the waters proposed to be supplied,—

"A statement of the quality of the water as exhibited by chemical analysis, specifying its adaptation for Domestic and Manufacturing Purposes, and its degree of hardness with reference to the Tests and Scale of Dr. Clark."

The Water-works sanctioned by the Board of Health have all the waters submitted to the same tests.

APPARATUS FOR CLARK'S WATER TEST—*continued.*

The process invented by Professor CLARK for DETERMINING THE HARDNESS OF WATERS is of easy execution, and of such extreme precision as to rank among the most exact and delicate operations of chemical analysis. The circumstances above referred to render this process of great interest, not only to professional Chemists, but to Engineers, Manufacturers, and the public.

SOLUTIONS AND APPARATUS FOR CLARK'S WATER TEST.

Made in strict accordance with the Professor's instructions.

1. FOR TESTING THE HARDNESS OF WATER.

2091. SOAP TEST, standard strength . . . *5s. per Pint.*

2092. STANDARD SOLUTION of 0° of HARDNESS
2093. — 1° —
2094. — 4° —
2095. — 8° —
2096. — 12° —
2097. — 16° — } *2s. per Pint.*

2098. GRADUATED POURET, for measuring the quantity of Soap Test, or Test for Alcalinity, used in each analysis. Graduated into 16 Test Measures, and every Test Measure (degree) divided into 5ths, form of *fig.* 1882, 10*s.* 6*d.*

2099. Mahogany Foot for the Graduated Pouret, 1*s.* 6*d.*

2100. Pipette to deliver 100 Test Measures of Water, *fig.* 2100, 3*s.* 6*d.*



2100.

When the Pipette is emptied, the drop of water at the beak must be *drained* out, as it belongs to the measured quantity. It must not be *blown* out, for that alters the quality of the water.

2101. Set of Six Stoppered Bottles, with flat-headed Stoppers, for Mixing the Water with the Soap Test; *per set,* 6*s.*

2102. Bent Tube for sucking Carbonic Acid from the Bottles, 2*d.*

2103. Five-Minutes Sand Glass, 3*s.* 6*d.*

2. FOR TESTING THE ALCALINITY OF WATERS.

2104. Berlin Porcelain Evaporating Basin, in which to simmer the water when under trial for Alcalinity, contents 1 quart, 3*s.* 6*d.*

2105. MEASURE to *Deliver* ONE PINT of WATER, when drained *two minutes,* 4*s.*

2106. PORTABLE BRASS TRIPOD, for supporting the Evaporating Basin over a Spirit Lamp, 3*s.* 6*d.*

2107. Glass Spirit Lamp, with Chimney, complete, 2*s.* 6*d.*

2108. Glass Stirrer, 4*d.*

2109. Set of Six Clark's Test Glasses, *fig.* 2109, 3*s.*

2109.

2110. Pipette, 4*d.*

2111. TEST FOR ALCALINITY . . . . . *2s. per Pint.*

2112. LITMUS TEST PAPER. . . . . *3s. per dozen Books.*

2113. Globular Flask, contents one gallon, with a Condenser attached. For boiling water to effect the decomposition of Bicarbonates without permitting the escape of steam, 10*s.* 6*d.*

2114. SPECIFICATION of the PATENT granted to PROFESSOR CLARK for a New Method of rendering certain Waters (the Water of the Thames being amongst the Number) less Impure and less Hard, for the Supply and Use of Manufactories, Villages, Towns, and Cities, with an APPENDIX on the Method of Testing Waters, 8vo, *sewed,* 1*s.* 6*d.*

ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

EDITORS OF THE FIRST EDITION.

The Rev. EDWARD SMEDLEY, M.A., late Fellow of Sidney College, Cambridge.
The Rev. HUGH JAMES ROSE, B.D., late Principal of King's College, London.
The Rev. HENRY JOHN ROSE, B.D., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.

PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS.

AIRY, G. B., Esq., A.M., F.R.S. Astronomer Royal.
ARNOLD, Rev. Thomas, D.D., Rugby.
BABBAGE, C., Esq., A.M., F.R.S.
BARLOW, Peter, Esq., F.R.S.
BELL, T., Esq., F.L.S.
BLAKESLEY, Rev. J. W., M.A.
BLOMFIELD, C. J., D.D., Bishop of London.
BONNYCASTLE, Captain, Royal Engineers.
BOWMAN, W., Esq., F.R.S.
BROOKE, H. J., Esq., F.R.S., F.L.S.
BROWNE, Rev. R. W., M.A., Professor of Classical Literature, King's College, London.
BROWNE, Rev. R. L., M.A.
CARWITHEN, J. B. S., B.D.
CLARK, F. Le Gros, Esq.
COLERIDGE, Samuel Taylor.
COOLEY, W. D., Esq., M.A., Trinity College, Dublin.
CORRIE, Rev. G. E., B.D., Norrisian Professor of Divinity, Cambridge.
COX, Rev. F. A., D.D., L.L.D.
DAUBENY, C. G. B., M.D., Professor of Botany and Chemistry, Oxford.
DE MORGAN, A., Esq., Professor of Mathematics, University College.
DONALDSON, T. L., Esq., Professor of Architecture, University College.
DON, G., Esq., F.L.S.
DOWLING, Rev. J. G., M.A.
GRAVES, J. T., M.A., F.R.S.
GRAY, J. E., Esq., F.L.S.
GWILT, J., Esq., F.R.S.
HALE, Ven. Archdeacon, Charter House.
HALL, Rev. T. G., M.A.
HAMILTON, Rev. H. P., M.A., F.R.S.,
HAMPDEN, R. D., D.D., Bishop of Hereford.
HARVEY, G., Esq., F.R.S., F.G.S.
HERSCHEL, Sir John F. W., M.A., F.R.S.
HINDS, S., D.D., Bishop of Norwich.
HOOD, Charles, F.R.S.
HORNE, Rev. T. Hartwell, B.D.
JAMES, J. T., D.D., Bishop of Calcutta.
JEBB, R., Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
JEREMIE, Rev. J. A., M.A., Haileybury.
JOHNSON, G., Esq., M.D.
KATER, Captain, F.R.S.
LARDNER, Dionysius, LL.D.
LEVY, A., Esq., M.A., F.G.S.
LINDSAY, Rev. J., M.A.
LOWNDES, W., Esq., M.A., Q.C.
LUNN, Rev. F., M.A., F.R.S.
LYALL, Rev. Dr., Dean of Canterbury
MCCAUL, A., D.D., Professor of Hebrew, King's College, London.
MACPHERSON, W., Esq.
MAURICE, Rev., Professor.
MILLER, W. H., Esq., M.A., F.R.S.
MOSELEY, Rev. H., M.A., F.R.S.
MOUNTAIN, Rev. J. H. B., D.D.
NARRIEN, J., Esq., F.R.A.S.
NEWMAN, Rev. J. H., B.D.
NICHOLSON, Peter, Esq.
ORMEROD, T. G., M.A., Archdeacon of Suffolk.
OTTLEY, Rev. J. B., M.A.
PEACOCK, Rev. G., D.D., Dean of Ely.
PHILLIPS, John, Esq., Secretary to the British Association.
PROCTER, Capt., Sandhurst.
REDDING, Cyrus, Esq.
RENOUARD, Rev. G. C., B.D., F.R.S.
RICHARDSON, Charles, Esq., LL.D.
RIDDLE, Rev. J. E., M.A., Oxford.
ROGET, P. M., Esq., M.D., F.R.S.
ROSCOE, Thomas, Esq.
ROSE, Rev. Henry John, B.D.
RUSSELL, Right Rev. Bishop.
SENIOR, Nassau William, Esq.
SMEDLEY, Rev. E., M.A.
SMITH, G. H., Esq., F.G.S.
SOUTH, J. F., Esq., F.L.S.
SPOONER, W. C., Esq.
STEPHENS, J. F., Esq., F.L.S., F.Z.S.
STODDART, Sir J., LL.D.
TALFOURD, Mr. Justice.
TAYLOR, W. C., Esq., LL.D.
THOMPSON, Rev. H., M.A., Senior Fellow of St. John's, Cambridge.
VIGNOLES, C., Esq., Civil Engineer.
WESTMACOTT, R., Esq., F.R.S., A.R.A.
WHATELY, Richard, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin.
WHEWELL, Rev. W., D.D., F.R.S., Master of Trinity College, Cambridge.
WILLIAMS, Robert, Esq., M.D.

PLAN OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

The INTRODUCTION.—On the Laws and regulative Principles of EDUCATION; or, in the Language of the Schools, the Elements of METHODOLOGY.

First Division.

PURE SCIENCES.

SECTION I.

FORMAL SCIENCES.

Philosophy of Language.
Logic.
Rhetoric.
Mathematics:—
- Geometry.
- Arithmetic.
- Algebra.
- Geometrical Analysis.
- Theory of Numbers.
- Trigonometry.
- Analytical Geometry.
- Conic Sections.
- Differential and Integral Calculus.
- Calculus of Variations.
- Calculus of Finite Differences.
- Calculus of Functions.
- Theory of Probabilities.
- Definite Integrals.

SECTION II.

REAL SCIENCES.

Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy.
Law:—
- General Principles of Law.
- Roman Law.
- English Law—
  - Laws of England.
  - Laws of Ireland.
  - Laws of Scotland.
  - Colonial Law.
- Canon Law.

Politics:—
- Law of Nations—
  - Diplomacy.
- Political Philosophy—
  - Statistics.
- Political Economy—
  - Commerce.

Theology:—
- Natural Theology.
- Evidences of Revelation.
- Scripture Doctrine.
- Biblical Literature.
- Biblical Antiquities.
- Religions and Religious Customs.

Second Division.

MIXED AND APPLIED SCIENCES.

SECTION I.

MECHANICAL PHILOSOPHY.
(*Mixed Mathematics.*)
- Mechanics.
- Hydrostatics.
- Pneumatics.
- Optics.
- Astronomy:—
  - Plane Astronomy.
  - Nautical Astronomy.
  - Physical Astronomy.
- Figure of the Earth.
- Tides and Waves.

SECTION II.

EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
- Magnetism.
- Electro-Magnetism.
- Electricity.
- Galvanism.
- Heat.
- Light.
- Chemistry.
- Sound.
- Meteorology.

SECTION III.

THE FINE ARTS.
- Architecture.
- Sculpture.
- Painting.
- Heraldry.
- Numismatics.
- Poetry.
- Music.
- Engraving.

SECTION IV.

THE USEFUL ARTS.
- Agriculture.
- Horticulture.
- Floriculture.
- Arboriculture.
- Carpentry and Joinery.
- Fortification.
- Engineering.
- Naval Architecture.
- Manufactures.
- Mechanical Arts.
- Chemical Arts.

SECTION V.

NATURAL HISTORY.

Inanimate:—
- Crystallography.
- Mineralogy.
- Geology.

Insentient:—
- Botany.

Animate:—
- Zoology.
- Physiology.
- Comparative Anatomy.

Vertebrals:
- Mammalia.
- Birds.
- Reptiles.
- Fishes.

Invertebrals:
- Molluscs.
- Insects.
- Crustaceans.
- Arachnidans.
- Myriapods.
- Spined Skins.
- Sea Nettles.
- Infusories.
- Polyps.

SECTION VI.

APPLICATIONS OF NATURAL HISTORY.
- Anatomy.
- Materia Medica:
  - Pharmacy.
- Medicine.
- Surgery.
- Veterinary Art.

Third Division.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

INTRODUCTION:—
- Dissertation on the Uses of History.
- Chronology.
- Chronological Tables.

ARCHÆOLOGY.

ETHNOLOGY.

ANCIENT HISTORY:—
- Sacred History.
- The Jews.
- Greece.
- Greek Literature.
- Greek Philosophy and Art.
- Ancient Oriental Nations.
- Rome.
- Roman Literature.
- Roman Philosophy.
- Classical Antiquities.
- Heathen Mythology.

MIDDLE AGES.

MODERN HISTORY:—
- The Christian Church.
- Greek Empire.
- Ottoman Empire.
- The Crusades.
- Italy.
- Germany.
- France.
- Spain.
- Portugal.
- Netherlands.
- Switzerland.
- Britain.
- America.
- India.

Fourth Division.

GEOGRAPHY.

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY.

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY:—
- European.
- American.
- Oriental.
- African.
- Classical.

BRITISH TOPOGRAPHY.

Fifth Division.

LEXICOGRAPHICAL.

English Lexicon, &c. &c. &c.
See Prospectus, § 43.

GENERAL INDEX.

UND BY
BURN,
ON GARDEN