

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SERMONS

SERMONS

BY

MARK PATTISON

LATE RECTOR OF LINCOLN COLLEGE,
OXFORD

London
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1885

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PREFACE.

WITH one exception, the Sermons contained in the present volume have never appeared in print in an authoritative form. As they have not had the benefit of a final revision by the writer himself, the Editors have ventured to correct a few obvious clerical errors; but they have not thought themselves warranted in doing anything more than this.

It will be observed that the majority of these Sermons belong to the ten years from 1861 to 1871. Four others, which do not fall within these limits of time, are included, partly for completeness' sake, and partly because it is believed that they may interest the readers of the recently-published *Memoirs*, as illustrating the views and position of the writer at an earlier period of his life.

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UNIVERSITY SERMONS

I.

[January, 1850.]

"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."—MATTHEW xxii. 37-40.

A MOST surprising solution of the proposed question this may well have seemed to an intelligent and reflecting auditor, and one calculated to draw from him the expression of wonder with which the simpler uneducated population of Galilee met our Lord's teaching, "Whence hath this man this wisdom?" For let us consider for a moment the bearings of the question and the reply.

There is no reason for considering the question as put in any captious spirit, or with the insidious purpose with which we read of some others approaching our Lord. It appears

to have originated rather in real admiration of the wisdom of our Lord's reply to the Sadducees—"perceiving," St. Mark says, "that he had answered them well"—and to have been put by one whose own disposition and view of truth earned for him the eulogy, "Thou art not far from the kingdom of God." But the query, "Which is the great commandment?" was wholly in the spirit of the Jewish theology of that age. It was a theology not of principles but of ruled points. Nature and reason, experience, human life and its instincts went for nothing, and accordingly revelation could not be appreciated or understood. The books of Moses were all in all, but the religion of Moses was made void. The records so scrupulously preserved and studied were treated as texts from which consequences were to be deduced by certain laws of consequence—all ingenuity was directed to doing this in the legitimate way, and the points in controversy between the contending sects were only how much of the documents was to be admitted as text-book, and what were correct deductions from them. It was strictly a legal

spirit which prevailed, to which the lively oracles had become but so many statute books. The doctors argued with the nicest subtlety on the letter of the statute, while the principles of the jurisprudence lay disregarded beneath. It was, in short, in the history of Judaism a period such as has appeared in the progress of all nations that have possessed anything like a culture and a literature — periods that have been denominated critical as distinguished from original epochs. A certain authority has possessed itself of the national mind, and men, accepting without question not only the authority but the statements without asking the reason of those statements, occupy themselves in applying the given statements to the proof and establishment of all received facts and practices. Such an age has recurred at least twice in the development of Greek philosophy—in the East between the second and sixth, and in the West chiefly between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. In the spirit, then, of a scholiast's theology, the lawyer in the text puts to the new teacher, who also professed to ground all his doctrine on

the received sacred books, a question probably much mooted and variously solved in the schools at that time, viz. which of the portions into which these scrupulous textualists had broken up the law of Moses deserved most veneration? which of the 613 precepts into which, being the number of letters in the Decalogue, the whole law was reduced should stand first? Though, as they said, God had more care of the letters and syllables in the Law than of the stars in heaven, yet as the stars were of unequal magnitude and splendour, so were the precepts of unequal rank and dignity. Which among them had the first place? Thus we may take the query, and the full significance of the answer will be apparent, as thus:—though indeed it be true that the words of the Law are of such value that not one jot or one tittle of a letter shall in any wise pass from it all, yet there is one sentence which stands first, one precept deserving to be called great, and another which, to apply the term familiar in your schools (δευτέρωσις), is a secondary commandment. But it is neither the ordinance of circumcision, nor the law of the Sabbath, nor

the ritual of the Paschal festival, nor the morning nor the evening sacrifice; and then quoting verbally from the books of Moses the two sentences in the text,—but it is this verse (of Deuteronomy), "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," which is the first precept, and that because a perfect direction of the faculties towards God, an *amor rite ordinatus ad Deum*, is the principle of all religion; and this verse (of Leviticus xix. 18), "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," is the second precept, because the principle of all morality is the due equilibrium of the selfish and disinterested affections.

If anything like what I have now endeavoured to express be the bearing of our Lord's reply, it offers, I think, a position which any naturalist theory of the origin of the Gospels is insufficient to account for. That out of the bosom of the Rabbinical school should issue an utterance which upset the principle on which that school was founded, that the whole system of gloss and interpretation should be at one effort discarded, and from commenting on a

hitherto unquestioned authority men should be on the spot recalled to the first principles of reason on which the dicta of that authority reposed,—this, if this had been an utterance of merely human wisdom, would be without parallel in the history of the transmission of thought, the history of religion and philosophy. It is true that the natural reaction of an age of criticism is to throw the mind back on first principles; that the rigorous deduction of gloss and commentary practises in the end a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* on its premisses. But the process in all the instances which history supplies has been slow and gradual, and the simple moral axioms have been only rescued from the artificial casuistry with which they have been overlaid after many efforts, many mistakes, an ardent controversy and vehement exaggerations of them. The establishment in any society of simple truths of morals is in the ordinary course of the world the *result* of a reaction and agitation of opinion. In the case of Christianity these first axioms are the antecedents and cause of the reaction which oc-

curred, and proceed at once in their faultless purity from the first originators of the religion.

This is one aspect in which these words of our Lord may be viewed; a second must be mentioned which is necessary to correct the former. For it is the case with respect to the whole moral teaching of the Gospel that to enable us to estimate it aright *two* opposite characteristics which it possesses must be embraced in our mind. It possesses at once novelty and antiquity. The ethics of Christianity are at once the same as, and different from, the ethics of the Old Testament. It is from dwelling on one of these characteristics of them to the exclusion of the other that erroneous views of the relation of the New to the Old Covenant have appeared, and are from time to time reappearing in Christendom. When the surprising originality of the morality inculcated in the discourses of our Lord is alone had regard to, we find persons contrasting it with the moral doctrines assumed in the Hebrew Scriptures, exalting Christianity by a comparison with Judaism, eulogising the religion of the New

Testament, while they repudiate with abhorrence that of the Old.

On the other hand, when the fabric of the Gospel history comes to be critically examined, and it is found that every idea, whether of morals or religion, may be traced to its germ in the older Scriptures, that the facts of the biography of Christ are but the realisation, both in their general character and in detail, of that anticipatory sentiment which was the life and substance of the old Jewish creed, and that the very language and expression of the narratives themselves are adopted from the Law and the Prophets, from these observations, which have been conducted by recent investigators with the highest ingenuity and all the resources of learning, a conclusion has been drawn that the Gospel story is a product of Jewish imagination, that its material cause existed in the sacred books of the Hebrew canon, and its efficient cause in the long-cherished Messianic expectation and the current ideas of the Palestine Jews, drawn to a head by the awful destruction of their religion and nationality at the close of

the first century of our era. This is the theory to which men have been conducted by dwelling exclusively on the resemblances of the Christian doctrine to the written and traditional belief of the Jews of that age. The first and obvious mode of encountering this mythical system is by pointing out those elements of the Christian scheme for which no Oriental creed furnishes a type, to insist, in short, on the originality of Christ's character and teaching. In answer to the first-mentioned class of objectors, those who, dazzled by the novel simplicity of the Christian morality, profess to embrace it as alone worthy of divine purity and holiness, it is necessary to bring forward the identity of principle in the moral teaching of Christ and that of Moses. By combining these two points of view we can alone obtain a just appreciation of the relation of the Old Testament to the New. To the latter alone I shall confine the few remarks which now remain to make. This endeavour to separate the Old Testament from the New, though revived of late years, not without considerable popularity, is no novel

effort of thought. We are familiar with it in the speculations of the earlier centuries, not only in the extreme and dogmatical form of Manicheism, but as a tendency more or less prevailing throughout the Christian body. We may select from representations popular at the present day one or two points of objection of this character.

One especial head of objection is drawn from the supposed contrast between the conception of the Deity presented by the Old Scriptures and the New. Instead of the Father of mercies and God of consolation of the New, we have, it is said, in the Old Testament an awful and terrible King of the world, a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, angry with the wicked every day, and keeping His anger for ever, of purer eyes than to behold iniquity. His favour is scarce less terrible than His anger. He is the jealous rival of the tutelary deities of Syria or Phœnicia, exacting from His votaries an exclusive homage. His code of laws is Draconian. He that offends in one point is guilty in all. Good were it for

man that he had never been born. Much more might be cited to this effect, but this will suffice to indicate the nature of the objection to which I now refer. We do not deny that such pictures represent, though in exaggerated terms, yet represent truly, one of the attributes of the Deity of the Old Testament. But, notwithstanding them, the Jehovah of the Jews is the God of the Gentiles and of Christianity, and the representations of His attributes in the Old Testament are in harmony with His dealings with man as presented to us in the New. The following suggestions may be offered on this head. If the Hebrew Scriptures present to us an angry and avenging aspect of the Deity, this is only what the course of nature and of the world also does. Man is not the object in this life only of indulgences, mercies, and enjoyments. Distress and sorrow are (to say the least) quite as widely dispensed in the world as pleasures and satisfactions. What are war, pestilence, and famine, or the more ordinary visitations of violence, disease, and pain, and the great final dissolution of our physical

frame, but so many visitations of a terrible and avenging nature, of the same character with that aspect of Divinity portrayed in the Old Testament? It is not, then, the mere representation of man as a suffering and afflicted being at which the objector stumbles—for in this respect it seems that the Jewish prophet does but echo the declarations of nature and experience—it is that other and further portion of this representation which speaks of this suffering as vindictive, as inflicted by a personal Providence as a personal retribution for sin. It is not the *fact* of human woe which is questioned, for to that fact experience bears its too plain testimony, but the *doctrine* that that woe is penal and judicial in its nature. But surely it is the *fact* of nature and not the *doctrine* of the Scripture in which the real difficulty consists. The doctrine that all pain is penal, that physical evil is a consequence of moral evil, that suffering is a visitation of a righteous Judge upon the sinner, is but an attempt to explain this phenomenon of suffering, to find a clue to this scene of misery and disorder which, without that clue,

would be hopeless and inexplicable indeed. "There is nothing in these invectives directed against the Jehovah of Moses which may not with equal fitness be directed against the Author of the course of this world. This abounding of natural evil is the effect of the divine abhorrence of moral evil, as asserted by Moses, or it is not—if it be so, then the Pentateuch and nature are so far in harmony; if it be not so, then nature is immeasurably more confounding in its moral mystery than revelation, inasmuch as it leaves us all the suffering without any adequate recognition of sin as its cause" (Vaughan). But the truth is, that this avenging aspect of the Divinity which offends so much in the Hebrew Scriptures is no peculiar feature of Judaism. The consciousness of moral delinquency in man, and the tokens of retribution and displeasure sent forth among us by the power or powers regarded as governing the world, have given this aspect of awfulness more or less to the religions of all nations. The Eumenides of Greek and the Loki of Scandinavian mythology, the Sheva of the

Brahminical and the Ahriman of the Magian theology, all owe their origin to the imperishable operations of human thought and human conscience, strengthened as these thoughts have been by seeing so much physical evil pressing everywhere closely on the heels of so much moral disorder. This darker aspect, then, of the Jehovah of the Old Testament which is so appalling to our weakness is nothing more than the Divine attribute of purity and holiness dwelt upon in its antagonism to sin. If the Almighty Being be absolute justice and righteousness—*i.e.* if there be a God at all—the regard which such righteousness must turn towards sin can only be that which the words anger, hatred, and aversion convey. The God of the Jews is not a mischievous spirit whose capricious personal favour is to be secured only by some fortunate individuals without reference to their moral character or conduct; it is the highest conception of absolute holiness regarded in relation to the aberrations of our free will. If morality be a truth, if the distinction between virtue and vice be anything, then in no other

colours can the Deity be represented to our minds than in those in which He is represented in the Old Testament; there can be no doubt, to use an expression of Butler, which side He is of—that He is for virtue and against vice.

If, then, the proclamation of nature concerning the God of nature is so awfully to this effect, that every system of religion devised by man presents some counterpart to the threatenings of Jehovah against sinners, if the universal instinct of mankind requires some such attribute in its Moral Governor, we conclude that no supposed revelation which does not so speak can possibly be of divine origin. So far, then, from its being a mark of superiority in the Scriptures of the New Testament, that they present to us the Deity divested of the terrible and avenging aspect which He wears in the Old, it would rather create a presumption, if they did so do, against them. If Christianity does offer us a Deity who can behold moral iniquity without offence, Christianity is less, instead of better, adapted to the circumstances of man, and responds less to the demands of his

moral nature than the older dispensation. But a very transient glance at the New Testament will tell us that this is not the case. The doctrine of the Gospel concerning human depravity and its terrible consequences is not a whit less awful than the threatenings of Moses and the prophets. It is true that it brings life and immortality to light, that it holds out hope and restoration and aid; but that is not now in question. We are not now speaking of the supernatural interposition to save, but of the natural aspect which the Father who gave His only begotten Son for the world's sin inevitably wears towards that sin. We may measure the divine wrath against erring man by the effort of divine mercy to avert the consequences of his error. The Incarnation, the sum of the Gospel history, is itself the standing evidence not more of the mercy which prompted the interposition than of the dreadful doom which awaited us but for that interposition.

Nay, the terrors of God's judgments are so far from being absent from the Christian Scriptures that they are present there in a

more terrible shape, more terrible in proportion as the punishments of the unseen world transcend in fearfulness the judgments of the visible. None of the denunciations of the prophets can thrill the soul with that awe with which it must regard its approach to Him who is revealed as able to destroy both soul and body in hell. If the national judgments denounced by Moses against national idolatry and apostasy are appalling to read, how much more awful is the thought of a personal judgment to come, of that dread ordeal through which each of us individually has to pass, which is first distinctly proclaimed in the Gospels? The doctrine of the New Testament is especially the doctrine of a life to come, and on this ground (it has been well said) "the degree in which it ministers to our hope must be the degree in which it ministers to our fears. The light and the shadow string these together. Responsibility augments with privilege; so it must be with guilt, and so with penalty." "He that despised Moses' law died without mercy: of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be

thought worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace?" Awful words these, which, with whatever qualification they may be received, are alone sufficient to refute the opinion that the New Testament stands in contrast with the Old in not presenting the Deity under the aspect of an avenging sin-hating God. The identity of the two systems on this point is complete. Declarations of the Deity against sin are found in Christianity as well as in Judaism. Nay, they hold a position in the latter system proportioned to the enlarged scope and being of that system. If the terrors of the Law were of a more temporal and secular nature, so were its promises and hopes. If it was Christianity which first distinctly promised an immortality of bliss, it at the same time disclosed that the tendency of unassisted nature was to an immortality of woe. The judgments in Deuteronomy are confined to the Jews; Christianity brings all mankind to stand before

the judgment seat of Christ. This proportional variation in the application of the principle only establishes more completely the identity of the principle on which the systems are based in common.

We have traced this identity in that attribute of God which represents Him as awarding judicial penalty to sin. The same method might be pursued with every other principle involved in the Christian scheme. The manifestation of such principle may have been in more outward and material conditions in the earlier covenant, in more inward and spiritual presence in the later: but the principle remains the same. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy strength" involves every relation of the finite created dependent spirit to the infinite, creating, absolute Spirit. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" involves every relation of co-ordinate beings, even to the new commandment which is in so especial a manner the Christian commandment of charity. Our sublimest conceptions of the majesty, beauty, and blessedness possible to the spiritual universe

are embodied in this language. "The mental progress of thirty centuries has added nothing to the oracle delivered from that far remote and shadowy past concerning the spiritual relations and the spiritual obligations of our race." To be as this law demands is to be as an angel of God, to be as man was at first, and as the capacities of man assure us he must be again if the destiny proper to his nature is to be realised.

II.

[Whit-Monday, 1851.]

"Charity never faileth: but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away."—1 CORINTHIANS xiii. 8.

WE are well accustomed to a division of the education which universities profess to give into professional and liberal. The one is the special initiation in the matter and method appropriate to any one of the learned professions; the other is the general cultivation of the intellectual power. Both are highly valuable, useful, and necessary for their respective purposes. But if we are to institute a comparison between them as to which must rank the highest in our esteem, we shall not fail to perceive that the value of the professional studies is a wholly relative and conventional value, depending both on the worth of the end

which each profession respectively seeks to, and on the estimation which that profession happens from time to time to hold with the world. For example, in our own country the profession of canonist enjoyed during several centuries that pre-eminence among the branches of the legal profession which has now passed to the common lawyer—passed very arbitrarily, it must be thought, in those countries which recognise the undisputed prerogative of the civil law.

But the higher education is that which has no professional application—which aims at no other end than the improvement of the mind, whose value, therefore, does not vary with the shifting valuation of the occupation to which it ministers, but is as permanent as is the worth of the mental powers it cultivates. These are the studies which draw forth and educe a portion of our common nature, which develop the elements of the humanity which is in us. *Litteræ humaniores*—the knowledge proper to man as man, and not as physician or lawyer. *Liberal* studies, for they are those which we pursue as

free men, for so far as we are occupied in our several professions we are not free, but the servants of those to whom we minister. The minister of the Gospel is not his own, but the servant of those to whom he ministers. "Necessity is laid upon me, yea, woe is unto me if I evangelise not." The highest species of education we thus conceive to be that which serves no further purpose than disciplining the mind—we have then done most for the man when we have most augmented his mental power; he is then best fitted for his sphere when his faculties in general have been most cultivated and his reason furnished with general and not with special knowledge—with that knowledge which is valuable for itself and not for its applications. This is a position which will be generally, though not universally, admitted, and which has been the foundation of every complete system of education in all times.

Quitting for the present this position—an observation founded on the nature of man—let us dwell on another position, a position

grounded on the Christian system. Christianity offers an object to the pure reason,—its theology, its doctrine of the nature of God. Christianity as a system of religion comprises a theology; but the theology is not put forward as the essential part of the religion. Christianity is by nothing so much distinguished from the other religions known to us as by laying its whole weight on morality. It communicates no knowledge but what is subservient to practice. What it discloses of the divine nature and government, it discloses only to ground human duty thereon. We are to be saved by a faith, but it is only by such a faith as is fruitful of works. Not to know, but to do, the will of God is its repeated inculcation. Compared with the more philosophical religions on the one hand, and with the more sensualistic and material popular religions on the other, this its distinctive ethical character will stand out in a clear light. The tendency of the more speculative and purely spiritual religions is to find employment for the reason only, to place the business and the happiness of

man in the unimpeded energy of thought—taking no account of the passions and of the bodily framework. This is the religion of the few. On the other hand, the religion of the vulgar has usually tended towards a material ceremonial observance—frankincense and gold are offered to propitiate the ill-will of a powerful Being whose jealousy, satisfied by the abandonment of a part, may leave his votary in quiet possession of the rest of his wealth. Intermediate between the religions which consist in material worship and those which are restricted to a rational contemplation stands the religion whose essence is moral action. Between the religion of the few and the many is the religion of all. This professes not to instruct man in that intensity of thought by which he is more than man, nor does it degrade his divine service into a sale and purchase of divine favour. Pure and undefiled *θρησκεία* before God is active charity and a pure life. Other religions have in their degree comprised or recommended morality. Christianity *is* a system of practical ethics. The true descrip-

tion of it is, not that it is a theology for the reason, a method of action for the practical powers, and a ceremonial for the senses, all in a combination, in which each of the three parts is equally of the essence of the thing, but it is essentially a discipline of life, having indeed its basis on a fixed metaphysical doctrine, and embodied in a variable ceremonial.

This position as to the essential character of Christianity, like our former, will, I think, be generally, though far from universally, admitted. For as there have been sects which, from partial or perverted views of the nature of man, have been led to disown and refuse all intellectual pursuits, misapplying the expressions of St. Paul as to the foolishness of human learning, so there have been other—often the same—sects which have conceived of Christianity as something *sui generis* and apart, a subject referable to no known class of cognoscibles, an action performable by no ascertained faculties of the soul. But disregarding these dissidents under either head, and satisfied with the assent of the reasonable and instructed to our two

positions, that the best education is rightly directed to the development of the mental powers, and again that Christianity is a discipline of holy and pure practice—let us proceed to put these positions in juxtaposition and ask ourselves if they are quite consistent. How can we, on the one hand, acquiesce in that position of Christianity which establishes it as a law and method of virtuous action, a perfect polity for the training of its citizens to a good life, and yet as members of that society maintain an educational system which devotes itself exclusively, or at least primarily, to the intellect? If we believe that the business of man as man is a perfect life of social virtue, an active obedience for obedience' sake, would not all the endeavours of education be bent in this direction, especially when we know that the most that education can do goes but a little way towards realising the idea of moral perfection and harmony which we can form? While, again, does not the actual direction of our education point to a different estimate of the intellect, to a value of it independent of its ministerial function as

the guide of life? Could we bring ourselves to dedicate so much time and labour, I say, not to the accomplishments but to the substantial cultivation of the intellect, if we believed that our life and the purpose of our being was centred in our practical energies? We do not insist on the rare and exceptional cases where devotion to the higher and abstract studies is found a force sufficient to countervail the universal attraction of the great gravitating centres of life, wealth, honours, and enjoyment—we would leave out of the account altogether the patient few who have willingly foregone the prizes of life, "the comforts of earth and the charities of home," for the sake of what Milton enthusiastically describes as "a calm and pleasing solitariness fed with cheerful and confident thoughts where we behold the bright countenance of truth in the quiet and still air of delightful studies," and we argue only from the respect in which general ability as distinct from special talent is held, from the regard had to enlarged views, to comprehensive intellect, to grasp of thought, to general information, to

knowledge as distinct from learning, would not this respect and regard be excessive and preposterous if all these things were to perish with the using? They would but be on the same footing with the most frivolous and childish pastimes, mere divertisements, avocations from the true and serious business of man. The sentiments and the practice of men who prize the abstract exertion of mind just in proportion as they are able to apprehend it present themselves as facts irreconcilable with that view of life which absorbs all the human energies into the one channel of moral and religious action.

But how is the incompatibility between the two positions widened when we go on to take into the account the future world, and that further consequence of the Christian view no less unmistakably attached to it, that not only is "knowledge not our proper happiness," but action—but that further on the mode of our action as right or wrong depends the whole future condition of the man. A practical religion, as opposed to a speculative one, involves, whether it assert it or not, the doctrine of a

judgment according to works. They that have *done* good shall go into everlasting life, and they that have *done* evil into everlasting misery. We cannot escape from this as the necessary consequence of a belief that duty, religious and moral, is our business here. But what an awful prospect this for a rational intelligence! To know that its weal and woe for ever are perilled on the use it makes of a few short and fleeting years, a mere point in comparison to that whole existence whose colour it is to decide. The immortal spirit, conscious of its own immortality, finds itself exposed to a probation in a matter and of a sort foreign to its own proper nature. Its function is to think, and it finds itself tied to a nature, entering as a constituent of a machine where its compelled business is to choose, and where it chooses at its own imminent risk. Immortal as it is in its own being, it is, without its own consent, the subject of an experiment which may end in its immortality becoming a curse to it. The condition of humanity as a whole has often been lamented in pathetic terms by the reflecting; and yet humanity as a

whole may not unreasonably be held accountable for its own misdoings. But with how much greater severity does the condition appear when we view it as that of an indestructible substance having no other power than that of thought, held responsible for actions of which it is only a concurrent cause, only a cause to that extent to which a thought determines an act, a being living on the brink of being ruined for ever by errors in the conduct of an ill-understood and enforced business! If such be the unhappy predicament of the reason, any cultivation of itself for its own sake, anything like an education not immediately ministrant to utility, all acquirement, all pursuit of knowledge, becomes truly not only what the practical man esteems it, an idle amusement, but a worse folly, it is time and attention diverted from an occupation for which all the time and attention we have to give are insufficient. Could a reason cognisant of its perilous footing ever for one moment abandon itself to the free and unimpeded exercise of its power, when by so doing it is necessarily withdrawing itself from matters of more

vital concern to it? Liberal education, that training which has no other object beyond self-improvement, would then be the most pernicious folly that has ever prevailed amongst mankind. The instinctive dislike and contempt which the man of the world feels for the theorist and speculator would be abundantly justified. The maxim of the market-place and the court, *ζητοῦσι τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράσσειν*, would be the dictate not of *worldly* wisdom alone, but of the truest spiritual wisdom.

But if we may not let one of these positions go for the sake of securing the other, is it possible to hold them both consistently? The belief in a separate immaterial substance, not subject to the laws of production and decay that pervade the physical creation, the hypothesis which alone seems to explain the respect paid to great intellect, and our actual systems of education—this belief would appear to draw on conclusions adverse to another belief no less general, that of the paramount importance to man of practical life. An exclusive attachment to the latter hypothesis is at the bottom of the

many popular notions of religion which refuse to admit any element of intelligence and exalt a simple Christianity, as well as of the higher efforts of the ascetic and mortified saint; asceticism being the culminating point of that view which looks too exclusively at the moral to the disparagement of the rational element. To pursue the opposite course, and to hold up the intellect as alone entitled to our cares, necessarily conducts to some such hypothesis by way of accounting for its present degraded position —as those of some of the Oriental mythologies, or of Plato, or of Origen—and we must suppose that its present dependence on matter and the senses is by way of penance for some past errors. But as each of these positions separately appears to rest on a broad basis of fact and observation, if we could find a point of view from which they could be seen to be in harmony, there would be a presumption created that it was a just view. Christian philosophy immediately felt this difficulty. It is one that attaches to the system of Aristotle, but its pressure was not made apparent owing to

the low place occupied in that system by the practical activity. It is, however, a difficulty unsolved by that system how the godlike thinking substance can be at once perfect in its own independence and yet appear again in the man as ministering to his well-being as a further end. But as soon as Christianity brought forward the further position that the reason is not only under a temporal obligation for a season to minister to the man's well-being, but that on its discharge of this obligation hung its own well-being or the contrary, when it superadded the notion of moral probation to that of moral obligation, then the unaccountable position of the supernatural particle became startling and loudly demanded an explanation: that whose only distinction it is that it transcends nature, finding itself lodged within nature, and called upon at its peril to co-operate with that nature to produce a new effect,—an effect to which nature alone cannot rise, an effect to which God, pure act of thought, cannot descend, that peculiar effect of which a man alone can be the cause—a moral action.

Time will only allow of our briefly indicating the line of explanation to which the Christian philosophy was driven for this anomaly in the physical world, the intrusion into it of a foreign substance not subject to its laws. It would be almost sufficient for this purpose to remind you of the two sermons of Butler on the Love of God, which tread closely in the footsteps of the great Christian philosopher in that modification of the system of Aristotle which it was found necessary to introduce to fill a breach which had always indeed existed in that system, but which Christianity had formidably widened.

The position of Christian philosophy on this subject reduced to a very general expression is this. Moral obligation, or the necessity of a practical activity, is not a lower, servile, and degrading business by some unaccountable power imposed on the thinking principle, a coil which it longs to shuffle off that it may revert to its own proper energy of thought,—it flows from the very nature and being of *a* reason. Of *a* reason, I say, for the same is not true of the Supreme Master Reason. But suppose a

separate and derived intelligence escaped from the prison of sense, and this complex scene, relapsed to its proper occupation, the contemplation of the Intelligible. Let it see but these two objects in the universe, God and itself. It must immediately enter upon a comparison of these two objects, and as immediately discover that they are related as cause and effect. Consequently arises immediately the notion of a relation of dependence, and that one notion is a sufficient foundation for a religion, a sense of obligation necessarily springs from a conception of dependence. Not, indeed, an obligation to act, for in the case supposed the thinking principle is not furnished with acting powers, but an obligation to think of that relation and to cherish the thoughts and sentiments to which the conception of that relation must lead. Further, suppose it to become aware of the existence of other minds like itself dependent on the First Mind, and its perception of their being and nature gives rise to a perception of relations and to a new class of sentiments. The groundwork of religion and morality then lies

in the understood relations of mind to mind—to mind supreme and mind co-ordinate—results immediately from the pure act of thought, from the intuition, and is not the consequence of the lodgment of the reason in a sensitive and animated material frame. But now suppose further this pure reason thus percipient of its relations to the supreme and to other derived reasons, to be in whatever way invested with a clothing of mere powers of action and sensation, with a body and an animal soul: these are not the conditions which constitute his dependent relation towards God,—that relation existed prior to these new accidents, these are but so many means and opportunities by which it can exhibit, embody, and give a sensible shape to those prior conceptions of relation subordinate and co-ordinate. The obligations of religion and morality do not arise from our imprisonment on earth in a habitation of clay; they are not founded on our animal but on our rational part, and are inseparable from the exercise of our reason — *where* that reason happens to be lodged and by what accidents to be environed

makes no difference—they only determine the particular form and expression that from time to time the reason may be able to give to these conceptions. In this view the whole difficulty of the adjustment of the demands of the practical and contemplative life vanishes. It is seen to be erroneous to speak of the moral as opposed and inferior to the intellectual powers, and to regard life upon earth with its practical obligations and duties as a sphere altogether alien, from which the mind is released by death to enter on its own proper existence. Mind here in the virtuous, and in them only, is acting on the very conceptions which will be its permanent support hereafter. In the words of Butler, "Recall what was said of the affection to moral characters, which in how low a degree soever is plainly natural to man and the most excellent part of his nature; suppose this improved, as it may be improved to any degree whatever, in the spirits of just men made perfect; and then suppose that they had a real view of that righteousness, which is an everlasting righteousness; of the conformity of the

divine will to the law of truth in which the moral attributes of God consist; of that goodness in the Sovereign Mind which gave birth to the universe; add to this a consciousness of having an interest in what they are contemplating—suppose them able to say, This God is our God for ever and ever—would they be any longer to seek for what was their chief happiness, their final good? Could the utmost stretch of their capacities look further? Would not perfect goodness be their very end, the last end and object of their affections? beyond which they could neither have nor desire, beyond which they could not form a wish or thought."

Grant the hypothesis of a reason in man, of an intelligence which can grasp the First Intelligible—this intelligence must conceive of that Intelligible as either itself or as separate from itself; if separate from itself, then the cause of itself; and this conception by an intelligence of an Intelligence which is the cause of itself immediately establishes a relation between them, of that intelligence which is dependent to that Intelligence which is absolute.

A deity who is thought without will can only be conceived on that alternative which identifies the human intellect with the divine—the conclusion to which the Averroists wished to push the undecided and seeming inconsistent language of Aristotle. If there exist intelligences separate from the Prime Intelligence, then that Prime Intelligence must be the efficient cause and not the final cause only of those other intelligences.

Thus it appears that the spheres of thought and action, of the speculative and practical life, are not to be contrasted; that contemplation and action are not competing theories of happiness; that morality is not to be set up and intellect disparaged, as if they were disparate pursuits. The excellence and dignity of active life so strenuously put forward by practical men is only to be vindicated on a view which assigns to pure reason an unapproached pre-eminence among our faculties. Moral and religious obligation can only be established on the basis of perceived relations to separate intelligents. The most abstract region of speculation is that

which must bear the weight of our most homely and household occupations. To profess an exclusive admiration of and devotion to business, with an implied, if not expressed, contempt for theory, is irrational and inconsistent. The man of theory, indeed, is too often not without cause the object of the anger or contempt of the man of practice. For the man of theory is often he who uses theory not as the guide but as the substitute for action; he is talking when he should be moving; he has always something better to *propose* than what you would do. He deserves, indeed, the disregard he usually meets with. Yet mere empirical action is servile and of little worth.

III.

[November 3, 1861.]

"The children ought not to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children."—2 CORINTHIANS xii. 14.

IT is not possible to doubt, on the whole, that the good of society tends towards an incompatibility with the highest development of the individual man. In order to acquire civil rights we part with much of our natural freedom. Members of one family have to exercise much self-denial for which there is no call were they living alone. The action of the machine destroys its own parts, and the general course of nature is founded upon the decay and reabsorption of individual organisms. Analysis and the microscope on the other hand bringing into full light the elaborate construction of single existences, the finish of each minutest detail of the insect or the plant, lead us in the opposite

direction—lead us towards the conclusion that the perfection of life is realised not in the whole but in each of the parts for its separate self.

As with material organisms, so with minds and characters. All the moral beauties of character are personal. All that moves us to respect, admiration, reverence, adoration is individual. There is no such thing as abstract merit. All our moral qualities for good or for evil are not absolute properties, like the qualities of matter, but tendencies to act and think in a given way. The more we are *ourselves*, the more the individual can withdraw itself from the blind mechanism of social habit, the more intense our moral life. The spontaneous energy of the will is the man.

Here are two distinct classes of facts, from which, when observed and collected irrespective of each other, opposite inferences must be drawn. The one class of facts leads to the conclusion that moral aim terminates in the utmost development of the individual. The other class of facts leads to the opposite theory, which would provide for the well-being of man

by incorporating him as completely as is possible in an all-pervading social mechanism. All actual governments and all known states of society are conducted on one or the other of these opposite principles. Not indeed that any practical form of society completely realises either of these ideas to the absolute exclusion of its opposite. No communistic community is so despotic as not to leave some play to the individual will. Only in the poetic fiction of Cyclopean times did a race of men ever exist without common θέμιστες, without a restraining law. But all politics and forms of government derive their character from the preponderance of the one or the other of these two balancing elements—from their tendency to favour individual energy, or to enforce uniformity of type upon their component units.

As governments thus fall into two separate classes with opposite tendencies, so do all schemes and methods of education. For education is only the effort of adult society to mould the new recruits as they fall in to such a degree of uniformity to its own habits as is

necessary to its own comfort. The instinct to educate on the part of society is far from being a purely unselfish instinct fundamentally. It is an instinct of self-preservation, a desire to maintain those habits of thought and standards of value to which we have become familiarised, but which would be destroyed or depreciated if a new race grew up alongside of us nourished in alien ideas. As education is thus only a function of social life, it necessarily partakes of the characteristics of that life. And so all methods of education are governed by one or the other of two conflicting aims. Of the one method the inspiring aim is to absorb the individual in the extant habits and ideas of the community or the class into which he is born. Of the other method the proposed end will be the culture and expansion of the man. The one sets out from the abstract idea of the whole, of the body corporate, whether universal humanity, or the State, or the Church, and seeks the welfare of the individual by assimilating him to it. The other starts from the concrete fact of the person, and seeks his well-

being in encouraging and promoting the healthy growth of all his powers and faculties, bodily and spiritual. But though all actual methods of education must be referred to one or other of these two types, not one presents the type of either without much mixture and check from the other. Not the iron rigours of Spartan discipline, not the tyranny of a democratic majority in a Greek republic, can wholly exclude the entrance of new ideas or the growth of a dissentient minority. Still less does any generation, or any *man*, however stimulated by the present, or nourished by hope of the future, ever succeed in entirely divesting itself of the ideas inherited from the past. But the difference is unmistakable between a state of society as in China, where the dead forms of the past extinguish all the life of the present, and that in the rising and thinly-peopled Western States, where the energy and enterprise of the young efface the influence and consideration of the generation they are superseding.

All society, as all nature, is sustained by the conflict and balance of these two tendencies

—the tendency to perpetuate type, and the tendency to deviate from it. In nature and in society alike, were the balance exactly adjusted, were these forces, the new and the old, in equilibrium, there would never be any epochs, any crises, any revolutions. Was the hereditary transmission of physiological and moral properties governed simply by the laws of life, without being crossed by other collateral changes, the old world would be supplanted by the new so insensibly that man at least would never be conscious of the change. A change may be entire, but if spread out over enormous periods of time, it will escape the best means which we, with our limited faculties, possess of preserving the memory of the past. But we find, in fact, that such liquid lapse of the current of life through infinite time has not been the course either of nature or society. What makes political history what it is, is the occurrence of revolutions—violent efforts, some abortive, some successful, of the new modes of social existence to supersede the old, or to give themselves rights alongside of the old. Political

change is only the recognition in the exterior fabric of the constitution of a social change which has already occurred in the interior relations of classes. And this social change, or alteration in the mutual relation of classes of society, implies an antecedent change in the character and ideas of the individuals of whom those classes consist. This change of the habits and thoughts of the individual takes place not in the *same* person. With very rare exceptions, the habits and notions of men are formed very early in life, and remain fixed to the end of it what they were. The change takes place between father and son—it occurs in the transmission of the nature—the same, yet with a difference. It is the new generation, which, even in stationary conditions of society, never exactly repeats the generation that preceded it.

A due regard for this law of flux and change in human society is one of the first principles of political wisdom. We cannot, even if we would, withdraw ourselves from the operation of the law. To attempt to do so—and the attempt has been repeatedly made—only entails

an accumulated debt on distant generations. In education, no less than in political institutions, the same law must be recognised as imperative. We are too apt, in our presumptuous ambition, to forget that only the present moment is our own. We must not build our houses as if we were erecting eternal mansions. We must not legislate for a remote posterity, but for the actual conjuncture. The mutability of human affairs is not a contingent instability, but an inexorable law of change. To attempt to remove any portion of our secular life from the operation of this law, by founding institutions which are to last for ever, by creating perpetuities, has been the fertile source of political embarrassment and individual unhappiness.

The duty which the State owes to its children, which the old owes to the new generation, is defined by this consideration. We can only form the young into one body, one republic with ourselves, by one of the two methods indicated just now. We must enforce our own ideas in the lump upon them, not admitting any divergence, or the intrusion of

any disturbing doubt. We must arm the State with despotic powers over the heart, mind, and character, and tie down every class in society by severe penalties as to how it shall think, act, and live, either by a minute code of caste regulations, or by the agency of a ubiquitous and inquisitorial police. In this way we may endeavour to perpetuate our own moral life, to preserve the unity of our State, to feel ourselves succeeded, not supplanted, by the young. That is one method—the method in which we set out from the idea of the State, from a given type of society. The other method is that in which we set out from the idea of the person, and endeavour to strengthen and expand those faculties of heart, mind, and soul, which the individual possesses in common with the rest of his species; to discipline the intellect and the character to the perfection of its powers. The first of these methods is familiar to us in this place as sketched in the most brilliant effort of philosophical imagination extant in literature,—the Ideal Polity of Plato. Recoiling from the chaotic anarchy of opinion and sentiment which

he found around him in his own country, and deeply impressed with the necessity of some vigorous conservative element to save society from perishing of its own licentiousness, Plato proposed a thorough reform of education as the remedy. This reform was based on a fixed system of ideas which was to be preserved and inculcated intact and unimpeached from generation to generation. These ideas were not related to truth relatively only, and to human action regulatively only, they were themselves the expression of absolute truth, or rather the only true forms of real existence. An objective moral type, existing outside of man, and the compulsory conformity of the citizen to that type in various degrees, according to his mental capacity and his calling—that is Plato's education.

In the Catholic universities of the middle ages the same principle of education is seen reduced to practice. Growing up under the shadow of a spiritual despotism, these schools were framed wholly with the view of teaching, of communicating useful knowledge. Mental discipline, or the formation of the individual,

was an idea wholly strange to them. Not only the sacred truths of Revelation, but all other subjects whatever were taught on the same footing. We must not think of the universities of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as exclusively, or even primarily, seminaries of theology. The curriculum culminated in theology, but not till it had first run through the whole cycle of knowledge as then received. Every part of secular science was taught in them, but it was taught not as science but dogmatically. Every branch of knowledge was reduced to the form of a *corpus doctrinæ*—of a deductive system—of which the first principles rested on the authority of some great name, Aristotle or Galen. The grand idea of science to which free Greek thought had attained, as a ἕξις or subjective condition of the individual reason, had disappeared, and knowledge had come to denote a syllabus of verbal propositions which could be written in a book, and inculcated by a professor. The initiation into this knowledge, its passive reception by the understanding, constituted education. One

active habit of the understanding, indeed, was incidentally cultivated by the Middle-Age education, which ought to be mentioned with praise wherever the object is to do justice to that system. This merit is the correct use of language; an accurate terminology, carried indeed by some over-subtle scholastics to absurd excess, but which in general contrasts most favourably with the slipshod and intangible metaphor which the revival of classical learning has introduced into modern style.

However thankful we in this country must be for the religious blessings which the Reformation movement brought to us, it will not be denied that its immediate effect on the universities was most disastrous. Even in education, however, it is to the Reformation movement that we must trace, however remotely, the origin amongst us of that other notion which has now prevailed for many years in our theory and practice in this place. Among all our many differences, there is probably no one point on which we are all so unanimous as that the end and aim of our academic efforts is the

cultivation of the intellect and the character, and not the communication of useful knowledge. In our practice, perhaps, we are hardly mindful enough of our principle. But as to our principle, as to the choice we make between the two theories of education which I have been contrasting, we are not likely to lose our hold, for some time to come, on that to which we are now committed by the whole cast of our institutions. That the intellect and the character have a health, a beauty, a perfection of their own, and that the attainment of this perfection is the scope of a liberal education, and that this mental cultivation is a thing quite distinct from the acquisition of information, or the inculcation of truth, or the reception of certain opinions, all this has been brought into clear and conscious light for us by controversy and collision with opposite and popular ideas of education. It may be that in the course of the controversy some of the disputants may have depreciated unduly the value of useful knowledge, or the necessity of traditive and protected opinion in certain subjects, but these are passing errors—

errors which we can shake off while we firmly grasp the great principle, that not the promotion of truth, but the cultivation of the individual, is the end at which we have to aim; that our business in this place is to form the mind, to enlarge, to correct, to refine it—to qualify it to know, not to give it knowledge, to enable it to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge; to give it command over its own faculties; to temper it to all the flexibility, keenness, sagacity, of which the raw material is capable; to endow it with method and philosophical grasp; to set it free from the dominion of prejudice, of preconceived opinion, of early bias, of popular illusion; to teach it to know itself, its strength and weakness; to assert its just rights without overstepping the limitation of its powers; to realise in its serene and balanced existence the paradox that it is at once cognisant of the absolute, and fettered by the phenomenal; to purge it from the moral evils of pride and self-admiration, and from the meaner vices of acquiescence, servility, degradation to selfish ends, ambition of place and profit; to maintain

among ourselves an intellectual republic, within which nor wealth nor rank nor station may enforce their vulgar claims to honour, but in which every one has accorded him, without envy, without depreciation, that consideration which properly belongs to him for that which he is in himself.

This, my brethren, is the noble task imposed upon us—the profession to which we have the honour and happiness to find ourselves called. May our only rivalry among ourselves be which can be most worthy of such a calling! Trifling, indeed, seems the best contribution that the best and ablest can make to so vast a field of enterprise. Yet it is one in which every one of us may do something if we will. If we cannot teach, we may exhort and encourage; if we cannot exhort with effect, we may give our sympathy, we may show by word and deed on which side our taste and feeling is engaged in the arduous struggle which is ever going on between mind and matter; between the spirit of mental cultivation and the spirit of worldly success; between the self-denial of solitary

study and the seductive attractions of the amusements and enjoyments of youth. We can all do *this;* and let us not think that sympathy is little to give. Sympathy is no substitute for alms; it will not clothe the naked or feed the hungry. But in spiritual and intellectual things a true sympathy is the most powerful aid which one human mind can lend to another; of far greater efficacy in stimulating to new effort, and in bracing to high resolve than the most correct instruction, or most luminous exposition of science. Hence it is that the most successful teacher is not he who has the most entire command of the principles of his science, or the fullest knowledge of its details, but he whose feeling is most in tone with its aims. There is an intellectual freemasonry by which liberal minds recognise each other, however widely separated they may be by station in life, by age, by acquirements, by extent of information. We call it intellectual sympathy, but it is strictly moral, for it is the love of truth which such minds have in common, and which is as unmistakable in the incepting

scholar as in the consummate scientific intellect. It is indeed the native condition of the young and ingenuous mind, while it is as yet unwarped by sinister and self-interested aims, before he has learnt to conceal and to comply, to qualify and to explain away, to flatter prevailing illusions, to echo popular cries, and to put in practice the other arts of the phraseological market.

This train of reflection leads me to an objection which must necessarily arise in our minds, whenever from dwelling in imagination upon the magnificent ideal of a cultivated intellect, we turn to our own practical achievement in the work. We cannot but think that it is very easy but very idle to be going over the theory of a university in our minds, to be drawing fine pictures of it, to magnify our office, and to call common things by lofty names. For when from these glowing visions of what might be we turn to what is, how little correspondence do we find! We look at the material upon which we have to work, and our aspirations become a mockery even in our own eyes; we are glad to hurry out of sight that they may

not draw upon us the deserved ridicule of practical men. We step out of our studies with hearts dilated with the magnificent outlines of the Temple of Knowledge in which we dream we minister, and we find ourselves not in an academical auditory, but among the lower forms of a grammar school. Instead of a liberal curiosity, intellectual tastes, studious habits, and the frugal self-control of the scholar; instead of our ardour to teach being met by an equal ardour to learn, we find that we have to do with ignorance, stupidity, sensual tastes, laziness, indifference, an effeminate passion for amusement, self-indulgent habits, listless, aimless temperaments, inert rather than vicious, unenergetic, unheroic, unimpassioned. When to the generation of the stupid, the insensible, and the frivolous is added those whose understanding is frost-bound by the prejudices of a narrow sphere, or an artificial theological system, and those to whom the university course is a pecuniary speculation, the remnant is small indeed of those with whom we can hope to establish that intellectual sympathy between

young and old which is the instrument of intellectual culture.

When our duties appear to us in this humiliating light, we are not to shrink from them in despair. No man in God's world is *above* doing the work to which God has called him. Still less must we sit down in a self-pleasing acquiescence in our own unprofitableness, folding the hands and muttering, All is well, when it is not well. To be above our work is to be unpractical, to forget the world in which we have to live. To plume ourselves upon our imperfections, to acquiesce in our shortcomings, is to be unspiritual, to forget God, who has placed us here to train for eternity. We exist in two worlds at once, we must not ignore the laws and conditions of either of them. This is the very distinction of liberal education, the difference between the higher and the primary, between what is properly education and instruction, between development and the inculcation of truth. The one regards a man so far as he is a citizen of the world, and desires to equip him with the knowledge that is of

most use to him upon earth, to harmonise his ideas with the ideas of the community in which he has to live. The other regards him as himself an immortal reason, capable of a perfection of his own, and of at once and from the first being put in training for that consummation. So far from putting away from us as visionary the loftiest ideal of a cultivated reason which we can form, we ought to be ever bringing it forward, dwelling on it, picturing it, aspiring towards it. In this thought is the very savour of our profession; as teachers, in this ideal is our inspiration. Our Oxford education is reproached with being too unpractical; with being no longer adapted to the exigencies of modern English life. The reproach is intelligible enough—it originates in an undeniable fact—but it misstates the character of that fact. It would be more true to say that what we are in danger of letting slip from us is the ideal transcendental aim of moral cultivation. We have come too much to regard ourselves as instructors in knowledge; we hold examinations in knowledge; we award our degrees and our

honours to those who have acquired certain amounts of knowledge. That which we teach here when regarded as knowledge, as we ourselves do in our practice regard it, the world is not perhaps so very wrong in rating at a very low value. Knowledge for knowledge, that must be of most worth which bears most immediately on life. It is idle to argue the *utility* of the old classical curriculum. It is hopeless to prove that a language is a more useful acquirement than the laws of chemistry and physiology; that a dead language is an acquisition better worth having than a spoken language; that geometry is on a par in its applications with the four rules of arithmetic; that the history and antiquities of Athens should be learnt by us rather than the history and antiquities of Britain. We have in practice ceased to argue thus. We have succumbed to the weight of common-sense; we have made concessions. But in our new legislation we have not proceeded upon any avowed principle, or with a clear conscience. We have patched up a compromise between the two rival theories of education,

in which we have gone far, I fear, to forfeit the benefits of each rather than combine the advantages of both. Had we become converts to the doctrine that the communication of truth is our business, we ought to have discarded our obsolete subjects, and substituted the new in their room. But we have not done this. We have retained our old matters, antiquated as they are, and no longer able to fulfil the function they once fulfilled. We have retained them, because they are still to us the signs and tokens of that which they once effectuated, because they serve to remind us of that theory of education which we have never renounced, which we all still maintain in theory, and which is probably destined, at no distant day, to reinform our practice. Let us not faint in our practical endeavours, though our path be, for the moment, somewhat obscured by the inconsistencies into which we have been betrayed. The theory of mental cultivation, which we in Oxford have maintained (in theory) as our peculiar pride, is in the most entire harmony with the progress of civilisation, whatever appearances there may

be to the contrary. If there be such a thing as general progress, if knowledge is being spread over Europe, and education becoming more diffused, all that is good in such progress involves the principle we contend for. Time and discussion and controversy will only bring this principle into clearer light, and it will come to be understood that mental enlargement is not the aristocratic privilege of the few but the equal right of all, according to the measure of their capacity; that it is in no mystical connection with the learned languages, but requires very few books, and the observation of very common things.

These anticipations are, however, hazardous. Confining our thoughts to our own immediate practice, let us not despair if our net is cast wide and yet seems to take but few. The liberalising influences of ingenuous training extend to a much wider circle, and to understandings of a humbler order than is often thought. If indeed a philosophical temper implied a deep study of philosophical tenets, ancient and modern, it must ever remain a rare privilege—but to think this is to be imposed upon by a

name! Philosophy, technically so called, as taught in the schools is one thing, and has a very remote bearing on that philosophical balance of judgment which is the end of educational cultivation. Science has been well said to be nothing but trained and organised common-sense; its vast results are won by no other mental processes than those which are practised by every individual in the humblest and commonest affairs of life. Scientific culture resides not in the knowledge of certain classes of facts, but in the habit of mind with which those facts are regarded. The scientific man employs no other methods of investigation than those which we are all habitually using, only he does it consciously, with exactitude and consistency. Scientific investigation is not a novel and peculiar art applicable only to the less obvious phenomena of nature—its perfection lies in its exclusion of extraneous and irrelevant evidence. To have a scientific mind is not to have observed much, but to know how to observe; it is not to know in any peculiar way, but simply to know, as we all know, where

we *do* know, where the reason acts upon the phenomena unimpaired and unclouded by opinion, imagination, conjecture, prepossession, authority, or prescription. What science is to natural law and exact ratios, a liberal mind is to moral law and contingent relations; it is a right judgment in all things. The philosophical judgment does not differ essentially from that homely useful quality which is our guide in the practical relations of life—only we call it "judgment" when it is limited to the narrow sphere of personal interests; it rises into philosophical breadth when the same dispassionate and balanced consideration is extended over the whole complex of human affairs, the vast and varied range of man's social interests, his moral and feeling nature. As for science, so for philosophy, the training is negative; it lies not in supplying the mind with any new power, or suggesting a peculiar point of view, but in the rigid exclusion of falsifying influences; in the maintenance of a sound and healthy thinking, which values men and things at what they are worth, neither more nor less.

If this be our ultimate end, it follows that few, if any, of our students are wholly excluded from participation in the benefits of our culture. As there is no individual who realises in himself the perfection of the scientific *and* the practical reason together, or even of either of them apart from the other; no one in whom cultivation is carried as far as conceivable, whose intellect is a pattern of what intellects should be, so there is scarcely any but may gain an idea of what real training is, and be at least in sympathy with those who have carried it farther than himself.

Further, we should do well to remember that the intellect is cultivated not by lectures only or chiefly, but still more by discipline. As influence is more to it than law, so discipline is more than teaching. The student has more to learn from the environments of life than in the class-room. Teaching rather tends to simplify or to supersede thought; it is the moral interests of life which awaken it. The world lies everywhere around him; nor is a university withdrawn from the ordinary currents of social life. But in the academical world there is this

peculiar, that here the student is brought in contact with a class of men who are not to be found in the world without. A university is the home and harbour of studious men—men who are devoting their lives to the pursuit of science with the same ardour with which others are pursuing practical ends; men who not only know more than himself, but who are also, like himself, still learners. For our function here is not only to teach but to learn. We *can* only successfully teach while we are learning. And this learning, for us the teachers, does not consist in reading new books, in making fresh experiments, in mastering novel fields of facts, but in nourishing the intellect by the old springs of wisdom, by the contemplation of the eternal truths of religion, by prayer and spiritual exercise, maintaining the thought at an habitual level above earthly things. Unless our teaching be seconded by the interior discipline of our own life, it will be but sounding words. Only so far as we ourselves are treading this heavenward path, are reserving some portion of the day for severe study, for self-communing, for

the presence of God, for bracing and healthy mental discipline, for withdrawal from the trivial topics of the street and the market, only so far can we hope that our teaching will penetrate to the inner mind of our pupils, or kindle in them congenial aspirations. We must not begin by being dissatisfied with those we have to teach, or be too ready to cast the blame on their listlessness, till we are quite sure the fault lies not in our own want of tone and earnestness. But if from whatever cause we fail to impress ourselves on others, this living in Him who is life itself, this being enlightened by Him who is the truth itself, this studious retirement, this communion of our spirit with the Spirit of God, is itself its own blessed occupation and reward, in which we may all well be content to serve and wait till we reach that sphere in which we shall no longer see *ἐν αἰνίγματι*, but see Him as He is. What we shall be hath not yet been manifested; but when it shall be manifested, we know that we shall be like Him, and shall see Him as He is.

IV.

[October 18, 1863.]

"Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."—MATTHEW vii. 14.

WHEN last I spoke from this place I ventured to call your attention to some of the conditions presupposed by all higher education. And particularly to that condition which is denoted or implied by the term "liberal." This condition we then ventured to say was essential to culture. Culture is not a science, or a knowledge, or an accumulation of several branches of knowledge—but the habit of a mind trained to know. Culture is not opinion, or right opinion—it is not thought, or power over thought, or power over its expression in language; it is neither logic, rhetoric, nor metaphysics. Culture is not scientific—it is not literary. It is not the acquisition or possession of any accomplish-

ment by the mind; it consists in the development of a cultivated intellect itself.

In a word, liberal education is philosophical.

We saw further, that all along the annals of education this conception of the nature and office of education has struggled with another conception, according to which education consists in the acquisition of knowledge and accomplishment. This idea has always been the more popular of the two—inasmuch as it recommends itself immediately to the practical sense of the average man in every community. When this conception is once generally received, there is still the further question, What accomplishment is likely to be most serviceable? What knowledge is most worth? This question has been variously answered in various stages of the progress of society in Europe. One age has considered that it was the knowledge of God as the highest essence, and has placed theology at the apex of its curriculum. Another age has held that the proper study is human nature, and has accordingly educated through literature, with the arts of rhetoric and

politics which give power over the actions of other men. A third age will regard a knowledge of the laws of nature and life as the most valuable acquisition, and will accordingly treat positive science as the sole intellectual object which can claim the attention of young or old.

These three opinions, that the most valuable knowledge is theology, that it is literature, that it is science, give rise to distinct methods of practical education; but all agree in the common principle that training is putting in possession of knowledge. As standing on this basis they may be contrasted with the other theory, which may be called the theory of liberal education—which proposes as its end the cultivation of the being in itself.

This recapitulation of the argument of our last discourse has seemed necessary in order to place ourselves at a convenient point of view for going on to touch upon some further elements of that mental formation which the highest education aims to produce.

Let us speak to-day of that ingredient of a

philosophical education which may be called its *ascetic* element.

It cannot be supposed that the University has to do with the intellect only. This is the very distinction between special studies and liberal training, that professional preparation addresses itself only to the understanding, while liberal culture grasps the whole being. We deal not with abstract intelligences but with *men*. All the great men who have ever moved and improved mankind have fastened instinctively not upon men's reason, but upon men themselves. All harmonising influences *are* rational, but they are more; they are human. The highest of all influences which has ever been brought to bear upon the spirit of man, was not an influence of science or knowledge, but a personal influence. So no training of the young can be attempted successfully if it be confined to the mind only. We may speak of forming the mind,—but we must mean by it forming the character.

So much is recognised by all who have to do with education, as true of it throughout every

grade. Let us consider the special mode in which that highest branch of education with which we, in this place, are concerned, operates in this concerted action upon the whole nature of the individual.

All observers are agreed that there is some connection between our moral and our intellectual nature, however widely they may differ in the terms in which they state that connection. Without involving any particular theory of the nature of the relation between these two sides of our nature, we all include in our idea of the educated man some measure of moral perception. In the lower strata of moral development the connection between the understanding and the heart is hardly at all discernible. The infant is learning its letters, and at the same time is being taught to obey its parents, and to fear God. There seems here no relation between the two lessons—between the intelligence and the will. As we grow up we are put under rules of conduct, at first merely arbitrary, gradually less so, till we are taught in due course the foundations of obliga-

tion—the reasons on which all rules of conduct rest—and we come to see that manly virtue is not conventional, but is reason applied to the regulation of life. In the well-trained man—the man of virtuous and religious habits—the intellect and the will are brought into harmony—not that he always does that which he knows to be right, but that the rule of God's commandments is seen by him to rest on the intelligible relations of man to man, and of man to God.

When we designate a person as an educated man, the phrase is very vague, but it can hardly be used without implying so much—that this information of the will by the understanding has been entered upon, that the man recognises the conditions of moral being, and bows to them—that he is become a law to himself, and has risen above that stage in which conduct is determined by habit, by custom, by the pains and penalties of criminal enactment.

Education then carries with it thus much, it brings a human being within the scope of morality or prudential religion—a moral state

of which the limits are not easily ascertainable by a definition, though readily recognisable as an average. It is that level of virtue at which a humanised society rests after it has provided for security by its police, and has given time and room to all the educating influences which arise of themselves as soon as violence and injustice, crime and the pressure of want are removed. It is not the average of human nature, but the average of ordered and organised human nature. This moral standard fills up all that interval which is above law, and is below spiritual life. It is social, not individual. It is the highest level of virtue to which *society* can attain—all above this is individual effort. Ordinary education furnishes the man at once with the practical knowledge and with the moral habits called for by the commerce of society. This knowledge and those moral principles have their adaptation to the ends of life.

The higher education takes up its disciples here. It pretends to carry them beyond this sphere, which is the immediate sphere of us all;

it claims to introduce us to a more comprehensive vision of truth, to a knowledge which is its own end, and to a sphere of moral energy which designs its own perfection. The highest training is philosophical and ascetic.

It might be desirable to use other terms, if other terms could be found, to characterise the two sides, intellectual and moral, of our education. Philosophy, we know, is always in disrepute with the generality, nor is it only contemned—its nature is misunderstood. Asceticism is a word still more unpalatable, and the meaning of which is almost as vaguely apprehended. So far from being praiseworthy, it is commonly supposed to denote the ritual mortifications and debasing superstitions of the convent.

Scarcely any sentiment of the Reformation has sunk deeper into the mind of this country than its aversion to Monkery. The vices of the English convents caused their fall—at least served as its justification; yet monkish virtue is still more alien to the spirit of a pure Christ-

ianity. The idea that we can merit grace—that man can co-operate with the sacrifice of Christ to make atonement for guilt, and obtain remission of its temporal penalties, is an error against which the Reformation emphatically protested. Monachism was the embodiment of this error—the sanction of it in an outward and visible institution. It is matter of great thankfulness to us that our Church was delivered from this powerful instrument for perverting the conscience, and spreading a cloud of ecclesiasticism over the heart of the English people. But the intensity with which the sound religious instinct of England revolted from the idea of merit, and the *ædificia* of monasticism which had been raised upon it, has perhaps led us too far. We are inclined to be suspicious of moral excellence. The very word virtue is misliked, it has a heathenish air. Ascetic piety is not so much forgotten as condemned for unevangelical. In rejecting the monastic institute which is the caricature of religion, we need to be careful lest we let slip the reality with it. Ascetic piety is one thing,

mortification of the flesh is another. Monachism came into the Church only as an attempt to realise, for the few, that high and pure life which had at first been the common ideal of all Christians.

Christianity entered the world as a new principle of life—the life of the Spirit—the renewal of the inner man. The pious Jew or philosophic heathen who joined the Christian community in Antioch or Alexandria, withdrew by that step from the pursuits of life—renounced secular ambition—became dead to the world—became a stranger where he had been a citizen, *πάροικος καὶ παρεπίδημος*—he became a citizen of the heavenly city—*ἡμῶν τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει.*[1] Persecution, when it came, made this separation more felt, it did not create it. Every Christian was a saint.

Gradually this first fervour of the spiritual life withdrew into an inner circle. The mass of the baptized assimilated more and more to the habits of general society. The Christians began to be distinguished from the Pagans, not

[1] Phil. iii. 20.

by renunciation of the world, but by observances and opinions. Against this gradual absorption of the Christian community by the Roman world monasticism was the natural reaction. It had indeed been preceded in point of time by other protests.

The writings of Tertullian in particular offer a lively picture of this strife going on between the party of strict evangelical practice and the laxer performance of respectable society. The ordinary standard of virtue had begun to have its defenders on theory. In earlier times the struggle had been between Christian and heathen morality—between the easy accommodating virtue, the *probum atque honestum*, of the Roman world, and the humility and self-abnegation of the Gospel. The first preachers of course condemned the depraved and libidinous practices of Roman manners—but they denounced them on heathen principles. Injustice, cruelty, and lust were forbidden by natural conscience, were forbidden to the unbeliever. To his own disciples—to the elect—St. Peter recommends abstinence from the

gratifications of the body,[1] *ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν σαρκικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.* The same struggle was afterwards transferred to the bosom of Christianity itself—the struggle between the moderate practice of the average Christian, and the endeavours of the more zealous after the more perfect way. In the third century it became an open breach under the name of Montanism.

The moral protest which Montanism had signified in the third century was renewed in the fourth by monachism. With this difference: the Montanist sought to compel by discipline the whole body of Christians to the strictest practices; the monk, on the other hand, did not consider the *Sæculum*—the Age with its mixed faults and virtues—to be given over to perdition, but he himself fled to the wilderness that he might satisfy his own longings for devotional abandonment. The distinction was introduced of two grades of holiness; the lower degree of virtue was obligatory on all the baptized; the higher, as a counsel of perfection, was recommended only

[1] 1 Peter ii. 11.

to the few who were ripe for it—who had a vocation.

It is undeniable that Manichean sentiment as to the origin of matter, and the turpitude of earthly life, of which the body is the organ, mingled with other and purer ideas in promoting the early spread of the monastic institute. When this and other motives are withdrawn, we find in the traditions of the early Fathers of the Desert the purest spirit of evangelical holiness, the noblest traits of moral beauty.

Two principles pervade their words and practice which exemplify this moral insight at once Christian and philosophic.

1. They recognise that the culture of the dispositions and faculties of the soul may be proposed to man as itself an object of his efforts.

2. They recognise that this self-culture is a spiritual work—that it lies not in formal performances, but in the practice of virtue, and the exercise of devout contemplation.

These principles are expressed in two words much used in the ecclesiastical annals of the fourth century, *ἄσκησις* and *φιλοσοφία*.

Of these two words neither is of Christian coinage. They are borrowed from the schools of the Greeks—and both are used in their strict and original Greek sense. *Ascesis* does not imply mortification—self-inflicted suffering or pain. It is simply *exercise.* Already in Plato μάθησις and ἄσκησις are the two parts of education. It implies that as the art and prowess of the soldier must be acquired by drill and assiduity, so we may make a study of moral excellence, and exercise ourselves with a view to it. "Herein I exercise myself," St. Paul says, "ἐν τούτῳ ἀσκῶ—to have a conscience void of offence."[1] This is the κυριακὴ ἄσκησις of which St. Clement speaks[2]—the discipline prescribed by the Lord Jesus—the γυμνασία εἰς εὐσέβειαν of the First Epistle to Timothy. The notion of ἄσκησις contains nothing propitiatory; it is an idea as old as that of culture, and always a part of it. It is coupled with ἔθος, but is not synonymous with it:[3] I may be habituated by others. ἀσκεῖν

[1] Acts xxiv. 16. [2] Strom. iv. 484.

[3] εἰς τὴν παντελῆ δικαιοπραγίαν τρία δεῖ συνδραμεῖν, φύσιν

implies the intervention of my own will—self-culture.

The tyro in Church history knows how constantly the Christian writers of the fourth century couple the term ascetic with that of philosophy. *Φιλοσόφῳ πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἀσκήσει διαπρέψας*[1]—"He was eminent in his day by a life of devout contemplation" is almost the stereotype obituary phrase by which Eusebius commemorates a holy priest or bishop. *Φιλοσοφίαν ἀσκεῖν* is a combination of terms equally familiar to the student of Plato. The word *φιλοσοφεῖν* alone conveyed to the Greek ear the notion of a practical direction of life. Philosophy was a mode of life, not of knowledge—a pursuit, not a science. The heads and founders of sects from Pythagoras to Epicurus and Chrysippus were not setters forth of physical and cosmical systems, but initiators into a new life introducing the soul of the disciple into a cycle of loftier thoughts and purer habits. The Greek

καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔθος· καλῶ δὲ λόγον μὲν τὴν μάθησιν, ἔθος δὲ τὴν ἄσκησιν.—Plutarch, *De Liberis educandis*, p. 2.

[1] Euseb., *De Martyr. Palaest.*, ii.

philosopher's contempt of wealth and station was a practical contempt to be carried into the arrangements of daily life. It is true that the literary men soon began to try to commit philosophy to books; they composed manuals of theological and metaphysical speculation which they entitled "Of Philosophy"—in the words of the great encyclopædist himself, "taking refuge from the severities of a life of self-discipline in doctrinal discussions they persuade themselves that they are philosophic men."[1]

We may thus easily understand how the Latin fathers sometimes place Christianity in an antithesis to philosophy—understanding by Greek philosophy erroneous cosmical or metaphysical hypotheses. Tertullian's well-known "Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid Academiæ et Ecclesiæ?"[2] is a challenge to the Heathen Schools; a claim for Christian revelation to be the only and absolute solution of the riddles of creation and moral providence. But

[1] ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν.—*Eth. Nic.* ii. 3.

[2] *De Præscript.*, 7.

the Greek fathers of Alexandria and Constantinople, better acquainted with the character of the Greek philosophers, though they refuted their errors, recognised in them the true forerunners of the Christian teacher — the moral preachers and reformers of their day, erroneous or imperfect in their notions of how the world was to be overcome—combatants, but with insufficient weapons, in the same warfare, victory in which was reserved for the faith of the Christian.

It would carry us beyond the present limits to trace the descent of this notion downwards from the fourth century through the Christian Schools—passing from the monastic institute into the university which grew out of that institute—to bring up the oft-repeated struggle of the disciplinal system of education against the doctrinal.

To come at once to our own circumstances and those of the present day.

Whatever the universities may once have been they are not now monastic. They are now schools of preparation for life. Shall we

not, it will be said, adapt them to English life as it is? If we were to consult the majority of those persons who take a real interest in our well-being, would they not say that if they have any fault to find with us, it is that we are too old-fashioned; that there is too much of the Middle Ages about us; that we do not, as the phrase is, keep pace with the times? It is thought to be a great happiness that we have shaken off the garb and routine of the convent; but it is hinted that we might go a little farther in the same direction with advantage—we might think more as the world thinks, read the books it reads, and devote our studies to the subjects it holds in honour.

We have, it is true, done much of late years in compliance with this advice. We have conformed reluctantly but gradually. If we compare Oxford of to-day with Oxford of a century back, the change seems total. The world is better satisfied with us; but it is still calling to us to come on, not to lag in the rear, to continue to raise ourselves to its level. When we compare this attitude which the world assumes

towards us, when we see it compassionating our weakness, condoning our shortcomings in consideration of our instalments of amendment, just tolerating our existence in virtue of our promises for the future—when we compare this humiliating tenure with our own historical position, with our world-wide renown, with our vast material resources, with our claims, our pretensions, above all, with our opportunities, it must surely awaken reflection—it must compel us to ask ourselves if this career of concession, this waiting upon popular opinion, this slow and sullen abandonment of our ground, following out unwilling and unconvinced the ideas of others—if this be the position we are permanently to occupy. Is it in this sense that we are to adapt our education to life, to conform to the spirit of the age? If we were what we claim to be, surely it would belong to us to point out the way; to find the right road and to proclaim it, to lead others along it, ourselves in the van.

Yet this is not the worst. We have had to suffer the bitter humiliation of having our

intellectual studies moulded by opinion outside our walls. We have had to see our languishing and impoverished learning reinvigorated by the ingrafting upon our decayed stock of new subjects in accordance with a mere popular conception of their utility—we have in reality abdicated the supremacy we have a right to exercise in the intellectual guidance of England. But if the prevalent notions on the training of the intellect are limited by a very gross conception of life and welfare, is the moral standard of public opinion more elevated? Is our conformity to the world to be carried into this department of training? Are we, here in our precious years of retirement, to know no more of the spiritual life than we can hope to do afterwards amid the pressure of public service, the strain of professional labours, or the still more distracting web of personal engagement which weaves itself round each one of us as life advances?

For if we are not wholly satisfied with our success in teaching, shall we say that we are more satisfied with our training? The two

indeed are so intimately blended that, whatever weak points there may be in our intellectual armour, the same must be expected to show themselves again in tone and temper. We all gladly acknowledge the fact, of which we were assured in an early part of the present year by one of our officers of discipline, that the academical youth are more decorous in their conduct, more amenable to authority, less given to outbreaks of headstrong vice and wild dissipation, than at any recent period of our history. These are matters of honest congratulation—valuable for themselves, still more valuable as tokens of a growing refinement of disposition. But when we appropriate a part of this credit to ourselves we ought to consider how much of this happy change is due to the gradual refinement of English manners—how much of this moral reformation comes to us from without. We now receive the young man from his home and his school already toned to the gentler charities of life — to courtesy, to humanity, to forbearance, sympathy, considerateness for others. He reflects,

in fact, in these qualities, the average standard of our English domestic life. He brings with him too other characteristics of modern society, only in a form suited to his age and circumstances. The insatiable appetite for amusement—the craving for variety—for constant succession of excitement—labour shrunk from—the restraint of attention felt as an intolerable annoyance—study as an irksome drudgery—pleasure itself sought with listlessness, not with passion, while day after day runs down the same easy round of sauntering comradeship: such are some of the symptoms of the soft self-indulgent spirit which attends the diffusion of wealth and civilisation. On such a soil we could not hope to grow the hardy fruit of independent judgment, of an informed and disciplined intellect. This moral weakness is the evil we have to meet—such as this the average student too often comes to us. Does our system, as it is, offer the corrective for his feebleness? Do we send him away braced, vigorous, determined, independent-minded, emancipated from his class prejudices, awakened

from his moral lethargy; or more luxurious, fastidious, and exclusive than he came to us, his judgment crippled for life by the adoption of some set of party opinions, a ready-made worshipper of worldly rank or fortune?

That we have reason not to be altogether satisfied with the level of attainment to which we can succeed in bringing up our students is, I think, generally admitted among us. Such dissatisfaction is of itself an encouraging feature —it is far better than acquiescence. The next thing is that we look in the right direction for the remedies. Hitherto we have tried legislation. We have increased the number and stringency of our examinations, the number and value of our rewards. These measures cannot be said to have failed. They have effected something—perhaps all that could have been reasonably expected of them. Examinations, we know, are not an adequate corrective of idleness; and they have a tendency to degrade preparatory teaching instead of to elevate it. To enforce study by examination is much on a par with compelling morality by public dis-

cipline, or restraining private extravagance by sumptuary laws. The outward actions are coerced by such enactments; the disinclination within remains what it was. What we wish to create is the disposition to self-improvement—*this* legislation cannot reach. The best contrived examination can only reach knowledge and acquirement; it cannot gauge character. We seek knowledge not for itself, but as a means for enlarging and building up the character. Something is wanted for this purpose more than the compulsion of examinations to be passed, or the inducement of honours and rewards which may be won.

Moral weakness in a dependent moral being can only be remedied by that Being from whom he originally derived all he has. But the one source of spiritual strength, God's Holy Spirit, operates by means, and discipline is the well-proved means of this grace. The young man is released from the exterior and positive discipline of school law. He comes to the university; there he should find offered, not forced upon, him a discipline which is strictly

moral, for it is voluntary, self-imposed, self-carried on. He should find instructors who are not merely ahead of him in his studies, more matured in mind, ready to open to him the realms of thought, but who are also desirous to introduce him to the one great art of life—the art of self-culture, self-discipline. In this art they are at once his instructors and his fellow-students; they are carrying on their own education in it, making their own experiences. This life is not a thing apart from their studies; towards its working out they all converge, and in it find their unity and their explanation. When the man has once entered this road, once engaged in the struggle for self-formation, the ambition of perfection, he soon finds that it is great enough to absorb all his powers; nay, that it calls out in him energies of which he never suspected the existence; it opens to him a vista which stretches far beyond the limits of this stage of being, which bridges over the interval between this world and the next, and endows life with a purpose and a meaning which no other pursuit can give it. He has

found a rock beneath his feet. He is astonished at the frivolous interests of those around him, their want of earnestness, their superficial hold on life, their apathy to the nobler objects of human pursuit; the levity, monotony, and nonchalance of their conversation, betraying itself even in the tones of their voice. Though he does not seek diversions as they do, he finds that he enjoys life more than they, and can taste its pleasures with a relish which only a pure mind, a clear intention, and a vigilantly watched conscience can bestow. God, and the human destiny to which God has called him, is his presiding thought. The rule of his day is to be always making the best of himself. Hence his security—the confidence with which he steps from his retirement into the world. To use the image of St. Francis de Sales, he handles the things of this world as an infant reaches forward to gather flowers with one hand, while with the other it grasps tight the hand of its father.[1]

This union or identity of mental and moral

[1] *Introd. à la Vie*, iii. c. 10.

improvement can only be enjoyed in its completeness in the highest order of studies which the university presents, viz. in the philosophical. It is by the possession of a faculty of philosophy mainly that a university is distinguished from a school on the one hand, and from an academy of science on the other. School, at life's commencement, teaches the elements of knowledge; an academy of science extends the bounds of knowledge. Between these two lies the faculty of philosophy in a university, which initiates into the *principles* of knowledge, and into a life in conformity with those principles. The precepts of the school and the discoveries of the academy can be committed to books—philosophy cannot, for it consists wholly in the training; in tempers and dispositions, in the habit and attitude of the soul. A Christian life is the true philosophy, and it can be communicated from teacher to disciple in only one way, by the contagion of example. Education is weak in proportion as it detaches the matters taught from religious training—strong in proportion

as it rises to discern their true unity. If it be the case that we, in this place, have let ourselves slide unawares into this politician's distinction between matters secular and matters religious; that we teach religious matter as one among many subjects—as a doctrine; that we have come to regard the secular branches as preparation for life in the world, and the religious branch as a distinct preparation for heaven, we have in this a sufficient explanation of the inefficacy of our system; we need not be surprised at the feeble power it seems to exert over the best minds.

Who is there indeed among us who is not at times oppressed even to sickness of heart by the consciousness of his own inadequacy? The teacher has his station between two ages, between the young and the old, between that which has been and that which is to be. In the presence of the past he stands, with its accumulations of fact and experience, defying by their multiplicity the grasp of any single memory, however capacious, with its revelations of beauty and grandeur in the moral and physi-

cal worlds transcending his utmost powers of conception to fix and body forth. Books may in some sort be the repository of the facts, but they cannot preserve the spirit which should give them life and meaning. Only the living intelligence can (not contain but) represent and give human expression to the magnificence, grandeur, order, and harmony in the presence of which he feels himself. Of this sublime deposit the teacher is the representative. That which he has seen and known and felt he seeks to declare to others. Of this vast total of all his experiences, his studies, his contemplations, aspirations, sufferings, prayers, under the consciousness of which he thinks and speaks, how small a part can be drawn upon in the direct and technical discharge of his office as instructor! How trivial seems what he can say in a lecture, a sermon, or a conversation! He feels as a man struggling to speak in his sleep, making a vain but exhausting effort to compass in words a meaning which is perpetually escaping from him. If not so much *what* we say, as the spirit in which we say it, is that which

influences, that spirit requires to be fed and supported. We cannot inspire our pupils with the taste for study and self-improvement if we ourselves are destitute of that taste. We have to lead the way on the road in which we would have them walk. Though instruction is our business here, it is only part of our business. We are here as teachers, but we are also here as learners. We are educating not others only, but ourselves also for eternity. We are all fellow-students together. Of all teaching, beyond the most elementary, it must be said that he best teaches who is himself learning. But in the higher region of mental and spiritual training the condition becomes an indispensable one. Our first business is to be ourselves somewhat, if we would bring up others to be the same. The tutor knows that when he has taken his degree, his education, so far from being completed, is but begun. If this be true of the *amount* of knowledge which may be amassed, it is still more true of the views and feelings with which knowledge is to be regarded. The demands of practical life increase upon us

so fast, as we grow older, that if they be not resisted, they invade not only the time, but the mind itself. We get gradually the habit of regarding everything from a temporal point of view. Our measure of the value of knowledge changes. We lose our youthful eye for poetical beauty, we despise philosophy, for the tender sensitiveness of the young conscience we substitute a barren orthodoxy and a decent conformity. And this process we call growing wiser as we grow older.

We can only escape this doom, this sentence of perpetual imprisonment of the understanding, and palsy of the moral feelings, by attending to cherish an inner hidden life of the soul free from the intrusion of the thoughts and feelings of the world. The soul in all its powers and faculties, the affections carried out in all their strength to Him who died for us; the understanding maintained in contemplation of the truths of science, the experience of history—this is the true ἄσκησις, the conscious exercise of all the practical energies based upon an interior cultivation of the powers of the soul.

V.

[April 30, 1865.]

ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.

"That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."—JOHN i. 9.

Two aspects of our education have occupied us on two former occasions,—the intellectual and the moral,—and we found that the quality which should distinguish the highest intellectual education from all the preparatory stages was that it should be *philosophical*, and that which should characterise the moral training in its highest form was that it should be *ascetic*. Our intellectual training should be a training not in philosophy, but to a philosophical spirit. Our intellectual aim here is not the acquisition of knowledge, but the attainment of a certain mental state. We learn, not to know this or that, but to *know*. In its moral aspect, our

education here is what we have called ascetic, *i.e.* it is a discipline of character. It grasps at nothing less than the whole man; it seeks to mould him wholly not only in his thoughts but in his inclinations and his will.

Resuming the subject at this point we see that one feature is common to both sides of such a training. Our intellectual and moral cultivation alike are developments from within; they are not forms imposed from without. This constitutes a distinction between the lower stages of education, that education of which all men do or can partake, and the superior education which a university professes to administer. The lower or school education is a communication of one or more accomplishments rising in number and complexity according to the time and pains bestowed upon the pupil, from the simple accomplishments of reading and writing to be learnt in the village school to the Latin and Greek and mathematics of the grammar-school. In all this course, however far it may be carried, however numerous the objects studied, the learner is passive; he submits to

be taught; he learns by a mechanical habit; he gives nothing of his own except so far as attention, memory, and application are active powers; his understanding is exercised but in the way of receptivity. In one word this education does not touch mind. Society has a parental instinct which impels it to reproduce in the rising generation an exact copy of itself. It desires to communicate its own opinions, practices, customs, unchanged. Social life is a mould in which each successive generation is cast, or a guild in which is propagated from age to age the mystery of the craft. The *mores et instituta majorum*, that is the ideal. Conformity to an external rule is the highest virtue; the appropriation of extant knowledge and traditional opinion the highest attainment of wisdom.

In the education which imposes this rule and habituates to its practice, all men can partake in proportion to the amount of their understanding. Every country as it advances in civilisation is gradually covered with schools and teachers for this purpose. It is requisite to our welfare and the continuance of society

that each of us should be brought within the range of such an education. We should be in a state of habitual rebellion against law and usage unless we had learned to recognise and submit to so much of the exterior conditions of our existence as comes in contact with our daily and personal life. For the different degrees in which we recognise the law of the phenomena around us are what chiefly constitutes the different degrees of education. We do in common parlance draw a distinction between an educated and an uneducated man, but the distinction is a vague one; the difference is one in degree only, not in kind. The most uninstructed day-labourer has learned to judge correctly on *some* part of the moral and physical phenomena of the world, yet we call him uneducated. The man of the completest knowledge has but learned to take the measure of a greater variety of sections of the same world. Artificial training has done for him over a wide field what actual experience has done for the other over a limited one. When the process is artificial we call it education; when natural we call it ex-

perience. Education is an abridged experience. Education is to the facts of life what language is to mental operations. It enables us to represent the absent as present, to see with the eye of the mind circumstances and situations which have never come within the scope of our personal observation. This faculty is capable of being cultivated to a very high degree of perfection; in a few cases it has become that prophetic eye of the statesman, a power of seeing distant consequences, which makes him the oracle of his age and country—the moral imagination is raised to the power of clairvoyance. But in its widest range and its grandest development, it remains the same faculty by which the humblest and least enlightened judges, when he *does* judge for himself, of the propriety of the simplest action. All education is directed, through its manifold degrees, to the calling out of this power.

As education rises stage above stage, it passes and carries the disciple through two distinct phases—the passive and the active. Through all the stages of the passive phase education

works with law, with custom, by authority. Society, through the teacher, is labouring to establish the unquestioned sway of opinion over the individual. In this phase education is an education in facts, and is bounded by phenomena. It gives the knowledge of phenomena according to their law, of facts in their sequence. In physics it is the knowledge of the laws of matter in their applications to the uses of life; in morals, the usages of society, the history, laws, constitution of our country; in religion, the visible Church with its rites, laws, history, and tradition. Throughout all this process the man is passive; he is the recipient only of the forms which come to him through, or in consequence of, sensation. He learns these forms that he may submit to them, that he may recombine them for any purposes he may have in view. He conforms himself to the conditions which he finds; he adopts opinion; he submits implicitly to the laws of social life, to the regulations of his Church. His understanding is exercised in bare apprehension of given facts and relations. His will

is exercised in prompt obedience to a rule. His judgment consists in testing all his actions by this rule. He asks, What is customary? What does the Church say? What will people think? What are others doing?

In this education we must all partake to some extent; we must be incorporated into the social routine. And was there nothing behind phenomena, here education might end. If society fixed upon an immovable base were competent to provide for our secular well-being, and if we could make over the management of our spiritual interests to an infallible Church, if the understanding were nothing beyond a passive receptacle of given forms, nothing further could be desired. But such is not the condition of the soul. Man has an active or creative power, by whatever name we are to call it. Mind is a reagent against society, a personality counteracting organisation, a judgment exercising a dissolving force upon received opinion. As such it presents itself at the first aspect simply in the light of a dangerous enemy; it must be the interest of society to extinguish

it. And it can be extinguished. All are stronger than some—the many than the few. Organisation is an overmatch for detached effort. But the surest mode is not by force, but through education. You have only to pronounce education complete when the disciple has run through its first phase to turn out the "*perinde ac cadaver*," the lifeless machine man of the Jesuit schools of the seventeenth century, with his varied accomplishments, his circumscribed understanding, his dead will and fanatical temper, his literary fertility, and his barrenness of idea.

Were human societies perfect, and their opinions infallible, they would be right in endeavouring to extirpate personality, and to seal up the intellect. But if the individual does not exist for the sake of the State and the Church, but the Church and the State for the sake of the individual, then it is precisely through this faculty that the road to culture and improvement lies. Instead of extinguishing it, there remains the other side of the alternative—to discipline it. This is the aim of

the higher education which we look for at a university. This education begins when mind begins to stir within us; to develop this faculty is the one task to which it addresses itself. The school education, the education in phenomena, through some stages of which all must pass, becomes a platform on which the university education is reared. It is indeed only a question of whether or no education shall be carried far enough, whether or not it shall include the *whole* man, shall be coextensive with the *whole* domain of thought, shall recognise philosophy and religion, or shall ignore philosophy and reduce religion to a system of arbitrary opinion, without a basis in the reason of things. Thus to complete education is the profession of a university; here the crown and apex is placed on all previous instruction; all the knowledge we have previously acquired, all that we have been taught of science, art, or accomplishment, has been preliminary, introductory, subordinate. Hitherto the established social and material order in which we find ourselves placed has imposed itself upon our

nature. On entering within the sphere of the superior education we are for the first time called upon to exert a force in an opposite direction—a reaction of the human soul against the barrier outside. A reaction—not a rebellion. The understanding and the will remain as before the passive instruments of society and nature. But we become conscious of a personal force, we obtain glimpses of a new world underlying the world of sense, law, and custom; we find ourselves members at once of two worlds, worlds distinct and yet connected, one of which contains the key to the other. This material universe, with its beauties, its utilities, and its order, receding from our ken in its present immensity without limit in space, and in its past history without limit in time; those forces equally real, though less patent to our conception,—light, heat, electricity, chemical affinity, gravitation; our own complicated relations to parts of this inorganic world, to the atmosphere, the waters, the superficial crust of our globe, relations essential to our existence . . . all this offers food to our curiosity of pressing import-

ance for us to know, the material of a hundred sciences, a very small part of which can be exhausted in even the longest life. Turning to the social existence of the race, we have the prehistoric periods, whose mysteries we are just beginning to obtain a glimpse of; then written records from their commencement till now, a series inexhaustible in its multiplicity of detail, baffling in its law; political theory and practical experience rising upon this detail, the whole train of social evils and necessities loudly calling for aid and cure; then art, with its thousand seductions, its vistas of Elysian fields; again, the endless combinations of the imagination, which make up literature—grave, gay, fantastic, or sublime reflections of all the moods of the ever-changing human spirit; place this, and more that cannot be enumerated—the *totum scibile*—before the mind's eye, and what human intellect does not feel overwhelmed by the enormity of the demand made upon it? The curiosity which is stimulated when but one corner of the unknown is presented to it is extinguished when it surveys the map of the

universe. The finite understanding is crushed when it is brought into the presence of the infinite expanse of the knowable, and turns aside in despair, crying, Who is sufficient for these things? *Ars longa, vita brevis!* Education, which opens this wonderful prospect before us, does but show us from the top of Pisgah the land flowing with milk and honey, which we can never appropriate. Education carried out in superficial extent is a humbling process. It is indeed more than humbling; the immensity of knowledge would crush the understanding; we should be compelled not to humility but to despair if, when we reached this point in our progress, relief were not afforded to us of a kind till then unknown. There is a point in the career of the learner when, as objects multiply around him with dazzling rapidity, and what is to be learnt grows in a ratio far beyond his powers of learning it, there breaks a new light in upon him; he becomes conscious of a force within himself; he feels the stirring of an innate power unknown before. His position with regard to things without, to other men, is

from this moment altered. His intelligence is not only the passive recipient of forms from without, a mere mirror in which the increasing crowd of images confuse and threaten to obliterate each other; it becomes active and throws itself out upon phenomena with a native force, combining or analysing them—anyhow altering them, reducing them, subjecting them, imposing itself upon them. *Vivida vis animi pervicit;* it has broken the bonds which held it captive, the spiritual principle within is born; we begin to live with a life which is above nature. The point of time in our mental progress at which this change takes place cannot be precisely marked; it is a result gradually reached, as every higher form of life is developed by insensible transition out of a lower. As physical life passes into psychical life by a succession of steps in which there is no break, so does psychical life into spiritual.

This is the life that the higher education aspires to promote, this is the power which it cherishes and cultivates, this is the faculty to which it appeals. From the very nature of the

faculty itself it is evident what the method of its education must be. From the spontaneous character of this power, from the fact that mind (as we may call it) is a force and not a capacity, arises the principle which must ever be the guiding light of our endeavour. The business of the educator in this phase must be not to teach but to stimulate, not to inculcate truths but to force growth. We may awaken, we cannot create, mind. It can no more be taught than virtue can be taught; but it will germinate in the congenial atmosphere of sympathy and example. All life is reflex action, from the rudimentary organism, if organism it can be called, of the one-celled zoophyte to the complex structure of the most perfect vertebrate, the life of the being is its response to stimulus, invitation from the environment responded to by counter-action from within. It is the same with intellect. All our accumulated stores of knowledge on which we pride ourselves, all our sciences, our wealth of books, our languages, literature, our traditional opinions,—these are not the things for which a university exists;

they are only means placed in our hands with which to call out and promote the life and growth of the mind. Knowledge is only the food of life, not the life itself; and our business is not to inculcate truth but to superintend life. Our first wisdom is to recognise this limitation of our power, to learn to concentrate our effort on this one direction. We cannot create the life; it is supplied to us: this power, this *ingenium*, is a light that lighteth every man; wherever there is intelligence, intelligence may be raised into intellect. The germ of the future plant is supplied to our hands in the intelligence which our pupils bring with them; it is ours to apply the light and heat required to expand the germs. The light and heat are supplied from the atmosphere and the soil. The young plant is transferred from the school to the university, where he is to find, it may be, more finished Greek scholars, better mathematicians, more experienced teachers in every department than he has before enjoyed; where no science is unrepresented by some leading name, probably an authority in his science wherever it is known;

he finds himself in a society where self-improvement is the one absorbing aim; among companions in whom an ingenuous curiosity to know is their ruling passion, by whom pastime and amusement are reduced from a pursuit to a recreation, and the time spent upon them is grudged as so much lost to the work of life; he finds himself under tutors and teachers, among whom is maintained a mental life quick, active, and various.[1] Here at least is one corner of the world where the day is not divided between money-making and sensual enjoyment; where a man is rated at what he is in himself, and not by his position; where the petty disputes of local politics cannot establish a footing; where the religious demagogue is estimated at his true value.

In such an environment the young plant will not fail to expand to its full natural size. The office of the educator is limited to that of removing hindrances. Given the adequate

[1] "Here the intellect may safely range and speculate, sure to find its equal in some antagonist activity, and its judge in the tribunal of truth."—J. H. Newman, *The Office and Work of Universities*, p. 24.

temperature in a seat of learning, *i.e.* let the pervading intellectual activity of the body be up to a certain mark, and let artificial obstacles be removed, and our work is done—the mind of each student will develop *itself* in the proper proportions of his native strength. Neither in this nor in any other province can man *create* life. He can only select out of the total of concomitant conditions those which are most favourable to growth, and withhold from contact with the germs those of a contrary tendency. Nothing does more to embarrass educative action than not clearly to perceive the limit of the power of mind and character in forming mind and character. No one has arrived at middle-life and acquired steadiness of thought and character without having as part of this acquisition a mass of opinions and views on all the subjects which lie beyond the reach of positive knowledge. These opinions are the result and outcome of his information and experience—of the whole series of his antecedents. His interest in those opinions, or probable propositions which he believes to be

true, is great. These opinions are not his experience or his judgment; they are modes in which he endeavours to bring his experience and his judgment to bear on others. We are all of us, small and great, daily engaged directly or indirectly, by word of mouth if not by pen, by action or by innuendo, in the endeavour to assert our mode of thought, to vindicate our point of view, to give an impulse to that tone of sentiment with which our own life is in harmony, to gain consideration for that class of ideas to which we have learnt to attach importance, in fact in endeavouring to impress our own personality upon the social mass. What is party in free states but an association among men of similar stamp and tendencies to obtain an ascendency in the world of fact for their own ideas? The direct propagation of opinion is not by any means the most efficacious way for bringing this influence of mind to bear. This indeed is so well understood that in the higher class of party journals the art of writing consists in seeming to say the opposite of that which you wish to be understood. And this is

no dishonest trick of rhetoric; it is but the indispensable rule of educated society. This unconscious effort to extend our mental influence is inseparable from our social position. It is the very healthy agitation and collision of the social atoms out of which the equilibrium of the whole fabric is maintained. Now to those among us who are called to the educational profession in its last and highest stage an opportunity is opened of doing what we are all doing, only directly instead of indirectly. In the world of mixed opinions it is little impression upon the whole that can be produced by a single weak human voice. But in a university in which is collected the flower of the rising generation, from the teacher's chair which is a monopoly of attention, with the young mind taken just at its opening, in the moment of its susceptibility, the temptation is doubtless great to abuse the opportunity, to employ the hour of influence not in their interests but in our own, to give them opinions instead of education. Temptation to abuse the opportunity did I say? But to many persons it seems its legitimate use.

If, they argue, my opinions on life, on morals, on social, political, and ecclesiastical questions are true and important, what more valuable service can I render to my pupil than by making him my intellectual heir, by transmitting to him the best result of my own long course of study and experience, and thus forearming him against, and abridging for him the years of toil and disappointment which the acquisition has cost myself? Nor is it only individuals who thus argue. There is a system of education widely spread and powerfully maintained, not the growth of to-day, but rooted in ancient precedent and established in the possession of more than half the universities of Europe. In this system education consists in the inculcation of truth, meaning by truth true propositions in probable matter. The principle cannot be better expressed than in the words of one whose voice, wont to be raised within these walls with thrilling power, is now, alas! heard no more by us. Sketching an ideal university, he says, it is a place where "truth, a subtle, nvisible, manifold spirit, is poured into the

mind of the scholar by his eyes and ears, through his affections, imagination, and reason; it is poured into his mind and is sealed up there in perpetuity, by propounding and repeating it, by questioning and requestioning, by correcting and explaining, by progressing, and then recurring to first principles. . . . It is the place where the catechist makes good his ground as he goes, treading in the truth day by day into the ready memory, and wedging and tightening it into the expanding reason." Such is the catholic university system, according to its only philosophical exponent in our language.[1]

Identical in its educational theory with this system is that of the positivist. The positivist knows of no other education than indoctrination. The pupil is to acquire all that order of knowledge which guides the right performance of the processes by which civilised life is made possible. Not science, strictly so called, but the possession for use of truths which have been established as the result of the various moral and physical sciences,—the inculcation of

[1] J. H. Newman, *The Office and Work of Universities*, pp. 22, 25.

knowledge is his ideal of education. Mental discipline is not wholly overlooked, nor are those miscellaneous activities disregarded which make up the leisure part of life devoted to the gratification of the tastes. The system of the catholic university, and the system of a society of positivist tendencies, differ indeed in other respects. The propositions which they respectively desire to inculcate are not only different but often contrary. The catholic teacher desires to imbue his pupil with the propositions in morals and politics he believes to be true, because he believes them to be true. The objective truth is to him fully represented by these propositions, which constitute the deposit of tradition—in his estimate the one permanent and enduring substance, each generation of mankind being but the transitory medium through which flows the majestic current of eternal truth. The importance of the individual is sunk to that of an atom; a man's life is a moment in the perennial existence of the hierarchical society. Positivism too measures welfare by that of the society, and its theory of

progress is the inevitable march of scientific truths promoting man's control over the material world. However different the objects aimed at by the catholic ideal of education and that of the man of science, they both meet in one point. They both propose as their end the exclusive supremacy of certain truths, not the cultivation of the individual; they both, for opposite reasons, distrust and dislike the cultivation of the intellect.

This idea, the culture of the intellect for its own sake, has been the aim and inspiration of that education which reformed Europe has inherited from Greek civilisation. That the mind can become an end to itself, that it can propose to itself its own perfection as a work to be wrought out by its own effort, that mental illumination is an illumination within the soul, by which it is enabled to see God,—this is the principle of intellectual cultivation. That the character can be purified, strengthened, and raised to a heroic height by discipline, self-denial, self-control, by a force exerted from within,—this is the principle of moral education.

The first of these we have inherited from the Greek world; the tradition is kept up, however imperfectly, wherever classical literature is made the corner-stone of education. The other, or moral side of training, is exhibited to us on the grandest scale in the founders of anachoretic and monastic retirement in the third and fourth ages of Christianity; and the tradition, too much enfeebled in the Protestant communities, is preserved encumbered with much superstition in the Catholic Church. The reunion in one scheme of the complete culture of the free intellect arrived at in the Greek schools with somewhat of the ascetic discipline and sterner moral purpose of the better ages of the Church, before virtue was undermined by the confessional, is perhaps too much to hope for our own university. Yet, I think, if we trace the history of those who have raised themselves to any distinction by their own efforts, we shall always find that some such conjunction of mental vigour and self-denial has been the secret of success. In each of these noble efforts, Greek intellect and catholic morals, we have an experi-

ment troubled with great defects and errors, by the observation of which we may profit if we will. Even were we to reform our education to-morrow we should not have done what we wish. Ours would still have been but another experiment. Education is not an art by itself which can be perfected within its sphere. It is but bringing extant social forces to bear on the young mind. Over those forces themselves the educator has little or no control. Education cannot, any more than life can, grasp its end. Life is a race. The best education is but a tendency. The utmost we can secure is that we tend in the right direction.

The end, then, of education is the person. If the man be turned out what he should be, the units will coalesce and constitute society. But, on the other hand, our only means of affecting the disposition of the individual is through sentiments, opinions, tendencies, which we do not create. Society exists and acts and moves according to laws—laws which no education can counteract. When we look upon the mass of mankind, upon the mass of those classes

which are called the educated classes, when we contemplate society in masses, the astonishing phenomenon is presented to us that, though the mass passes judgments, maintains opinions, holds views, asserts its will, and exercises a choice, not any one of the individual minds who compose the aggregate does any of these things in his own person. The average individual citizen thinks as those with whom he lives think, acts as those about him act. He has no spontaneous judgment, no real free-will. His mental movement is as inevitably determined by the movement of the mass as are the movements of the parts of the glacier by the direction of the whole glacial mass. Public opinion governs the world, yet public opinion is the opinion of no one in particular; it is each appealing to every one else. Men lean against each other and the whole community stands upright, though no separate member of it is in equilibrium. Yet are they quite unaware of the fictitious character of their opinions and of the illusory nature of their seeming free-agency. Each man is so certain of the exclusive truth of his opinion that

he is ready to use force to compel the dissentient to come in to it. It is only the philosophic observer who has risen to take a survey of human history as a whole who can trace the genesis of opinion, who can see that the individual is a molecular unit, that what society thinks and does is determined by a law from which there is no escape.

But this philosophic observer *himself?* is he exempt from the common necessity? is the rest of mankind strictly bound within the limits of the prevailing opinion, the slave of established custom, and does he only walk the earth a free man? or has he succeeded in struggling upwards to those serene regions of the heavens to which gravitation does not reach? Does education open an escape into such a region? Is there any condition of intellect which is spontaneous and intuitive? Are there such mental altitudes as genius, originality, conscience? Are there any real existences beyond those of which the senses take cognisance? Is the human mind capable of apprehending such existences? Can education be

rightly directed to foster and develop such a capability ?

There are at present in the civilised world *two* considerable forms of thought very different from each other, but both of which undertake to answer this question, and to answer it in the negative. The positive philosophy, not considerable in the numbers of its disciples, is yet to those who read the signs of the times a coming power in the world, making itself felt more and more, year by year, not by noisily rallying adherents to any party flag, but by silently filtering through all branches of knowledge and all the topics of practical debate, pointing triumphantly to the past history of humanity as the record of its inevitable march to conquest; strong in its confidence in its future; strong too in the intellectual weakness of the forces arrayed against it. To this form of thought those worlds or beings of which theology and metaphysics profess to treat have no existence. It is not that this or that theology, this or that philosophy, are in error and require to be corrected. Theology and

metaphysics are to it imaginary explanations of material phenomena. There is no explanation of the origin or occurrence of these phenomena. To control the social and physical conditions of existence is all that man can aspire to. Education is the learning how to exercise this control. Hence education must be an education in science—nay, can be in nothing else, for the sciences cover the whole field of knowledge. A university in a positivist country is a place where all the sciences are taught. In such a system of education intellect holds a subordinate place. Indeed, by practical men of positivist tendencies, intellect is ever regarded with jealousy as a troublesome, perhaps rebellious obstruction in the way of practical arrangements. But scientific knowledge is uniform. It knows neither country nor language. Human beings trained on this system would become exact copies of each other. All individuality would be extinguished. Spontaneity would be unknown. The individual vigour and manifold diversity which combine themselves in originality; all that is rich, diversified, and animating

in human life as it now exists would disappear. The understanding and the will, deprived of their initiative, would become part of a great social machine embracing all mankind—a state of society from which much present evil would be expelled, but in which virtue also would become impossible.

On the opposite side is ranged a vast and powerful organisation of opinion which is hostile to the education of the intellect as understood in free universities. This is the catholic opinion of the Western Church. The catholic system, no less than the positivist, claims the whole man, strikes at the very head of our education. It denies the possibility of philosophy. It does not deny, it asserts, existences and relations other than those given in sensation; but it refuses man any faculty by which these existences and relations are apprehended. It pretends indeed to a philosophy, but its philosophy is one in which the first principles are given on authority; and an authoritative philosophy is as much a contradiction in terms as an authoritative science. Positivism

has its philosophy; but the philosophy of science is only the co-ordination and inter-dependence of the most abstract propositions of all the sciences. The philosophy of the catholic schools is only logic, an exercitation in the mental connection of propositions, into the grounds of which it is not free to inquire. Hence the stunted and hide-bound character which is found to be the result of such an education, so that an Italian university has become a by-word.

Will it be said that this is very unpractical, that I have been drawing a picture of imaginary evils, that the advancing wave of ultramontanism is still at a safe distance from British shores, and that positivism is insignificant? It may be so; the mind, when it tries to look at phases of opinion in the light of the principles on which they depend, is apt to forget the interval between the opinions and the principles on which those opinions rest. But if the positive philosophy be the possession of few, the spirit of positivism is everywhere. Wherever there are strong physical natures with a strong

grasp of life and a keen sense of its enjoyments; wherever there is concentrated energy and worldly success following it; where wealth, the getting or the spending it, becomes a paramount notion; wherever rank and fortune and social position are eagerly competed for; wherever dress and frivolous amusements fill the day,—*there*, in both sexes, and through all grades, there is practical positivism.

Again, if ultramontanism is at a safe distance, the spirit of catholicism is among us. Christianity entered the Roman world in the second century as a moral reform of a corrupt and enervated society. Catholicism makes its insidious approach through an offer to deny the conscience; not as a reform, but as a compromise with the terrors of the world to come. The principles of positivism and the doctrines of catholicism are in terms opposed; in practical life there is a fatal tendency to unite the two. Crushing the intellect with its doctrine of obedience, sapping the character by the luxury of spiritual direction more fatal to manly independence than that Sybarite luxury to which

the republics of old succumbed, neo-catholicism achieved in less than two centuries the degradation of Italy. Leaving the Italians their vices, their positive enjoyments, their frivolous pastimes, their music, mathematics, and physical science,—it interdicted intellect. When the moment of awakening comes, whatever of virtue, of intelligence, of public spirit, remains among the Italian people is found unhappily arrayed against the Church, and the dreadful alternative is forced upon the country of infidelity or spiritual authority. Both parties have issued upon a false and impracticable position; the Church has repudiated the intelligence, the reason, the equity, the equality, the spirit of self-improvement by efforts which are now actively working to mould and refine modern society,—the conduct and control of all this spiritual movement the Church has lost, nay, has herself renounced.

In her recent manifesto the Church of the West has abdicated, in form, her right to teach and guide society. She has renounced the education of the world. She takes her stand

henceforward upon its ignorance. She has proclaimed that knowledge is against *her*, and that *she* is against knowledge. She is to occupy herself no longer with the interests of mankind, but enters upon a sordid struggle for her own existence; and she has announced what we feared was true, but were unwilling to believe, that she stakes that existence upon a principle which is incompatible with the moral well-being of society. Education has passed into other hands than those of the Church.

Happily for us, this is not yet the position of the Church in our own country. The Church of England still possesses the schools and universities; may she never forfeit them! May she never take the fatal step of standing upon authority instead of upon reason, upon intellect, upon education, upon the spiritual and moral cultivation of the soul!

VI.

[February 24, 1867.]

βλέπετε τὴν κλῆσιν ὑμῶν, ἀδελφοὶ, ὅτι οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα . . . ἀλλὰ τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ Θεὸς, ἵνα τοὺς σοφοὺς καταισχύνῃ.

"Ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called: But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise.

"For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe."—1 CORINTHIANS i. 26, 27, 21.

THIS passage—nor this passage alone, but other declarations to be found in the New Testament to a similar purport—has been often employed to depreciate learning. On a still wider scale than its use as a weapon of controversy, has been its general influence on the Christian consciousness. The various sects, whose opinions are professedly enthusiastic or obscurantist, have fortified themselves by these

words of the apostle in their maintenance of a theory of conversion which leaves no place for the understanding, in making, as is often said, Christianity an affair of the heart, and not at all of the head. And far beyond the pale of those denominations whose tenets on this point are obviously determined by their want of knowledge, there is abroad, in the religious world generally, an uneasy suspicion of knowledge and its results, of intellect and its cultivation—a suspicion not wholly due to this, or any, texts, but which is kept alive by their recurrence to the ear and to the memory. Quite distinct from any supposed special cases of conflict between particular discoveries of science and the words of revelation—such incompatibility, *e.g.*, as has been imagined to exist between geological theory and the Mosaic account of the creation—there is a disposition, habitual to the average religious mind, to mistrust science—a mistrust not of any result of science, but of science itself; a disaffection not to this or that critical investigation, but to the inquiring mind. Putting aside also all the

pretensions of reason to interfere in matters of faith, whether it claims as co-ordinate with revelation, or as the interpreter of revelation, or at least as its recipient,—putting aside all the controversy on the limits of reason in its application to religious matters,—may it not be said that all Christian communities are pervaded by a sentiment of jealousy towards intelligence, as something not wholly good in its nature? It is thought that intelligence is not only occasionally hostile to religion by reacting critically on its truths, or on their evidence, but that it is not in any way the instrument of our religious life—that a life of intellect is in its essence a looking in any other direction than that of God and heaven.

This suspicion of intelligence as a secret foe is a phenomenon in the religious world the existence of which, tacitly felt, if not openly expressed, will hardly be denied. On the other hand, we have also facts in the history of the Church which are due to a conviction of an opposite nature. The Catholic Church of the West, though its policy has been largely

coloured by this jealous timidity, has yet always professed in terms a certain amount of obligation in respect of science. The Church of England in particular has ever prided herself on being a learned Church. Our schools and universities are not secular institutions founded by the Civil Power for its own purposes; they originated in a view of life which, whatever else it held, conceived it incumbent on a Christian education to give a proper training to the reason. This noble institution, the atmosphere of which we breathe, our Chairs of Science and Philosophy, our devotion to the classics, our vocation as tutors or professors, to which so many of you are giving your powers, are sufficient evidence that the policy of a Christian Church is not necessarily a policy of repression of mind. The encouragement of learning and science is the public and deliberate policy of our Church,—a policy which has been deliberately maintained since the Reformation, through all our political changes, and all our mutations of religious opinion.

This public policy, however, has been

throughout encountered by strong currents of feeling from an opposite direction—a feeling suspicious of, if not hostile to, intellect—a feeling which has more than once attained embodiment and utterance, but which, when not uttered, is still present beneath, more or less strongly, just in proportion to the revivals of the religious consciousness, whether those revivals originate in the Puritanical or in the Catholic element.

If we ask which of these two attitudes is most consistent with the apparent sense of the text,—the attitude of our approved ecclesiastical policy, which establishes a philosophical education, or the attitude of religious literature, and the popular pulpit, which suspects and depreciates it,—most people will feel themselves obliged to answer that the popular impression best corresponds to the *prima facie* sense of the words, and will think that the traditional policy of our Church is in contradiction with those words. This contradiction is usually removed by the supposition that there exists a heathen wisdom and a heathen philosophy,

which is a different philosophy from a Christian philosophy; that St. Paul is condemning the former, and is proposing to replace it by a new or Christian philosophy. It is said that it is not intellect, but the unregenerate intellect, which is anti-Christian. The wisdom of the heathen world had failed to find out God, but there is a true knowledge which apprehends Divine things.

Such an interpretation was the natural and necessary result of time—time which originated in Christendom practices and institutions which could not be justified by the letter of Scripture. The modern interpreter, who had himself spent years in the acquisition of theological lore and of this very Greek learning of which St. Paul speaks, was necessarily driven, when he came to this text, to some interpretative compromise. The fact before the commentator's eyes—a palpable one, and of too great magnitude to be overlooked—was that in every Christian nation, and in proportion as that nation rose in the scale of humanity, it immediately had recourse to, and replaced in its schools this very Greek

learning which St. Paul repudiates—it immediately made, and was compelled to make, its highest education philosophical, and to recognise in the philosophical mind the highest development of man. The illiterate expounder of Scripture, Montanist, Wycliffite, or Puritan, had no such difficulty. He appropriated at once, in his own sense, the words now before us, and would have been surprised if he had found Scripture recognising human learning for any other purpose but to denounce it. But the learned expositor had to reconcile the fact and the tradition of education with the words of St. Paul. He mostly did this by the supposition of a double philosophy—a pagan or unenlightened philosophy, which St. Paul is supposed to condemn, and another, or Christian philosophy, which is that taught in the Christian schools. That even if Greek books are used in education, yet the Christian Church or society being the educator, the heathen ideas receive a Christian character, or one corrected by Christian ideas.

This theory has probably been widely prevalent. But it is impossible that it should be

accepted, as it proceeds on an erroneous notion of the nature of philosophy. Greek philosophy is neither in itself, nor in its employment in education, a system of doctrines inculcated on authority, but a habit of thought. Truth is one. There are not two philosophies. There are many applications of science, but there is but one mode of scientifically knowing. Philosophy cannot be formulated in propositions in such a way that there can be propositions which are philosophically true, but theologically wrong. Philosophy and science are nothing but our ordinary human faculties cultivated artificially till they acquire the habit of perceiving and knowing things in the most perfect way in which things can be known. The acquisition of such a habit, then, cannot be a matter irrelevant to religion. The habit must be the very organ of religious thought, as of every other kind of thinking.

Two questions arise upon this—

1. What is the position which Christianity as the absolute religion assumes towards philosophy?

2. What, historically, was the attitude assumed by Christianity in its origin towards Greek philosophy?

It is to the second only of these inquiries that I venture to-day to ask your attention for a few minutes.

Our first view must be taken in the first century.

The relation between Christianity and Greek philosophy in the first century cannot be more distinctly stated than in the passage of St. Paul now before us, when the context of the passage is properly understood.

The word which our language is throughout this passage obliged to render Wisdom, is *σοφία*, which, if not exactly synonymous in the usage of that age with *φιλοσοφία*, is far more akin to it than the corresponding English terms, wisdom and philosophy, are to each other. Both the Greek words, *σοφία* and *φιλοσοφία*, in the lax and indeterminate usage of the writers of the first century, have to be taken in a wide and general sense. The wisdom or philosophy which is meant here is that which is

given by a liberal education. When it is said by St. Stephen of Moses, that he was "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians," the real import of the words is that he was brought up in all the best culture of the country, and not what the Authorised Version suggests, that he was initiated into some specific mysteries known only to the Egyptians, *ἐπαιδεύθη πασῇ σοφίᾳ Αἰγυπτίων.* The regular course of a Roman youth's education in the first century was grammar, *i.e.* reading and writing; then, at fourteen, he entered the school of the rhetorician. Finally, at seventeen, when the powers of thought begin to expand themselves, he was transferred to the academy of the philosopher. This pupilage did not imply that he became a disciple of one of the rival sects, Stoic or Academic; it meant only that he was grounded in the principles of physics, metaphysics, and morals, so far as they were the common property of the educated classes, and embodied in classical literature. Though *φιλοσοφία* in the writers of the period includes philosophy and science, so far as they were known in education,

we should yet often not be far wrong if we rendered it by the word Literature. When, then, St. Paul here draws the sharp contrast between the *σοφία τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, human philosophy —"the words which man's wisdom teacheth," *διδακτοὶ ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγοι*—on the one hand, and on the other "the foolishness of preaching," what he is pointing at is the undeniable fact that the Christian movement originated wholly outside the sphere of educated thought. It owed nothing to classical literature. The first Christians were drawn mainly from the poorer and uneducated classes; there were a few exceptions, not many wise— *οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοί.* What is more, the movement itself, whatever it consisted in, did not originate in the *cultivation* of the age, neither in its general cultivation, nor in any specific and innovating school of thought. Christianity does not advance in the first instance as a new teaching which seeks to rival and displace existing schools by superior truth, superior argument, or greater power of satisfying curiosity and solving difficulties of speculation. Its

contents are not cognate to thought or knowledge.

What primitive Christianity was in its essence may be best seen in martyrdom. The martyr was the Christian hero, raised above his fellows by the degree of his endurance, but exhibiting a virtue in its essence the same as theirs. The martyr is the Christian written in large characters. The language of the apologists and earliest writers, speaking of martyrdom, may be reduced to two ideas. 1. The exaltation of the spirit above the incidents of temporal life, death included. 2. Participation in the sufferings of Christ. There is not, in their conception of martyrdom, the notion of bearing witness to an opinion — notwithstanding the ready etymology. The witness of the martyr was a witness to the vivid faith he felt; to the power of the regenerate soul in realising the unseen, and arriving at a conviction of the nothingness of material objects; to an ambition which was dead to the world, and desired only to be with Christ. Their endurance unto death was undeniable evidence of their own faith, and the most

effective encouragement of that of others. This is the *contemptus mortis* which attracted the notice even of the supercilious Tacitus. The cloud of witnesses in the Hebrews were witnesses not to a creed, but to the victory of the immortal soul over the world. From the first, Christianity came forward as the religion of suffering. It represented moral perfection as at once desirable and unattainable. But its absence was compensated for by suffering—by the sufferings of Christ, and the joint sufferings of His devoted followers, who filled up the measure of that which was behind—*τὰ ὑστερήματα τῶν θλίψεων τοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

In martyrdom then, *i.e.* in its extraordinary, no more than in its ordinary phasis, did Christianity present itself to men as a reform of thought, as an intellectual principle, as a truer system of philosophy.

This is, historically, the position of Christianity towards philosophy in the first century—a relation of entire heterogeneity or of mutual exclusion. For we may remind ourselves that the contrast between the educated and the un-

educated sections of society was very much more marked then than now. *Now*, cheap literature, daily or periodic, diffuses the language and opinions of cultivation far beyond the circles which can be considered cultivated. The interval between the well-educated man and the day-labourer in the Christian countries of the West may be as wide now as then; but this interval is now filled up by graduated social strata, so finely shading off into each other that it is impossible to say where the line should be drawn. In the first century language itself drew the line of demarcation sharply. The language of cultivation was Greek, and only over a very small area of Greece proper, and in a few great cities of Macedonian foundation, was Greek spoken by any but persons of cultivation. Literature, education, language—in a word, philosophy—was the exclusive privilege of a class.

Over against this small educated class stood the great mass of the provincials, populace or peasantry, who were entirely excluded from the ideas and the medium of education. These

popular masses remained *after* their absorption into the Empire, as *before* it, in their primitive national groups. They inherited, with the language, the traditional sentiments of their respective races. Among these sentiments the most powerful was an attachment to their traditional mythologies. We are apt to speak as if in the Roman world of the first century A.D., pagan worships had died, or were dying out. This is an illusion created by literature. These beliefs had disappeared from the minds of the literary and educated class, but they had not yet faded at all in the esteem of the public. The temples were still thronged with worshippers, sacrifices still ascended from every altar, there were prayers, vows, priests, processions, incense, pilgrimages to favourite shrines, portents interpreted, oracles asked and given, the adoration of the trembling devotee, the proud pomp of the gorgeous ceremonial. This or that temple may have lost something of its celebrity; an ἄγαλμα here or there may have gone out of fashion; some of the old oracles had become mute, but this was not from *decay* of

piety, it was from *excess* of it. The old objects of veneration were but displaced by the multitude of new claimants. It is not too much to say that the Roman world—the more civilised part of it—was never more religious than it was in the first century A.D. The words which St. Paul addressed to the men of Athens might be extended to the whole Mediterranean—*κατὰ πάντα δεισιδαιμονέστεροι*—on all sides awake to religious impressions. The eyes of mankind seem to have been turned in the direction of the supernatural—they sought it everywhere and eagerly, and the demand created the supply. A crowd of unknown gods, and new ritual, the prophet and the fortune-teller, magic arts, omens, divination, initiations, penances, and mystical commemorations occupied the serious attention of men.

It was into this fermenting mass of superstitious fever, *i.e.* among the bulk of mankind, and not into the thin upper stratum of the reading and educated, that the Christian message from heaven was launched. The consequence was that, while it was out of all relation

to philosophy, its relation to the popular worships was one of sharp conflict and deadly hostility. Philosophy lay outside its orbit—was nowhere in contact with it. Christianity, as a moral phenomenon, is unknown to the classical literature of the first century. The existence of Christ is barely mentioned as a historical fact. The characteristic of that century is the collision of the new faith with the established creeds and popular worships.

It may perhaps be said that this collision was a collision with power and not with popular feeling; that it was the magistrate and not the rival creed which conducted all the early persecutions. This is so only in appearance. The Empire, from its origin to the end of the Flavian dynasty, from Augustus to Domitian, *i.e.* for the whole of the century which now occupies us, was *popular* in its origin. It belonged to the people, not to the aristocratic or literary class. This class was feared and persecuted by the first Cæsars. During all this first age the philosophers were against Cæsarism. Power shared the instincts and suspicions of

the people. When Nero or Trajan punished Christians, it was not from choice, but from necessity. Popular feeling was too strong for them. It was not merely a maxim of State policy that the ancestral worships must be sustained; but it was under the balcony of Cæsar, as once before at the judgment-seat of Pilate, that there was a clamorous mob which Cæsar dared not refuse. The early persecutions were not the collision of religion with power, the first shock of battle between Church and State; they were results of the jealousy of rival worships against a movement felt to be deeper based than themselves.

In the whole of this period then, Christianity is moving in a different plane from philosophy. It is in the realm of facts, of devout practice, of pious sentiment, of renunciation, of worship, not in the realm of ideas. It encounters rude opposition and violence, but not from the educated class, who know nothing of it, who have not learnt to distinguish it from the many similar phenomena which surround them. St. Paul, in this epistle to the Christians of Corinth,

notes this negative relation between Christianity and philosophy. He passes no condemnation on philosophy—he neither anathematises it as in itself anti-Christian, nor laments its absence from Christian teaching.

In the second age of the Church a great change has silently come into the world in this respect. The relation between power and what we have called philosophy, *i.e.* the ideal basis of liberal culture, was totally altered. The imperial power of the Julian and Flavian families had represented force—the swords of the legions or prætorians. Philosophy had been anti-Cæsarean. With Nerva, A.D. 96, philosophy may be said to have ascended the imperial throne. Not that all the emperors of the second century were individually men of education. Trajan was not at all a philosophic man in understanding or in morals. A rude soldier, with a camp training, he paraded rather than disguised the grossest habits of military debauch. But in the consolidation of the imperial system the character of the individual emperor was becoming of less importance.

Administration was being slowly penetrated by ideas—the ideas of reason and humanity. It was gradually being rationalised. Government was ceasing to be the tyranny of arbitrary will. The old principles of Roman municipal law were being built up into a system of universal jurisprudence. Power had passed over to the educated class, and was becoming imbued with its habits of thinking. Philosophy ceased to be political, republican, or aristocratic. It was resigned to have an emperor, and content to wield a delegated power. Power, on its part, ceased to see in the philosopher a secret enemy and conspirator—a reminiscence of Republican Rome.

Coincident with this change in the relation between philosophy and power had occurred a change in the character and aims of philosophy. Greek philosophy had been speculative and scientific. It was the ambition of human curiosity exploring for its own gratification the causes of phenomena. After the Greek schools were transplanted to Rome they had lost their intellectual colour. Before the first century

they were transformed into schools of personal morality. In an ascetic severity the aristocratical "wise man" sought the mental independence which he could no longer find in the institutions under which he had to live. Philosophy in the first century was accepted by the educated class in commutation for political freedom. In the second century philosophy changed its direction. It ceased altogether to have political associations. It became much less individual and egoistic. Its direction was turned outwards upon society. It became an instrument of progress. Politics had ceased to be. Social organisation became the attractive object which employed the minds of men. At no period of history, perhaps, has the outward victory of moral ideas been more decisive than in the second century of the Christian era. The social and administrative problems of the time were taken up, discussed, and decided, on the broadest principles of reason and humanity. The classical conception of the rights of man had been limited to the πόλις—a small corporation of some thirty thousand men was conceived

in a state of perpetual warfare with many neighbouring corporations. This condition of international war was the natural condition. The unity of the *Orbis Romanus* which destroyed country introduced the conception of the brotherhood of humanity. It removed the basis of morals from the fact of sharing a common country to the fact of sharing a common nature. Philanthropy and mercy were recognised as new elements of legal right (δικαιοσύνη). The despotic authority of the Paterfamilias was restrained. The slave, though not yet enfranchised, became the object of the law's regard. Dio Chrysostom, the adviser of Trajan, is the first Greek writer who has pronounced the principle of slavery to be contrary to the law of nature. Government occupied itself with the condition of the free labourer. Enfranchisement is encouraged. Marriage is protected and raised. Human sacrifices are prohibited, though they cannot be altogether prevented.

All this was the work of philosophy or education.

It was impossible that philosophy should

assume this new direction without a change being wrought in its relations with Christianity.

It was in the second century that the Christian movement was first brought face to face with Greek culture. For Greek philosophy means Greek culture, and Greek culture was classical and comprehensive, based on, and nourishing itself by, the whole results of Greek thought. The unity in the Greek mind is as marked as its variety; and the culture of the second century — whether Pythagorean with Plutarch, Stoic with Epictetus and M. Aurelius, or Platonist with Dio Chrysostom—was the culture of the great Hellenic tradition, a tradition in which all the great minds were represented; where Heraclitus with Xenophanes, Plato with Aristotle, Chrysippus with Carneades, found their place. Christianity approaches this tradition; that movement which appeared to a Tacitus an insignificant superstition, born among the peasantry of Syria—it recognises in it at once its own features, and makes common cause with it against the inhumanities of the world.

1st. It was impossible for the Christian to

have the least tincture of Greek learning without becoming aware that philosophy, from its origin, had been one long protest against the popular mythology. Philosophers had suffered persecution, even death, for not worshipping the gods of their country. Others had avoided the same fate by prudent reserves. The Christian preacher, when denouncing the vanity of idols, could borrow his best arguments from the Greek classics.

2d. Greek philosophy, not quite so unanimously, but still by an immense preponderance of weight and numbers, had taught the unity of God. "God is one," exclaims Athenagoras, as in astonishment at the mass of testimony he can collect out of the classics. "God is one! this is what every philosopher proclaims. Why should it be penal for us Christians only to say the same?" At this period especially, Greek philosophy was eminently religious. As Plato, in his mature age, returned towards the Pythagoreanism of his early youth, so in this its maturity did Greek philosophy return towards the same cast of thought. The philosophic

literature of the second century is theistic. The attitude it now holds towards the Olympic legend ceases to be that of satirical scorn. The theogonies are now treated with respect, and explained by interpretations. Symbol and allegory are set to work, all the grossness of the old worships is wiped out, and the thousand deities of paganism are declared to be but many names of the same one God. What the universalism of the first emperors had attempted materially, philosophy attempts now metaphysically. In their capacity of Pontifex Maximus, the Cæsars had made their endeavour after religious unity by the process of giving a home in the Eternal City to all the gods of all the nations. The Capitol became the Pantheon of the world. Instead of fortifying the national and hereditary worships, this vast scheme of toleration was fatal to them all. The hold of a national superstition over the mind of its votaries depended upon isolation. Brought into presence one of another, the idols of each tribe had mutually killed each other. The philosophers now made their attempt at an ideal religious

unity. They would penetrate behind the veil of the Form to the conception which lay hid beneath it, to the Eternal and the True, of whom the local deities were transient and phenomenal representations. Thus the Christian writers and the philosophers were drawn together by their common desire to reinstate a positive religion in its hold over all.

3d. Philosophy was pre-eminently moral. This reform of the pagan theology which was attempted by the philosophers was undertaken under the pressure of moral ideas. Greek philosophy in the old time had never been sceptical. It *had* been critical. It had rejected the Olympic legend because it wanted evidence. As early as the fifth century B.C. it was understood that the popular theogonies had been the creation of the poets. But it was not merely want of historical evidence which had condemned the Mythus in the eyes of philosophy. It was its immorality. The canon of criticism to which theology was subjected was morality. The legend was despised by the philosophers as a fiction. It was odious to

them because it was subversive of virtue. Here Christianity found a point of sympathy. That religion, which Tacitus only knew as *exitiabilis superstitio*, was, whatever it was besides, a moral reformation. Christianity, as taught by Christ and His apostles, so far from colliding with the morality of reason, descended into the depths of the human consciousness, and elicited from it a response to a morality which the schools had wished, but had not dared to teach. So far from proclaiming an unmoral God, the Gospel, in its earliest form, presents itself as an uncompromising appeal to the reason and the moral consciousness in its most exalted manifestations. At once rational and supernatural, it is supernatural by its profound rationality. On charity, on forbearance, on wealth, on property, on marriage, on chastity, on the most delicate problems of human conduct, Christ has left declarations of so high a philosophy, that He Himself, as the Searcher of hearts, assures us "all men cannot receive this saying, save he to whom it is given."

These are points in which an instant sym-

pathy was found to exist between Christianity and Greek culture, when the two were brought into contact. It was a sympathy, not with any of the distinctive tenets of any particular school, but with the broad principles of Greek culture. But in the second century these distinctive marks, though by no means effaced, had ceased to have the importance once belonging to them. The Porch, the Garden, nor the Academy can be considered in this second century as constituting distinct congregations or marking divisional areas of thought. The prevailing tone of the period was what has sometimes been called "eclecticism." This eclecticism was not a peculiar school basing itself upon a special principle, but the general residuum of all previous schools which had become the common heritage of thinking and educated men. The moral character of the second century is given it by this popular philosophy—a philosophy eminently practical, universally applicable, of the very stuff of which life itself is made. The second century is the reign of common sense in life and literature. The whole Greek world

was now reaping the harvest which had been sown by generations of speculative men. All the wild, the imaginative, the ideal, the subtle, was evaporated, and only those results left behind which recommended themselves to every one's reason and common sense. The so-called eclecticism was not a system of elected truths, but so much of the whole result of a nation's thinking as had survived in the way of natural selection—that which was rational and universal had lived, that which was imaginative and peculiar had died out.

This rational residuum of centuries of Greek mental activity was the philosophy in which Christianity recognised at once its own elements.

This surprising phenomenon—that a religious reform which, wherever it came from, came from outside the pale of liberal culture—that this religious reform was found by the philosophic culture of the second century to be identical with itself in all its chief elements—this was a phenomenon which could not but attract the attention of observant men, and

invite an explanation. Such an explanation was soon propounded by the educated Christian writers, such as Justin, Origen, and Clement of Alexandria, after the middle of the second century.

The bearing of the explanation given by them on Christian theory is too large a topic to be entered upon at present.

The fact itself, of which they sought the explanation, is one which offers to the mind various food for reflection. Confining ourselves to the single point of view from which we started, we find that there was one moment in the history of Christianity when the highest reason, as independently exercised by the wise of the world, was entirely coincident with the highest reason, as inspiring the Church. There was discovered to be, not two philosophies, but one true philosophy, common to them both. Whatever may be the merits of the explanation propounded by St. Clement, whatever may be the true explanation of the fact, we learn from the fact itself that the supposed necessity of a collision between the intellect of man and the intel-

ligence of the Church is imaginary. If the Church and reason have at later times been in conflict, it must be either that reason, being a fallible power of induction, has adopted for a time an erroneous conclusion, or that some Christian teachers have occasionally undertaken the defence of unreasonable matters. Such incompatibility can only really exist between particular and temporal conclusions. Between Reason as such, and Christianity as such, in their broad principles as applied to life and conduct, history seems to show us in a remarkable instance that no inconsistency exists.

VII.

[June 6, 1869.]

"Ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called."—1 CORINTHIANS i. 26.

ON a previous occasion we considered the attitude assumed by Greek philosophy towards the Christian ideas, at the period when the two first came into collision. In the second and third centuries of our era, the period of the Antonines and Alexander Severus—a period of civilisation and culture such as the world did not see again till the first half of the eighteenth century, after the peace of Utrecht—the educated classes of Greco-Roman society became slowly aware that there was growing up a set of moral and religious ideas which in the disinterested self-abnegation of its standard of human conduct, and the pure moral attribution of its theistic conception, offered a surprising

coincidence with the best and wisest thoughts of the best and wisest sages of the Greek schools, during the five or six centuries of their existence. Greek philosophy had been all along at war with the popular religions, and the philosophers often in danger from the devotees of those religions, not because their religious ideal was laxer, but because it was more refined than that of the religious world. Greek philosophy had been a protest of six centuries against an immoral deity, against the gods of the nations—gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust, whose attributes were rage, revenge, or lust. It was inevitable that, as soon as there arose among the Christians teachers who had any tincture of Greek literature, they should appropriate this protest, and look with veneration upon these philosophers as upon precursors of the faith. An immediate amalgamation of Greek literature and Christian teaching was the consequence. That small judaical sect, of which it could be said in the middle of the first century that not many wise, not many learned, were called, became rapidly co-

extensive with the culture of the civilised world. The fusion of philosophy with Christianity was complete. How in the course of the two following centuries the Church, in the pursuit of a hierarchical system, alienated knowledge, contemned learning, destroyed Greek books, and banished the seven professors of philosophy, become again anti-Christian, beyond the limits of the Roman empire—all this constitutes the history of the first breach between Christianity and human reason.

The next epoch in the history of the relations between the Church and reason is formed by the grand outgrowth of Latin philosophy in the University of Paris in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In the scholastic philosophy reason and faith were once again reconciled and reunited. And the reunion was not by concordat, but by fusion. The scholastic philosophy is true to the common principle of all philosophy, in that it sought not a partial account of this or that class of facts, but an explanation which is commensurate with the whole of the known facts. The scholastic philosophy did not

exempt any one region of knowledge from its operations. It did not set aside the Christian verities as a domain where it had no mission, and confine itself to physics, or to logic. It threw the whole of ascertained beliefs or received ideas into a common alembic, and proposed to itself as its problem the construction of a complete and consistent exposition of the knowable.

The harmony thus established between faith and reason was destined to be once more disturbed. Owing to the operation of causes well known to you, the Church let go its hold upon knowledge, gave itself up to the pursuit of ecclesiastical power, and in the sixteenth century we again find science encamped outside the Church, and the new philosophy more or less at war with faith.

It may be sufficient to have indicated these two epochs—the second and the twelfth centuries—as the moments when philosophy and faith coincided, when the highest culture of the age was in harmony with its highest religious instincts. But I propose to-day to ask your

attention to the modern period of philosophy, that in which we now live, and to the peculiar attitude towards faith by which it is distinguished from former periods of philosophical activity.

We hear a great deal on all sides, at the present day, of what are called the sceptical tendencies of the age. We are told that we are living in an exceptional time—a time at which the human intellect is obeying a powerful influence in a direction away from religious truth. Nor is this only a vague impression prevailing in circles of inferior intelligence. Even influential leaders of opinion warn us against false philosophy, materialism, secularism, unbelief, and speak as if under a suspicion that what is called the intellect of the age is alienated from religion. It is surmised that a war is being carried on for the destruction of revealed truth. A materialist tone is said to pervade all our reasonings about practical questions. Science, as a whole, seems to stand in antithesis, if not to Christianity, at least to the philosophical or speculative part of Christian

belief. We hear much of a crisis of the faith, of the perilous errors which are abroad in society, of the aggressions of science, of the attempts to secularise education. These complaints are not confined to our own country. Indeed they are not so loudly accentuated among us as in other parts of Western Christendom. They are loudest where the pressure of science is the greatest. The phenomenon is a European phenomenon, and is reproduced in every nation with a local colouring, but with a substantial identity. It is in the neighbouring countries of France and Belgium that the outcry and protest against the spread of irreligion is most loudly heard, and is made with most success. Many of my hearers are doubtless familiar with the eloquent and stirring appeals of eminent French prelates against the errors of the day; indeed, the manifestoes of the bishops of those countries contain little else beside denunciations of the rationalistic and materialistic delusions of the age. The language of the leaders is echoed in the pulpits and the religious press. Nor is the alarm

allowed to evaporate in rhetoric. In the most public and solemn form, in an encyclical letter addressed to all the bishops of the Catholic world, and in the syllabus which is annexed to it, a large number of propositions which are asserted to be current among men at this moment are condemned as philosophically false. An appeal is even made to the Protestant or other separated communions to unite for the purpose of resisting the progress of those ideas through the European community. The teaching of the schools is moulded accordingly. You cannot open any of the text-books on religion, on morals, on logic, on history, as compiled for the higher schools which are under the influence of the clergy, without finding the same apprehensions and the same suspicion of knowledge. All universities are declared dangerous to faith and morals; and our own, in particular, has recently been challenged in direct terms as giving an education which is infidel to the core.

These cries of alarm, so solemnly promulgated, so industriously propagated, and which

receive such publicity through the pulpit, are a phenomenon which points to the divorce between philosophy and faith to which allusion has been already made. Let us ask, Is this panic justified by the facts? What is, at this moment, the relation between the popular Christian belief, and the body of certified knowledge which in the widest sense of the word can be called science?

First, we may distinguish in these complaints against the irreligion of the day two separate parts. In the general charge of religious alienation brought against our time there is involved a censure on the low standard of practical attainment, and the coldness of devotion. In every society and in every age the public standard and the general practice must be found very far short of the ideal of Christian virtue, and the entire attachment of the heart to the object of the Christian's hope. The minister of Christ must therefore always be in his right when he stands up to rebuke a pleasure-seeking or care-immersed generation, and to remind them of their higher destinies.

We may then dismiss the question whether in its love of pleasure, or its lust of gain, or its ambition for social consequence, our generation is morally weaker than those which have gone before. But it is quite different when the Christian minister undertakes to prescribe modes of thought, to condemn opinions, and to pronounce certain principles of politics or society true or false. It is to this narrower question that it is proposed to confine ourselves. Are the current principles of public thought and speech, are the tendencies of science, is the tone of popular speculation, are the first principles of logic and philosophy as taught in our schools, incompatible with Christian or with theistic beliefs? What *is*, in the epoch in which we are living, the attitude of philosophy towards Christianity?

It may perhaps be safely asserted that there exists a widespread excitability of the theological curiosity—an excitability which is stimulating all minds that can entertain ideas to carry those ideas up to first principles, and to endeavour to attain a conception of the supernatural which shall be in harmony with what is

ascertained of the natural. This curiosity arises from the unconscious instinct of the understanding endeavouring to harmonise its own contents. So far from being sceptical or blameable, it is surely evidence of the deep-felt interest of the soul in its own fate, a living sense of the momentous issues which depend on having a valid answer to the questions which speculative philosophy raises. This feverish curiosity is not sceptical, but ardently desirous for satisfaction. It is but a sign that the intelligence of the age cannot rest in that arrangement by which human life is cut into two halves—one half belonging to this world, which is based on a foundation of science and philosophical principles, and another half belonging to religion and the Church, underneath which is to be postulated a different set of data. The so-called scepticism is the blind and painful effort to combine two separated beliefs into one whole, and to require a common ground of evidence for both. Intelligence is throughout of a piece and uniform; and in proportion to its activity will be its struggle for consistency of thought.

Now it is surely not to be denied that the present form of intelligence is, in some of its deepest principles, discrepant from the mould in which the thoughts of the last generation ran. Not to lose ourselves in so wide a field, let us take the history of a single idea. Let us take the Théodicée, or the vindication of the moral attributes of God, considered in relation to the sufferings of sentient beings. The Théodicée of the last century was of comparatively recent construction. The publication and popularisation of Newton's calculations in the early years of the eighteenth century had powerfully attracted men's minds to the contemplation of the vast expanse of space and the infinite scale of the universe. This enlarged conception of the Cosmos required a readjustment of the old conception of the providential government of God, and broke up the narrow and anthropomorphic system which had satisfied the imaginations of an earlier age whose mental horizon was bounded by the visible horizon of the heavens and the earth, of which God was the King. Accordingly at the beginning of the

last century a Théodicée came into vogue adapted to the enlarged astronomical system. This mode of conceiving the Supreme Governor of the universe, sketched by the master-hand of Leibnitz, became the common form of the higher religious thought for the rest of the century. According to the Leibnitzian Théodicée God was an architect, and the universe as we see it was His construction. The intricacy of the machinery was the evidence and the measure of the intelligence which had contrived it. There was not only contrivance but design. For though, in this system, man ceased to be the central object of Divine care, and was reduced to a comparative insignificance, yet the end of the Creator was the happiness of His creatures, through all the stellar worlds, this earth included. Harmony, order, and law pervaded all these arrangements from the epoch of their creation. The will of God was free, not subject to a necessity, but this free will was determined by the suitable or the reasonable. Evil and suffering in this fallen corner of the universe were necessary ingredients of the good of the

whole; moral virtue being impossible without freedom, and freedom being impossible without choice between good and evil. The vast space over which the scheme was spread was held to be the solution of all apparent contradictions. For though from our corner we can see enough to know that perfect wisdom and perfect goodness are at work for us, we cannot see over the whole scheme, and therefore cannot tell by what means the harmony of the general design requires to be sustained.

Such was the scheme of natural religion which found general acceptance among philosophic minds in the last age—whether Christian or deist, or wavering indecisively between the two. Even Voltaire, who wrote on more than one occasion in ridicule of the optimist scheme, yet appears to have shared in this conception of the Supreme Being. It is a scheme adopted into the education of our universities as embodied in the popular manuals of Butler and Paley, and far beyond the university area forms part of the heritage of all cultivated men.

When, then, we who have been brought up

in this tradition of natural religion—natural religion as the foundation and condition of all religion—hear that our first principle is being variously questioned; when we find the men whom we regard as leaders in science either denying, or hesitating to affirm the ideas of cause and design; when we are first awakened from our security in a rational basis of our Christian belief, it is surely not mere bigotry if the first sentiment excited be one of resistance. It is but natural that men who have passed into the world, whose avocations do not allow them leisure, or whose practical energy has deprived them of the flexibility of intellect necessary for speculation, should decline to re-examine the foundations of their whole mental superstructure.

Such a re-examination of the received principles of natural religion is, however, urgently necessary. For it is by no means true that the attack upon the received philosophy in general, and upon the Leibnitzian mechanical artificer of the universe, proceeds from any peculiar spirit of anti-religion abroad in our age. When in the seventeenth century the mechanical philo-

sophy supplanted the old hypothesis of substantial forms, precisely the same outcry was raised against it. But no sooner had Newton's calculations carried the new philosophy home to the intellect of a new generation, than a new Théodicée adapted to the new conception of nature was prepared. Leibnitz abandoned the *a priori* road, and found his way back to the idea of God through the works of creation.

There has been slowly growing up of recent years a new conception of nature and natural law. This new conception, which may be shortly, though imperfectly, indicated by the word "development," originated in the domains of the naturalist and the experimental philosopher, and has only recently begun to penetrate to the speculations of philosophy properly so called. But now every science is contributing its share, and even those sciences which are still reluctant show signs of a tendency hereafter to fall under its sway. We can now no longer represent to ourselves our solar system as a machine having an order and harmony arranged at some definite point of past time—

an order which it will continue to obey till it is as suddenly dissolved by the Creator at a future point of time—which was the conception to which the natural theology of the past century was adapted. We are now compelled to represent to ourselves the condition of our solar system, of our planet, and of man upon it, as it exists at this moment, as being the consequence of an antecedent condition—that again of a prior state, and so backwards far beyond the scope of observation. Geology has revealed to us that the extant condition of the surface of our planet is the sequel of antecedent conditions developing themselves with imperceptible change through periods of time so vast as to be inconceivable. The extant organic forms of animal life are not fixed unalterable types, but are developments from more elementary forms, and are themselves transitional to other forms. Physical laws now in operation are themselves sufficient, with the co-efficient of time, to explain the given condition of things. The laws of nature are wholly unknown to us; what we call law being only a record of a momentary

connection between phenomena. The progress of science is a continual filling up of gaps in theory by the discovery of new intermediate facts. Those hiatuses which the natural theology of the past age seized upon to occupy with its theory of creation are being one after the other filled up. Though a perfect continuity in the succession of phenomena is not as yet ascertained over the whole field of our observation, the tendency of knowledge is, by the constant intercalation of new facts, to establish the high probability of such a continuity. The more we investigate, the more we find that in existing phenomena graduation, from the like to the seemingly unlike, is everywhere found; and in the changes in past phenomena gradual progression is the law of universal nature. The supreme induction of modern physics, that all the forces which are in operation in our solar system are convertible into each other, that all the phenomena known to us are produced by a slow process of such conversion, that the quantity of moving force in the world is being gradually expended in producing light, heat,

motion, and animal life, and is thus being irrecoverably buried in the particles of matter—this induction, though not yet in the position of a law verified by all the facts, is still ascertained to so high a degree of probability, that we cannot choose but think of nature under this conception of development. The theory may be awaiting complete verification, but all the lines of knowledge may be seen converging towards this generalisation.

It is impossible that so novel a conception of nature could establish itself in science without having a powerful influence on the received theory of natural theology. It is to the slow infiltration of this idea of continuity and progression that we may attribute the perturbation perceptible in recent years in the region of rational theology. The established Théodicée of Leibnitz was adapted to a philosophy of the Cosmos, in which the universe though a vast, was yet a limited, quantity, in which time was compressed within the narrow limits of written records, and in which phenomena lay in isolated groups, with plenty of interspaces between

them. The natural theology of the last century filled, so to say, all the vacant spaces thus left before and between the natural with its supernatural. There was provided by the state of scientific knowledge room for fiats of creation and intervention. The new conception of continuity and progress takes away all these spaces, and makes one reign of inexorable law co-extensive with phenomena. It seems thus to banish the Creator and Governor from the phenomenal world where we had placed Him, and to be removing God far away out of our sight. And as the foundation of all practical religion is a sense of the presence of God, and our accountability to Him, we cannot wonder that science should be thought to threaten religion in its vital part.

The question of causation is only one of the points on which science is in conflict with the received religious philosophy. There are others. Yet it would seem that the first claim for a rehearing must be that of the relation in which God stands to the world. For the question of natural theology is not, Can we inductively infer the existence of God from the works of creation ?

but another much more importunate and disturbing, Is it possible to conceive the existence of a first cause and providential governor consistently with what is certainly known of phenomena?

The state of rational theology in this country is at this moment one of utter abandonment. I may remind you of what was said by one of our most eminent and high-minded leaders of science so lately as August last. Addressing a crowded assembly of scientific men, the President of the British Association bade them beware of that dangerous two-edged weapon, Natural Theology, a science falsely so called, which seeks to weigh the infinite in the balance of the finite, and shifts its ground to meet the requirements of every new fact that science establishes, and every old error that science exposes.

Consistently with the respect due to the eminent person who expressed this opinion, it must be desirable that a protest should be entered, and in this place, against a doctrine so unphilosophical. Yet the opinion thus publicly

announced may be cited as an extreme case of that disturbance of first principle which I have been endeavouring to illustrate. The attempt to settle the apparent conflict between reason and revelation by declaring revelation to be non-rational is renewed from age to age. The history of opinion teaches us that the attempt to erect a Christian altar to the Unknown God is always made with the greatest plausibility at epochs like the present, when the accumulation of new knowledge is in active conflict with old forms of thought.

Existence is one and uniform throughout the cognoscible. The human intellect is one and simple in all its cognitions. This is the hypothesis on which must rest all scientific theology, and all philosophy, if there be a philosophy, and if there be a scientific theology. If the objects of our religious worship are not apprehensible by our reason, they are not apprehensible at all, and are to us as non-existent. The positivist hypothesis becomes then the inevitable hypothesis. Then metaphysics and theology *are* sciences falsely so called—the metaphysical and the theo-

logical are then transitional modes of conceiving the universe, which must now be discarded.

There is no doubt an intrinsic complexity in the philosophical question of reason and faith. But there are other causes which concur to the entanglement. It is not that there are on one side and on the other truths which are irreconcilable, but that there are on one side and on the other habits of thought which repel each other. If scientific men are often ready to relegate religion and philosophy together into the region of the unintelligible, are not divines often found to adopt a mode of thinking and speaking from which logical and scientific method is conspicuously absent? If religious men are complaining that the intellect of the age is atheistic, scientific men are complaining that the spirit of the clergy is against science. When applied to our own country, the one complaint is, I trust, not more truly founded than the other. Yet it cannot be denied that there are appearances which may give a colour to the assertion. What we cannot see at home we may see on a large scale in other countries.

The attitude of the ultramontane Church in the west of Europe is one which cannot be contemplated without serious misgivings. It is not only science, but society, which is threatened. The actual position of the Catholic clergy in some of those countries is that of an open and avowed combination against the highest interests of the modern state. There is a growing fear among the educated laity that religion and the Church are being organised to promote the ends of a political party. The Church of Rome has irretrievably broken with knowledge. She has denied so much that is believed to be true that her position is intellectually untenable. And as she can never retract, her only course is to take her stand upon ignorance. The uneducated in any country are always a majority of the population, and if she can retain her hold on them she can show a numerical preponderance. To follow out this policy it is necessary to keep the clergy in ignorance also. To this end all the energies of the hierarchy are now directed. Isolation in education is now a life and death question for the Church of Rome.

Seminaries screened from the light of day, where a sham philosophy, a shadowy science, and a mutilated history may be inculcated on authority, are essential to the success of the policy.

The tradition of our own Church of England has been hitherto based, not upon the ignorance of the community, but upon its best knowledge. We have nothing to fear from the free air and the ultimate disclosures of science. What we have to fear is that the level of instruction among the clergy should fall, as it has in France, below that of the average of the other professions and of literature. A clergy undisciplined in the method and principles of science, and trained only in theological casuistry, are a dangerous force armed against the interests of the community. Modern societies are regulated more and more by knowledge, and less by tradition. Modern politics resolve themselves into the struggle between knowledge and tradition. The question for the English nation is, On which side will it have its clergy? This University is now, after a stubborn resistance, turning visibly to the side of knowledge. Will it

carry the clergy along with it? It is to be hoped that from this place no voice may go forth to spread the false alarm of the danger of science. The true danger lies in any attempt to isolate theology, to make it a mere matter of rote, and memory, and tradition, while all other knowledge is active, real, and in constant contact with facts.

We have just taken, after much deliberation and discussion, the step of opening a school of theology. If some among us have doubted the expediency of this measure, it has not been because we doubted that theology affords the materials of a true and a truly educative knowledge. What we have feared was not that our youth should learn theology, but that under the appearance of studying theology, they should imbibe a narrow antipathy to knowledge. There is an unwholesome atmosphere floating about much of our religious literature—a superstitious hostility to science, a secret dread of active intelligence. It ought to be our anxious care in conducting our new experiment that this spirit is not suffered to make its way into our school of theology.

VIII.

[October 22, 1871.]

"That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being."—ACTS xvii. 27, 28.

IT cannot have escaped the notice of any one who is ever so slightly acquainted with the current religious literature and preaching of our day that the evidences of religion are no longer a subject of general interest.

This characteristic of popular teaching comes into stronger relief when we contrast this century with that which immediately preceded it. In the eighteenth century, or during the larger part of it, no religious teacher could find access to the minds of a congregation unless he started from the platform of rational religion.

All the text-books and handbooks which

were employed in education, which were recommended by Bishops to candidates for orders, either consisted of proof, or their contents, whatever they were, were thrown into an array of argument against some imaginary objector. The natural sciences were treated as instrumental to the same theme. Natural philosophy and anatomy, the habits and instincts of animals, all were turned into forms of exhibiting the wisdom and goodness of the Creator.

All this has completely died out. Scarce a vestige of this once popular mode of thought can be traced in the language of religious teachers of our day.

This is a phenomenon which, even if it stood as an isolated fact in the history of our Church, would be worth examination. But, if we find that it is not a detached trait of manners, not a mere change of the fashion of pulpit address, or the discarding of a worn-out topic, but that it can be traced to causes which lie deep in the religious consciousness of the age, it may not unfitly be propounded in this place for your consideration, though the few minutes allotted

me will barely suffice to indicate some of the bearings of the inquiry.

About the middle of the last century there came over England—Church and Dissent alike—a wave of religious fervour. It is matter of history how about that time the rational teacher was superseded in the ordinary way of reaction by a more impassioned and energetic but less cultivated teacher. There went forth over the land a band of preachers who started from entirely new premisses. Instead of virtue, they undertook to preach Christ. Instead of inculcating the moral law they dwelt on faith. Instead of proving the being of a God they offered the gospel. They desisted from establishing the possibility of miracles, but warned sinners to flee from the wrath to come. Slighted by the educated for their ignorance, despised by the man of the world for their importunity, these teachers, whether under the name of Methodist or Evangelical, were received with eagerness by the uneducated and unsophisticated populations. Their success was not a little favoured by the unmeasured contempt which

they poured upon their predecessors. Warmth was their criterion, and they denounced with vehemence the cold reasoners who continued to offer their demonstrations of revealed religion to still unconvinced audiences. They scoffed at, or pitied these blind leaders of the blind who, though ordained ministers of the establishment, were themselves still unconverted men.

This form of religious sentiment gradually conquered its way, first to tolerance, then to respect, and finally to preponderance in the Church of England. It is now already matter of history, though it has occurred within the experience of the older among us, how, after the triumph had been achieved, this has had in turn to yield the platform to a new tone of religious sentiment. The new phase which began amid confusion and alarm, and even cries of treason to the church, and which has established itself in quiet acceptance in the short space of one generation over the face of England—this phase is the antithesis of its predecessors. It has its germ in the grand idea of the univer-

sality of the Church Catholic in its two sections, the Church triumphant and the Church militant, the intimate union between Christ and His people, and our incorporation by the sacraments into this eternal and indestructible society. This system is in its germ as well as its development the antithesis of that which it has supplanted. The evangelical system of the eighteenth century had its point of departure in the subjective consciousness of the individual. Its criterion was in an awakened sensitiveness of the ego. The revived catholicism of the nineteenth century has its point of departure in the Christian society. Its criterion is citizenship or incorporation, which *ipso facto* conveys all spiritual privilege. The two systems originated too in different strata of English life. While the gospel of methodism was preached to the poor, and gradually made its way upwards in social consideration, the catholic system originated with a few academic students who read the Fathers in the original, and is only now finding the machinery by which it can descend within the sphere of the apprehension of the less educated.

It is not my present purpose to examine the contrasts presented by these successive forms of the theological sentiment. The only point on which I would now dwell is a characteristic which is common to them both. They both adopt the same attitude towards natural religion. The two systems of doctrine and sentiment, though proceeding from opposite poles of thought, and upon antagonistic principles, agree in their alienation from, and aversion for, natural theology, the evidences of Christianity, anything of the nature of proof, or the philosophy of religion. The catholic movement, no less than the evangelical movement, which it has superseded, joins in repudiating and contemning the evidence writers of the eighteenth century. The whole of the theological literature of the last century is a dead letter, as completely obsolete as the predestinarian controversies of the seventeenth century.

This being the change which time has effected in the current strain of doctrinal theology, we have to inquire to what causes is this change to be referred? What are the general

habits of thought of which this change is an indication ?

The account which was commonly rendered by the early leaders of the evangelical movement of their own motives was something like this :

They arraigned the whole generation of the classical English pulpit of being *unedifying*. The Tillotsons, the Barrows, the Souths, the Blairs, had addressed the understanding only, and did not touch the heart, whereas to preach the gospel was to proclaim a Saviour. The historical belief of the facts of Christianity is not faith. The whole of revelation may be summed up in two propositions. You are a perishing sinner, and Christ is here ready to save you. These propositions, however, must not be merely assented to by the understanding ; there must be a profound emotional consciousness of sin, and a heartfelt appropriation by the soul of Christ's merits as *my* personal saviour. Preaching is an instrument or means of grace by which this emotional conviction and personal appropriation is aided or brought about.

This was the theory of Christianity as offered by the evangelical leaders of the last century. They regarded themselves as missionaries to heathens, and carrying a message or statement of fact which was not to be proved by reason, but which appealed directly to the emotional consciousness.

Though the preachers of the catholic movement approached the subject from an opposite point of view, it was one which no less distinctly repudiated reason or reasoning proof. The congregations, they said, were not heathen, but Christian by baptism and by education. It was preposterous to be perpetually attempting to prove the truth of revelation to them. They come to church to worship, to pray; the sermon is but, like the creed, a memento to them of doctrine which they implicitly believe. A church is not a collection of inquirers after a truth, but an association of the faithful who are united by a common belief.

Such is the explanation which the two classes of teachers offer of the change now under consideration. But though no doubt true, it goes

but a little way towards explaining the phenomenon. For the change in question was not a mere alteration of the form of pulpit address, a substitution of exhortation for reasoning in preaching merely, it has really been a transfer of the whole mind of the English Church to a new basis of its religious belief. Not merely our preaching, but our whole theology has been shifted to a new ground. And this transfer has not been the work of any body or party within the Church, it has been effected in dependence upon laws of opinion which have operated far beyond merely Church circles, which have pervaded the whole community.

The hidden source of the change in question by which the character of English theology in our day has become different from what it was in the last century must be looked for in the altered relations of religious thought to the other provinces of human knowledge.

The history of science in the seventeenth century is the history of its struggle against theological opinion and ecclesiastical power. Natural knowledge did not in its origin set

itself up against the Church, it only contended to be allowed to exist, and professed not to interfere with the creed of the Church. Descartes proclaimed his absolute submission to the Church, but wished to be allowed to prosecute science as a field outside the pale of theology.

Gradually there grew up beyond the Church's confines a vast fabric of knowledge which rested neither on Church authority nor on Scripture —knowledge too certain to be gainsaid, too important to be overlooked. That system of astronomy which the Church had striven to crush in the sixteenth century as heresy had, before the close of the seventeenth, established itself as an established truth beyond the possibility of question, though it was still denied admittance into the schools in catholic countries. A convergence of events favoured in a singular degree the spring which the human mind made towards the close of the seventeenth century. The intellect of man was wonderfully stimulated through his imagination by the immense spaces opened upon it in the disclosure of the architec-

ture of the heavens. This stimulus extended far beyond the narrow circle of men of science. The popularisation and enlargement of the Copernican astronomy by the calculations of Newton concurred with two political events, which tended in no small degree to set free the spirit of man, and to make him essay his powers. These events were the uprising of the people of England against the attempts of a catholic sovereign to regain England to the catholic faith, and the breaking down of the overgrown fabric of ecclesiastical tyranny in France by the united arms of England and Germany. The effect of the general spirit of freedom which sprang up in the northern countries of Europe upon religious ideas was, that they intermingled for the first time for many centuries with the current of philosophical ideas. The movement exhibited itself at first in the form of an attack. All the old traditional truth was questioned and put upon its defence from the basis of the new acquisitions. The phenomenon of free thinking, which rose to the surface at this period, was the abuse of the

novel sense of mental emancipation, the wantonness of the enfranchised slave, burning the gods he had been compelled to worship. More instructed minds, however, were at hand to teach the proper use of the new liberty of thought. Locke meditated on the reasonableness of Christianity. But the form which was finally impressed on theological speculation, and which it long retained, was given it by the genius of Leibnitz. The inspiring thought of this speculation was—the unity of knowledge. Science forms but one whole. There are not two different modes of knowing, nor two independent bases of thought. There is but one logic of its processes—one intuition of its ultimate grounds. Hence there are not two parts of religion—one natural, ascertainable by reason—the other belonging to a distinct order of cognitions. But the domain of all the knowable, lying between two fixed poles of thought, between the ego — the point *from* which all knowledge begins — and God, the point in which all knowledge ends — forms but one harmonious, homogeneous whole,

without inconsistency, contradiction, or incompatibility.

The peculiar mode in which Leibnitz deduced this uniformity, or vast chain of being, which comprises all creation—the erroneous conceptions or gratuitous hypotheses which he mixed up with his comprehension of all systems, do not concern us at present. The impulse was given ; the ideas of Leibnitz' Théodicée were absorbed by a whole generation, while his peculiar theory—his monads and pre-established harmony—never acquired currency. The principle of the unity of thought and being was then introduced into English theology, or rather became the assumption of all the leading theological writers. It followed that there were no contradictions between different parts of knowledge ; no contrast between divine truth and human truth. Truth is one. The moral laws and the physical laws by which the course of nature and the actions of man are governed form a consolidated system, of which we see not a mere outside or phenomenal show, but we have a glimpse into the interior

of the vast machinery. That the human spectator cannot embrace the whole plan is not from any imperfection in his intelligence as intelligence, but from its localisation. "His time a moment, and a point his space," man cannot comprehend the scheme of Providence any more than his eye can take in the roll of the planets round their several suns in the innumerable systems which compose the world. But what he cannot comprehend as a whole he can apprehend. His knowledge is real knowledge as far as it goes. There is no incomprehensible absolute beyond his view, the true nature of which is sealed against his approach. The moral attributes of the divine intelligence which are exhibited in that corner of the universe which is open to his inspection are real attributes, or laws of function, from which, as in any other induction, he passes to a universal conclusion. From what we see of God's dealings in the world of nature, we may safely reason as to His dealings in those other worlds which are invisible to us.

For a brief period English religious thought

seemed to be placed upon this footing, the only footing on which a sound theology can rest, if it is to rank as co-ordinate with other branches of knowledge, and to command the assent of an instructed society. How the impulse gradually died out, how more contracted minds reoccupied the field of religious teaching, and replaced it in its old isolation, has just been alluded to. The Puritan school superseded the rational. But a school of theology which repudiated philosophy, and knew nothing of historical criticism and took its stand upon the Bible as interpreted by each man's religious sentiment, had laid its foundation on the sand. A demand necessarily arose for an interpreter. And as reason had been rejected, the only alternative was an authoritative interpretation. On this basis arose the High Church school. The collision between these two modes of religious sentiment, the clash of feeling between the expiring school of those who insist upon the Bible and religious conviction, and the rising school of those who start from Church authority and sacramental union, occupies the foreground

of the religious history of our time, and in the confusion and tumult of the strife we are apt to lose sight of the real character of the position now occupied by religious opinion.

Let us try to recall, for a moment, the true features of the situation. If we compare only the two rival theologies, we see how inevitable it was that Church authority should carry the day against the unsubstantial theory of a self-interpreted Bible. But though the theology of authority has had an easy triumph over the theology of sentiment, its own position is at present highly critical. It is threatened by two bodies of opinion. On its right flank it encounters the mass of ultramontane opinion. Why, it is asked, if the principle of Church authority is accepted in part is it not accepted in whole? If the Catholic Church of the fourth century was an inspired source of truth, the Catholic Church of the nineteenth century speaks in the same name, and claims the same inspiration. If Church authority is to be accepted, not subject to the test of criticism, it must be in the form of Papal Infallibility. This objection

may be put aside for a moment, but it must recur again and again, because no answer can be found to it except in a criticism of the infallibilist claim, and all such criticism is *ipso facto* a surrender of the principle of authority. On the left flank menaces a danger still more serious. This is the side on which the religious opinion of our country is related to the other parts of human knowledge. The synthesis of reason and faith, of revelation and science, with the promise of which the eighteenth century opened, has passed away as a dream. A frightful gulf now yawns between religion and science, and a bridge between them is considered almost hopeless. Far beyond the pale of science proper, if we take widely the educated mind and the higher literature of our day, must it not be confessed that it is trained to admit laws of thought, to exact rules of evidence, to enforce through all its knowledge a logic of proof which it dares not apply to its own religious tenets? Especially there is a pervading suspicion of physical science and scientific men, as materialists, hostile to religion, little given to belief.

It is imagined that they are employed upon a kind of knowledge which leads them away from God, that they are immersed in matter, in the contemplation of mere transitory truth, while religion deals with the eternal verities. And as their object is one which is beyond the scope of religion, so their method of exact observation and verification is supposed to be one which belongs peculiarly to their subject, and of which moral truth does not admit. And though physical science is thought particularly dangerous, a similar attitude is adopted towards all the other branches of human knowledge, especially towards historical criticism, comparative mythology, ethnology; while in the practical sciences of politics, sociology, and economics, the prudential path of the acting statesman comes into direct collision with the data of the current theology.

Thus it is that in our day the Church—and not the Church of England merely as an endowed institution, but the Christian religion in whatever visible form embodied—is losing its hold on the English mind. While the zeal of

the clergy in the cause of the Church is beyond all praise, while the Church of England as a political party is more efficiently organised than it has been at any time since the Reformation, there is an element of decay within which cannot be watched without causing the most serious alarm. The Church of England has ceased to be an intellectual power in England—it is not at the centre of intelligence. It is to be feared that it is passing into a position of antagonism to knowledge.

It is difficult to get this fact acknowledged, it is more difficult still to get its importance recognised by those who do admit its truth.

A common mode of thinking on the subject is something of the following kind. It is true that intellect is alienated from the Church, but then it always has been so. From the Apostles' days till our own, it is the poor and the ignorant by whom the gospel has been embraced, while it has been rejected by the wise and prudent. In the matter of religion all mankind are on a level. The reconcilement of the sinner to the Holy One can but be effected

in one way, in finding which the most cultivated intellect has no advantage over the rudest peasant. Philosophy is a pastime of otiose spirits, a luxury, a phantasy of the brain. It may be a sad thing that the prevalent philosophy should be materialistic. An orthodox philosophy ought to be taught by authority. But, after all, the evil does not reach very far. It is a very limited circle which concerns itself about speculative topics at all. The mass of the people are untouched by them—and as for the labourer and artisan, where the clergyman meets with most difficulty, the resistance is due to quite other causes than speculative infidelity.

So much of this line of argument as is founded upon the spread of Christianity at its commencement involves a misconception of the course of opinion in the second and third centuries which has formed the subject of a previous discourse. The other position, that philosophy or religious speculation is the idle occupation of a few minds, and stands in no relation to the condition of practical religion in a given age, is an error of which I propose

to treat more fully on a future occasion. It may be permitted me to remark in conclusion that the influence of speculative theory upon institutions and conditions of society is an influence so subtle that it is no wonder that it escapes the notice of the generality of men who are absorbed in finding proximate causes. It is only when this subtle influence manifests itself in the form of a revolution that its power is recognised. In such cases as the French Revolution of 1788, or the spread of Christianity in the third century, when the grain of mustard seed has become a tree, the transmutation of the idea into the political fact is recognised by all; it forces itself upon their attention. But what is not equally capable of being placed in a palpable form is the insensible agency of abstract thought unceasingly operating to mould and modify civil society. It is with human communities as it is with the face of the planet which they inhabit. Geological catastrophes are few and local. But the agencies of heat, light, motion, and pressure, because they are constant and universal, escape detection all the

while they are operating the series of never-ending change. So in the spiritual world there are ideal forces which operate on so vast a scale, and over such spaces of time, that their action cannot be seized at any given point.

Such an insensible force has now for some time been exerted by physical discovery. The natural theology of the last century is no longer found to be satisfactory in presence of the geological and biological sciences as they now stand. The answer that the sciences are wrong and the theologians are right does not admit of being discussed or refuted, for it is the answer of ignorance. The answer of the Catholic Church—which is, to take refuge in its own authority—can only be practically tendered where there is an infallible living authority, as in the chair of St. Peter. It seems to be the business of the English Church especially, a Church which has never yet broken with reason or proscribed education, to fairly face these questions, to resume the natural theology of the past age, and to re-establish the synthesis of science and faith.

IX.

[Assize Sermon, March 2, 1871.]

"As he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled, and answered, Go thy way for this time; when I have a convenient season, I will call for thee."—ACTS xxiv. 25.

THERE seems to be, if we look at the current opinions on the subject, little agreement among us as to what is the exact relation in which the Christian religion stands to morality. That obedience to the moral law is among the obligations which a profession of Christianity carries with it, is scarcely denied by any. But within the limits of this general admission there is every shade of opinion as to the nature of the connection between the two. The great mass of educated Englishmen who are in the habit of reflecting at all on such subjects combine, I suppose, an acceptance of Christian doctrine with an admission of the obligations of morality;

but the different proportions in which the combination takes place in their minds have a very marked influence upon their general habits of thought and action. It is not possible to classify men on this principle, or even to mark precisely the finely-graduating shades which discriminate one man's point of view from another's.

Yet on the whole there are two leading types of opinion, towards one or the other of which all thinking men verge in their general habits of thought—the type of opinion which subordinates religion to morality, or that which, on the other hand, subordinates morality to religion.

Of this latter form—that which subordinates morality to religion—we find the extreme in that opinion which holds that the will of God is the only or ultimate foundation of the moral law. When we dwell upon the thought of the Infinite and Eternal God in His absolute and unchanging nature, and place in the shadow of His omnipotence this ephemeral creature, man, whose existence is a moment in the history of

his planet, and whose planet is a speck in the ocean of the universe, we are so overwhelmed by the contrast, that we may well acquiesce in a blind submission to the fiat of the great Father of all, not only without question, but without justification. If God has commanded, that may well be enough for us. The business of life is the worship of God. Religion is not a code of laws or prohibitions, but the devout attitude of a waiting and dependent creature. In the spiritual life of such a soul holiness is involved not as conformity to law, not as obedience to command, but as one of the necessary conditions of that divine communion which occupies all its energies. The Christian's life is conceived as one of supernatural privilege, in which he is raised above morality,—not in the sense that he may dispense with its restraints, or violate its rules, but in the sense that his nature responds to a higher law,—he is no longer a servant, but a son.

It cannot be denied that this type of opinion is founded in very noble sentiments—more than this, that it rests on a reasonable basis. If

there be a God, an eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent Being, the relation of man to Him cannot be very different from that thus ideally depicted.

At the opposite pole of thought on the subject is that opinion which tends to measure religion by morality. This cast of thought has for its starting-point the actual condition of humanity. It conceives human happiness as the one great object towards which man must needs aspire. It observes how imperfectly all human society is organised for the attainment of this end. Yet it perceives that so far as society does succeed in realising any measure of this happiness, it is only and merely in virtue of those rules which are dictated by reason expounding the moral law, and by the employment of force to compel obedience to those rules. It goes on to infer that could obedience to these be secured more completely, in all those details which the machinery of public order cannot reach, a far higher degree of general happiness would be obtained than is to be met with at present in any existing community.

Here religion, they think, comes into play. The obligation *in foro conscientiæ* supplements the obligation of which municipal law can take cognisance. A church is defined, as by Dr. Arnold, "a voluntary society for the putting down of evil." As God in revealing Himself to His creature could have no other object than that creature's welfare, so what He has revealed is merely regulative of our conduct. As the Jewish revelation or old dispensation was emphatically a code of observances, ceremonial and moral, so in the Christian revelation its first characteristic is its lofty morality. The discourses of Christ consist mainly, or wholly, of directions for moral conduct, or the inculcation of the human virtues. The Gospels are not dogmatic. They relate the life of one who went about doing good, and inculcating it by His teaching. Creeds are the invention of a later time. The very ceremonies of the Christian religion are a scaffolding for the building up of holiness of life—baptism is the washing away of the defilement of evil, the sacrament of the Supper is the food which sustains the soul

in the following of Him who was without stain or spot.

This class of opinion has, like the former, its extreme form, and its modifications of every shade and colour. Its extreme form is that pure naturalism which denies to all religions any real content, any valuable truth, beyond that amount of morality which may be embedded in their doctrines. In this view Christianity is a republication of the religion of nature, and Christ was an exemplar of virtue. The superiority of Christianity to other religions consists wholly in the superiority of its moral code. But this extreme shape of naturalism is not the only form in which this opinion of the subordination of religion to morality is found. It may be, and often is, combined with any degree of belief in the supernatural character of Christianity.

Having thus indicated in outline the two opposed classes of opinion on this subject, I may go on to remark, that though opposite and irreconcilable, it is impossible to hold upon them a judicial inquiry, and to pronounce the one

of them false and the other true. They are so far contrary views of the facts of life and history, that they cannot both be held by the same mind; and therefore those minds which have an affinity for one view, must tend with equal repulsion to reject the opposite. They are, in fact, alien habits of mind rather than contradictory opinions. They are modes of classifying mankind. Men must, when they think at all of religion and morality, think under one or other of these forms. But they do not set about investigating this question by itself, or making up their mind upon it on its separate evidence — they find themselves already, prior to reflection, ranged on one side or on the other. Even those who have not carried reflection far enough to be able to formulate their own opinion on the point would, if subjected to a skilful Socratic examination, be discovered to be on one side or the other virtually. Many an educated man, if asked what is his opinion of the relation between religion and morality, would be at a loss for an immediate answer to the question, while a bystander, accustomed

to apply the test, would have no difficulty in gathering from the tenor of his general opinions on which side his answer ought to be.

It is, I have said, a mode of classifying men. It bisects the world of men and books. If we are at a loss often to apply it to individuals, we have no difficulty in testing churches and communities by it. If our perception of contemporary tendencies is confused and dim, we can see clearly enough the alternate prevalence of the two forms of thought in the written history of our race. Indeed the history of human progress may be summed up as the history of the struggle between the two modes of viewing society and law. Religion and morality have not contended as enemies for mutual destruction, but they *have* struggled with alternating success for supremacy. This struggle is traceable throughout all history wherever we have a clue to the inner working of social change. But it has never been exhibited on so great a scale as in the first two centuries of our era, when Christianity as the universal religion superseded the old mythologies. For whatever other causes

may have co-operated to the diffusion of Christianity, it cannot be doubted that it offered itself as a purification of the individual conscience and of family life. The Middle Ages witnessed the triumph of the antagonist principle. Public law and family life reverted again to the theocratic basis on which they had rested in the old Asiatic monarchies, the civil law retired into a corner, and the moral reason was kept in subjection to the authority of an infallible hierarchy.

The gradual diffusion or re-diffusion of knowledge slowly undermined this ecclesiastical fabric. The conscience of men revolted against the crimes committed in the name of the Church. The civil law, the great written repertory of the social experience of Greco-Roman civilisation, began to reassert itself, and furnished principles which laid the foundation of a science of politics in which the welfare of mankind began again to form the ultimate standard of appeal. From this time forward Western Europe, or the whole of the civilised world, has been divided into two sections by this fundamental distinction. The Catholic

portion seeking to organise society upon the basis of religion; all that is not Catholic employing religion as an instrument for the amelioration of society. For it is a superficial mode of speaking, where we speak, as we sometimes do, of Catholicism as being only a form of Christianity differing by certain theological tenets from other forms called Protestant. Catholicism is much more than a theology or a religion; it is much more than one among the denominations of Christianity. It is a whole habit of mind, founding itself upon deeply-seated principles of philosophy, and striving like the forms of animal and vegetable life to develop itself under the given conditions of air and light and warmth. In this struggle for existence it meets another principle or set of principles of no less vigour and vitality than itself, and founded like itself on a widely-extended survey of the facts of life. Middle-Age Catholicism, or the dogmatic and hierarchical system of an infallible Church, finds itself face to face with the principle of civilisation which is also striving to mould and organise society.

For it is no longer, as it has been in times past, Protestantism, or the religion of the Bible, or the Reformed Faith, which is the antagonist of the Catholic Church. Its true rival and competitor is the whole of that fabric of science—moral, political, physical—which has been slowly built up by the labour of four centuries, and the results of which tend more and more stringently to govern the conduct both of individuals and of communities.

Men of piety and wide views, afflicted at the sight of our unprofitable religious differences, have at different times proposed schemes of pacification among the churches. There seems no reason why such a reconcilement might not be effected, if not in the way of compromise, at least in the way of comprehension, where these disputes turn only on dogmatic differences. But no amalgamation is possible between two organic forms of social life, which each claim universality, which aspire to possess the whole man, which are impelled by their inward force to realise themselves in fact. Between the Catholic Church and modern civilisation, the

question is not one of truth and falsehood, one which can be settled by any logical argumentation, or ventilated by an appeal to history; it is a struggle for existence—a struggle which can only be settled by the survivance of the stronger.

COLLEGE SERMONS

I.

ADDRESS

ON OCCASION OF THE DEATH OF A MEMBER OF LINCOLN COLLEGE,[1] WHO WAS ACCIDENTALLY DROWNED WHILE BATHING IN THE ISIS, MAY 31, 1847. READ IN THE COLLEGE CHAPEL ON SUNDAY, JUNE 6.

"εἰ πάσχει ἓν μέλος, συμπάσχει πάντα τὰ μέλη."
1 CORINTHIANS xii. 26.

AFTER the first shock of the sad event itself had passed, my first anxiety, dear friends and pupils, has been to communicate with you on the subject. And I have only deferred it till now that I might have the advantage of this time and place; a time when we are all assembled, and a place where we may be best assisted in calm and serious reflection. Let me invite you to contemplate together for a few minutes, in the view which as thoughtful, educated, and Christian

[1] See *Memoirs of Mark Pattison*, p. 262. The name of the undergraduate was John George Stilwell.

men we should do, this afflicting event, in which the Almighty Arbiter of life and death has interposed so visibly among us. We have thought, I know, of little else since, and even in the midst of our necessary avocations a sense of weight and oppression has seemed to hang over us; we spoke and moved as men do in whom the impressions of sight and sense were for a time overmastered by a glimpse of a world beyond. And indeed this could not have been otherwise. We would not, if we could, have banished this sadness and solemnity. But it is time that we now remember that such bare impression on our minds, a mere involuntary emotion, the spontaneous tribute of nature, has no value or use unless it be employed to lead us to something further. Our natural taste and sense of propriety is gratified by such sentiments, and offended by the contrary; as even the slave in the tragedy rebukes the untimely revelry of Hercules in the house of death. Besides, the mere passive impression in this, as in all other cases, was only designed to rouse us to resolve and to act. If they do not do this,

even the emotions of grief become the mere selfish indulgence of a luxurious sentiment. It is worse than useless to feel rightly, if we do not go on and follow up our feelings by the appropriate actions. And so it is even with those rare events and visitations of Providence, which are most calculated to startle and alarm us. Few are so frivolous or insensible as not to be touched by the sudden death of a friend or companion, and to most persons such an occurrence is the most deeply agitating that can befall them. But merely to have received such an impression, however profound, to have surrendered ourselves passively to the current of feeling, is not enough. We are reasonable creatures, not only capable of reflection, but of whom reflection is required, by the very constitution of our nature. We are bound in each case as it arises to judge to the best of our ability, and to act to the utmost of our power. And if we could not, or if we will not, give our diligent consideration when such an occurrence overtakes us, we should be borne down under the mere burden and pressure of our perplexity

and distress. A vague fear of God's judgments would crush our hopes. We should sit still and do nothing as persons wrapt in Egyptian darkness.

There may be some who are quite aware of this—who will not shrink back at the sight of death, or allow the fear of it to have dominion over their minds for a moment. They would say, that it was quite true that it was want of thought and experience that made sudden deaths so alarming to the generality of men; that all such exaggerated and superstitious terrors were calmed and corrected by age and observation; that such events happened every day without interfering with the course of the world, or rendering our plans and calculations for our future too insecure; that it is perfectly well known, that life depends on certain conditions of body, and is subject to innumerable casualties in the ordinary system of nature; and that the world must be taken as it is, and that it is unreasonable to disquiet ourselves because we cannot render our lives wholly secure, but that we must adopt the part of common pru-

dence in acting on the presumption of life, and neglecting the remote contingencies which might cut it short. And others, who would not perhaps say so much as this, would yet endeavour to check their fear, and escape from the uncomfortable thought, by the common argument, that they were no worse off than other people, that they took their chance with the rest of the world, and that as the uncertainties of life did not interfere with the enjoyments of others, they could not see why they should with theirs.

Many speak thus; and we are all, I fear, liable to the temptation to think so, as the readiest means of getting rid of the painful thoughts which on occasions like the present, will force themselves upon us.

But if it is an idle and unprofitable use of a serious impression to receive it merely, and let it melt away, this mode of reflecting upon it is still worse. For to think thus is only to think of it for the purpose of getting rid of it; to endeavour to reason ourselves out of our better thoughts—to explain away the tokens of God's power, and to soothe our fears of His judgment.

This is the abuse of our reason to sophistry, and not its use in guiding and confirming our inclinations towards good. If a dull and trembling acquiescence in the Divine dispensations is less than our duty, to argue them away and to endeavour to view them as ordinary occurrences, and having no reference to ourselves, is wilfully to shut our eyes; to seek to be blind, and to say we see.

For what is the nature of that peculiar force and power which such an occurrence is calculated to have in rousing our hearts, and stimulating us to religious action? It is not merely that we are frightened, that we think that what has befallen a friend to-day, may be our own fate to-morrow, nor only that we are grieved and mourning for his loss; but because it seems to bring us more closely and immediately into God's presence—it seems to tear asunder the veil which this world interposes between us and the next, to be a living instance and proof that God is among us and about us, though we see Him not; that He is not in heaven only, or some distant part of the universe, but "not very

far from every one of us." The world goes along in its daily course, and we go with it, go in and out, and find ourselves, even in spite of direct efforts to the contrary, absorbed in its concerns, and our belief in God remains a dry tenet preserved in our creed, but left out of our calculations for the day. The fixed and invariable order of nature, and the placid flow of her changes on the one hand; on the other, the active strife of men's wills and passions, opposite causes, yet tend to one effect, that God's hand, and His law, which are beyond them all, are pushed aside out of our view. But while we are living on, sailing gaily with the flood-tide of youth, health, spirits, enjoying life, and grasping at its satisfactions, or contending for its prizes, let a sudden fate snatch from us, not by the natural and slow operation of disease the work of weeks or days, but at one blow, in a moment of time, one of those who moved among us, whom we saw every day in the full exercise of bodily and mental powers, and when, where one minute was a living intelligence, we see the next but a mass of inert and insensible

matter; does it not place before us, in a way not to be mistaken or overlooked, the line which separates the two worlds, the world of spirits, in view of which we really now exist, towards which we are continually advancing, and in which we are to dwell for ever, and that other world of matter in which we are now for a time imprisoned? We then see with which part of the compound being man it is that we have most affinity, and in which we are most interested; not the outward shell of his bodily frame, with which we can now hold no communion, and interchange no thought, but bury it out of our sight; but rather the invisible inmate of that tabernacle, the now disembodied spirit, which cannot perish, or be destroyed, though it cease for a time to be accessible to us. To keep up in his own mind this perception of the truth of things unseen, to maintain an abiding sense of the near presence of God, to assert the dominion and prerogative of his moral nature over his animal, is the one end and aim of the good man here on earth. And when we have by sad experience come to know our own

feebleness in this respect, the weakness and faintness of our spiritual powers, and the strength and activity of our passions, we shall thankfully embrace any opportunity, and accept every chastisement, which may aid us in this arduous struggle against nature.

We must regard this event, then, as a solemn lesson, read in an especial manner to ourselves each one of us. We have known and hear from time to time of equally awful visitations near us and around us. We may, if we will, benefit by them. But *this* has been done *among* us—has been brought home to ourselves; we cannot, if we would, close our eyes to it, or escape it. God seems to have sent a message directly to every one of us. His ordinary callings and warnings we share with others, and we are guilty if we neglect them. How doubly guilty shall we not be, if we neglect Him when he speaks distinctly to ourselves! To most of us here present this must have been the most solemn event that has yet befallen us in the course of our lives. We *cannot* be after this in the same condition as before. If we are not better, if we

do not take the warning, then we have deliberately rejected it. We cannot plead ignorance, and say we have not heard, we have not known, for God has spoken to us. For every good thought that has crossed our minds without being acted upon, we shall have to give account; how much more for so express and powerful a summons to repentance as the present!

Should you ask now in what way you may best turn to account the solemn lesson; I would say, first, heartily and with thankfulness accept it as the voice of God; cherish and tender your impression of awe as a most valuable aid to faith; and carefully shun, as a temptation, any inclination to laugh off, or put aside, such a wholesome fear, from false shame under the idea that it is cowardice, weakness, want of manliness and experience. Next, hasten, before the first ardour of the excited feeling dies away, to preserve so precious a gift, and one which can hardly be repeated with equal effect, to preserve it in the only way in which it can be preserved, by embodying it in a distinct resolution of amendment—an act of repentance,

and resolution of amendment of life. For there is no fear here of acting extravagantly, by acting under the influence of this feeling, as would be the case in matters of this world. We think too much already of worldly things, and rate them too highly, and therefore any excitement of mind when they are the subjects only disturbs our judgment, and exaggerates a false illusion. But of heavenly things we habitually think so infinitely below their real value, that the strongest stimulus to the imagination must leave it still short of the reality of those things, which the very angels only desire to look into. Such a stroke as we have now received shows us nothing new, makes known to us nothing that we did not know before, but like the flash of lightning in the dark night, enables us for a moment to see objects as they really are.

Consider, then, that herein the finger of God has touched your heart, that He may rouse you from your slumber, and start you anew in the path of obedience, if you have forsaken it. Avail yourself of your present warmth, as of an opportunity which may never occur again,

of overcoming the first difficulties of active obedience, and so of fixing your conduct and character. Any present fervour or strength you may be conscious of is a direct gift of grace, to be laid out in immediate action. Think of the relative dimensions and importance in which in your first alarm time and eternity respectively appeared to you, and remember that that view is only wrong in being infinitely below the truth. Endeavour to maintain this standard in your mind, and recur to it to right your judgment when you find yourself, as you surely will do, measuring by the false measures current in the world.

I would wish to speak to you on this occasion, if possible, in terms yet less general. Your resolves for the future can only be rightly founded on repentance for the past. And this can only be effectual, when it is not merely a vague sentiment of regret for general evil, but a specific recantation and renunciation of the individual acts of sin. And if there be any one of you who is the prey of any one particular temptation, of any guilty habit,

seize this occasion of making a stand, of freeing yourself by a vigorous effort before it be too late.

Those whose danger lies in the attractions of society, or the studies of this place, must remember that such temptation is the more insidious as its evil is not so apparent and acknowledged. But ambition is not less a vice because it is the vice of noble minds; and it has this peculiar quality, that whereas other sins are committed for the gratification of some one passion or particular propension, he who is the slave of ambition must from the nature of the case be so with all his powers and faculties, nothing less than the devotion of all his days and nights and every energy will avail for success.

Finally, this sad event may well serve to remind us that living within the same college walls and in the same society, we form altogether but one family, one household, and that therefore we have duties to one another over and above that common courtesy and civility which we owe to all with whom we mix in

society. I fear we are too apt to forget this. Just because we are in such close contact with one another, our mutual faults and failings are the more exposed to observation, and require the more charity and forbearance, instead of being made matter for talk and amusement. A time of sorrow common to us all is a time when men draw closer together, and springs of sympathy are touched, which ordinary events could never have reached. "If one member suffer, all the members suffer with it." I have not been unobservant of many little tokens of this nature during the past week—a week of which I think and hope the memory will not speedily be effaced from our minds. For myself, I cannot express how much my share of our common grief, increased as it is by the sense of the imperfect way in which I discharged my duty towards him whose place is now vacant among us, has been mitigated by the consciousness that I possessed your sympathy; and the evidences of good and generous feeling which have been drawn forth on this occasion, not the less grateful because showing themselves in little

things, will be among the most cherished recollections of my life.

I commend you to God, and myself to your prayers.

II.

[May 12, 1850.]

ἑνὸς δέ ἐστι χρεία.—LUKE x. 42.

THESE few words express an axiom or first truth in morals—one received in all systems. But it is one which is not only theoretically true, but which is admitted and felt to be so by every one in his own experience. It enters into our belief, and through it into our lives. Our wide differences from others, our disagreement, even collision with them, our alien tastes, our diverse paths and pursuits, even our entire want of sympathy, do not prevent us from seeing that through and above this dispersedness there is one common end in view, or if not in view, which all our eyes are straining with more or less success to catch sight of. It requires but little experience to reveal to us that the things we desire, however acutely, and

pursue so ardently, do not satisfy us. There is no sort of disappointment in life equal to the disappointment of gaining some long-cherished wish, and finding that it has not in it the sweetness for which we nourished it. But if we would benefit by such a shock, it must be not by throwing up the pursuit in which our very success has turned out failure, and trying some other. We should suffer the first experiment to convince us that our error lay not in a mischoice of the object we had selected to aim at, but in having supposed that any present, partial, single object, contained in itself the rest or stay for which the mind leaned towards it. It is a shadow of the thing we want, and not *it*. We have grasped the form, and the substance is still beyond us. Thus it is that we learn that amid all our apparent isolation we are all trying for the same thing. We gravitate on separate orbits, but round a common centre. Amid all the infinite diversity of our pursuits, one man does not after all so much differ from another; we have a common nature, and we like and dislike, when we come to understand it, in the same way.

Nothing seems to divide and separate men more than difference of creed. Irreconcilable seem the schisms that divide Roman Catholic from Protestant, and the various sects of Protestants from one another. Yet travellers in the East have observed that in the presence of the vast antagonist power of Islam the divisions between Christians seem to sink into nothing, and Christendom is felt for the first time to be *one*. Such is the view which the traveller can take of Europe when he is able to see it in perspective. A similar vantage-ground or standing-point should we endeavour to attain if we would form just views of our brother-men in other matters. Instead of dwelling on contradictions of tastes, on our antipathies, we should abstract from them, and we should find at bottom that the whole world is kin.

But of the many lines of thought which these words open out to us, the one which I wish to suggest to you now is that in which it bears on our own business in this place. It must have occurred to many to ask, Since all religion insists so strongly on the vanity of

human life, tells us that it is a dream, a shadow, a smoke, having nothing in it permanent and reliable, and experience, corroborating this, leaves us at the end of life with nothing but a series of disappointments, and makes us feel all through, that when we get most we get nothing worth having, that none of our objects has given us what we wanted, in short, that rest and peace and satisfaction are to be looked for hereafter, but not *now*—that God alone and His presence can give us the joys we vainly seek here; when, in short, the present, what we do and work for here, is so entirely valueless in itself, and dependent for all its worth on the future, it is very natural to ask, Then why so much labour and toil and trouble for these husks, why do we seek so eagerly if we know we cannot find? Why all this solicitude, whether in the feeble shape of fretting and querulousness, or in the more manly one of forethought and prudence, for what we know to be trivial and transitory? What profit is there in attainments, in a careful education, in laborious studies, in painful discipline, in forming

habits of accuracy, in distinguishing and in reasoning, if all these are to perish with the using?

When men are oppressed by a sense of the worthlessness of life, or by the disproportion between their efforts and their objects, they may try to establish something like consistency in their lives in two ways. They may give up the world and despise its cares and pursuits, devoting their lives wholly to meditation on things above. That which is unseen and eternal may so overbalance in their minds the present and the temporal, that they contemn the latter as insignificant. Religious duties come to be thought the one only obligation, the business of life to be altogether secular and carnal, studies, literature, taste, and all that cultivates the mind to have something in them heathen, profane, unbecoming the Christian.

Or, on the other hand, instead of thus exalting religious services at the expense of active duties, a man may lower his religious notions to the level of the necessities and the demands of his social occupations. There is a certain

routine of daily duties to be gone through: we may take this as the basis of our system of life, and then add upon this just so much religious practice as is compatible with it. This mode of escaping the felt inconsistency between the overwhelming greatness of the Divine objects and the littleness of the things in which we live is a far more common, and even on that account more dangerous, error than the former. For neither of these methods is the right method of bringing our religious belief to bear on our conduct, of reconciling the future with the present. What we want to bring about in ourselves is the due balance and equipoise between the principle of faith and the principle of action, so to pass through things temporal that we finally lose not the things eternal; to be in such a way convinced that but *one* thing is needful as not to destroy all stimulus and interest for the *many* things in which we find ourselves of necessity involved.

First, then, it must be observed that the inward harmony of soul which is proposed must not be sought by the means of partitioning off

the one province from the other, and fixing limits between them, by concluding a peace between the world and God, and giving part of our day to one, and part to the other. I will suppose —what, however, is highly unlikely—that in this bargain our time and our thoughts are fairly divided, and that there is an honest purpose to consecrate a considerable share of both—as much as can in fairness be spared, to devotion and religious exercises. Supposing even that this order of our day was adhered to for a time, it would very soon betray the unsoundness of the system attempted, devotion would flag, prayer become a formal exercise, and languor and dissatisfaction creep through our whole spiritual being. Religious emotion, if hoarded apart and cherished for its own sake, can no more than any other feeling sustain itself. Our life becomes a wearisome struggle between two contending aims, from which we reap the satisfactions of neither. The future world is sufficiently in sight to cast a gloomy and awful shadow over the present, which prevents our hearty enjoyment of it, and the daily renovated

impulse which active life gives to our worldly principles is making them continually encroach and threaten to overwhelm the religious perceptions. Our life is a lame halt between two opinions, between God and the world. Untrue to both, so prosperous in neither. This is the consequence of isolating our religious belief from the other parts of our life, and treating it as a thing apart and *sui generis*. We easily get into the way of judging and thinking and acting on grounds and by a standard which we imbibe unconsciously by imitation and communication with our companions, grounds which we should find it hard to state perhaps, while our cherished and most serious convictions are put away in a corner of our minds, and brought out only when we are alone, or at the periods of devotion. We may exclude from our conduct and motives everything that is not purely secular. Some men even take a pride in bringing their modes of thinking as much as possible to a conformity with that which prevails at the time, or in their particular circle, and allow no other rule of right for their guide.

And if at the same time, and along with their success in acquainting themselves with what is called the ways of the world, and their capacity of adapting themselves to its laws, they still retain in the background a thin shadow of an early impressed religious faith, it is apt to take the form of a complacent persuasion that they are on that ground better persons than those whom they are striving to resemble outwardly.

What we want, then, is a piety that shall be energetic and efficacious through our whole life, through every act we do, every word we speak, every breath we draw. We should not distinguish our day into one part given to God, and the rest to ourselves, but it should be all of one colour and texture. The one thing needful which we want to secure is a penetrating and all-powerful motive, universal in its extent to apply to our every act, minute, special, practical, to ensure its being brought out into our conduct, not lodged as a dormant creed in our understanding. We should not have *any* worldly employments, for our whole life should be a religious act. This is the inward and

outward harmony which constitutes a sound being, when all our movements flow naturally from one central governing thought. Such a character is not a compound of two tendencies ill at ease in one another's neighbourhood, and subsisting by a forced compromise, but a uniform whole in which one pure aim informs each separate impulse. Life is then not a state of rest or equilibrium produced by opposite forces, but a sustained motion towards a fixed point. The Divine life in the soul is not a detached inward feeling or belief, while our outward life goes on on different rules, but is a light which becomes visible through its manifestation in single and trivial acts. Nay, the least acts are those of the *most* consequence, for as the external form is little, in that proportion the radiance of the informing good will show the brighter.

Taking, then, this as the general account of the character we should aim at creating, we may draw some useful conclusions home to our own peculiar situation and duties.

It is our special vocation here to form and

cultivate the mind, to call out in every possible direction the intellectual faculties, to give scope to all varieties of taste, to follow up every channel of useful knowledge. This is a task which must needs require not only all our time, but from its very nature as a schooling of intellect by itself must absorb all its energies. Now, how is such a devotion of the whole mind to this so diversified a business to be made compatible with that concentration of the soul on God as our one end which the laws of our spiritual being demand? Not certainly by a compromise between our studies as a secular, and our devotions as our religious duty. Not by fencing off a sacred portion of our time as our soul's, and abandoning the rest to study as a worldly but necessary employment. For, if temporal only, how necessary? If the object of our education here were only to qualify us to make a better figure in this short life, how preposterous and unreasonable to bestow so much time and pains on so shortlived being! We must adopt our studies into the religious life, which must be the basis and groundwork

of our whole life. Devotion must not merely enter as an essential element into our day, but must occupy the whole of it, as furnishing the ultimate end to which each part tends, and on which the whole framework of our life is settled.

To be more explicit as to the mode in which this is to be done—in which the recognition of God and the world to come is to be made the quickening principle through which we are to be carried forward over the single steps even of our course of study. We will suppose then a student entering on his course here, and pausing to deliberate which of the objects for which a course of systematic reading can be carried on is the object he ought to propose to himself—what is the one true guiding idea of our education. He will come to his deliberation with two points granted, two admissions—*one* a very general one, something to the effect that the true business of man on earth is a preparation for a life to come: *one*, on the other hand, a knowledge of the special fact that a certain number of books or subjects are proposed to

him to be thoroughly learnt during his residence here. His difficulty then will be to trace the connecting link between these two admitted truths, to find the middle term which shall bind these two extremes together, the conductor which shall enable him to bring down the heavenly influence to guide and quicken his steps on earth. The whole science of life may be said to consist in finding middle terms to bind our daily acts to our first principles. . . . He resolves then to enter on the duties of the place from some one of the inferior motives which offer themselves abundantly on all sides —from mixed motives we will suppose, some better some worse—as the desire of the honours of the university, the wish for self-improvement, all backed up by his general wish to do what is right, to do what is approved by his friends, and those to whom he looks up. As he goes on in his course, he is gradually and experimentally testing the worth of these secondary and mediate motives, and he finds that some of them, that, *e.g.*, derived from the desire of distinction, is a personal, selfish, temporal object,

which ends in itself and will not connect with his general aim—his preparation for a future state of being—while on the other hand the desire of self-improvement, which entered in as an element into his first general confused compound motive, will gradually expand and advance towards his first principle, will mediate and serve as a bond of union between his general aim and the special duties in which he finds himself engaged by his position here. This is the general history of the justification of motive, of the way in which secondary and confined aims are by a sincere and unselfish heart slowly thrown off, and opened out into abiding and eternal ones.

I have selected in this supposed case the desire of self-improvement as the mediating idea which should gradually elevate the aim, and finally lead up to the more pure and abstract idea of simple reference to God which is the highest conceivable motive. Many other terms might be used to describe the general purpose of the education sought in this place. I selected this because even in the minds of

those who come here with lower and less worthy aims a general wish for self-improvement is almost always mingled. It remains with themselves to dwell on and give increased prominence to this better motive, or neglecting it to let a less pure but more exacting ambition become supreme over their wills. Not indeed that even this motive of improvement could, unless it rested on that further and final one, sustain for long the heart and whole weight of action of a reflecting man. But through it and (mediately) moved by it we may fairly look up to God and hope to have His blessing and assistance in our work. But unless our motive will stand the test of this reference, unless we can bear to contemplate the pure judgment of the Divine Being as resting on our act, that act is not one which we ourselves can regard with any contentment. This habitual reference of everything we do to a single ruling motive is absolutely necessary for anything like consistency of action and of character. See the strength of will and steady power which a man derives from consistent adhesion to any, even

the lowest purpose. Even obstinacy, which is mere perseverance without a purpose, and is more often mischievous than useful, has something about it respectable. Much more does the steady persevering pursuit of an object of importance, whatever it be, command the esteem of men at large. Let the same perseverance and consistency be exhibited in retaining before the mental view a true, unselfish, and lofty ideal of life, in enforcing on our conduct through its most minute and homely details a pure and comprehensive principle, and there will exist one of those characters which we reverence, which impress themselves with an irresistible force on every other with which they come in contact. When the "various talents" are united with the "single mind," they give their possessors a moral weight and mastery which is instantly recognised, and to which all around pay a willing homage. The deeper the heart is fixed, the more wide in its scope is the principle to which one has committed the guidance of his life, the greater is its power of versatility, the more inexhaustible are

its applications in detail. The wider the principle, the greater its flexibility of adaptation. To be able to sympathise extensively with others, to gain access to the secret thoughts and springs of other minds, our own springs of action must lie deep.

Such a pervading motive is proposed to you by your very residence in college in the business of self-improvement—cultivation of the whole mind and character. In taking this one idea as your guide, you are not making an arbitrary selection of your own motive, but you are taking that which your circumstances provide for you. You come here to study in apprenticeship the rules of that art of life which you are to practise hereafter on your own account. Start with this general intention to make the best of yourself—be it general, be your idea of what is best cloudy and ill-defined, yet let it be but steadfastly held to, and it will work itself clear, and assume shape by being acted out. Approve, admire, love, whatever savours of obedience to this self-imposed law, listen with captivated ear for every echo of its

harmonies. No other rule or idea than this will meet all the requirements of your college life. Looking upwards *it* alone can put you into complete connection with the supreme law and will of God, for *it* is your business here, and your business at any given period of your life is to you a declaration of God's will concerning you. Looking downwards towards the actual details of your life, this aim at self-improvement is the only one that can embrace all you have to do. It is an infallible referee whether you are going on right or no. You may object amusement, and say that amusements are surely the postponing the serious aims of life, and would not amuse were they not enjoyed without any such reference. This is true, but *why* do we in amusement deliberately put by the conscious entertainment of our guiding purpose? Only that we may be able to resume it again more effectively. This gives then a safe practical rule — that amusement is right only so long as it is relaxation, as it then, and then only, subserves the general purpose. Beyond this point it defeats its legitimate object and

becomes itself the serious occupation. Any pastime or game, however innocent or useful in itself, if it encroaches on hours that ought to be devoted to work or to sleep, if it makes great demands on the mind, if it begins to fascinate, is wrong. You cannot *then* bring it under your general canon, you cannot while engaged in it feel that it is contributing to your one purpose. Even amusement, then, is no exception to the universal empire of the motive of self-culture. Your endeavour should be *to* make this motive omnipotent as it is universal, to give it might as it has right. Simply allow it to work, and it will of course extend its sway over your whole conduct. Add to your faith virtue, *ἐπιχορηγήσατε τὴν ἀρετήν*. Supply your principle with the occasions for its exercise in single acts, and it will exert its own supremacy. This steady hold of the *unum necessarium* is the hidden power that can give the grace and manly firmness of consistency to the most multiform and diversified activity. Whatever we do, let it tell towards the sum total of life. Be jealous that your character be not frittered

away and enfeebled by adopting even occasionally any lower motive. Shun above all that worst of slavery, the resting your happiness on the good opinion of others. What you do do to God and not to men.

III.

[November 24, 1861.]

"The kingdom of heaven is as a man travelling into a far country, who called his own servants, and delivered unto them his goods. And unto one he gave five talents, to another two, and to another one; to every man according to his several ability."—MATTHEW xxv. 14, 15.

I MAY assume, I suppose, that the fact is well known to you all that our perceptions, that a man's act of perception, is of a compound nature. In the judgments we are every moment forming on the things around us, on the objects of sight, *e.g.*, there is one part which is a passive impression on the sense—on the eye—and there is another part which is an active inference of the intelligence—these two parts put together make up what is called a perception: we are said to perceive a phenomenon or external thing offering itself to the senses.

This composite character of perception explains how it is that our power of perception

is capable of improvement by practice. The trained eye can see beauty, form, proportion, points, which an unskilled eye is unable to discern. Not because the organ of sense in one man differs so very much from the same organ in another man, but because the inferential judgment which goes to make up his intuition has been cultivated. True, there is some difference in the sentient organs of different men. But this native difference in the organ bears a small proportion to the acquired differences in the perceptive faculty which attention, observation, habit, and education develop. It is not only in works of art, or the artificial fabrics of the manufacturer, that these degrees of discernment arise, but in the common everyday exercise of the senses on everyday outward objects. We all know the difference between eyes and no eyes. But we do not all bear in mind to what a small extent this difference in the power of perception is native in us, and how greatly it is occasioned by training and exercise. Persons not accustomed to analyse their own minds, to reflect—

uneducated persons, in short—are accustomed to ascribe this quickness and fulness of perception in those persons in whom it is found to natural endowment entirely. It is only as we advance in an observant study of the human mind that we come to distinguish with clearness how much of it is to be attributed to natural power, and how much to habit and exertion.

What has now been said of perception by the senses may be extended to the whole of the human soul. That whole personal power and weight, that calibre of character, moral and intellectual, which we feel in another man, which we recognise as the person, is a result—a result compounded of original forces, and of the exercise and discipline of those forces. These two—faculty and exercise—are combined to generate this result; but they combine in very unequal proportions, nature being pretty much the same in all men, while the degree of exertion and cultivation may differ by the whole difference between the savage and the civilised man. Here, again, it requires reflection and experience to discriminate how much in a noble

character is due to natural gift, and how much to art and labour and self-improvement. The inexperienced and uneducated always ascribe eminent greatness of mind and character to natural endowment. The savage tribes look up to a civilised man as to a heaven-inspired sage. The young especially are apt to attribute all differences of attainment to natural cleverness. And it is impossible to disabuse them of this notion. For all the facts they see are the facts of natural differences between man and man, which differences do undoubtedly exist; while all the other facts, the effect, viz., of strenuous and prolonged effort in the development of original force, are facts which require time to watch, and which therefore are unknown to the young.

Young men, then, are necessarily believers in and admirers of "cleverness," and disbelievers in and contemners of industrious effort. Among the many, many impediments to complete education, this persuasion is not the least. It acts upon the more forward and vigorous to make them neglect labour as superfluous for

them—it acts upon the slothful and dull to make them despair of improvement as beyond their reach. It makes the first sort of men falsely self-reliant; leads them to rely on a treacherous faculty, on quickness of apprehension—a faculty which in life is apt to betray into fatal mistakes. They think they can dispense with study, and yet make as good a show as the diligent man. So perhaps they can, but then it is but *show* they can make. So long as we are children this ambition to shine may procure us the applause of our comrades and playfellows; but when we go out into the world, and begin to take our place in life, we find out that we have been under a mistake, that this undisciplined cleverness is so far from leading a man to success or esteem that it makes right-judging men mistrustful—he is seen through at once—the hollowness of his character is detected on the first trial; he has the mortification of seeing the men whom in his vanity he has falsely despised as plodders and drudges pass him in the race.

On the other side, upon another and much

larger class of men, this fallacious worship of cleverness has a discouraging effect. The slothful, the negligent, the frivolous, the self-indulgent, take refuge in this plea of "want of ability" to excuse themselves from the irksomeness of labour. The error of this sort of men is as great, their fault worse, and their case more hopeless than that of the other. If the vain man, who thinks work beneath him, calls forth our pity, the sluggard and the do-nothing excite our indignation. The man who squanders his five talents in the gratification of his own vanity may often be awakened to his error, and, though in bitterness and mortification, be recalled to the humbler paths of useful labour. It is far less probable that the man who has once begun to hide his one talent in the earth will ever be roused to disinter and to employ it. Mental torpor, once indulged, steals upon the soul insensibly but fatally. He who has taken a wrong direction *may* find it out, and retrace his steps and make a fresh start; but he who has refused to move at all soon stiffens into a posture of immobility, and loses the

power, even if he should acquire the wish, to put forth an effort.

The diligent use of our powers, whatever they are, is an obligation equally incumbent on us all, young and old, here and elsewhere. But on you, my young friends, and in this place, it is your *only* obligation. At an age when other young men have closed their education, and are already immersed in the business or the profession by which they are to earn their living, you are sent here with no other duty than that of self-improvement. Three precious years are yours in which you have as your vocation, as your one sole object and aim, the making yourselves better and worthier men. Shall you dissipate this golden time, this spring of your year, in amusements, in pleasures, in idle company, in boyish pastimes, in indolence and lethargy? With what eyes must we stand by and see you not seizing the opportunity to fit yourselves to live, but slipping through it in listless indifference, unconscious where you are, unreflecting for what you come here!

But you do wish to do yourselves good, to make yourselves better—all of you wish it—but only in a very few of you is the wish to improve strong enough to arouse the will to work. Labour is so difficult, irksome to the quick, hateful to the dull. Yes, there is the point—the difficulty of education is not an intellectual but a moral one. Therefore, the discipline we have to submit ourselves to is one of the will rather than of the mind. Self-improvement and mental improvement are not synonymous expressions. The man is ever more than the mind. There is a great difference, and other than a mental one, between a wise man and a clever fellow. He is the wise man who has an instructed mind and a regulated choice. Practical wisdom is the application of just thoughts to good ends. Whenever you begin to apply thoughts to ends that are good, the thoughts themselves increase in excellency.

Let steady self-improvement be your end. Propose to yourselves as your guiding aim not a class, not a scholarship, not surpassing others, but the cultivation of your own mind through

the instrumentality of the studies of the place. Be intent on the business of disciplining your minds and characters. Seek knowledge. Seek the power of concentrating and methodising your thoughts; strive to become of better habits, of selecter tastes, of higher and more comprehensive aims. Let the desire of self-improvement, steadily maintained, verify and glorify all your studies. Reading that knows nothing of the destinies and hopes of man's immortal soul is a very dry and profitless pursuit.

And the attractiveness of what is good will grow with acquaintance. Hand and heart in the work, you will discover every day more and more to quicken, enlarge, and rejoice you. The mind is self-revealed by its own operations. Your impulses will be raised by habit into motives. The inward reluctancy to moral and studious effort will gradually give way, and be replaced by a readiness and an ease. Intellectual movement from a painful effort will become its own gratification. Your years here will not be spent in laying up a store of regret for your after life.

IV.

[November 1, 1863.]

"Seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, . . . let us run with patience the race that is set before us."—HEBREWS xii. 1.

THIS is the day on which the Church proposes to us the commemoration of the departed saints. The public, solemn, and liturgical recognition of the saints by our national Church is an act of great significance. It suggests to us infinite matter for reflection. Who are saints? How were they, while on earth, distinguished from other men? Where are they now? What are their thoughts, their feelings, their occupations, their hopes? Do they think of us, or know anything of us? Do they care for us? The collect for the day speaks of our communion and fellowship with them; what is the nature of that fellowship? When do we feel it?—to what course of action does it lead

on our part?—what obligations does it impose?—what privileges does it confer upon us?

This range and direction is not merely permitted to our thoughts, it is proposed to them by the solemn and regularly recurrent festival of the 1st of November. A spacious field of speculation indeed, leading us on into the sublimest mysteries of the Christian revelation and the loftiest destinies opened to the human race. As it would be vain to attempt to touch all the topics suggested by the service of the day in the course of one half-hour, let us select one from among the rest, and let us take that one which the collect already quoted brings before us—the saints proposed as *our* example—"Grant us grace so to follow thy blessed saints in all virtuous and godly living," etc.

It is often, I think, supposed that a Christian saint is an extraordinary personage, who lived long ago, in times quite different from our times, passed through an altogether eccentric career, and did extraordinary things—having trials far beyond the trials of ordinary life, and a super-

human strength in meeting them—a being having a legend rather than a biography; whose acts we may read from curiosity, but with no higher view; in whose life there is probably as much of fiction as of fact, and not worth our while to discriminate between the two; in a word, a wonderful being, the object of admiration, not of imitation. In what they were holy it is a holiness far beyond our feeble reach; a virtue that consisted rather in defiance of society, in a contempt of the customs and observances of the world. We think of them as flying from social engagements, as being so far above this world as to be out of it, as having lived in a bygone age, as being nothing to us beyond an object of curiosity if we happen to come across any account of them.

If we are disposed to think in this way it may be useful to remind ourselves of what was in fact the origin of the commemoration of the saints in the Church. It originated in the reverence we all pay to goodness—to superior goodness. A saint was one who was eminent in the society of Christians, not for rank, or

birth, or power, or wealth, or knowledge, but for spirituality. The honours which the Pagans paid to dead emperors, to those who had the rule over them, the Christians paid to those who rose above them in virtue. To live above the world, above its temptations, above its enjoyments, to begin upon earth the communion of the soul with God,—this was the aim of the whole body of the Christians. To do this was to go through the struggle proposed to us, *τρέχειν τὸν ἀγῶνα*, to run the race set before us. All were engaged in this effort—young and old, rich and poor; it was a race in which all were runners. But, as is always the case where effort and exertion are required, the degrees of attainment were infinitely varied. Some surpassed the rest, and did better than anybody what everybody was trying to do. All Christians were at first saints—they are repeatedly called so in the Epistles. The word saint means holy, *ἅγιοι*—those who led a spiritual and virtuous life. It was only gradually and after a long time that it came to be appropriated to such only as rose above the level in virtuous

living, those who were most dead to the world, those who triumphed most completely over the flesh, who realised the future in the present, who were most thoroughly conformed to the example of Jesus. Under all circumstances, and in the most corrupted periods of the Church's history, goodness and virtue have remained the foundation of the ideal of the saintly character. It is true, indeed, that not in later, but in early times as well, many corruptions were introduced into this ideal. Pain was regarded as expiatory, self-inflicted austerities were held meritorious, bodily mortification rather than spiritual perfection became the aim of the candidate for heaven. Those who contended for some favourite opinion of the day, or for the rights of the Church, were held up by the clergy as heroes; and the want of the Christian graces was too easily compensated by zeal for orthodox tenets. Miracles, too, of which the greater part, to say the least, are fictitious, came to be ascribed to every saint, because miracle was regarded as indispensable to the character of a saint.

These are among the principal circumstances which brought discredit upon the *cultus* or respect paid to saints in the Church of the West. Mere imposture in its baser forms did something, an untrained and enthusiastic religious imagination did more, to make the whole creation of the Catholic lives of the saints be set aside by a more reasonable Christianity as a pure fiction, a romance of the Middle Ages much upon a par with the tales of chivalry which grew up along with them or out of them. All the reformed churches which took their origin in the sixteenth century in the great religious movement of that period, except our own, threw aside with the worship of saints all that related to the subject. They erased the holy days from their Calendar, and the topic of saint from their catechisms and compendiums of religion. Thus they rushed from one extreme to another; in sweeping away a fiction they lost sight of much most valuable fact—they desired to abolish a superstition, and they rooted up with it that natural and divinely implanted instinct which leads us to respect

superior attainment, superior goodness, to look up to those who have gone before us in the path of holiness as our pattern and our encouragement.

Our own Church in this, as in other things, acted with more moderation, more wariness, and therefore with more wisdom. The Church of England does not allow the saints to be invoked or prayed to for their assistance, protection, or patronage; but it does not neglect to commemorate them. It sets apart special days for the anniversary of each of the apostles and evangelists, for the Virgin Mary, and the first martyr, Stephen. It does not even confine itself to names mentioned in Scripture. Many names from later centuries, Saxon as well as Roman and Greek, are retained in the Calendar, and the very comprehensive festival which we are this day celebrating, intended to embrace all the saints, is a festival which dates no farther back than the seventh or eighth century of the Church's history. But while it gives God thanks for His saints, the Church is careful to lay principal stress on that one point in which

the saintly character is our example, viz. in virtuous and godly living. We do not point to any wonderful works said to have been performed, to extraordinary endurance of penance and self-inflicted suffering, to zeal in behalf of the Church or its interests, as they were supposed to be, but to godly life; those who *lack* this mark are not saints to us; and the saints ought to be kept in memory by us in order that their godly example may stimulate us to follow in their footsteps. "If," says St. Bernard, "the history of their lives relates of any saints that they have done wonderful things, these extraordinary works may be the effects of *their* sanctity; they are not its conditions or its measure. They did those works, if they did them, because they were holy men. They are not holy men for having done the works."[1]

A saint, then, is nothing more than an eminent Christian—one who in charity and meekness, in gentleness, forbearance, resignation, patience, long-suffering, kindness, mercy, benevolence, sympathy for others, self-denial,

[1] Ap. Bourdaloue, Serm. "Sur la Sainteté."

has risen above the average attainment of humbler Christians. A saint is one who has had the same weaknesses, temptations, trials, difficulties, which we have all of us had; and who has had the same opportunities and assistances of Divine grace to meet and resist them that we may have. Saints are those who have conquered themselves; who have risen above vainglory, love of the world, love of riches, love of praise; who have preferred in everything conscience to interest, truth to flattery, the favour of God to the favour of man; who have held fast to integrity in their dealings, sincerity in their language, good faith in their engagements. Saints are they who have submitted themselves to the will of God for good and for evil, casting themselves upon God's providence to do with them as He wills, without repining, discontent, envy of others' better fortune, or discontent with their own lot. These are common things —common to speak of, I mean. There is nothing new or extraordinary or surprising in such an enumeration. These qualities or characteristics which I have been going over

are in all our mouths—we all of us sometimes try after them ourselves; we recommend them to others; we find mention of them, or some of them, in all books and discourses. We all approve of them—we cannot do otherwise. A saint is only one who sets himself to acquire these habits; who devotes himself to the practice of these virtues; who makes it his ambition to be good; who uses as much effort to be a *good* man as others do to be great men; who places his joy and happiness in the daily exercise of piety and holy affections; who is ready to say with George Herbert: "All worldly joys seem less when compared with showing mercy or doing kindness."

In all this there is nothing strange or eccentric, nothing to be wondered at and passed by. The example of the saints is precisely the example for all of us, for this very reason that it is an excelling pattern of common, human, everyday, practical goodness which is placed before us. A very high and excellent pattern indeed and difficult to be imitated, impossible to be attained to; but still a pattern of that

ordinary stuff of which our daily life is made up. It is an example which is at once open and inviting to us all in its kind, and yet transcendent in the degree of its holiness.

For it may be said of true goodness that it is both most common and most rare. It is common, if one may say so, in respect of the material and texture of which it is made. The daily round, the common task, the familiar relations of life, the established and regularly-recurring calls of business and duty, the words which every minute have to be spoken, the acts which every hour have to be done or to be refrained from, the average friction of the machinery of life,—this is the sphere, none other than these are the occasions and opportunities, of saintliness. They lie close indeed to every one of us; not an hour of our waking life passes but we have a choice between better and worse, a call to act upon a higher motive, a prompting of God's Holy Spirit, an opening to the divine life, a glimpse of the world to come, an invitation to rise above ourselves.

Life is made up of little things; the saintly life is so too, for the saintly life is only one of our lives perfectly arranged and conducted. On the other hand true goodness is rare in that it is seldom met with. Every man who is not utterly abandoned does good acts, and acts from religious motives sometimes. Every one of us contends with himself, restrains his passions, curbs his temper, is upright, merciful, benevolent, just, temperate, self-denying, considerate for others, in some things and on some occasions. We see such traits of goodness in our friends and associates, and take notice of them; approving them at times, at other times, alas! disbelieving in their possibility, and trying to attribute the acts to some selfish and worldly motive. But though single acts and traits of goodness are, God be thanked, to be found on all sides of us in a Christian community, yet how rare is the consistently good man! Of course I do not mean the sinless, faultless man —such a man does not and never did exist. But the man who is endeavouring after holiness; who is making it his first and paramount

object to walk with God; who thinks first and in all matters of what is right, and only secondly what is his own interest; who is making it the business of his life to be wise, virtuous, devout, spiritual. Is not our ordinary life—the average life of the good sort of men—a life directed to some present and material object, a life of making money or of spending it, a pursuit of power, influence, authority, promotion, pleasure, or profit, tempered by occasional benevolence, and regulated so as to avoid dishonesty and the more open and gross breaches of morals and propriety? When we witness a life such as this, do we not pronounce it good? Does it not pretty well satisfy all our ideas of a Christian's vocation? We should often mistake such a life for a Christian life, especially if it comes before us disguised and recommended by a zealous adoption of the opinions or phrases of some party or other in the Church. But the true and thoroughly good man, the man who is not satisfied to fulfil the average duties of society, but is making it his first ambition, his chief business, his real pleasure to live to God

—how rare is such a character! Do any of us know of many such persons? Do we know of one such?

Indeed the life of the saint is a hidden life, and it may be that there stands at this moment one among us whom we know not; one whom we overlook and yet in whose soul God's spirit is doing a precious work; one whose occupation in the world may be humble, yet who may be in secret leading the saint's life of contemplation and prayer. Our estimate even of goodness is too apt to be a mere social estimate. There is a benevolence which attracts admiration, which makes a noise in the world; a goodness of heart and character, a *real* not a mere superficial goodness, which fixes the eyes of men, and whose praises they are ready to sound—that of men who are useful in their generation, who take the lead in public works of humanity and philanthropy. Such men are doing God's work; yet there may be others wholly unknown to fame, whose names will not pass from mouth to mouth, or be mentioned in print, who are yet more advanced in the way of holiness, more

favoured by God, who will sit higher in His kingdom. We are not only apt to overlook goodness but to measure it by a very popular standard; our eyes are apt to be dazzled by the more showy and lustrous colours; they are not trained to seek out the quiet and undemonstrative signs of the heart that waiteth still upon God. "If we would trace truly the hand of God in human affairs, we must unlearn our admiration of the powerful and distinguished, our reliance on the opinion of society, our respect for the decisions of the learned or the multitude, and turn our eyes to private life, watching in all we read or witness for the true signs of God's presence, the graces of personal holiness manifested in His elect."[1]

True saintliness, then, is rare; and rare as it is from its unobtrusive, retiring character, it is more rarely still that it meets with recognition from us. We do not value it or care enough about it to be curious to look for it; and as it does not force itself upon our notice we may easily pass it by even where it

[1] J. H. Newman, *Parochial Sermons*, vol. ii. p. 5.

exists without seeing it is there. When we *do* discern it we are not unwilling to admit its excellence; we may go further, and even be sensible of its beauty. But it does not fix our gaze. It is not the direction of our ambition; we have no thought of striving to be like-minded. Or it may be that, from time to time, in sickness or in our more serious moments, the idea of a holy life may present itself to our imagination in attractive colours; we may even go so far as to wish we could adopt it, to think that we would do so if we had not got so much else to do, so many more immediate claims upon our time and attention. I speak now not of the dissolute or hardened, not of the worldling who has so long denied the existence of worth and goodness that he is no longer able to discern it, but believes all mankind to be the helpless slaves of their propensities and their interests, incapable of a disinterested action, only to be constrained to right by law and police. Of these men let us not now speak. Let us speak only of those who have not lost their faith in goodness; those who, themselves

worthy and good, just, kind, humane, sympathetic, know these qualities when they see them in others; know, recognise, and honour them. But of such men, of those who go so far as this, how few there are who get beyond this! The many do not appreciate holiness of life at all, have no eyes for it, do not believe it possible. A few only are advanced so far as to be able to see goodness; to be conscious of generous impulses themselves, and so to credit others with them. Of these few how small a number who go on to the study and practice of good; who are so far enlightened by God's Spirit as to choose a holy life for their own portion and pursuit, to give it the devotion of their lives and purposes, to make all other things subordinate to it, finding in it alone sufficient occupation for all their energies, satisfaction for all the yearnings of their nature!

Of the coldness, deadness, and spiritual barrenness of our time there are various causes. One, and a very influential cause, is that of which this day reminds us. It is the influence of example. We all know that our opinions,

and tastes, and estimates of things depend to a great degree upon those of the society in which we live. We are far more apt to underrate than to overrate the degree of this dependence. It would probably surprise many of us, even of those who pride themselves upon their independence of mind, could they be made aware how entirely, even in the most important matters, their judgments are governed by the public opinion of their own circle of friends and associates, or those of their own age and class. Now it can hardly be said that among religious people (of the professedly profane and irreligious we need not now speak), but even among religious people it can hardly be said that a devout and holy life holds the chief place in honour and esteem. Our modern life is so keen, its interests so intense, the ardour of the race so exciting, that no room is left for that class of thoughts which lead towards piety and contemplation of divine things. The tendencies of things are sure to be brought out under the pressure of numbers, and a multitude or society of men competing with each other in any given

line of life will mould each other into a uniform character, and intensify the predominant taste and feeling whatever it may be. It is not just to decry worldly pursuits and occupations; to run down our daily and public life as a struggle for material objects, a selfish pursuit of gain, an interested ambition, an egotistical indulgence in pleasure. All these evil tempers and habits *are* mixed up with our daily life, but they are not the whole of it. There are many better elements. But taking it at its best, allowing the many good qualities which active life calls out in those who are engaged in it, it is still true that it is so quick, intense, and absorbing that its successful conduct demands all the energy, perseverance and concentration of which a man is capable. Hence keenness, vigour, boldness, skill, enterprise, readiness, hardiness, determination, solidity—the manly virtues of a trading and speculating people, are held in first honour among us. I do not say in undue honour, for truly honourable qualities they are. It is by their possession and exercise that our country holds among the kingdoms of Europe the

position of which we are all so justly proud. But if not unduly honoured may we venture to say that they are too exclusively honoured? that they tend to thrust out of sight the softer evangelical virtues of humility, patience, self-abnegation, prayer, devotion, charity? Characters are formed and estimated among us by the one standard always, never by the other.

May we not go on to say that this hardiness and independence of character is too often carried on to an extreme? There is a want of reverence, a self-assurance, an affectation of worldly knowledge, a confident tone bordering on arrogance, which in an especial manner marks the youth of our day. An early selfishness, and a conviction of the constant action of selfish motives, are developed in our young men along with the spirit of commercial activity, an undue sense of self-importance which hides from us the relative proportions of what is out of self. Devoid of the noble feeling which pays instinctive homage to what is good, we seek satisfaction in poor and arid admiration of ourselves.

The case would be reversed if we lived in a society in which the spiritual world and the presence of God in it was more vividly realised than it is by us,—a society in which a man was estimated rather by his standing in that invisible world than in this visible world of rank, position, income, and expenditure; a society in which the aims and ends of life are true, abiding, eternal, and that fade not away.

Such a society exists; it is not very far from every one of us—it may be that we are ourselves among its members. It is called the Church of Christ. The Church is such a society. In this society goodness only is in honour; rank, wealth, station, power, popularity, count for nothing in it. Its members have only one ambition, that of being like-minded to Christ, to Him who came not to do His own will, but the will of Him that sent Him. In this free brotherhood the members know each other by no outward marks or badges of party, but by a spiritual resemblance, by a secret sympathy of character, by a common feeling and love for the good and the perfect. It is an

association under the name of Christ not for political purposes, for conquest, for aggrandisement, for party ends, for the propagation of opinions, but for the purpose of leading a godly life—a life of which devotion, contemplation, prayer, and the practice of holiness, are the one ruling end and aim. And this society comprehends not only living and breathing men now actually working upon this earth; thousands of every past generation which has been since the world began are among its members. This is the only society in the world in which the dead still live, in which the spirits of the just made perfect can be spoken of, not as former, but as actual members. The saint who was glorified a thousand years ago still lives to God—lives in His Church in the plenary exercise and enjoyment of all its rights and privileges. A nation —a political society—is proud of its great men, the men who have worked and fought for it, who laid the foundation, and built up the fabric of its greatness. It looks to them as examples, it trains its youth after their pattern, it studies their lives, it has their words ever in its mouth,

it celebrates their memories as we this day are here to commemorate the worthy, the pious, the learned men who in the course of four centuries have found a home within the walls of our College. But in the Christian Church the past and present are all one; the dead yet live; death constitutes no wall of separation; it is but deliverance from the body, a welcome deliverance from weakness, temptation, imperfection. The saints are among us and with us; the wise and good of all ages are of our society; they feel with us, suffer with us, sympathise with us, encourage and aid us.

Surely we should do well to acquaint ourselves with the histories of holy men, the saints and martyrs whether of ancient or of modern times, to study their lives and acts, to rouse our sluggishness by the accounts of their zeal, and kindle our lukewarmness by their fervour. The biographies of good men have always been a chief delight of pious persons, many of whom have left it on record how much they owed to such reading. We name certain names in honour, but what virtue is there in a name to

those who do not know what it denotes? It is the association which is everything; but to those who do not know the true history of that to which the name belongs there are no associations with it, or wrong ones. It is not for the sake of doing honour to them only, but more for the sake of improving ourselves that we should try to learn and cherish the story of the lives of good men. Such reading is abundant and is easily found by those who wish for it. Not to speak of the Church histories, and the acts of the martyrs, the lives of the primitive bishops, the successors of the Apostles, and the Fathers, there are within our own branch of the Church instructive records of holiness and simplicity of manners in the biographies of Donne, Hooker, Sanderson, Hammond, Bull, Nelson. I say nothing of more modern lives, as their number is so great, and it might be invidious to select. Nor are we confined to members of our particular Church. The communion of saints spreads far beyond its limits, or the limits of any visible corporation. Lives of holy men in the Roman Catholic Church of the middle and

later ages are no less applicable to our purpose, which is to know how they lived, not what opinions they held on controverted points.

Ours is not a state of perfection and security, but one of imperfection, of striving, probation, and endeavour. We cannot do without the sympathy of members, the sense of companionship on our path. God's spirit indeed is ever near to us, suggesting, moving, quickening, supporting. But He is in contact with our nature by ordinary channels, and of these none is more efficacious than that of example. It is a great thing if we have near to us some friend or teacher to whose words and acts we can look as a suggestive source of goodness and wisdom. We should choose to have as our friends and intimates only those whom we see striving to live the better life. We are not called upon to shun the world, to avoid general society, to have no dealings with worldlings. We must live among men and act with men without affecting any singularity. It is not the so-called professors of religion that we seek, nor those who claim to be converted men, nor those who

affect a zeal for the Church or for Church opinions, but the sincere and genuine man who in his everyday life and outward acts lives with others and seems to do as others do, but who is all the while cherishing within his soul the aspiration towards the eternal world, who is striving humbly and in the sight of God towards the society of that great multitude which the seer saw in vision, a multitude which no man could number of all nations and kindreds and people and tongues, standing before the throne and before the Lamb.

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
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